In any action commenced pursuant to Section 6-5-391 or Section 6-5-410, against a health care provider whether in contract or in tort based on a breach of the standard of care the amount of any judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall not exceed the sum of $1,000,000. Any verdict returned in any such action which exceeds $1,000,000 shall be reduced to $1,000,000 by the trial court or such lesser sum as the trial court deems appropriate in accordance with prevailing standards for reducing excessive verdicts. During the trial of any action brought pursuant to Section 6-5-391 or 6-5-410 neither the court nor any party shall advise or infer to the jury that it may not return a verdict in excess of $1,000,000; in the event the jury is so advised or such inference is made the court, upon motion of an opposing party, shall immediately declare a mistrial. The maximum amount payable under this section, $1,000,000, shall be adjusted on April fifteenth of each year to reflect any increase or decrease during the preceding calendar year in the Consumer Price Index of the United States Department of Commerce. Said adjustment shall equal the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index during the preceding calendar year.
(Acts 1987, No. 87-189, p. 261, §8.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases, 1995–2014 · leading case:
Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995).
Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995).
· cites it 44× “On April 23, 1993, Dr. Schulte and PAM filed a motion requesting reduction of the verdict to $1,000,000, with consumer-price-index adjustments, the amount of the damages limitation set forth in Ala.”
Mut. Assur., Inc. v. Schulte, 970 So. 2d 292 (Ala. 2007).
· cites it 16× “MAI's decision not to settle the claim was premised, at least in part, on § 6-5-547, Ala.Code 1975, which capped damages in wrongful-death medical-malpractice cases at $1,000,000, plus an additional amount adjusted annually for inflation.”
Schulte v. Smith, 708 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1997).
· cites it 15× “The Legislature of Alabama, in 1987, adopted legislation limiting the amount of damages a party could recover against a health care provider.”
Mobile Infirmary Ass'n v. Tyler, 981 So. 2d 1077 (Ala. 2007).
· cites it 6× “, that Lida was experiencing the worst abdominal pain she had ever had, is substantial evidence supporting the allegation in subparagraph 8.”
Ex Parte Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172 (Ala. 1999).
· cites it 2× “Griggs, 585 So.2d 1317, 1325 (Ala.1991) (holding that Ala.”
Health Care Auth. for Baptist Health v. Davis, 158 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2013).
· cites it 2× “As we further explained: “The distinction between the [county and municipal] entities subject to § 11-93-2 and [the medical providers] subject to § 6-5-547[, Ala.Code 1975,] renders these respective statutes so fundamentally distinguishable as to eliminate the need for further…”
Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008).
“"Because the rule stated in this opinion would change this Court's construction of the limitations provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous construction of the statute, a construction [the plaintiff] may have relied on, we would apply this new rule prospectively only, i.”
Walker v. Capstone Bldg. Corp., 96 So. 3d 77 (Ala. 2012).
““ ‘Because the rule stated in this opinion would change this Court’s construction of the limitations provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous construction of the statute, a construction [the plaintiff] may have relied on, we would apply this new rule prospectively only,…”
Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2007).
“"Because the rule stated in this opinion would change this Court's construction of the limitations provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous construction of the statute, a construction [the plaintiff] may have relied on, we would apply this new rule prospectively only, i.”
Ex Parte Panell, 756 So. 2d 862 (Ala. 1999).
“Because the rule stated in this opinion would change this Court's construction of the limitations provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous construction of the statute, a construction Panell may have relied on, we would apply this new rule prospectively only, i.”
Hall v. Chi, 782 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 2000).
“See § 6-5-547, Ala.Code 1975. The 1987 Act did not alter the AMLA in such a way as to overrule the construction this Court in McMickens had given the term "all actions," as that term is used in § 6-5-482(a) a construction that excludes the application of the AMLA's statutory…”
— Ala. Code § 6-5-547(a) — 4 cases
Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008).
“"Because the rule stated in this opinion would change this Court's construction of the limitations provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous construction of the statute, a construction [the plaintiff] may have relied on, we would apply this new rule prospectively only, i.”
Walker v. Capstone Bldg. Corp., 96 So. 3d 77 (Ala. 2012).
““ ‘Because the rule stated in this opinion would change this Court’s construction of the limitations provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous construction of the statute, a construction [the plaintiff] may have relied on, we would apply this new rule prospectively only,…”
Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2007).
“"Because the rule stated in this opinion would change this Court's construction of the limitations provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous construction of the statute, a construction [the plaintiff] may have relied on, we would apply this new rule prospectively only, i.”
Ex Parte Panell, 756 So. 2d 862 (Ala. 1999).
“Because the rule stated in this opinion would change this Court's construction of the limitations provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous construction of the statute, a construction Panell may have relied on, we would apply this new rule prospectively only, i.”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.