As used in this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings ascribed to them, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
(1) ADVERTISEMENT. A commercial message in any medium that directly or indirectly promotes or assists a rental-purchase agreement, except for instore merchandising aids.
(2) CONSUMER. An individual who leases personal property under a rental-purchase agreement.
(3) MERCHANDISE. The personal property that is the subject of a rental-purchase agreement.
(4) MERCHANT. A person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly leases, offers to lease, or arranges for the leasing of merchandise under a rental-purchase agreement, and includes a person who is assigned an interest in a rental-purchase agreement.
(5) RENTAL-PURCHASE AGREEMENT. An agreement for the use of merchandise by a consumer for personal, family, or household purposes, for an initial period of four months or less that is automatically renewable with each payment after the initial period, and that permits the consumer to become the owner of the merchandise. This term does not include any transaction wherein a consumer sells personal property to a merchant and then leases the same personal property back with or without a right to repurchase the property. Any rental-purchase agreement in compliance with this chapter shall not be construed to be, nor governed by the laws relating to:
a. A “credit sale” as that term is defined in subdivision (4) of Section 5-19-1; or
b. A “security interest” as that term is defined in subdivision (37) of Section 7-1-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
(Acts 1986, No. 86-497, p. 945, §1; Acts 1991, No. 91-654, p. 1232, §1; Acts 1993, No. 93-614, §1(3).)
Notes of Decisions
Rent-A-Ctr. v. Shelby (In Re Shelby), 127 B.R. 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1991).
· cites it 16× “Both were *685 based on the contention that Ala. Code § 8-25-1 et seq. controlled, making this transaction an executory contract, and that it was not a credit sale as defined in Ala.”
In Re Burton, 128 B.R. 807 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989).
· cites it 7× “Code Section 8-25-1 et seq. is controlling and inasmuch as the particular agreements came within the definition included in such Code Section that it automatically makes the Uniform Commercial Code inapplicable.”
In Re Brown, 128 B.R. 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989).
· cites it 4× “Applicability of Alabama Code Section 8-25-1 et seq. Colortyme asserts that Alabama Code Section 8-25-1 et seq.”
In Re Trusty, 189 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
· cites it 2× “6 The clear intent of the Alabama legislature in passing its rent-to-own statute, Code of Ala.1975, § 8-25-1 to § 8-25-6 was to create a commercial device that would allow for the transfer of property from a creditor to a debtor with the eventuality of ownership but that would…”
Givens v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ala. 1988).
“Code § 8-25-1 , et seq. (1975 supp.). Defendants point out that this act did not become effective until September 1, 1986.”
Bobby R Golemon (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2022).
· cites it 6× “A rental purchase agreement is defined as, “An agreement for the use of merchandise by a consumer for personal, family, or household purposes, for an initial period of four months or less that is automatically renewable with each payment after the initial period, and that…”
— Ala. Code § 8-25-1(5) — 1 case
Rent-A-Ctr. v. Shelby (In Re Shelby), 127 B.R. 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1991).
“Both were *685 based on the contention that Ala. Code § 8-25-1 et seq. controlled, making this transaction an executory contract, and that it was not a credit sale as defined in Ala.”
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