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Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the fact that one party has made payments from non-marital income to preserve marital property should be considered as one of the circumstances to be weighed by the trial court in dividing the marital property.”
114 citation events (75 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Beals v. Beals (alaska, 2013-06-28) · Strongest negative: Skvarch v. Skvarch (alaska, 1994-07-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 42 distinct citers.
discussed Vacated Skvarch v. Skvarch
Alaska · 1994 · confidence high
This might be considered an inequitable division, given Richard’s far greater earning capacity. 4 See, e.g., Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 810 (Alaska 1992) (authorizing superior court on remand “to adjust property division if equitably required” after rehabilitative alimony award was vacated); Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Alaska 1987) (“When a couple has sufficient assets, the spouse with the smaller earning capacity can and should receive a larger share in the property distribution to aid him or her in this transition.”).
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Beals v. Beals (7×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Alaska · 2013 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the fact that one party has made payments from non-marital income to preserve marital property should be considered as one of the circumstances to be weighed by the trial court in dividing the marital property.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Haines v. Cox
Alaska · 2008 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the fact that one party has made payments from non-marital income to preserve marital property should be considered as one of the circumstances to be weighed by the trial court in dividing the marital property.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Abood v. Abood (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see, e.g."
Alaska · 2005 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
a valuation date should be chosen which will provide the most current and accurate information possible and which avoids inequitable results.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Randall Wolffe v. Robin Wolffe (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Alaska · 2025 · confidence medium
We then turn to his arguments relating to the child, including the court’s decision 6 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992) (citing Doyle v. Doyle, 815 P.2d 366 , 369 n.5 (Alaska 1991)); see also Berry, 978 P.2d at 96 . 7 Ramsey, 834 P.2d at 809 . 8 Berry, 978 P.2d at 96 ; see also Ramsey, 834 P.2d at 809 . 9 See Hayes v. Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 901 (Alaska 1996). 10 Skinner v. Hagberg, 183 P.3d 486, 489 (Alaska 2008) (citing Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf, 741 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Alaska 1987)) (visitation); Ginn-Williams v. Williams, 143 P.3d 949 , 952 n.3 (Alaska 2006), superseded in part on…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charity L. Massie v. Darrell L. Massie
Alaska · 2025 · confidence medium
In its supplemental findings the court agreed, writing that the debt was a litigation cost but “should stay in [Darrell’s] column on the spreadsheet because the appraisal was necessarily incurred.” Charity argues that the 15 Morris v. Morris, 506 P.3d 8 , 13-14 (Alaska 2022) (quoting Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992)). 16 In her reply brief Charity argues that she should have been credited for her own mortgage payments between the parties’ separation and the fire, but we have repeatedly upheld the superior court’s refusal to award such a credit when one party remains …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donavin G. Bender v. Holly A. Bender (2×)
Alaska · 2024 · confidence medium
We have “required that trial courts consider payments made to maintain marital property from post-separation income when dividing marital property.”23 Credits for such payments are called Ramsey credits, after the case in which we authorized them.24 “We have not, however, held that the spouse who makes such payments must necessarily be given credit for 19 Grove v. Grove, 400 P.3d 109, 114-15 (Alaska 2017). 20 Id. at 115-16 . 21 Burts v. Burts, 266 P.3d 337 , 343 n.30 (Alaska 2011). 22 See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992) (citing Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daniel Butts v. Katherine Lemaster
Alaska · 2024 · confidence medium
The fact that he was the couple’s primary breadwinner did not require the court to view the asset any differently.25 The court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to weigh this factor in Butts’s favor. 26 payments from non-marital income to preserve marital property should be considered as one of the circumstances to be weighed by the trial court in dividing the marital property.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992))). 23 See, e.g., Brennan v. Brennan, 425 P.3d 99, 111 (Alaska 2018) (concluding it was not abuse of discretion for…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Troy A. Rohde v. Annette L. Rohde
Alaska · 2022 · confidence medium
The court fixed his annual income at $66,248, an amount Troy characterizes as far above his historical average of $35,258. 28 Hall v. Hall, 446 P.3d 781, 783 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992)). 29 Id. 30 Troy also argues that a television in Annette’s possession was erroneously credited to him instead.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John B. Morris v. Andrea L. Morris
Alaska · 2022 · confidence medium
The superior court denied reconsideration of the issue and several others “because they [were] either new arguments, or they were adequately addressed in the initial findings.” Generally, “arguments raised for the first time on reconsideration are waived”13 but can be reviewed for plain error.14 “Plain error exists ‘where an obvious 11 See Hockema, 403 P.3d at 1089-90 (affirming valuation of excavation equipment where expert testified that he had adjusted appraisals to account for condition of equipment). 12 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 13 Wells v. Barile, 358…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. Hall (2×) also: Cited "see"
Alaska · 2019 · confidence medium
Ramsey , 834 P.2d at 809 (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Douglas Greene v. Michelle Greene n/k/a Michelle Zarkovich
Alaska · 2018 · confidence medium
This 50 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 51 See, e.g., Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080, 1091 (Alaska 2017) (no abuse of discretion in denying credit to husband when he lived in house after separation); Hansen v. Hansen, 119 P.3d 1005, 1011-12 (Alaska 2005) (no abuse of discretion when the superior court gave “clear reasons for its decision” to deny credit). 52 Horning v. Horning, 389 P.3d 61, 65 (Alaska 2017). 53 Id. (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 265 P.3d 279, 290 (Alaska 2011)). 54 Id. (quoting Stevens, 265 P.3d at 290 ). -21- 1701 denial was reasonable in light of the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Benjamin S. v. Stephanie S.
Alaska · 2018 · confidence medium
On remand, the court should also reevaluate this award. 43 Berry v. Berry, 978 P.2d 93, 96 (Alaska 1999). 44 Id. (quoting Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992)). 45 Id. 46 The court also noted that it had used the separation date for the value of the principal balance on the mortgage, which “reduc[ed] the dollar value of the home equity.” This had the effect of giving Benjamin partial credit for the payments, because the mortgage debt assigned to him in the property division included the portion of the principal balance that he had paid in the intervening years. -17- 1665 Benja…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shannon Longway-Marotta v. Ronald Dean Nelson
Alaska · 2017 · confidence medium
It thus follows that the trial court also has the discretion to give that spouse credit for the increase in home equity created by those mortgage payments . . . .”); Berry, 978 P.2d at 96 (“Courts may give credit to one spouse for post-separation payments made to preserve marital assets, but are not required to do so. . . . [N]o fixed rule requiring credit in all cases should be imposed.” (quoting Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willie Jackson v. Amie Sey
Alaska · 2016 · confidence medium
In 22 AS 25.24.160(a)(4) (emphasis added). 23 Richter v. Richter, 330 P.3d 934, 939-40 (Alaska 2014) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992); then citing Hatten v. Hatten, 917 P.2d 667, 671 (Alaska 1996)). 24 We note, however, that one spouse’s incarceration does not always or necessarily result in the destruction of the marital economic unit.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ruppe v. Ruppe
Alaska · 2015 · confidence medium
Richter v. Richter, 330 P.3d 934, 939-40 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992)). 41 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Karl Shear v. Elizabeth Shear
Alaska · 2014 · confidence medium
We have not, however, held that the spouse who makes such payments must necessarily be given credit for them in the final property division.”8 In the context of post-separation mortgage payments, we have specifically held that a trial court is not required to credit the paying spouse, even where the other spouse has exclusive possession of the residence.9 Here, Elizabeth was awarded possession of the residence under a domestic violence protective order, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to consider that order in equitably dividing the marital estate.10 Under these circumsta…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Richter v. Richter
Alaska · 2014 · confidence medium
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992) (citing Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1986)). 23 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stanhope v. Stanhope
Alaska · 2013 · confidence medium
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 40 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Helen S.K. v. Samuel M.K.
Alaska · 2012 · confidence medium
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992); Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1991). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Erlinda Partridge v. James R. Partridge
Alaska · 2012 · confidence medium
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992).[4] 4 Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). -3- 1412 Pursuant to this ruling, we remanded “for consideration of the credit due to James for paying marital debt . . . .”5 James filed a petition for rehearing but did not question our conclusion that the debt was marital.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Partridge v. Partridge
Alaska · 2010 · confidence medium
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 48 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Beal v. Beal (4×) also: Cited "see"
Alaska · 2009 · confidence medium
Id. (quoting Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992)). 58 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Worland v. Worland
Alaska · 2008 · confidence medium
Specifically Charles cites Korn v. Korn, 46 P.3d 1021, 1022 (Alaska 2002) (remanding because "interim spousal support and imputed rental value are not actually marital property and trial court did not explain why it counted them as marital property" after it "held a trial on disputed property questions and issued its final decision dividing the couple's marital property"); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 808 (Alaska 1992) (rejecting trial court's finding that parties functioned as single economic unit after separation); and Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1991) (no settlement involved). 1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hooper v. Hooper
Alaska · 2008 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992) (citation omitted) (holding that superior court was not required to give husband credit for post-separation payments that preserved marital estate, but recognizing that it could do so). 29 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess
Alaska · 2007 · confidence medium
See also Carr v. Carr, 152 P.3d 450, 454 (Alaska 2007) ('The superior court may impute the rental value of one party's exclusive use of the marital residence after separation to that party when it equitably divides the marital estate between parties."); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992) ('We have required that trial courts consider payments made to maintain marital property from post-separation income when dividing marital property.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hansen v. Hansen
Alaska · 2005 · confidence medium
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 22 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beal v. Beal
Alaska · 2004 · confidence medium
And the plethora of motions and counter-motions by both parties suggests that the superior court determined that it would be best to resolve all pending disputes after hearing the evidence at trial. [19] Edelman v. Edelman 3 P.3d 348, 357 (Alaska 2000); Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550 , 553 n. 4 (Alaska 1990); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 73-74 (7th ed.1999). [20] To this amount, payable as of the date of the judgment, the superior court added 8.5% interest until paid in full. [21] Cf. Ellingstad v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 979 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Alaska 1999) (holding that maxim of statutory interpr…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Conner v. Conner
Alaska · 2003 · confidence medium
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 28 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Korn v. Korn
Alaska · 2002 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Berry v. Berry, 978 P.2d 93, 96 (Alaska 1999); Dodson v. Dodson, 955 P.2d 902, 912 (Alaska 1998); Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247, 253 (Alaska 1997); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 13 . 908 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska 1995). 14 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berry v. Berry (2×)
Alaska · 1999 · confidence medium
See Chase v. Chase, 662 P.2d 944, 946 (Alaska 1983); see also Doyle, 815 P.2d at 370 (upholding award to wife of one-half of nineteen-twentieths of husband's military retirement pay because the parties were married for about nineteen of husband's twenty years of service). [10] See Brown v. Brown, 914 P.2d 206, 209 (Alaska 1996); Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 574-75 . [11] Brown, 914 P.2d at 209 . [12] Id. (quoting Hayes v. Hayes, 756 P.2d 298, 300 (Alaska 1988)). [13] Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). [14] Compare Brotherton v. Brotherton, 941 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Alaska 1997) (remanding f…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nicholson v. Wolfe
Alaska · 1999 · confidence medium
See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 908 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska 1995); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 29 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Dodson v. Dodson (6×) also: Cited "see"
Alaska · 1998 · confidence medium
We noted that the parties’ permanent separation in the summer of 1988 “represented ‘a final separation that [was] intended to, and [did] in fact, lead to a divorce.’ ” Id. at 809 (alteration in original) (quoting Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harrelson v. Harrelson (2×)
Alaska · 1997 · confidence medium
We have not, however, held that the spouse who makes such payments must necessarily be given credit for them in the final property division." Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992) (citing Doyle v. Doyle, 815 P.2d 366 , 369 n. 5 (Alaska 1991)); see also Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 908 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska 1995) (holding that while payment of fair market rental value for the use of marital property may be required under some circumstances, trial courts have discretion whether to give credit for post-separation payments to maintain marital property in property divisions).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cox v. Cox (2×)
Alaska · 1994 · confidence medium
This court has “required that trial courts consider payments made to maintain marital property from post-separation income when dividing marital property.” Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). “[T]he fact that one party has made payments from non-marital income to preserve marital property should be considered as one of the circumstances to be weighed by the trial court in dividing the marital property.” Id.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Money v. Money
Alaska · 1993 · confidence medium
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809-10 (Alaska 1992). 3 .
discussed Cited "see" Edelman v. Edelman (2×)
Alaska · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 22 .
cited Cited "see" Brotherton v. Brotherton
Alaska · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1992) (holding no fixed rule requiring credit in all cases should be imposed).
discussed Cited "see" Rodriguez v. Rodriguez
Alaska · 1995 · signal: accord · confidence high
The cases on which he relies require a determination on the existence of a joint economic enterprise, but only with regard to distribution of property acquired “with income earned after a final separation that is intended to, and does in fact, lead to a divorce....” Id. at 3 (emphasis added); accord Ramsey, 834 P.2d at 809 ; Bays v. Bays, 807 P.2d 482, 486 (Alaska 1991); Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Alaska 1987).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brian Edward Miller v. Loreta Miller (2×)
Alaska · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Superior courts must consider and may credit a spouse for contributions from post-separation income.15 Contributions to be considered include payments made to maintain marital property.16 However, the court is not obligated to award “dollar-for-dollar credit,” and should consider “whether [any] credit should be offset by the value of the benefit of post-separation use.”17 15 Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 463 (Alaska 2013); see also Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992). 16 Beals, 303 P.3d at 464 (citing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 908 P.2d 1007, 1013 (Alaska 1995)). 17 Id.; see…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hockema v. Hockema
Alaska · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Edelman v. Edelman, 3 P.3d 348, 354 (Alaska 2000) (citing Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809 (Alaska 1992)) (rejecting the notion that a spouse must, as a rule,, be credited for post-separation payments made to maintain marital property). 26 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ulsher v. Ulsher (2×)
Alaska · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Schanck, 717 P.2d at 5 ; see also Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809-10 (Alaska 1992); Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1987); Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Alaska 1981).
Clair J. RAMSEY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Sandra S. RAMSEY, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
S-4206, S-4207.
Alaska Supreme Court.
Jul 24, 1992.
834 P.2d 807
Kathleen A. Weeks, Law Offices of Kathleen A. Weeks, Anchorage, for appellant/ cross-appellee., Sharon L. Gleason, Rice, Volland & Gleason, P.C., Anchorage, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Rabinowitz, Burke, Matthews, Compton, Moore.
Cited by 50 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

MATTHEWS, Justice.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Clair and Sandra Ramsey were married on April 11, 1964. At the time the divorce decree was issued, August 27, 1990, both were 47 years old. Clair earns at least $120,000 a year as a real estate agent for Jack White Company. Sandra has operated her own interior design business since 1979. In 1989 the net earnings from her business were $7,829.

The parties physically separated in the summer of 1988. Clair filed for divorce in May 1989. After trial in August 1990, Judge Johnstone issued the decree and findings at issue in this appeal.

In those findings, the court concluded that the parties did not cease functioning as an economic unit until the summer of 1990. Neither party was given credit for payments made before that date to preserve marital assets or provide spousal support.

The court awarded Sandra rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $1,500 a month for four years. The award was designed to facilitate her plan to make her interior design business self-supporting. Based on the Merrill 1 factors and in light of the alimony award, the court made an “approximately equal division of the assets.” ' In addition, the court awarded Sandra $5,000 for attorney’s fees and expert costs.

DISCUSSION

A. Credit for Post-Separation Payments

Clair argued below that the economic partnership created by the marriage ended upon separation, thus he . was entitled to credit for post-separation payments made to maintain the marital estate and to support Sandra. Judge Johnstone, however, found that due to the extensive commingling of finances, “the parties continued to function economically as a single unit until the summer of 1990.” Based on that finding, the court identified all of the parties’ marital assets as of May 11,1990. We find that the court’s economic unit finding was clearly erroneous.

The first step in the process of marital property division is to determine “what property is available for distribution.” Chotiner v. Chotiner, 829 P.2d 829, 831 (Alaska 1992). Specifically, the court must “identify what marital property, as[*809] distinct from separate property, exists at the distribution date.” Id. In Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1991), we distinguished between the date, marital property is identified as such and the date it is valued; the latter should “be as close as practicable to the date of trial.”

A valuation date should be chosen which will provide the most current and accurate information possible and which avoids inequitable results. It is distinct from the date marking the termination point for inclusion of property within equitable distribution. The latter date marks the end of the marital team effort. Since this date may be well in advance of the dissolution proceedings, a valuation date linked to it may result in stale financial information. L. Golden, [Equitable Distribution of Property, ] at § 7.01 [(1983)].

Id.

In Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1986), we stated the general rule for determining when property acquired after separation is properly excluded from the category of marital property:

As a general rule, we hold that property accumulated with income earned after a final separation that is intended to, and does in fact, lead to a divorce is excluded from the category of marital property, as long as it is obtained without the invasion of any pre-separation marital asset.

(Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the parties separated permanently in the summer of 1988. That point represented “a final separation that [was] intended to, and [did] in fact, lead to a divorce.” Sandra’s continuing economic dependence alone does not indicate the continuance of the marital economic unit. The court’s determination that the marital enterprise continued until May 11, 1990, was clearly erroneous. [2]

We have required that trial courts consider payments made to maintain marital property from post-separation income when dividing marital property. Doyle v. Doyle, 815 P.2d 366, 369 n. 5 (Alaska 1991). We have not, however, held that the spouse who makes such payments must necessarily be given credit for them in the final property division. Clair argues that there are public policy reasons which require that some credit be given for such payments. He argues that not doing so tends to promote hostile relations between the parties and may result in a potential wasting of marital assets. While these arguments have some weight, it is our view that no fixed rule requiring credit in all cases should be imposed. Instead, the fact that one party has made payments from non-marital income to preserve marital property should be considered as one of the circumstances to be weighed by the trial court in dividing the marital property. This rule is consistent with our treatment of payments made from separate property acquired prior to the marriage which are used to acquire marital property. See Chotiner, 829 P.2d at 834-35 (court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give credit for separate property contribution of husband, but on remand court was authorized to grant credit).

Since the trial court erred in determining the termination date of the marital partnership, this case must be remanded. On remand the court should consider whether Clair should be given credit for contributions he made from separate property in order to preserve marital property, and should make written findings on this point.

B. Rehabilitative Alimony

Based on the business plan Sandra. presented to the court, Judge Johnstone awarded her rehabilitative alimony for four years. The award was designed to “enable her to more fully provide for her own future needs through job development.”

In general, “our decisions have established a preference for meeting the parties’ needs with the division of property,[*810] rather than with alimony, where marital assets are adequate to do so.” Schanck, 717 P.2d at 5 (citing Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Alaska 1981) and Malone v. Malone, 587 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Alaska 1978)). Although the preference does not apply to awards of alimony for a limited duration, Bays v. Bays, 807 P.2d 482, 485 (Alaska 1991), “where marital assets are adequate to equitably provide for both parties, ... rehabilitative alimony is properly limited to job training or other means directly related to the end of securing for one party a source of earned income.” Schanck, 717 P.2d at 5.

Here Sandra has operated an interi- or design business since 1979. She is an experienced designer. In addition she had a transition period of two years between separation and divorce to develop the business into a self-sufficient enterprise. Under these circumstances her need for rehabilitative alimony seems both speculative and unwarranted. [3] We therefore vacate the award of rehabilitative alimony. On remand the court is authorized to adjust the property division if equitably required by this change.

C. Property Division

In light of our conclusion that the marriage terminated as a joint enterprise on the date of separation, the court must adjust the allocation of property. “The rule that has evolved in Alaska for dividing assets acquired after a separation resulting in a divorce is based on the source of the payment with which those assets are acquired.” Schanck, 717 P.2d at 2. The rule states that “property accumulated with income earned after a final separation that is intended to, and does in fact, lead to a divorce is excluded from the category of marital property, as long as it is obtained without the invasion of any pre-separation marital asset.” Id. at 3.

In accordance with this rule, any business-related commissions Clair earned after the summer of 1988 are his separate property. Schanck, 717 P.2d at 3. Also, post-separation earnings Clair contributed to his Keogh account should not be considered part of the marital estate.

D. Attorney’s Fees

Sandra claims that the court erred by awarding her only $5,000 of $17,-500 in outstanding attorney and expert witness fees. As 25.24.140 authorizes the court to award attorney’s fees based on economic need. This court has interpreted that provision to give broad discretion to the trial courts. “ ‘An abuse of discretion is established where it appears that the trial court’s determination as to attorney’s fees was manifestly unreasonable.’ ” Kowalski v. Kowalski, 806 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Palfry v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606, 613 (Alaska 1970)). Here the court’s award of $5,000 was not “manifestly unreasonable.” See Mann v. Mann, 778 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1989) (affirming a lower court’s refusal to award attorney’s fees to a spouse despite lesser earning capacity and a smaller award of marital property). Nonetheless, in light of the significant adjustments which may be required as a result of this opinion, the award of attorney’s fees should be vacated so that the superior court may recalculate fees once it determines an appropriate property division.

CONCLUSION

The Ramseys’ marriage terminated as a joint enterprise on the date of separation. The award of rehabilitative alimony is vacated. We remand the case for the trial court to equitably allocate the marital property in light of the proper date of termination, Clair’s post-separation contributions to the marital estate from post-separation income, and Sandra’s needs in the absence of rehabilitative alimony. The award of attorney’s fees is vacated.

1

. Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 (Alaska 1962).

2

. The decision to value the parties’ assets as of May 11, 1990 was defensible. The court found "that upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances ... all of the parties’ assets should be valued on the same approximate date as close to trial as possible.”

3

. This case resembles Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986), where the court awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony for an eighteen-month period after the wife had re-entered the job market as a nurse. We found that since the wife was pursuing her chosen occupation she had no further need for rehabilitative alimony. Id. at 5.