green
Positive treatment
31.8 score
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999
2012
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jeremy Todd Anderson v. State of Alaska
A factual and legal determination supporting this finding must be made on the record. 23 State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996) (quoting State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986)). 24 See State v. David N.J., 19 A.3d 646 , 669 n.34 (Conn. 2011) (declining to consider defendant’s arguments that a prior case was wrongly decided “in the absence of adequate briefing addressing the stare decisis considerations attendant to overruling” that case). 25 Anderson, 436 P.3d at 1076 . –9– 2774 legally consent to sexual activity with an adult, a child and an adult cannot be in…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wassillie v. State
The cases that the Taggard court relied on were based on fundamental defects in the text of the indictment or information — these charges failed to allege an essential element of the offense.14 This type of defect implicates the defendant’s right to notice of the charge, a right that undoubtedly has an impact on the trial proceedings.15 The Taggard court 9 500 P.2d 238 (Alaska 1972). 10 598 P.2d 503 (Alaska 1979). 11 See Kinegak v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 129 P.3d 887, 889-90 (Alaska 2006) (“A prior decision should be overruled only if the court is clearly convinced that the precedent i…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fleming, Mark Alexander
(2×)
State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245-46 (Alaska 1996).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fleming, Mark Alexander
State v. Fremgen , 914 P.2d 1244, 1245-46 (Alaska 1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
NOTES [*] Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a). [1] AS 11.61.200(a)(1). [2] 554 U.S. ___ , 128 S.Ct. 2783 , 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). [3] Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2788 . [4] Id. [5] Id. [6] Id. [7] Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2799, 2814 . [8] Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18 . [9] Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2799, 2816 . [10] Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2816-17 (emphasis added). [11] Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2822 (emphasis added). [12] See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 , 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875); Presser v. Illin…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Petrolane Inc. v. Robles
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
We overrule our decisions only when "clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent." State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996) (quoting State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 102 P.3d 937, 943 (Alaska 2004) ("The stare decisis doctrine rests on a solid bedrock of practicality: no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in ev…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State, Department of Corrections v. Cowles
(2×)
State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999) (quoting State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996)). . 721 P.2d at 1126 . .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
B.R. v. State, Department of Corrections
(2×)
State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245-46 (Alaska 1996).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Kinegak v. State, Department of Corrections
(6×)
State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245-46 (Alaska 1996). .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
David v. State
State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996) (citations omitted). 25 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lawson v. Lawson
Id. at 928-30 . 7 . 99 P.3d 538, 540 (Alaska 2004) (quoting State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996)). 8 .The two provisions of Civil Rule 90.3 that mention "best interests of the child” are: (c)(3) In addition to ordering a parent to pay child support as calculated under this rule, the court may, in appropriate circumstances, order one or more grandparents of a child to pay child support to an appropriate person in an amount determined by the court to serve the best interests of the child. (k) ...
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Semancik
(3×)
State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996). 15 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Crocker
(2×)
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn, v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 , 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (explaining that courts have a duty and obligation to follow precedent); State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999) (quoting State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996)) (stating that courts should reverse prior decisions only when they are “clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more harm than good would result from a departure from precedent”). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Evans v. McTaggart
This did not prevent him from then using the "preponderance of the evidence" test in Buness. [6] 951 P.2d at 1210 n. 3. [7] 959 P.2d at 375 . [8] Op. at 1084-85. [9] Carter, 779 P.2d at 1197 , cited in C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380 . [10] 781 P.2d at 989 n. 7. [11] C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380 . [12] 989 P.2d 141 . [13] Op. at 1085. [14] Todd, 989 P.2d at 143 . [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Todd, 989 P.2d at 143 ("[T]he burden is on the non-parent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that parental custody would be `clearly detrimental.'") (emphasis added); J.W., 951 P.2d at 1210 n. 3 ("The nonparent ha…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Martinez
Defendant spends a portion of his argument discussing several cases in which Alaska appellate courts refused to read strict liability into the statutory rape statute on the grounds that "a refusal to allow the mistake-of-age defense to the charge of statutory rape would be to impose criminal liability without a criminal mental element and consequently would violate Alaska's Constitution." State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Alaska 1996); see also State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996). .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Coon
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996). .
discussed
Cited "see"
Wassillie v. State
See Kinegak v. State, Dep't of Corr ., 129 P.3d 887 , 889-90 (Alaska 2006) ("A prior decision should be overruled only if the court is clearly convinced that the precedent is erroneous or no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from overturning the case." (citing State v. Fremgen , 914 P.2d 1244 , 1245-46 (Alaska 1996) ) ).
cited
Cited "see"
Jordan and Letendre v. State
But the court ultimately affirmed this Court's decision: see State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wright v. State
See State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996) (a prior decision should be overruled only if the court is clearly convinced that the precedent is erroneous or no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from overturning the case). 19 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Native Village of Tununak v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services
Kinegak v. State, Dep't of Corr., 129 P.3d 887, 889 (Alaska 2006); see State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996) (Stare decisis is a practical, flexible command that balances our community's competing interests in the stability of legal norms and the need to adapt those norms to society's changing demands.") (alterations omitted). 66 .
STATE of Alaska, Petitioner,
v.
Michael FREMGEN, Respondent
v.
Michael FREMGEN, Respondent
S-6926.
Alaska Supreme Court.
Mar 22, 1996.
Eric A. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Sp. Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for petitioner., Mauri Long and Ray R. Brown, Dillon & Findley, P.C., Anchorage, for respondent.
Compton, Rabinowitz, Matthews, Eastaugh, Carpeneti.
Cited by 32 opinions | Published
ORDER NO. 33
The Court having previously granted the State’s Petition for Hearing, and having considered the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters the following order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The State’s Petition for Hearing is DISMISSED as improvidently granted.
2. We have concluded that the State’s Petition for Hearing was improvidently granted for the following reasons:
The State asks to overrule State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978); Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978); Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1971), and Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969), primarily on the ground that this court misread and misapplied Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).
We have said:
When a common law court is asked to overrule one of its prior decisions, the principle of stare decisis is implicated- [SJtare decisis is a practical, flexible command that balances our community’s competing interests in the stability of legal norms and the need to adapt those norms to society’s changing demands. In balancing these interests, we will overrule a prior decision only when “ ‘clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent’ _” State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986) (quoting State v. Souter, 606 P.2d 399, 400 (Alaska 1980)). A decision may prove to be originally erroneous if the rule announced proves to be unworkable in practice. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853, 112 S.Ct. at 2808. Additionally, a prior decision may be abandoned because of “changed conditions” if “related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [or] facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application....” Id. at 855, 112 S.Ct. at 2809.
Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Alaska 1993) (alteration in original). [1]
In the present case, we are not persuaded to depart from principles of stare decisis and abandon our Speidel, Alex, Ki-moktoak, and Guest line of cases which established that it would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law to convict a person of a serious crime without the requirement of criminal intent. In establishing this constitutional doctrine we did not view Morissette as controlling precedential authority, but rather were “influenced by and to a great extent followed the United States Supreme Court’s opinion[.]” State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 106 (Alaska 1975). It is the general logic and force of Morissette that influenced our Speidel line of cases, not simply the specific holdings of Morissette regarding federal statutory construction. [2]
[*1246] In short, we adhere to the principles articulated in Speidel, Alex, Kimoktoak, and Guest that, except for public welfare type of offenses, strict criminal liability without some form of mens rea is violative of Alaska’s Constitution. More particularly, we reaffirm our holding in Guest and reiterate that a refusal to allow the mistake-of-age defense to the charge of statutory rape would be to impose criminal liability without a criminal mental element and consequently would violate Alaska’s Constitution.
1
. See also Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Alaska 1994).
2
. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), said:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil....
[*1246] Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation. Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the common law. The unanimity with which they have adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element.
(Footnotes omitted.)