Alaska Statutes

Alaska Stat. § 11.81.610 (2026)

Construction of statutes with respect to culpability

✓ current as of July 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section AK-LEGakleg.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
Sec. 11.81.610. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability.
 (a) [Repealed, § 44 ch 102 SLA 1980.]
 (b) Except as provided in AS 11.81.600(b), if a provision of law defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, the culpable mental state that must be proved with respect to
     (1) conduct is “knowingly”; and

     (2) a circumstance or a result is “recklessly.”

 (c) When a provision of law provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. If acting recklessly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. If acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally.




Notes of Decisions
Cited in 48 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case: Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 15× “AS 11.81.610(b) specifies the culpable mental states applicable in cases where one is not expressly provided for in the statutory definition of an offense: (b) Except as provided in AS 11.”
Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021). “, Alaska Stat. §11.81.610 (b) (1983); Ark. Stat.”
Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 3× “The amendment to AS 11.81.610 was explained as follows: The second amendment repeals AS 11.”
Velez v. State, 762 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 6× “Under AS 11.81.610, the elements of any crime may be separated into four categories: conduct, surrounding circumstance, result, and culpable mental state.”
Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 4× “Further, in light of AS 11.81.610(b)(1), the term "knowing" would be surplusage as applied to conduct.”
State v. James, 698 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1985). · cites it 2× “See AS 11.81.610(c). Similarly, the difference in the extent of injury required would not, by itself, be significant, since a finding of serious physical injury would necessarily include a finding of physical injury.”
Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 3× “Under AS 11.81.610(b), the culpable mental state of “knowingly” must be applied to Michael’s conduct.”
Timothy W. v. Julia M., 403 P.3d 1095 (Alaska 2017). “59 But AS 11.81.610(b) provides: “if a provision of law defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, the culpable mental state that must be proved with respect to .”
Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “AS 11.81.610(b) (where no mental state is expressly provided for under the revised criminal code, the applicable mental states are "knowingly" with respect to conduct and "recklessly" with respect to a circumstance or a result).”
Jordan & Letendre v. State, 367 P.3d 41 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 4× “One clause of this statute, AS 11.81.610(6)(1), declares that the government must normally prove that a defendant acted "knowingly" with respect to the conduct specified in a criminal statute.”
Riley v. State, 60 P.3d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). “See AS 11.81.610(c): “If recklessly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.”
Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “The state argues that in the absence of an explicitly designated culpable mental state, AS 11.81.610(b) controls the statute’s interpretation.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.610(6)(1) — 1 case
Jordan & Letendre v. State, 367 P.3d 41 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016). “One clause of this statute, AS 11.81.610(6)(1), declares that the government must normally prove that a defendant acted "knowingly" with respect to the conduct specified in a criminal statute.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.610(a) — 2 cases
Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). “The amendment to AS 11.81.610 was explained as follows: The second amendment repeals AS 11.”
Noblit v. State, 808 P.2d 280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.610(b) — 20 cases
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “AS 11.81.610(b) specifies the culpable mental states applicable in cases where one is not expressly provided for in the statutory definition of an offense: (b) Except as provided in AS 11.”
Timothy W. v. Julia M., 403 P.3d 1095 (Alaska 2017). “59 But AS 11.81.610(b) provides: “if a provision of law defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, the culpable mental state that must be proved with respect to .”
Beran v. State, 705 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “AS 11.81.610(b) (where no mental state is expressly provided for under the revised criminal code, the applicable mental states are "knowingly" with respect to conduct and "recklessly" with respect to a circumstance or a result).”
Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). “Under AS 11.81.610(b), the culpable mental state of “knowingly” must be applied to Michael’s conduct.”
Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). “The state argues that in the absence of an explicitly designated culpable mental state, AS 11.81.610(b) controls the statute’s interpretation.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.610(b)(1) — 4 cases
Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “Further, in light of AS 11.81.610(b)(1), the term "knowing" would be surplusage as applied to conduct.”
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “AS 11.81.610(b) specifies the culpable mental states applicable in cases where one is not expressly provided for in the statutory definition of an offense: (b) Except as provided in AS 11.”
Smith v. State, 28 P.3d 323 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
Lampkin v. State, 141 P.3d 362 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.610(b)(2) — 16 cases
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “AS 11.81.610(b) specifies the culpable mental states applicable in cases where one is not expressly provided for in the statutory definition of an offense: (b) Except as provided in AS 11.”
Abruska v. State, 705 P.2d 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). “Further, in light of AS 11.81.610(b)(1), the term "knowing" would be surplusage as applied to conduct.”
Sergie v. State, 105 P.3d 1150 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
Lampkin v. State, 141 P.3d 362 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). “Under AS 11.81.610(b), the culpable mental state of “knowingly” must be applied to Michael’s conduct.”
— Alaska Stat. § 11.81.610(c) — 10 cases
State v. James, 698 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1985). “See AS 11.81.610(c). Similarly, the difference in the extent of injury required would not, by itself, be significant, since a finding of serious physical injury would necessarily include a finding of physical injury.”
Riley v. State, 60 P.3d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). “See AS 11.81.610(c): “If recklessly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.”
Flink v. State, 683 P.2d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). “AS 11.81.610(b) specifies the culpable mental states applicable in cases where one is not expressly provided for in the statutory definition of an offense: (b) Except as provided in AS 11.”
Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
Maddox v. Hardy, 187 P.3d 486 (Alaska 2008).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.