Alaska Statutes
Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160 (2026)
Judgment
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Sec. 25.24.160. Judgment.
(a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide
(1) for the payment by either or both parties of an amount of money or goods, in gross or installments that may include cost-of-living adjustments, as may be just and proper for the parties to contribute toward the nurture and education of their children, and the court may order the parties to arrange with their employers for an automatic payroll deduction each month or each pay period, if the period is other than monthly, of the amount of the installment; if the employer agrees, the installment shall be forwarded by the employer to the clerk of the superior court that entered the judgment or to the court trustee, and the amount of the installment is exempt from execution;
(2) for the recovery by one party from the other of an amount of money for maintenance, for a limited or indefinite period of time, in gross or in installments, as may be just and necessary without regard to which of the parties is in fault; an award of maintenance must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce by being based on a consideration of the following factors:
(A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage;
(B) the age and health of the parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets;
(F) the division of property under (4) of this subsection; and
(G) other factors the court determines to be relevant in each individual case;
(3) for the delivery to either party of that party's personal property in the possession or control of the other party at the time of giving the judgment;
(4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether joint or separate, acquired only during marriage, in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the court, in making the division, may invade the property, including retirement benefits, of either spouse acquired before marriage when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it; and to accomplish this end the judgment may require that one or both of the parties assign, deliver, or convey any of their real or personal property, including retirement benefits, to the other party; the division of property must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce by being based on consideration of the following factors:
(A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage;
(B) the age and health of the parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets;
(F) the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live in it for a reasonable period of time, to the party who has primary physical custody of children;
(G) the circumstances and necessities of each party;
(H) the time and manner of acquisition of the property in question; and
(I) the income-producing capacity of the property and the value of the property at the time of division;
(5) if an animal is owned, for the ownership or joint ownership of the animal, taking into consideration the well-being of the animal.
(b) If a judgment under this section distributes benefits to an alternate payee under AS 14.25, AS 21.51.120(a), AS 21.54.020(c), 21.54.050(c), AS 22.25, AS 26.05.222 — 26.05.226, or AS 39.35, the judgment must meet the requirements of a qualified domestic relations order under the definition of that phrase that is applicable to those provisions.
(c) Notwithstanding (a) of this section, if one of the parties to an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void expressly submits to the court the issue of property division and has not withdrawn that issue from the court before judgment, the court shall provide in the judgment for the division of property and may not reserve the issue of property division for a later time unless the conditions of AS 25.24.155 have been met.
(d) For each judgment issued under this section, the court shall include in the records relating to the matter the social security numbers, if ascertainable, of the following persons:
(1) each party to the action;
(2) each child whose rights are addressed in the judgment.
(e) When distributing property identified as community property under a community property agreement or trust under AS 34.77, unless the parties have provided in the agreement or trust for another disposition of the community property, the court shall make such disposition of the community property as shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors, including
(1) the nature and extent of the community property;
(2) the nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) the duration of the marriage; and
(4) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or right to live in the family home for reasonable periods to a spouse with whom the children reside the majority of the time.
(a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide
(1) for the payment by either or both parties of an amount of money or goods, in gross or installments that may include cost-of-living adjustments, as may be just and proper for the parties to contribute toward the nurture and education of their children, and the court may order the parties to arrange with their employers for an automatic payroll deduction each month or each pay period, if the period is other than monthly, of the amount of the installment; if the employer agrees, the installment shall be forwarded by the employer to the clerk of the superior court that entered the judgment or to the court trustee, and the amount of the installment is exempt from execution;
(2) for the recovery by one party from the other of an amount of money for maintenance, for a limited or indefinite period of time, in gross or in installments, as may be just and necessary without regard to which of the parties is in fault; an award of maintenance must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce by being based on a consideration of the following factors:
(A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage;
(B) the age and health of the parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets;
(F) the division of property under (4) of this subsection; and
(G) other factors the court determines to be relevant in each individual case;
(3) for the delivery to either party of that party's personal property in the possession or control of the other party at the time of giving the judgment;
(4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether joint or separate, acquired only during marriage, in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the court, in making the division, may invade the property, including retirement benefits, of either spouse acquired before marriage when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it; and to accomplish this end the judgment may require that one or both of the parties assign, deliver, or convey any of their real or personal property, including retirement benefits, to the other party; the division of property must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce by being based on consideration of the following factors:
(A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage;
(B) the age and health of the parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets;
(F) the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live in it for a reasonable period of time, to the party who has primary physical custody of children;
(G) the circumstances and necessities of each party;
(H) the time and manner of acquisition of the property in question; and
(I) the income-producing capacity of the property and the value of the property at the time of division;
(5) if an animal is owned, for the ownership or joint ownership of the animal, taking into consideration the well-being of the animal.
(b) If a judgment under this section distributes benefits to an alternate payee under AS 14.25, AS 21.51.120(a), AS 21.54.020(c), 21.54.050(c), AS 22.25, AS 26.05.222 — 26.05.226, or AS 39.35, the judgment must meet the requirements of a qualified domestic relations order under the definition of that phrase that is applicable to those provisions.
(c) Notwithstanding (a) of this section, if one of the parties to an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void expressly submits to the court the issue of property division and has not withdrawn that issue from the court before judgment, the court shall provide in the judgment for the division of property and may not reserve the issue of property division for a later time unless the conditions of AS 25.24.155 have been met.
(d) For each judgment issued under this section, the court shall include in the records relating to the matter the social security numbers, if ascertainable, of the following persons:
(1) each party to the action;
(2) each child whose rights are addressed in the judgment.
(e) When distributing property identified as community property under a community property agreement or trust under AS 34.77, unless the parties have provided in the agreement or trust for another disposition of the community property, the court shall make such disposition of the community property as shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors, including
(1) the nature and extent of the community property;
(2) the nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) the duration of the marriage; and
(4) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or right to live in the family home for reasonable periods to a spouse with whom the children reside the majority of the time.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 236
cases (34 in the last 5 years), 1984–2026 · leading case: Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010).
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010). “160(a)(4) identifies the factors a court must consider in making an equitable property division, while AS 25.24.160(a)(2) and the cases interpreting it articulate the findings a court must make to justify a rehabilitative alimony award.”
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019). “’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1997). “2d 1252, 1255 (Alaska 1994) (citing AS 25.24.160(a)(2); Messina v. Messina, 583 P.”
Young v. Kelly, 334 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2014). “” I acknowledge that the statute also instructs courts to divide “property .”
Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015). “2 The parties also disputed the value of the subsidy; Andy urged adoption of a composite rate that assumed Becky was likely to remarry, whereas Becky argued that her individual circumstances justified applying a lower, individual rate.”
Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2006). “” The superior court therefore proceeded to examine the Merrill factors codified in AS 25.24.160 and determined that in order to balance the equities it must invade Bill’s separate property as allowed under AS 25.”
Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1987). “(4) for the division between the parties of their property, whether joint or separate, acquired only during coverture, in the manner as may be just, and without regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the court, in making the division, may invade the property of…”
Hooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681 (Alaska 2008). “160(a) states in pertinent part: In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide [[Image here]] (4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether…”
Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080 (Alaska 2017). “” 10 Courts may award spousal support pursuant to AS 25.24.160(a)(2). In doing *1089 so, courts must consider nearly identical factors to those weighed in dividing marital property, although property division- and spousal support “serve distinct purposes and are not…”
Downs v. Downs, 440 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2019). “To justify its division the court discussed the relevant statutory factors from AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 9 It found that Deborah was retired, 67 years old, and needed the marital assets to live comfortably for the rest of her life.”
Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1992). “In relevant part AS 25.24.160 provides as follows: (a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide .”
Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2016). “AS 25.24.160(a). 72 . See Jones v. Jones, 942 P.”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(2) — 3 cases
Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986).
Hunt v. Hunt, 698 P.2d 1168 (Alaska 1985).
Propst v. Propst, 776 P.2d 780 (Alaska 1989).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(3) — 10 cases
Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1987). “(4) for the division between the parties of their property, whether joint or separate, acquired only during coverture, in the manner as may be just, and without regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the court, in making the division, may invade the property of…”
Dundas v. Dundas, 362 P.3d 468 (Alaska 2015).
Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986).
Tybus v. Holland, 989 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1999).
Hammer v. Hammer, 991 P.2d 195 (Alaska 1999).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(4) — 9 cases
Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987).
Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1986).
Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986).
Dunn v. Dunn, 952 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1998).
Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802 (Alaska 1986).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(5) — 1 case
Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf, 741 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(6) — 7 cases
Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417 (Alaska 1985).
Gabaig v. Gabaig, 717 P.2d 835 (Alaska 1986).
Brooks v. Brooks, 677 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1984).
Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986).
Hunt v. Hunt, 698 P.2d 1168 (Alaska 1985).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a) — 16 cases
Bishop v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804 (Alaska 2002).
Schaub v. Schaub, 305 P.3d 337 (Alaska 2013).
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019). “’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
McCarter v. McCarter, 303 P.3d 509 (Alaska 2013).
Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2016). “AS 25.24.160(a). 72 . See Jones v. Jones, 942 P.”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(1) — 7 cases
Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921 (Alaska 1992).
Dundas v. Dundas, 362 P.3d 468 (Alaska 2015).
Pattee v. Pattee, 744 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1987).
Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1989).
Lawson v. Lawson, 108 P.3d 883 (Alaska 2005).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(2) — 33 cases
Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1992). “In relevant part AS 25.24.160 provides as follows: (a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide .”
Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080 (Alaska 2017). “” 10 Courts may award spousal support pursuant to AS 25.24.160(a)(2). In doing *1089 so, courts must consider nearly identical factors to those weighed in dividing marital property, although property division- and spousal support “serve distinct purposes and are not…”
Dodson v. Dodson, 955 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1998).
Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2006). “” The superior court therefore proceeded to examine the Merrill factors codified in AS 25.24.160 and determined that in order to balance the equities it must invade Bill’s separate property as allowed under AS 25.”
Barnett v. Barnett, 238 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2010).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(2)(A) — 5 cases
Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1992). “In relevant part AS 25.24.160 provides as follows: (a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide .”
Hammer v. Hammer, 991 P.2d 195 (Alaska 1999).
Broadribb v. Broadribb, 956 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1998).
Kazue Bulger-Post v. Michael Cody Post (Alaska 2015).
Jeremy Novak v. Laura Novak (Alaska 2015).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(2)(B) — 1 case
Gottstein v. Kraft, 274 P.3d 469 (Alaska 2012).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(2)(D) — 3 cases
Dunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).
Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2006). “” The superior court therefore proceeded to examine the Merrill factors codified in AS 25.24.160 and determined that in order to balance the equities it must invade Bill’s separate property as allowed under AS 25.”
Guerrero v. Guerrero, 362 P.3d 432 (Alaska 2015).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(2)(E) — 5 cases
Wagner v. Wagner, 386 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2017).
Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080 (Alaska 2017). “” 10 Courts may award spousal support pursuant to AS 25.24.160(a)(2). In doing *1089 so, courts must consider nearly identical factors to those weighed in dividing marital property, although property division- and spousal support “serve distinct purposes and are not…”
Jones v. Jones, 942 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1997).
Forshee v. Forshee, 145 P.3d 492 (Alaska 2006).
Gottstein v. Kraft, 274 P.3d 469 (Alaska 2012).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(2)(F) — 1 case
Kazue Bulger-Post v. Michael Cody Post (Alaska 2015).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(2)(G) — 1 case
Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1997). “2d 1252, 1255 (Alaska 1994) (citing AS 25.24.160(a)(2); Messina v. Messina, 583 P.”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4) — 152 cases
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010). “160(a)(4) identifies the factors a court must consider in making an equitable property division, while AS 25.24.160(a)(2) and the cases interpreting it articulate the findings a court must make to justify a rehabilitative alimony award.”
Young v. Kelly, 334 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2014). “” I acknowledge that the statute also instructs courts to divide “property .”
Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1997). “2d 1252, 1255 (Alaska 1994) (citing AS 25.24.160(a)(2); Messina v. Messina, 583 P.”
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019). “’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2006). “” The superior court therefore proceeded to examine the Merrill factors codified in AS 25.24.160 and determined that in order to balance the equities it must invade Bill’s separate property as allowed under AS 25.”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(A) — 12 cases
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019). “’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
McDougall v. Lumpkin, 11 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000).
Green v. Green, 29 P.3d 854 (Alaska 2001).
Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680 (Alaska 2010).
Glover v. Ranney, 314 P.3d 535 (Alaska 2013).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(B) — 7 cases
Dunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010). “160(a)(4) identifies the factors a court must consider in making an equitable property division, while AS 25.24.160(a)(2) and the cases interpreting it articulate the findings a court must make to justify a rehabilitative alimony award.”
Fortson v. Fortson, 131 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2006).
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2018).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(C) — 12 cases
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010). “160(a)(4) identifies the factors a court must consider in making an equitable property division, while AS 25.24.160(a)(2) and the cases interpreting it articulate the findings a court must make to justify a rehabilitative alimony award.”
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019). “’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
Hooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681 (Alaska 2008). “160(a) states in pertinent part: In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide [[Image here]] (4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether…”
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2018).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(D) — 15 cases
Veronica Louise Hudson v. Daniel Lee Hudson, 532 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2023).
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2018).
Grove v. Grove, 400 P.3d 109 (Alaska 2017).
Dunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010). “160(a)(4) identifies the factors a court must consider in making an equitable property division, while AS 25.24.160(a)(2) and the cases interpreting it articulate the findings a court must make to justify a rehabilitative alimony award.”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) — 11 cases
Veronica Louise Hudson v. Daniel Lee Hudson, 532 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2023).
Dunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).
Troy A. Rohde v. Annette L. Rohde, 507 P.3d 986 (Alaska 2022).
Maxwell v. Sosnowski, 420 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2018).
Gambini v. Hamilton, 440 P.3d 184 (Alaska 2019).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(F) — 5 cases
Silvan v. Alcina, 105 P.3d 117 (Alaska 2005).
Bellanich v. Bellanich, 936 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1997).
Hanlon v. Hanlon, 871 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1994).
Francesca S., f/k/a Francesca K. v. Shawn K. (Alaska 2021).
Lawrence E. Vogltanz Jr. v. Stacy Arleen Stinson (Alaska 2021).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(G) — 10 cases
Downs v. Downs, 440 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2019). “To justify its division the court discussed the relevant statutory factors from AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 9 It found that Deborah was retired, 67 years old, and needed the marital assets to live comfortably for the rest of her life.”
Hooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681 (Alaska 2008). “160(a) states in pertinent part: In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide [[Image here]] (4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether…”
Laura Aubert, Pers. Rep. of the Est. of David L. Aubert v. Debra J. Wilson, f/k/a Debra J. Aubert, 483 P.3d 179 (Alaska 2021).
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010). “160(a)(4) identifies the factors a court must consider in making an equitable property division, while AS 25.24.160(a)(2) and the cases interpreting it articulate the findings a court must make to justify a rehabilitative alimony award.”
Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2016). “AS 25.24.160(a). 72 . See Jones v. Jones, 942 P.”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(H) — 4 cases
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019). “’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Daniel Butts v. Katherine Lemaster (Alaska 2024).
Herbert D. Johnson v. Lynn M. Johnson (Alaska 2020).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(I) — 6 cases
Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015). “2 The parties also disputed the value of the subsidy; Andy urged adoption of a composite rate that assumed Becky was likely to remarry, whereas Becky argued that her individual circumstances justified applying a lower, individual rate.”
Pasley v. Pasley, 442 P.3d 738 (Alaska 2019).
Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453 (Alaska 2013).
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019). “’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
Nicholson v. Wolfe, 974 P.2d 417 (Alaska 1999).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(4)(T) — 3 cases
Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015). “2 The parties also disputed the value of the subsidy; Andy urged adoption of a composite rate that assumed Becky was likely to remarry, whereas Becky argued that her individual circumstances justified applying a lower, individual rate.”
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680 (Alaska 2010).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(5) — 1 case
Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf, 741 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1987).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(d) — 8 cases
Hooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681 (Alaska 2008). “160(a) states in pertinent part: In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide [[Image here]] (4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether…”
Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess, 259 P.3d 462 (Alaska 2011).
Abood v. Abood, 119 P.3d 980 (Alaska 2005).
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Young v. Kelly, 334 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2014). “” I acknowledge that the statute also instructs courts to divide “property .”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(d)(I) — 1 case
Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015). “2 The parties also disputed the value of the subsidy; Andy urged adoption of a composite rate that assumed Becky was likely to remarry, whereas Becky argued that her individual circumstances justified applying a lower, individual rate.”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(a)(d4) — 1 case
Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015). “2 The parties also disputed the value of the subsidy; Andy urged adoption of a composite rate that assumed Becky was likely to remarry, whereas Becky argued that her individual circumstances justified applying a lower, individual rate.”
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(c) — 2 cases
Husseini v. Husseini, 230 P.3d 682 (Alaska 2010).
Sloane v. Sloane, 18 P.3d 60 (Alaska 2001).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(c)(6) — 1 case
Kriya D. v. Scott C. (Alaska 2023).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(e) — 2 cases
Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1994).
John L. Philips v. Barbara S. Bremner Philips, Barbara S. Bremner-Philips v. John L. Philips, 477 P.3d 626 (Alaska 2020).
— Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160(g) — 1 case
Timothy W. v. Julia M., 403 P.3d 1095 (Alaska 2017).
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