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Alaska Stat.Chapter 25.24

Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160 (2026)

Judgment

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1984–2026 236citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 236 opinions since 1984, 34 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(4) (152 cases).

Sec. 25.24.160. Judgment.
 (a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide
     (1) for the payment by either or both parties of an amount of money or goods, in gross or installments that may include cost-of-living adjustments, as may be just and proper for the parties to contribute toward the nurture and education of their children, and the court may order the parties to arrange with their employers for an automatic payroll deduction each month or each pay period, if the period is other than monthly, of the amount of the installment; if the employer agrees, the installment shall be forwarded by the employer to the clerk of the superior court that entered the judgment or to the court trustee, and the amount of the installment is exempt from execution;

     (2) for the recovery by one party from the other of an amount of money for maintenance, for a limited or indefinite period of time, in gross or in installments, as may be just and necessary without regard to which of the parties is in fault; an award of maintenance must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce by being based on a consideration of the following factors:
          (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage;

          (B) the age and health of the parties;

          (C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage;

          (D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance;

          (E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets;

          (F) the division of property under (4) of this subsection; and

          (G) other factors the court determines to be relevant in each individual case;

     (3) for the delivery to either party of that party's personal property in the possession or control of the other party at the time of giving the judgment;

     (4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether joint or separate, acquired only during marriage, in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the court, in making the division, may invade the property, including retirement benefits, of either spouse acquired before marriage when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it; and to accomplish this end the judgment may require that one or both of the parties assign, deliver, or convey any of their real or personal property, including retirement benefits, to the other party; the division of property must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce by being based on consideration of the following factors:
          (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage;

          (B) the age and health of the parties;

          (C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage;

          (D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance;

          (E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets;

          (F) the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live in it for a reasonable period of time, to the party who has primary physical custody of children;

          (G) the circumstances and necessities of each party;

          (H) the time and manner of acquisition of the property in question; and

          (I) the income-producing capacity of the property and the value of the property at the time of division;

     (5) if an animal is owned, for the ownership or joint ownership of the animal, taking into consideration the well-being of the animal.

 (b) If a judgment under this section distributes benefits to an alternate payee under AS 14.25, AS 21.51.120(a), AS 21.54.020(c), 21.54.050(c), AS 22.25, AS 26.05.222 — 26.05.226, or AS 39.35, the judgment must meet the requirements of a qualified domestic relations order under the definition of that phrase that is applicable to those provisions.

 (c) Notwithstanding (a) of this section, if one of the parties to an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void expressly submits to the court the issue of property division and has not withdrawn that issue from the court before judgment, the court shall provide in the judgment for the division of property and may not reserve the issue of property division for a later time unless the conditions of AS 25.24.155 have been met.

 (d) For each judgment issued under this section, the court shall include in the records relating to the matter the social security numbers, if ascertainable, of the following persons:
     (1) each party to the action;

     (2) each child whose rights are addressed in the judgment.

 (e) When distributing property identified as community property under a community property agreement or trust under AS 34.77, unless the parties have provided in the agreement or trust for another disposition of the community property, the court shall make such disposition of the community property as shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors, including
     (1) the nature and extent of the community property;

     (2) the nature and extent of the separate property;

     (3) the duration of the marriage; and

     (4) the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or right to live in the family home for reasonable periods to a spouse with whom the children reside the majority of the time.




The 20 cases that cite Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010).
cites § 25.24.160 20×subsections: (a)(4) 10× (a)(4)(C) 4× (a)(2) 2× (a)(4)(G) 2×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“160(a)(4) identifies the factors a court must consider in making an equitable property division, while AS 25.24.160(a)(2) and the cases interpreting it articulate the findings a court must make to justify a rehabilitative alimony award.”
The case’s holding
A court may award an unequal division of marital property based on one spouse bearing the primary burden of child rearing which impeded their career development.
Later courts cite it for
“we review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence, including expert witness testimony, for abuse of discretion and will only reverse an erroneous decision if it affected the substantial rights of a party.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENSharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019).
cites § 25.24.160 13×subsections: (a)(4) 6× (a) (a)(4)(A) (a)(4)(C)cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
The case’s holding
A change in a court decision necessitates the recalculation of an equalization payment (recalculating equalization payment).
3
GREENHarrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1997).
cites § 25.24.160 18×subsections: (a)(4) 14× (a)(2) 2× (a)(2)(G) 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“2d 1252, 1255 (Alaska 1994) (citing AS 25.24.160(a)(2); Messina v. Messina, 583 P.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may consider premarital cohabitation when dividing property but must distinguish assets acquired before and during the legal marriage.
Later courts cite it for
“mandates that he be given credit.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENYoung v. Kelly, 334 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2014).
cites § 25.24.160 18×subsections: (a)(4) 15× (a)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“” I acknowledge that the statute also instructs courts to divide “property .”
Later courts cite it for
“courts will fill in gaps where parties' reasonable expectations are clear, but they cannot impose performance where it is not clear the parties had a meeting of the minds.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENEngstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015).
cites § 25.24.160 12×subsections: (a)(4) 5× (a)(4)(I) 4× (a) (a)(4)(T)cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“2 The parties also disputed the value of the subsidy; Andy urged adoption of a composite rate that assumed Becky was likely to remarry, whereas Becky argued that her individual circumstances justified applying a lower, individual rate.”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion if it considers improper factors, fails to consider relevant statutory factors, or assigns disproportionate weight to certain factors while ignoring others.
Later courts cite it for
“an abuse of discretion occurs if the court considers improper factors, fails to consider relevant statutory factors, or assigns disproportionate weight to some factors while ignoring others.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENOdom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2006).
cites § 25.24.160 9×subsections: (a)(4) 5× (a)(2) 2× (a)(2)(D)cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“” The superior court therefore proceeded to examine the Merrill factors codified in AS 25.24.160 and determined that in order to balance the equities it must invade Bill’s separate property as allowed under AS 25.”
The case’s holding
Payment of marital debts from a separate account converts the funds used to pay those debts into marital property.
7
GREENLaing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1987).
cites § 25.24.160 11×subsections: (a)(4) 5×cited by 77 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“(4) for the division between the parties of their property, whether joint or separate, acquired only during coverture, in the manner as may be just, and without regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the court, in making the division, may invade the property of…”
The case’s holding
Nonvested pension rights are marital assets subject to division through reserved jurisdiction rather than present value calculations to avoid placing forfeiture risk on the employee spouse.
Later courts cite it for
“on the other hand, whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard in exercising its broad discretion is a question of law regarding which this court may substitute its independent judgment on appeal.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENHooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681 (Alaska 2008).
cites § 25.24.160 9×subsections: (a) 3× (a)(4) 2× (a)(4)(G) 2× (a)(4)(C)cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“160(a) states in pertinent part: In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide [[Image here]] (4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether…”
Holding on this section
A court may consider factors beyond the statutory list in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) when dividing marital property, since that list is not exhaustive and such consideration is entirely appropriate.
9
GREENHockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080 (Alaska 2017).
cites § 25.24.160 6×subsections: (a)(4) 3× (a)(2) 2× (a)(2)(E)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“” 10 Courts may award spousal support pursuant to AS 25.24.160(a)(2). In doing *1089 so, courts must consider nearly identical factors to those weighed in dividing marital property, although property division- and spousal support “serve distinct purposes and are not…”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by awarding spousal support based on the recipient's preference without first determining if needs can be met through property division.
10
GREENDowns v. Downs, 440 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2019).
cites § 25.24.160 6×subsections: (a)(4) 4× (a)(4)(G) 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“To justify its division the court discussed the relevant statutory factors from AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 9 It found that Deborah was retired, 67 years old, and needed the marital assets to live comfortably for the rest of her life.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court reverses a trial court's division of property only if the distribution is clearly unjust.
Later courts cite it for
“judicial bias may . . . arise during the course of judicial proceedings if 'a judicial officer hears, learns, or does something intrajudicially so prejudicial that further participation would be unfair.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENJones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1992).
cites § 25.24.160 13×subsections: (a)(2) 9× (a)(2)(A) 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“In relevant part AS 25.24.160 provides as follows: (a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide .”
The case’s holding
A trial court must make specific findings regarding a spouse's financial needs when awarding spousal support.
Later courts cite it for
“when the recipient spouse intends to apply the alimony toward job training designed to lead to employment.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENJerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2016).
cites § 25.24.160 7×subsections: (a)(4) 5× (a) (a)(4)(G)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“AS 25.24.160(a). 72 . See Jones v. Jones, 942 P.”
13
GREENDunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).
cites § 25.24.160 7×subsections: (a)(2)(D) 2× (a)(4) 2× (a)(4)(B) (a)(4)(D)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“33 AS 25.24.160(a)(2)(D), (a)(4)(D). 34 Guerrero , 362 P.”
14
GREENVeronica Louise Hudson v. Daniel Lee Hudson, 532 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2023).
cites § 25.24.160 12×subsections: (a)(4) 6× (a)(4)(D) 4× (a)(4)(E) 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“The court made specific findings about each of the statutory factors under AS 25.24.160(a)(4) in order to fairly allocate the economic effect of the divorce.”
15
GREENHeustess v. Kelley-Heustess, 259 P.3d 462 (Alaska 2011).
cites § 25.24.160 8×subsections: (a)(4) 3× (a) 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“Based upon the other Merrill factors cited in the 2008 findings, the court may decide that the division remains fair and equitable, or it may adjust the division if it is necessary to do so to "fairly allocate the economic effects of divorce" under AS 25.24.160. To be clear, we…”
16
GREENMcLaren v. McLaren, 268 P.3d 323 (Alaska 2012).
cites § 25.24.160 12×subsections: (a)(4) 8× (a) (a)(4)(G)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“160(a)(4) states that the court may provide "for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether joint or separate, acquired only during marriage, in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the…”
Later courts cite it for
“requiring the superior court to inform pro se litigants of all the relevant substantive law would put a trial judge in the precarious position of acting as attorney for an unrepresented party, which is exactly what we have sought to avoid ....” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENBarnett v. Barnett, 238 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2010).
cites § 25.24.160 5×subsections: (a)(2) 2× (a)(4)cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“18 Under AS 25.24.160, courts are generally called upon to divide property "acquired only during marriage.”
The case’s holding
Spousal support awards require adequate findings regarding the recipient's needs and the payer's ability to pay, and pre-marital expenses are not marital debt absent specific findings.
Later courts cite it for
“because we deem waived any arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, we do not here reach the merits of these issues.” · 11 citing courts
18
GREENFletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2018).
cites § 25.24.160 7×subsections: (a)(4) 3× (a)(4)(D) 2× (a)(4)(B) (a)(4)(C)cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“" The superior court also considered the AS 25.24.160(a)(4) property division factors (the Merrill factors) 1 and made relevant findings.”
The case’s holding
A court may fix a divorce separation date by weighing the parties' objective and subjective intent to end the marriage, plus economic support, commingled assets, and joint tax returns.
Later courts cite it for
“generally 'admissions made in the pleadings are conclusively established.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENRose v. Rose, 755 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1988).
cites § 25.24.160 11×subsections: (a)(4) 11×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“She also contended that the trailer, although purchased prior to the marriage, was a precoverture asset subject to division under AS 25.24.160(a)(4). [8] Debra requested that the court award her one-half the value of the foregoing assets, as well as one-half the value of Duane's…”
The case’s holding
In a short marriage without significant commingling of assets, a trial court may treat property division as rescission, restoring the parties to their pre-marriage financial positions.
Later courts cite it for
“trial court may, without abusing its discretion, treat the property division as an action in the nature of rescission, aimed at placing the parties in, as closely as possible, the financial position they would have occupied had no marriage taken place.” · 5 citing courts
20
GREENDodson v. Dodson, 955 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1998).
cites § 25.24.160 8×subsections: (a)(2) 4× (a)(4) 4×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 25.24.160
“In fact, the superior court implicitly treated them as such, finding them to be "both just and necessary," as required by AS 25.24.160(a)(2). The superior court reasoned that if Ms.”
The case’s holding
Post-separation debt is not marital property solely because one spouse remains economically dependent on the other.

Show all 236 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420052026

One bar per year. Tallest: 14 cases in 2013. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Alaska232Miss.2Ala. Civ. App.1Miss. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(a)23 cases
Hooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681 (Alaska 2008).“160(a) states in pertinent part: In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide [[Image here]] (4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether…”
Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess, 259 P.3d 462 (Alaska 2011).“Based upon the other Merrill factors cited in the 2008 findings, the court may decide that the division remains fair and equitable, or it may adjust the division if it is necessary to do so to "fairly allocate the economic effects of divorce" under AS 25.24.160. To be clear, we…”
Abood v. Abood, 119 P.3d 980 (Alaska 2005).
Bishop v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804 (Alaska 2002).
Schaub v. Schaub, 305 P.3d 337 (Alaska 2013).
Showing the top 5 of 23. More in the list view →
(a)(1)7 cases
Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921 (Alaska 1992).
Dundas v. Dundas, 362 P.3d 468 (Alaska 2015).
Pattee v. Pattee, 744 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1987).
Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1989).
Lawson v. Lawson, 108 P.3d 883 (Alaska 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(a)(2)33 cases
Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1992).“In relevant part AS 25.24.160 provides as follows: (a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide .”
Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080 (Alaska 2017).“” 10 Courts may award spousal support pursuant to AS 25.24.160(a)(2). In doing *1089 so, courts must consider nearly identical factors to those weighed in dividing marital property, although property division- and spousal support “serve distinct purposes and are not…”
Dodson v. Dodson, 955 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1998).“In fact, the superior court implicitly treated them as such, finding them to be "both just and necessary," as required by AS 25.24.160(a)(2). The superior court reasoned that if Ms.”
Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2006).“” The superior court therefore proceeded to examine the Merrill factors codified in AS 25.24.160 and determined that in order to balance the equities it must invade Bill’s separate property as allowed under AS 25.”
Barnett v. Barnett, 238 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2010).“18 Under AS 25.24.160, courts are generally called upon to divide property "acquired only during marriage.”
Showing the top 5 of 33. More in the list view →
(a)(2)(A)5 cases
Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1992).
Hammer v. Hammer, 991 P.2d 195 (Alaska 1999).
Broadribb v. Broadribb, 956 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1998).
Kazue Bulger-Post v. Michael Cody Post, No. S15013 (Alaska Apr. 8, 2015).
Jeremy Novak v. Laura Novak, No. S15524 (Alaska Aug. 26, 2015).
(a)(2)(B)1 case
Gottstein v. Kraft, 274 P.3d 469 (Alaska 2012).
(a)(2)(D)3 cases
Dunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).“33 AS 25.24.160(a)(2)(D), (a)(4)(D). 34 Guerrero , 362 P.”
Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2006).
Guerrero v. Guerrero, 362 P.3d 432 (Alaska 2015).
(a)(2)(E)5 cases
Wagner v. Wagner, 386 P.3d 1249 (Alaska 2017).
Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080 (Alaska 2017).
Jones v. Jones, 942 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1997).
Forshee v. Forshee, 145 P.3d 492 (Alaska 2006).
Gottstein v. Kraft, 274 P.3d 469 (Alaska 2012).
(a)(2)(F)1 case
Kazue Bulger-Post v. Michael Cody Post, No. S15013 (Alaska Apr. 8, 2015).
(a)(2)(G)1 case
Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1997).“2d 1252, 1255 (Alaska 1994) (citing AS 25.24.160(a)(2); Messina v. Messina, 583 P.”
(a)(4)152 cases
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010).“160(a)(4) identifies the factors a court must consider in making an equitable property division, while AS 25.24.160(a)(2) and the cases interpreting it articulate the findings a court must make to justify a rehabilitative alimony award.”
Young v. Kelly, 334 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2014).“” I acknowledge that the statute also instructs courts to divide “property .”
Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1997).
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019).“’ ”52 While “[a]n equal division of marital property is presumptively just,”53 the court may deviate from an equal division based on the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and…”
Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324 (Alaska 2006).
Showing the top 5 of 152. More in the list view →
(a)(4)(A)12 cases
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019).
McDougall v. Lumpkin, 11 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000).
Green v. Green, 29 P.3d 854 (Alaska 2001).
Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680 (Alaska 2010).
Glover v. Ranney, 314 P.3d 535 (Alaska 2013).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(a)(4)(B)7 cases
Dunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010).
Fortson v. Fortson, 131 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2006).
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2018).“" The superior court also considered the AS 25.24.160(a)(4) property division factors (the Merrill factors) 1 and made relevant findings.”
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(a)(4)(C)12 cases
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010).
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019).
Hooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681 (Alaska 2008).
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2018).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(a)(4)(D)15 cases
Veronica Louise Hudson v. Daniel Lee Hudson, 532 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2023).“The court made specific findings about each of the statutory factors under AS 25.24.160(a)(4) in order to fairly allocate the economic effect of the divorce.”
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148 (Alaska 2018).
Grove v. Grove, 400 P.3d 109 (Alaska 2017).
Dunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010).
Showing the top 5 of 15. More in the list view →
(a)(4)(E)11 cases
Veronica Louise Hudson v. Daniel Lee Hudson, 532 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2023).
Dunmore v. Dunmore, 420 P.3d 1187 (Alaska 2018).
Troy A. Rohde v. Annette L. Rohde, 507 P.3d 986 (Alaska 2022).
Maxwell v. Sosnowski, 420 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2018).
Gambini v. Hamilton, 440 P.3d 184 (Alaska 2019).
Showing the top 5 of 11. More in the list view →
(a)(4)(F)5 cases
Silvan v. Alcina, 105 P.3d 117 (Alaska 2005).
Bellanich v. Bellanich, 936 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1997).
Hanlon v. Hanlon, 871 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1994).
Francesca S. v. Shawn K., No. S17527 (Alaska Sept. 8, 2021).
Lawrence E. Vogltanz Jr. v. Stacy Arleen Stinson, No. S17675 (Alaska July 7, 2021).
(a)(4)(G)10 cases
Downs v. Downs, 440 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2019).“To justify its division the court discussed the relevant statutory factors from AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 9 It found that Deborah was retired, 67 years old, and needed the marital assets to live comfortably for the rest of her life.”
Hooper v. Hooper, 188 P.3d 681 (Alaska 2008).
Laura Aubert v. Debra J. Wilson, 483 P.3d 179 (Alaska 2021).
Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707 (Alaska 2010).
Jerry B. v. Sally B., 377 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2016).“AS 25.24.160(a). 72 . See Jones v. Jones, 942 P.”
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(a)(4)(H)4 cases
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019).
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Daniel Butts v. Katherine Lemaster, No. S18367 (Alaska Mar. 6, 2024).
Herbert D. Johnson v. Lynn M. Johnson, No. S17357 (Alaska July 22, 2020).
(a)(4)(I)6 cases
Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015).“2 The parties also disputed the value of the subsidy; Andy urged adoption of a composite rate that assumed Becky was likely to remarry, whereas Becky argued that her individual circumstances justified applying a lower, individual rate.”
Pasley v. Pasley, 442 P.3d 738 (Alaska 2019).
Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453 (Alaska 2013).
Sharon Thompson v. Everett Thompson, 454 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2019).
Nicholson v. Wolfe, 974 P.2d 417 (Alaska 1999).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(a)(4)(T)3 cases
Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2015).
Day v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256 (Alaska 2012).
Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680 (Alaska 2010).
(a)(5)1 case
Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf, 741 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1987).
(c)2 cases
Husseini v. Husseini, 230 P.3d 682 (Alaska 2010).
Sloane v. Sloane, 18 P.3d 60 (Alaska 2001).
(c)(6)1 case
Kriya D. v. Scott C., No. S18270 (Alaska Jan. 25, 2023).
(e)2 cases
Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1994).

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