Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1171
Acts which constitute forcible entry or detainer
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A person is guilty of forcible entry and detainer, or of forcible detainer, as the case may be, if he:
1. Makes an entry into any lands, tenements or other real property, except in cases where entry is given by law.
2. Makes such an entry by force.
3. Wilfully and without force holds over any lands, tenements or other real property after termination of the time for which such lands, tenements or other real property were let to him or to the person under whom he claims, after demand made in writing for the possession thereof by the person entitled to such possession.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 35
cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1960–2026 · leading case: United Effort Plan Trust v. Holm
United Effort Plan Trust v. Holm (2004)
“Section 12-1173 (2003) adds that there is a forcible detainer if: 1.”
Grady v. Barth (2013)
“were let to him or to the person under whom he claims”); Ariz.”
Kadera v. Superior Court (1996)
“”) section 12-1171. In its complaint, Respondents allege Petitioners allowed a non-relative to reside in their unit and conducted a babysitting business from it.”
Alton v. Tower Capital Co. (1979)
“*604 Forcible entry and detainer actions are governed by A.R.S. § 12-1171 et seq. A.R.S. § 12 — 1173 provides: “A.”
Colonial Tri-City Ltd. Partnership v. Ben Franklin Stores, Inc. (1993)
“section 12-1171 provides in relevant part: A person is guilty of forcible entry and detain-er, or of forcible detainer .”
Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehmann's, Inc. (1990)
“Once the action is commenced, it is governed by the forcible entry and detainer statute, A.R.S. § 12-1171 to 12-1183. 8 . The landlord in Given relied on § 27-1215, A.”
Staffco, Inc. v. Maricopa Trading Co. (1979)
“On 1 July 1975, Maricopa Trading filed a complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court for forcible entry and detainer under A.R.S. §§ 12-1171, et seq., against Staffco and Staffieri alleging default in the monthly rental payments required under said lease.”
Rapp v. Olivo (1986)
“They argue that even if the seven-days notice required by A.R.S. § 33-1476(F) (mobile home act) was proper, that the landlord also had to give the notice of termination and written demand for possession referred to in A.”
Arizona Real Estate Inv., Inc. v. Schrader (2010)
“Compare A.R.S. § 12-1171, et seq. (forcible entry and detainer proceedings) with § 33-1377 (2007) (special detainer actions).”
Rreef Management Co. v. Camex Productions, Inc. (1997)
“section 12-1171: A person is guilty of forcible entry and detainer,, or of forcible detainer, as the case may\b,e, if he: 3.”
Lakin Cattle Company v. Engelthaler (1966)
“§ 33-361 and A.R.S. § 12-1171 et seq. George Engelthaler, Dan Ford, and the Silver Star Cattle Company, hereinafter referred to as appellees, were granted a motion to dismiss followed by a judgment in their favor based upon a plea of res judicata.”
Cottonwood Plaza Associates v. Nordale (1982)
“It found that the relationship between the parties was more than a simple landlord-tenant relationship and that the summary action of forcible detainer was not available to the appellant.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1171(1) — 1 case
Rreef Management Co. v. Camex Productions, Inc. (1997)
“section 12-1171: A person is guilty of forcible entry and detainer,, or of forcible detainer, as the case may\b,e, if he: 3.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1171(3) — 10 cases
Grady v. Barth (2013)
“were let to him or to the person under whom he claims”); Ariz.”
Alton v. Tower Capital Co. (1979)
“*604 Forcible entry and detainer actions are governed by A.R.S. § 12-1171 et seq. A.R.S. § 12 — 1173 provides: “A.”
Colonial Tri-City Ltd. Partnership v. Ben Franklin Stores, Inc. (1993)
“section 12-1171 provides in relevant part: A person is guilty of forcible entry and detain-er, or of forcible detainer .”
United Effort Plan Trust v. Holm (2004)
“Section 12-1173 (2003) adds that there is a forcible detainer if: 1.”
Rapp v. Olivo (1986)
“They argue that even if the seven-days notice required by A.R.S. § 33-1476(F) (mobile home act) was proper, that the landlord also had to give the notice of termination and written demand for possession referred to in A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1171(A)(3) — 1 case
Sunstate v. Elflein (2024)
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