Arizona Revised Statutes
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-202 (2026)
Construction of statutes with respect to culpability
✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
AZ-LEGazleg.gov (official)
JustiaTitle on Justia
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
A. If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense without distinguishing among the elements of such offense, the prescribed mental state shall apply to each such element unless a contrary legislative purpose plainly appears.
B. If a statute defining an offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense, no culpable mental state is required for the commission of such offense, and the offense is one of strict liability unless the proscribed conduct necessarily involves a culpable mental state. If the offense is one of strict liability, proof of a culpable mental state will also suffice to establish criminal responsibility.
C. If a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. If acting recklessly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. If acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 73
cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: State v. Nunez, 806 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1991).
State v. Nunez, 806 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1991). “Whether the trial court's jury instruction based on A.R.S. § 13-202(C) was erroneous under principles of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel.”
State v. Francis, 388 P.3d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). “¶12 To resolve that question, we look instead to A.R.S. § 13-202 (2016), "Construction of statutes with respect to culpability.”
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne, 314 P.3d 1239 (Ariz. 2013). “, and that [his actions occurred] under circumstances likely to cause death or serious physical injury” to the children. ¶70 If a statute requires a mental state, it applies to each element of the offense unless it “plainly appears” that the legislature intended otherwise.”
State v. Womack, 847 P.2d 609 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). “Defendant's argument relies upon A.R.S. § 13-202(A), which provides: If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense without distinguishing among the elements of such offense, the prescribed mental state shall…”
State v. Brown, 64 P.3d 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “See generally § 13-202; Bridgeforth (charge of scheme or artifice to defraud requires state to prove defendant knowingly obtained benefit by false pretense and intended to defraud others); State v.”
State v. Cabanas-Salgado, 92 P.3d 421 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “He relies on A.R.S. § 13-202(A) (2001), which states: If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense without distinguishing among the elements of such offense, the prescribed mental state shall apply to each…”
State v. Gomez, 437 P.3d 896 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019). “1983) (§ 13-202 applies to Title 28 offenses). Under § 13-202(B), we will construe a statute to create a strict-liability offense "only when there appears to be a clear legislative intent not to require any particular mental state for the commission of the crime.”
State v. Williams, 698 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1985). “” The State must show that the driver knew or should have known that the license has been suspended.”
State v. Lycett, 650 P.2d 487 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “§ 13-202(B) provides: If the statute defining an offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense, no culpable mental state is required for the commission of such offense, and the offense is one of strict liability…”
State v. Tocco, 750 P.2d 874 (Ariz. 1988). “§§ 13- *119 2301 and 13-2308 and is mandated by A.R.S. § 13-202(A). 3 Nor are we persuaded by Tocco’s contention that the 1985 amendment is a legislative acknowledgement of a deficiency in the statute.”
State v. Falcone, 264 P.3d 878 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). “2008) (pursuant to § 13-202, “knowingly” in AR.S. § 13-3405(A)(4) requires state to prove defendant knowingly transported substance he knew to be marijuana, knowing it was to be sold).”
State v. Zaragoza, 209 P.3d 629 (Ariz. 2009). “More specifically, we believe the legislature intended to criminalize an impaired person’s control of a vehicle when the circumstances of such control — as actually physically exercised— demonstrate an ultimate purpose of placing the vehicle in motion or directing an influence…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-202(A) — 28 cases
State v. Francis, 388 P.3d 843 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). “¶12 To resolve that question, we look instead to A.R.S. § 13-202 (2016), "Construction of statutes with respect to culpability.”
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne, 314 P.3d 1239 (Ariz. 2013). “, and that [his actions occurred] under circumstances likely to cause death or serious physical injury” to the children. ¶70 If a statute requires a mental state, it applies to each element of the offense unless it “plainly appears” that the legislature intended otherwise.”
State v. Womack, 847 P.2d 609 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). “Defendant's argument relies upon A.R.S. § 13-202(A), which provides: If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense without distinguishing among the elements of such offense, the prescribed mental state shall…”
State v. Cabanas-Salgado, 92 P.3d 421 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “He relies on A.R.S. § 13-202(A) (2001), which states: If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense without distinguishing among the elements of such offense, the prescribed mental state shall apply to each…”
State v. Tocco, 750 P.2d 874 (Ariz. 1988). “§§ 13- *119 2301 and 13-2308 and is mandated by A.R.S. § 13-202(A). 3 Nor are we persuaded by Tocco’s contention that the 1985 amendment is a legislative acknowledgement of a deficiency in the statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-202(B) — 21 cases
State v. Gomez, 437 P.3d 896 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019). “1983) (§ 13-202 applies to Title 28 offenses). Under § 13-202(B), we will construe a statute to create a strict-liability offense "only when there appears to be a clear legislative intent not to require any particular mental state for the commission of the crime.”
State v. Lycett, 650 P.2d 487 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “§ 13-202(B) provides: If the statute defining an offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense, no culpable mental state is required for the commission of such offense, and the offense is one of strict liability…”
State v. Brown, 64 P.3d 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “See generally § 13-202; Bridgeforth (charge of scheme or artifice to defraud requires state to prove defendant knowingly obtained benefit by false pretense and intended to defraud others); State v.”
State v. Williams, 698 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1985). “” The State must show that the driver knew or should have known that the license has been suspended.”
State v. Zaragoza, 209 P.3d 629 (Ariz. 2009). “More specifically, we believe the legislature intended to criminalize an impaired person’s control of a vehicle when the circumstances of such control — as actually physically exercised— demonstrate an ultimate purpose of placing the vehicle in motion or directing an influence…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-202(C) — 22 cases
State v. Nunez, 806 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1991). “Whether the trial court's jury instruction based on A.R.S. § 13-202(C) was erroneous under principles of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel.”
State v. Bay, 722 P.2d 280 (Ariz. 1986).
State v. Schurz, 859 P.2d 156 (Ariz. 1993).
State v. Angle, 720 P.2d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Ontiveros, 81 P.3d 330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.