Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704 (2026)

Dangerous offenders; sentencing

✓ current as of May 2026

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13-704. Dangerous offenders; sentencing

A. Except as provided in section 13-705, a person who is at least eighteen years of age or who has been tried as an adult and who stands convicted of a felony that is a dangerous offense shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment as follows:

Felony Minimum Presumptive Maximum

Class 2 7 years 10.5 years 21 years

Class 3 5 years 7.5 years 15 years

Class 4 4 years 6 years 8 years

Class 5 2 years 3 years 4 years

Class 6 1.5 years 2.25 years 3 years

B. Except as provided in section 13-705, a person who is convicted of a class 4, 5 or 6 felony that is a dangerous offense and who has one historical prior felony conviction involving a dangerous offense shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment as follows:

Felony Minimum Presumptive Maximum

Class 4 8 years 10 years 12 years

Class 5 4 years 5 years 6 years

Class 6 3 years 3.75 years 4.5 years

C. Except as provided in section 13-705 or section 13-706, subsection A, a person who is convicted of a class 4, 5 or 6 felony that is a dangerous offense and who has two or more historical prior felony convictions involving dangerous offenses shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment as follows:

Felony Minimum Presumptive Maximum

Class 4 12 years 14 years 16 years

Class 5 6 years 7 years 8 years

Class 6 4.5 years 5.25 years 6 years

D. Except as provided in section 13-705 or section 13-706, subsection A, a person who is convicted of a class 2 or 3 felony involving a dangerous offense and who has one historical prior felony conviction that is a class 1, 2 or 3 felony involving a dangerous offense shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment as follows:

Felony Minimum Presumptive Maximum

Class 2 14 years 15.75 years 28 years

Class 3 10 years 11.25 years 20 years

E. Except as provided in section 13-705 or section 13-706, subsection A, a person who is convicted of a class 2 or 3 felony involving a dangerous offense and who has two or more historical prior felony convictions that are class 1, 2 or 3 felonies involving dangerous offenses shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment as follows:

Felony Minimum Presumptive Maximum

Class 2 21 years 28 years 35 years

Class 3 15 years 20 years 25 years

F. A person who is convicted of two or more felony offenses that are dangerous offenses and that were not committed on the same occasion but that are consolidated for trial purposes or that are not historical prior felony convictions shall be sentenced, for the second or subsequent offense, pursuant to this subsection. For a person sentenced pursuant to this subsection, the minimum term prescribed shall be the presumptive term. If the court increases or decreases a sentence pursuant to this subsection, the court shall state on the record the reasons for the increase or decrease. The court shall inform all of the parties before the sentencing occurs of its intent to increase or decrease a sentence pursuant to this subsection. If the court fails to inform the parties, a party waives its right to be informed unless the party timely objects at the time of sentencing. The terms are as follows:

1. For the second dangerous offense:

Increased

Felony Minimum Maximum Maximum

Class 2 10.5 years 21 years 26.25 years

Class 3 7.5 years 15 years 18.75 years

Class 4 6 years 8 years 10 years

Class 5 3 years 4 years 5 years

Class 6 2.25 years 3 years 3.75 years

2. For any dangerous offense subsequent to the second dangerous felony offense:

Increased

Felony Minimum Maximum Maximum

Class 2 15.75 years 28 years 35 years

Class 3 11.25 years 20 years 25 years

Class 4 10 years 12 years 15 years

Class 5 5 years 6 years 7.5 years

Class 6 3.75 years 4.5 years 5.6 years

G. A person who is sentenced pursuant to subsection A, B, C, D, E or F of this section is not eligible for suspension of sentence, probation, pardon or release from confinement on any basis, except as specifically authorized by section 31-233, subsection A or B, until the sentence imposed by the court has been served, the person is eligible for release pursuant to section 41-1604.07 or the sentence is commuted.

H. The presumptive term authorized by this section may be mitigated or aggravated pursuant to the terms of section 13-701, subsections C, D and E.

I. For the purposes of determining the applicability of the penalties provided in subsection A, D or E of this section for second or subsequent class 2 or 3 felonies, the conviction for any felony committed before October 1, 1978 that, if committed after October 1, 1978, could be a dangerous offense under subsection A, D or E of this section may be designated by the state as a prior felony.

J. Convictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction for the purposes of subsection A, B, C, D or E of this section.

K. A person who has been convicted in any court outside the jurisdiction of this state of an offense that was punishable by that jurisdiction as a felony is subject to subsection A, B, C, D or E of this section. A person who has been convicted of an offense punishable as a felony under the provisions of any prior code in this state or the jurisdiction in which the offense was committed is subject to subsection A, B, C, D or E of this section. A person who has been convicted of a felony weapons possession violation in any court outside the jurisdiction of this state that would not be punishable as a felony under the laws of this state is not subject to this section.

L. The penalties prescribed by this section shall be substituted for the penalties otherwise authorized by law if an allegation of prior conviction is charged in the indictment or information and admitted or found by the court or if an allegation of dangerous offense is charged in the indictment or information and admitted or found by the trier of fact. The release provisions prescribed by this section shall not be substituted for any penalties required by the substantive offense or provision of law that specifies a later release or completion of the sentence imposed before release. The court shall allow the allegation of a prior conviction or the allegation of a dangerous offense at any time before the date the case is actually tried unless the allegation is filed fewer than twenty days before the case is actually tried and the court finds on the record that the defendant was in fact prejudiced by the untimely filing and states the reasons for these findings. If the allegation of a prior conviction is filed, the state must make available to the defendant a copy of any material or information obtained concerning the prior conviction. The charge of prior conviction shall not be read to the jury. For the purposes of this subsection, "substantive offense" means the felony that the trier of fact found beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant committed. Substantive offense does not include allegations that, if proven, would enhance the sentence of imprisonment or fine to which the defendant otherwise would be subject.

M. Except as provided in section 13-705 or 13-751, if the victim is an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development, the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to this section.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 133 cases (46 in the last 5 years), 1983–2026 · leading case: Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).

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Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). · cites it 4× “See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-704 (West 2001); Ark.”

State v. Hyde, 921 P.2d 655 (Ariz. 1996). · cites it 8× “A.R.S. § 13-704(B) (Laws 1993, Ch. 2, § 1, effective Feb.”

State v. Smith, 159 P.3d 531 (Ariz. 2007). · cites it 5× “The State concedes that A.R.S. § 13-704(B) (2001) applies to Smith and allows him to choose between death by lethal injection or lethal gas, as long as he does so twenty days before the execution date.”

State v. McCray, 183 P.3d 503 (Ariz. 2008). · cites it 6× “Because McCray committed the murder before November 23, 1992, he is entitled under AR.S. § 13-704(B) (2001) to choose between lethal injection and lethal gas.”

State of Arizona v. George Benjamin Larin, 310 P.3d 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “Notably, in separate proceedings, the jury acquitted Larin of the prohibited possessor charge and found the aggravator of use, threatened use, or possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument not proven.”

State v. Hurley, 741 P.2d 257 (Ariz. 1987). · cites it 5× “See A.R.S. § 13-704 (Supp.1978) (now § 13-604).”

State v. Harrod, 183 P.3d 519 (Ariz. 2008). · cites it 3× “XI ¶ 80 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Harrod’s death sentence as modified to comply with A.R.S. § 13-704(B). CONCURRING: RUTH V. McGREGOR, Chief Justice, REBECCA WHITE BERCH, Vice Chief Justice, W.”

State of Arizona v. Debbie Lynn Copeland, 310 P.3d 46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 7× “” ¶ 10 Since the legislature’s reorganization of Arizona’s sentencing statutes in 2008, the substance of this sentence enhancement provision is found in § 13-704 and is applicable to “a person .”

State of Arizona v. Armando Pena, Jr., 331 P.3d 412 (Ariz. 2014). · cites it 2× “A.R.S. §§ 13-704; 13-707. ¶ 12 We now turn to the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the victim’s hand injury constituted “temporary but substantial disfigurement.”

State v. Hargrave, 234 P.3d 569 (Ariz. 2010). · cites it 2× “2000) (subsequently reenacted and renumbered as A.R.S. § 13-704(A) (2010)). The State concedes that the fifteen-year sentence is unlawful because it falls outside the statutory range.”

State v. Perkins, 699 P.2d 364 (Ariz. 1985). · cites it 4× “The Comment to A.R.S. § 13-704(F) [now A.R.S. § 13-604(H)] provides an example of offenses committed on the same occasion: If the offender commits a robbery and in order to escape he or she kidnaps the victim, a consolidation of the two felonies with a conviction on the robbery…”

State of Arizona v. Daniel Andrew Snider, 311 P.3d 656 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “3 ¶ 3 Snider was charged in a single indictment with twenty-four counts of armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, aggravated assault, and first-degree burglary, all dangerous offenses pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-704. The state also alleged pursuant to § 13-706(A) that Snider was…”

Show all 133 citing cases →

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(A) — 44 cases

State v. Hargrave, 234 P.3d 569 (Ariz. 2010). “2000) (subsequently reenacted and renumbered as A.R.S. § 13-704(A) (2010)). The State concedes that the fifteen-year sentence is unlawful because it falls outside the statutory range.”

State v. Andriano, 161 P.3d 540 (Ariz. 2007).

State v. Trujillo, 257 P.3d 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).

Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000).

State v. McLemore, 288 P.3d 775 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(B) — 16 cases

State v. Hyde, 921 P.2d 655 (Ariz. 1996). “A.R.S. § 13-704(B) (Laws 1993, Ch. 2, § 1, effective Feb.”

State v. Smith, 159 P.3d 531 (Ariz. 2007). “The State concedes that A.R.S. § 13-704(B) (2001) applies to Smith and allows him to choose between death by lethal injection or lethal gas, as long as he does so twenty days before the execution date.”

State v. McCray, 183 P.3d 503 (Ariz. 2008). “Because McCray committed the murder before November 23, 1992, he is entitled under AR.S. § 13-704(B) (2001) to choose between lethal injection and lethal gas.”

State v. Harrod, 183 P.3d 519 (Ariz. 2008). “XI ¶ 80 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Harrod’s death sentence as modified to comply with A.R.S. § 13-704(B). CONCURRING: RUTH V. McGREGOR, Chief Justice, REBECCA WHITE BERCH, Vice Chief Justice, W.”

State v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1994).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(C) — 1 case

State v. Grier (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(D) — 3 cases

State v. Ruiz-Gastelum (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).

State v. Meeks (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).

State v. Strover (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(E) — 3 cases

Dino Kyzar v. Charles Ryan, 780 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2015).

Ortiz v. Shinn (D. Ariz. 2021).

State v. Najim (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(F) — 2 cases

State v. Perkins, 699 P.2d 364 (Ariz. 1985). “The Comment to A.R.S. § 13-704(F) [now A.R.S. § 13-604(H)] provides an example of offenses committed on the same occasion: If the offender commits a robbery and in order to escape he or she kidnaps the victim, a consolidation of the two felonies with a conviction on the robbery…”

State of Arizona v. Daniel Andrew Snider, 311 P.3d 656 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). “3 ¶ 3 Snider was charged in a single indictment with twenty-four counts of armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, aggravated assault, and first-degree burglary, all dangerous offenses pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-704. The state also alleged pursuant to § 13-706(A) that Snider was…”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(F)(1) — 1 case

State v. Aguayo (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(G) — 7 cases

State v. Hon. brain/hu, 422 P.3d 1065 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).

State v. Valles (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).

State v. Clemons (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024).

State of Arizona v. Dominick Cooke, 562 P.3d 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024).

State v. Riehle (Ariz. Ct. App. 2026).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(K) — 1 case

State v. Hurley, 741 P.2d 257 (Ariz. 1987). “See A.R.S. § 13-704 (Supp.1978) (now § 13-604).”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(L) — 6 cases

State of Arizona v. George Benjamin Larin, 310 P.3d 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). “Notably, in separate proceedings, the jury acquitted Larin of the prohibited possessor charge and found the aggravator of use, threatened use, or possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument not proven.”

Juan Carlos Vicente Sanchez v. Hon. ainley/state of Arizona, 321 P.3d 415 (Ariz. 2014).

State of Arizona v. Manuel Jesus Pesqueira, 333 P.3d 797 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).

State v. York (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).

State v. Scarpati (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(b) — 1 case

Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999).

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