A. A classified law enforcement officer who is suspended, demoted or dismissed by the department head, after a hearing and review before the merit system council, may have the determination of the council reviewed pursuant to title 12, chapter 7, article 6 in the superior court of the county in which the law enforcement officer resides. If the determination of the council is overruled by the court, the law enforcement officer shall be reinstated in the officer's position and the officer shall be reimbursed for any compensation withheld pending determination by the council and court.
B. If the order of the department head was for a suspension greater than sixteen hours, demotion or dismissal and the court exonerates the officer, the court may award, in whole or in part, the reasonable costs and attorney fees that the law enforcement officer incurred or were incurred on behalf of the law enforcement officer in the court proceedings. The award of attorney fees by the court shall not exceed $15,000. An award of attorney fees does not apply if either of the following applies:
1. The order of the department head was not for disciplinary purposes but was for administrative purposes such as a reduction in force.
2. The disciplinary action related to off-duty activities unrelated to the required duties of the law enforcement officer. If the department head appeals the decision of the court, the court's award of any costs or attorney fees to an officer shall be stayed pending the conclusion of the appeal. If the department head's decision is upheld on appeal, the award of costs or attorney fees in favor of the officer shall be reversed.
C. If a law enforcement officer of a county, city or town described in section 38-1007 appeals from a decision of a department head in connection with the law enforcement officer's suspension greater than sixteen hours, demotion or dismissal and the county, city or town maintains a merit system or civil service plan for its employees, and the merit system or civil service plan appeals board exonerates the officer, the merit system or civil service plan appeals board may award, in whole or in part, the reasonable costs and attorney fees that the law enforcement officer incurred or were incurred on behalf of the law enforcement officer in connection with the appeal. The amount of the award by the merit system or civil service plan appeals board shall not exceed $10,000. If the department head appeals the decision of the merit system or civil service appeals board, the award of attorney fees shall be stayed pending the conclusion of the appeal. If the officer appeals to court the decision of the merit system or civil service plan appeals board, or of the city or town council or board of supervisors if the city, town or county has no such board, and the court exonerates the officer, the court may award, in whole or in part, the reasonable costs and attorney fees that the law enforcement officer incurred or were incurred on behalf of the law enforcement officer in connection with the appeal. The award of attorney fees by the governing body or court shall not exceed $15,000. An award of attorney fees under this subsection does not apply if either of the following applies:
1. The order of the department head was not for disciplinary purposes but was for administrative purposes such as a reduction in force.
2. The disciplinary action related to off-duty activities unrelated to the required duties of the law enforcement officer. If the department head appeals the decision of the court, the court's award of any costs or attorney fees to an officer shall be stayed pending the conclusion of the appeal. If the department head's decision is upheld on appeal, the award of costs or attorney fees in favor of the officer shall be reversed.
D. A department head shall have the right to have all council policies and decisions reviewed pursuant to title 12, chapter 7, article 6 in the superior court of the county in which the law enforcement officer resides and legal counsel for the department head shall be provided by the county or city attorney in whose jurisdiction the department lies.
E. Notwithstanding section 38-1106, subsection J, any appeal of a suspension, demotion or dismissal in which a single hearing officer or administrative law judge has been appointed by the merit system council or appeals board to conduct the appeal hearing shall be open to the public unless the hearing officer or administrative law judge determines that good cause exists to close the hearing.
Notes of Decisions
Stant v. City of Maricopa Emp. Merit Bd., 319 P.3d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 12× “After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the board concluded that Stant had violated department policy, the disciplinary measure was appropriate, and the termination was done in good faith for cause.”
Rash v. Town of Mammoth, 315 P.3d 1234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 10× “¶ 9 Here, Rash filed his special action pursuant to AR.S. § 38-1004, a statute authorizing a writ of certiorari in the superior court for either the employee or the law enforcement department to appeal the merit system council’s final decision on disciplinary action.”
Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 218 P.3d 1045 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“§ 38-1004(A). ¶ 28 We conclude that the portion of paragraph twenty-one providing for judicial review by the superior court pursuant to the ARA of the Board’s resolution of disputes between the County and petitioner Grosvenor is void.”
Pima Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Smith, 760 P.2d 1095 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 6× “The Council’s decisions are final unless appealed pursuant to A.R.S. § 38-1004. 1 A.R.S. § 38-1004 provides for appeal of the Council’s decision by either the employee or the Department.”
Ayala v. Hill, 664 P.2d 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 2× “The council’s determination thereon shall be final except on appeal as provided in § 38-1004. (emphasis added). Section 38-1004 provides in part: B.”
Pima Cnty. v. Pima Cnty. Law Enf't Merit Sys. Council, 99 P.3d 19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “¶ 9 The Council contends that, because A.R.S. § 38-1004(D) expressly authorizes only a “department head” to seek review of the Council’s decisions and policies, this court lacks “subject matter jurisdiction of this proceeding as it pertains to Pima County.”
Klein v. Pima Cnty. Law Enf't Merit Sys. Council, 579 P.2d 573 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 2× “Appellants contend the Pima County Law Enforcement Merit System Council erred when it found that they were not law enforcement officers and therefore not entitled to an appeal under A.R.S. § 38-1004. We agree. When appellants were “reclassified” by acting Sheriff Barr, they were…”
Fox v. Maricopa Co (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 9× “The superior court should have considered whether laches should bar this special action, and we vacate the order of dismissal and remand for the superior court’s analysis and application of that doctrine.”
Grosvenor Holdings v. Pinal Cnty. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “We note, moreover, as petitioners did in their reply, that the rule in Ayala that subjected a decision of the Commission to review pursuant to the ARA has since been amended, eliminating any reference to the ARA and providing instead that review shall be by a writ of certiorari…”
Pima Cnty. v. Klein, 644 P.2d 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 2× “The appeal to the superior court was pursuant to A.R.S. § 38-1004 for review upon writ of certiorari.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1004(0) — 1 case
Stant v. City of Maricopa Emp. Merit Bd., 319 P.3d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
“After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the board concluded that Stant had violated department policy, the disciplinary measure was appropriate, and the termination was done in good faith for cause.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1004(A) — 6 cases
Rash v. Town of Mammoth, 315 P.3d 1234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
“¶ 9 Here, Rash filed his special action pursuant to AR.S. § 38-1004, a statute authorizing a writ of certiorari in the superior court for either the employee or the law enforcement department to appeal the merit system council’s final decision on disciplinary action.”
Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 218 P.3d 1045 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“§ 38-1004(A). ¶ 28 We conclude that the portion of paragraph twenty-one providing for judicial review by the superior court pursuant to the ARA of the Board’s resolution of disputes between the County and petitioner Grosvenor is void.”
Stant v. City of Maricopa Emp. Merit Bd., 319 P.3d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
“After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the board concluded that Stant had violated department policy, the disciplinary measure was appropriate, and the termination was done in good faith for cause.”
Fox v. Maricopa Co (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
“The superior court should have considered whether laches should bar this special action, and we vacate the order of dismissal and remand for the superior court’s analysis and application of that doctrine.”
Grosvenor Holdings v. Pinal Cnty. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“We note, moreover, as petitioners did in their reply, that the rule in Ayala that subjected a decision of the Commission to review pursuant to the ARA has since been amended, eliminating any reference to the ARA and providing instead that review shall be by a writ of certiorari…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1004(B)(2) — 1 case
Stant v. City of Maricopa Emp. Merit Bd., 319 P.3d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
“After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the board concluded that Stant had violated department policy, the disciplinary measure was appropriate, and the termination was done in good faith for cause.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1004(C) — 2 cases
Stant v. City of Maricopa Emp. Merit Bd., 319 P.3d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
“After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the board concluded that Stant had violated department policy, the disciplinary measure was appropriate, and the termination was done in good faith for cause.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1004(D) — 1 case
Pima Cnty. v. Pima Cnty. Law Enf't Merit Sys. Council, 99 P.3d 19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
“¶ 9 The Council contends that, because A.R.S. § 38-1004(D) expressly authorizes only a “department head” to seek review of the Council’s decisions and policies, this court lacks “subject matter jurisdiction of this proceeding as it pertains to Pima County.”
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