Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

When time period commences as to claim under workers' compensation or occupational diseases act for death of worker due to contraction of disease. 100 A.L.R.5th 567.

Ark. L. Rev.

Workmen's Compensation — Statute of Limitations on Seeking Additional Benefits, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 148.

Leflar, Compensation for Work-Related Illness in Arkansas, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 89.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Notes, Workers' Compensation — Statute of Limitations on Seeking Additional Benefits. Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 576 S.W.2d 216 (1979), 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 513.

Arkansas Law Survey, Greene, Workers' Compensation, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 271.

Survey—Workers' Compensation, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 269.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Even though the Workers' Compensation Commission may not have authority to declare challenged statutes unconstitutional, such issues should first be raised at the administrative law judge or commission level. Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark. App. 333, 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982).

Appellant's constitutional challenge to the silicosis limitations statute failed for lack of proof that an arbitrary classification was involved or the statute was unsupported by a legitimate governmental interest. Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 25 Ark. App. 66, 752 S.W.2d 288 (1988), rehearing denied, 25 Ark. App. 66, 754 S.W.2d 850 (1988), review denied, 297 Ark. 24, 759 S.W.2d 792 (Ark. 1988).

Purpose.

The primary purpose of the one-year statute of limitations in subsection (b) of this section is to give the claimant that much extra time to decide whether he has been fully compensated for his injury; consistent with this purpose is the rule that the period is tolled so long as the claimant is being furnished medical services or is being “compensated” — it is the furnishing of the services that tolls the statute, not the payment thereof. Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126, 890 S.W.2d 253 (1994).

Applicability.

The statute of limitations does not apply to scheduled injuries. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 63 Ark. App. 160, 975 S.W.2d 863 (1998), rev'd, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).

While a two-year statute of limitations applied to the filing of a claim for workers' compensation benefits pursuant to subsection (a)(1), that limitations period did not apply to bar the employee's claim against the employer where the employee was not filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits, but instead was seeking to enforce an Illinois judgment he had already received based on an injury he sustained in Illnois while working for the employer; in that case, the 10-year limitations period for enforcement of judgments applied, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-114, and the enployee's claim was not barred under it. Dodson v. Taylor, 346 Ark. 443, 57 S.W.3d 710 (2001).

Employee's request to obtain a factual determination from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations in this section as the limitation period did not apply where employee was not making a claim for benefits. Johnson v. Bonds Fertilizer, Inc., 365 Ark. 133, 226 S.W.3d 753 (2006).

This section applies solely to claims for additional compensation; thus, it did not apply to a factual determination of whether claimant was a special employee because no claim for compensation had been filed against the company, only a third-party claim filed under § 11-9-402. Nucor Corp. v. Rhine, 366 Ark. 550, 237 S.W.3d 52 (2006).

Action at Law.

If in suit for damages it is found that a worker is an employee, not an independent contractor, then, upon further determination by the Workers' Compensation Commission, the employer or insurance carrier is entitled to claim the statutory allowance provided for in subsection (e). Co-Ark. Const. Co. v. Amsler, 234 Ark. 200, 352 S.W.2d 74 (1961).

The doctrine of election of remedies is not applicable where a workers' compensation claim is made subsequent to the filing of an action at law by an employee against an employer. Owens v. Bill & Tony's Liquor Store, 258 Ark. 887, 529 S.W.2d 354 (1975).

Filing a claim before the administrative agency of another state charged with the administration of its worker's compensation laws is not an action at law. Haney v. Young Sales Corp., 22 Ark. App. 212, 737 S.W.2d 669 (1987).

Dismissal.

Subdivision (a)(4) of this section grants the Commission authority to dismiss a claim without prejudice; under the authority granted by § 11-9-205(a)(1)(A), the Commission has promulgated a rule which provides that if a party requests that a claim be dismissed for want of prosecution, the Commission may dismiss the claim with prejudice. Johnson v. Triple T Foods, 55 Ark. App. 83, 929 S.W.2d 730 (1996).

Employer's Duty.

Medical treatments which are required so as to stabilize or maintain an injured worker are the responsibility of the employer under subsection (b) of this section. Artex Hydrophonics, Inc. v. Pippin, 8 Ark. App. 200, 649 S.W.2d 845 (1983).

Foreign Award.

A claimant, on the one hand, should be bound by his acceptance of an official award of compensation in one state if he had actively participated in the procurement of the award and if the employer or insurance carrier had not improperly or in bad faith channeled the claim into that state; if the claimant, on the other hand, did not know that the payments he was receiving were pursuant to the laws of another state, and the payments were not made under an official award, an employer's or carrier's contention that the payment was “under the laws of another state” was a self-serving claim which should not be given effect. Houston Contracting Co. v. Young, 267 Ark. 322, 590 S.W.2d 653 (1979).

Jurisdiction.

Where employee asserted a cause of action in circuit court based in part on this chapter and in part on the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., the circuit court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction. Malone v. Trans-States Lines, 325 Ark. 383, 926 S.W.2d 659 (1996).

Notice of Treatment.

Employer's failure to receive actual notice of follow-up treatment is not determinative of the limitations on claim for additional compensation where “payment of compensation” was made by employer by virtue of the medical services which were actually furnished within the limitations period and for which employer had reason to know would be furnished. Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126, 890 S.W.2d 253 (1994).

There is no better way for petitioner to decide whether he has been fully compensated than to return to his authorized physician or staff for follow-up treatments after surgery; moreover, there is no better illustration of medical services with respect to the provision of which an employer or carrier should have knowledge than follow-up treatment from an authorized surgery. The better practice would be for the employer to be actually notified of these follow-up visits, although the better practice is not what is required by this section. Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126, 890 S.W.2d 253 (1994).

Payment of Compensation.

The furnishing of medical services constitutes payment of compensation in the context of subsection (b) of this section, and such “payment” suspends the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation. Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126, 890 S.W.2d 253 (1994).

Statute of Limitations.

If injury becomes known to claimant his lack of knowledge as to the law on filing of claims is no defense, since one in full possession of his mental faculties should know that he should file a claim if he has an injury. Sanderson & Porter v. Crow, 214 Ark. 416, 216 S.W.2d 796 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Where, on appeal to Supreme Court in workers' compensation case, appellant did not make any argument in its brief of the defense of the statute of limitations it had urged below, the point would be treated as abandoned. W. Shanhouse & Sons v. Sims, 224 Ark. 86, 272 S.W.2d 68 (1954).

If a substantial doubt exists as to the applicable statute of limitations, the longer rather than the shorter limitation is to be preferred and adopted. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956); Guthrie v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 20 Ark. App. 69, 724 S.W.2d 187 (1987).

Where an employer or his insurance carrier furnishes an injured employee medical and hospital services, this constitutes a payment of compensation or waiver which suspends the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).

The time of disablement is the time when the employee actually became unable to perform his regular work. Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Smith, 233 Ark. 67, 342 S.W.2d 480 (1961); Arkansas Coal Co. v. Steele, 237 Ark. 727, 375 S.W.2d 673 (1964).

Where employee voluntarily refunded amounts compensation carrier had tendered as compensation and medical payments, the refunded amounts belonged to the employee and not to the carrier, and employee was entitled to them even though period of limitations for compensation claims had expired. Bryan v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 246 Ark. 327, 438 S.W.2d 472 (1969).

The limitations under this section run in favor of the employer, and a worker's compensation carrier cannot claim the benefit thereof unless the limitation has also run in favor of the employer. Browning's Restaurant v. Kuykendall, 263 Ark. 374, 565 S.W.2d 33 (1978).

The burden is not on the carrier to find out whether medical treatments are continuing; the burden is, rather, on the claimant to act within the time allowed. Superior Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Shelby, 265 Ark. 599, 580 S.W.2d 201 (1979).

While claims for replacement medicine may toll the running of the statute of limitations, such claims cannot revive once the statute has run against other forms of compensation. Terminal Van & Storage v. Hackler, 270 Ark. 113, 603 S.W.2d 893 (1980).

The statute of limitations does not run against replacement medicine and claimant could still receive replacement for medicine and drugs if she could establish a connection to the original injury; nevertheless, payment for replacement medicine does not revive a claim for additional benefits once the statute has run against other types of compensation. Terminal Van & Storage v. Hackler, 270 Ark. 113, 603 S.W.2d 893 (1980).

The purpose of the statute of limitations in workers' compensation cases is to permit prompt investigation and treatment of injuries. Woodard v. ITT Higbie Mfg. Co., 271 Ark. 498, 609 S.W.2d 115 (1980); St. John v. Arkansas Lime Co., 8 Ark. App. 278, 651 S.W.2d 104 (1983).

The statute of limitations provided in subsection (a) does not begin to run until the true extent of the injury manifests itself and causes an incapacity to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the accident, which wage loss continues long enough to entitle him to benefits under subchapter 5 of this chapter. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983); Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 38 Ark. App. 86, 829 S.W.2d 424, aff'd, 311 Ark. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992).

Where claimant was incapacitated to earn the wages he was receiving at the time of his accident and the incapacitation continued for a long enough period to entitle him to benefits under § 11-9-501, he sustained a compensable injury within the meaning of this section and the statute of limitations began running at that time, notwithstanding that the claimant was paid full wages during period of incapacitation. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983).

The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the employee knows or should reasonably be expected to be aware of the extent or nature of the injury. Freeman v. Tiffany Stand & Furn., 20 Ark. App. 183, 726 S.W.2d 294 (1987), appeal dismissed, American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 801 S.W.2d 55 (1991).

The burden of filing a claim within the statute of limitations is on the claimant. Plunkett v. St. Francis Valley Lumber Co., 25 Ark. App. 195, 755 S.W.2d 240 (1988).

The court cannot extend the period of the statute of limitations on appeal, despite the fact that the claim may be meritorious. Plunkett v. St. Francis Valley Lumber Co., 25 Ark. App. 195, 755 S.W.2d 240 (1988).

When the substantial character of the injury becomes known, then the claimant must file his claim within a specified period of time, or be barred thereafter by the statute of limitations. McDonald Equip. Co. v. Turner, 26 Ark. App. 264, 766 S.W.2d 936 (1989).

For purposes of commencing the statute of limitations under subdivision (a)(1), the word “injury” is to be construed as “compensable injury,” and an injury does not become “compensable” until (1) the injury develops or becomes apparent and (2) claimant suffers a loss in earnings on account of the injury; thus, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until both elements of the rule are met. Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 311 Ark. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992).

This state is technically a “compensable injury” state. Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 311 Ark. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992).

Although claimant's injury to her thumb had been apparent for some three years, it was not until she underwent surgery that the limitations period under subdivision (a)(1) commenced to run. Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 311 Ark. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992).

Because it was clear that the employer's reduction in workers' compensation payments to the employee was without benefit of an order to do so, and the employee was simply attempting to enforce the prior order in the employee's favor and not set forth a claim for additional benefits, this section did not bar the claim. Carroll Elec. Coop. v. Pack, 85 Ark. App. 293, 151 S.W.3d 324 (2004).

Because claimant's employer had previously paid claimant's medical expenses, his claim should have been one for “additional” benefits, however, regardless of whether the request was classified as an “initial” claim or an “additional” claim, claimant was entitled to benefits; if the claim was classified as a claim for “additional” benefits, then the claim, timely filed, tolled the statute of limitations, and if the claim was classified as a claim for “initial” benefits, it could not be dismissed without a hearing. Dillard v. Benton County Sheriff's Office, 87 Ark. App. 379, 192 S.W.3d 287 (2004).

Workers' compensation commission erred in finding that a claim was not barred by subsection (b) of this section and awarding benefits because it found that the claimant had obtained treatment for his shoulder on March 13, 2002 which was within one year of the December 2001 order of dismissal. Instead, the commission should have made a finding as to the last date of payment of compensation because the claim had to have been filed within one year of that date. Single Source Transp. v. Kent, 99 Ark. App. 153, 258 S.W.3d 416 (2007).

Where an employee sustained a compensable heart injury by inhaling toxic smoke and subsequently alleged that the inhalation of chemicals also caused permanent damage to the employee's lungs, the claim for a separate lung injury was barred by the statute of limitations because the employee did not effectively file a claim for a lung injury at the same time the employee filed the initial timely claim for a heart injury, and the “latent injury” rule did not save the claim. Martin Charcoal, Inc. v. Britt, 102 Ark. App. 252, 284 S.W.3d 91 (2008).

Claimant was entitled to receive additional workers' compensation benefits because he filed a claim for additional benefits within one year of his last date of compensation, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and because reasonable persons could find that the claimant's continued treatment was necessitated by his work-related injuries. Kent v. Single Source Transp., Inc., 103 Ark. App. 151, 287 S.W.3d 619 (2008), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 460 (Apr. 16, 2009).

Under subdivision (f)(2) of this section, the legislature intended to protect minors, residing with a natural parent who failed to pursue a claim on their behalf, by permitting them to file a claim after age eighteen; under subdivision (f)(2) and § 11-9-801, the legislature contemplated court action for the appointment of a guardian and the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission properly allowed the decedent's son's claim for dependent-death benefits pursuant to subdivision (f)(2). Hicks v. Bates, 104 Ark. App. 348, 292 S.W.3d 850 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 717 (Mar. 18, 2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 487 (June 4, 2009).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission properly held that an employee's 2005 claim for medical benefits for a 2000 injury was not time-barred by subsection (b) of this section because the claim was not for additional benefits, but was for the enforcement of a prior order; the employer had stopped paying for medical treatment, without an order to do so, that the employee received after May 2002. Care Manor v. Wheeler, 2009 Ark. App. 132, 307 S.W.3d 32 (2009).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that the claim for additional benefits was barred by the statute of limitations, because the conclusion that the entry of the agreed order resolved the request for additional benefits and effectively adjudicated the claim for additional benefits ignored the statutory language allowing for an injured employee to pursue additional benefits when the need indisputably arose within the statutory framework; the case was never dismissed pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the agreed order granted a continuing award of benefits which included the physician referral. Curtis v. Big Lots, 2009 Ark. App. 292, 307 S.W.3d 37 (2009).

Workers' Compensation Commission erroneously concluded that the claim for additional benefits was time barred, because the claimant's timely request for additional medical benefits tolled the statute of limitations until the claim was finally and completely litigated, not only on the general medical-benefit claim but on all benefits that might flow from that specific request. Stewart v. Ark. Glass Container, 2009 Ark. App. 300, 307 S.W.3d 614 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 680 (May 27, 2009), rev'd, Stewart v. Ark. Glass Container & Risk Mgmt. Res., 2010 Ark. 198, 366 S.W.3d 358 (2010).

When appellant developed problems with her fingers in 1993 and 1994 while working on the assembly of motors, she received medical treatment during those years. Although she complained about her thumb in 2005, this was not a new injury; her claim for additional benefits filed in 2007 was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in subdivision (a)(1) and subsection (b) of this section. DeSpain v. Franklin Elec. Co., 2009 Ark. App. 770 (2009).

Pursuant to this section, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the employee's claim was time barred as his present claim was characterized as one for additional benefits; the services were not considered at the time of the previous opinion. Gardner v. Beverly Enters., 2009 Ark. App. 787 (2009).

Claimant's request for additional medical benefits was time-barred under this section because it was not filed one year from when the claimant last received medical benefits or two years from date of the claimant's injury; the claimant's request for change of physician and an administrative law judge's order on a prior claim that was dismissed in its entirety did not toll the statute. Stewart v. Ark. Glass Container & Risk Mgmt. Res., 2010 Ark. 198, 366 S.W.3d 358 (2010).

Permanent disability claims were barred by the statute of limitations in subdivision (b)(1) of this section because, although a claimant filed a timely request for additional medical treatment, she failed to request permanent-disability benefits until more than one year after the last payment of compensation by an employer. Flores v. Walmart Distrubution, 2012 Ark. App. 201 (2012).

Because the last payment for an employee's 2001 back injury was in 2001, any additional compensation for that injury was clearly barred by 2010 pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Raulston v. Waste Mgmt., 2012 Ark. App. 272, 411 S.W.3d 711 (2012).

Company was entitled to a writ of prohibition, because the lung disease and silicosis claim was covered by the Workers' Compensation Law, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the claimant's alleged disease from his exposure at home was covered under the Law; the time of disablement was within three years of his last injurious exposure, and the claimant failed to file his claim within the one-year limitation period. Porocel Corp. v. Circuit Court of Saline County, 2013 Ark. 172 (2013).

Statute of repose creates a substantive right to be free from liability after a legislatively determined period of time, and subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section represents a policy-driven, legislative judgment to shield an employer from claims that arise three years after the last injurious exposure; coupled with the exclusive-remedy provision, it was not the intent to absolve an employer of liability after a period of time only to subject the employer to liability in tort after that period. Hendrix v. Alcoa, Inc., 2016 Ark. 453, 506 S.W.3d 230 (2016).

Circuit court properly dismissed an estate's wrongful-death and survival action against a decedent's employer on the ground that the claims fell within the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Law because the claims were within the coverage formula of the law, even though the decedent was ultimately denied recovery due to his asbestos claim being time-barred under the law. Hendrix v. Alcoa, Inc., 2016 Ark. 453, 506 S.W.3d 230 (2016).

Where the deceased employee had retired from his employment in 1995 but was not diagnosed with mesothelioma until 2012 and thus his workers' compensation claim was barred by subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section, his estate's civil action against the employer for wrongful death also failed; because the Workers' Compensation Law covered occupational diseases and asbestos-related claims, the exclusive-remedy provision applied to bar the civil action. Hendrix v. Alcoa, Inc., 2016 Ark. 453, 506 S.W.3d 230 (2016).

—Additional Compensation.

The cost of medicine and medical, surgical, or hospital services provided under this chapter is compensation within the meaning of subsection (b), allowing additional claim to be filed for injuries within one year from the last payment of compensation. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).

Provision of subsection (b) makes no distinction between voluntary payment of compensation and payments made as the result of an award or order of the commission after a hearing and applies to both cases. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).

Where there was doubt as to whether employee's claim for additional compensation after receipt of compensation was governed by the six-month period provided by § 11-9-713 for modification of an award or by subsection (b) of this section, the longer period provided by this section was favored. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).

Primary purpose of the one-year statute is to give the claimant that much extra time to decide whether he has been fully compensated for his injury, not for the purpose of paying belated medical bills. Phillips v. Bray, 234 Ark. 190, 351 S.W.2d 147 (1961); Perkins v. Arkansas State Hwy. Dep't, 5 Ark. App. 203, 634 S.W.2d 399 (1982).

Subsection (b) is applicable only when a claimant had received compensation and then sought additional compensation. Miller v. Southern Mach. & Iron Works, 239 Ark. 218, 388 S.W.2d 391 (1965).

Subsection (b) cannot be used to extend the period within which death benefit can be claimed beyond one year from date of death. Miller v. Southern Mach. & Iron Works, 239 Ark. 218, 388 S.W.2d 391 (1965).

While the furnishing of additional medical services is compensation and constitutes payment so as to suspend the running of the statutory limitation, the limitation runs from the date of the furnishing of the medical services and not the date of payment therefor by the employer or insurance carrier. Heflin v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 244 Ark. 195, 424 S.W.2d 365 (1968).

Medical treatment furnished the employee constitutes the payment of compensation, and the statutory period of limitation for filing a claim with the commission for additional compensation starts running from the date of last treatment. McFall v. United States Tobacco Co., 246 Ark. 43, 436 S.W.2d 838 (1969).

In a claim for additional compensation the statute of limitations only commences at the date the last payment would have been due if the compensation had been paid in installments instead of a lump-sum settlement. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Friar, 247 Ark. 98, 444 S.W.2d 556 (1969).

A claim for additional compensation is to be treated as a continuation of the original demand for compensation, and in fixing the attorney's fee thereon the action of the commission in the parent case is to be considered, while the maximum fee shall be within the fixed limitations of § 11-9-715 and shall not exceed certain percentages of compensation awarded. Norsworthy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 249 Ark. 159, 458 S.W.2d 401 (1970).

An employer's offer to provide medical services from one source or another for an employee who has returned to work following a period of temporary disability did not amount to the payment of compensation within the meaning of subsection (b). Industrial, Inc. v. Pierce, 263 Ark. 11, 563 S.W.2d 1 (1978).

The manifest purpose of the 1968 amendment to subsection (b) of this section was to extend the statute with respect to an employee's right to obtain the replacement of medicine, crutches, artificial limbs, and other apparatus that would be permanently or indefinitely required as a result of the original compensable injury. Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 576 S.W.2d 216 (1979).

The one-year statute governing claims for additional compensation runs from the last payment of compensation, which means the furnishing of medical services. Superior Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Shelby, 265 Ark. 599, 580 S.W.2d 201 (1979).

Evidence sufficient to support the commission's finding that the medical treatment afforded claimant effectively tolled the running of the statute of limitation, and therefore the employer was liable for the additional medical expenses incurred by the claimant. Salant & Salant, Inc. v. Williams, 267 Ark. 987, 593 S.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1980).

There is only one consistent, harmonious construction to be placed on the relationship between subsection (b) of this section and § 11-9-713 in an effort to make them both effective: Where a claimant seeks additional benefits after a final award, § 11-9-713 governs as to the grounds required, and subsection (b) of this section governs the period of limitation for all claims for additional benefits whether or not there has been a final award. Southern Wooden Box Co. v. Smith, 5 Ark. App. 14, 631 S.W.2d 620 (1982).

A claimant is not entitled under Arkansas law to obtain additional benefits after a final award without a showing that he has experienced a change in physical condition; a change in economic conditions is not a sufficient ground for reopening an award. Southern Wooden Box Co. v. Smith, 5 Ark. App. 14, 631 S.W.2d 620 (1982).

The burden of filing a claim for additional benefits within the statute of limitations is upon the claimant. St. John v. Arkansas Lime Co., 8 Ark. App. 278, 651 S.W.2d 104 (1983).

Where claim was not an original claim for compensation and the employer was fully aware of the injury and its compensability, counsel's letter notifying the Workers' Compensation Commission that he had been employed to assist the claimant in connection with unpaid benefits, and listing the claimant's name, the employer's name, and the WCC file number was sufficient to constitute a claim for additional benefits. Cook v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 21 Ark. App. 29, 727 S.W.2d 862 (1987).

Period of limitations prescribed in subsection (b) is tolled where a person hired in Arkansas receives benefits under the law of another state where he is injured, but does not actively initiate the proceedings and remains unaware of the source of the payments. Haney v. Young Sales Corp., 22 Ark. App. 212, 737 S.W.2d 669 (1987).

“Replacement medicine” is “medicine”, and therefore, payment for replacement medicine is “payment of compensation” within meaning of subsection (b) of this section. Furnishing of replacement medicine may toll running of statute, but if more than one year passes between furnishing of replacement medicine to claimant, a claim for additional compensation may well be barred by statute because such claims are not revived once statute has run. Evans v. Northwest Tire Serv., 23 Ark. App. 11, 740 S.W.2d 151 (1987), aff'd, Northwest Tire Serv. v. Evans, 295 Ark. 246, 748 S.W.2d 134 (1988).

When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of, and in the course of, the employment, the employer is responsible for every natural consequence that flows from that injury. If, after the period of initial disability has subsided, the injury flares up without an intervening cause and creates a second disability, it is a mere recurrence, and the employer remains liable if the claim is made within the greater of two years after the injury or one year after the date on which compensation was last paid. However, if the second period of disability is the result of a second incident which contributes independently to the injury, it is a new one for which the employer becomes liable, and the statute of limitations begins to run anew, even though the prior condition may contribute to a major part of the final condition. McDonald Equip. Co. v. Turner, 26 Ark. App. 264, 766 S.W.2d 936 (1989).

In determining the date of the last payment of compensation under subsection (b), the date of receipt of the last payment rather than the due date is controlling. Myles v. Paragould Sch. Dist., 28 Ark. App. 81, 770 S.W.2d 675 (1989).

Subsection (b) governs only the time in which a claimant, suffering a recurrence of an earlier fully compensated “compensable injury,” must file a claim for “additional compensation.” Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 311 Ark. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992).

Where claim, filed after insurer discontinued payment of disability benefits in 1988, was one for enforcement of the commission's 1986 order, rather than a request for “additional” compensation, the claim was not barred by subsection (b) of this section. Helena Contracting Co. v. Williams, 45 Ark. App. 137, 872 S.W.2d 423 (1994).

Claimant's treatment by physician was not based on a valid referral and the claim for additional compensation was barred by the statute of limitations when it was filed more than one year after date of last compensation payment and more than two years after the injury. Pennington v. Gene Cosby Floor & Carpet, 51 Ark. App. 128, 911 S.W.2d 600 (1995).

A 1995 claim for medical benefits was a claim for “additional compensation” and was not merely a request to enforce a 1981 opinion, since all of the benefits and compensation awarded in the 1981 opinion were paid prior to the issuance of that opinion and the claimant neither sought nor required any further medical treatment between 1981 and 1995. Joe Brennan Gen. Contracting v. Adair, 62 Ark. App. 240, 971 S.W.2d 798 (1998).

Employee's claim for additional compensation benefits following a knee replacement in 2003 for an injury that occurred in 1971 was not barred by the statute of limitations or by the doctrine of laches as the rehabilitation of employee's knee could not have been litigated earlier, and the limitations statute did not apply to replacement of the knee joint. Jones Truck Lines v. Pendergrass, 90 Ark. App. 402, 206 S.W.3d 272 (2005).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation correctly determined that claimant's request for additional benefits was barred by the statute of limitations because he did not request his shoulder surgery until more than one year after the last payment of benefits. Eskola v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 93 Ark. App. 250, 218 S.W.3d 372 (2005).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that subsection (b) of this section did not bar a worker's claim for additional benefits where the date of his last injections for left carpal tunnel syndrome was well within one year of the date the worker made his claim for additional benefits requesting release surgery. Nucor Yamato Steel Co. v. Kennedy, 2017 Ark. App. 126, 513 S.W.3d 895 (2017).

While claimant's medical treatment continued during a five-year gap in indemnity payments, the fact remained that the indemnity payments stopped for a period of five years before being resumed, and claimant failed to file any claim for benefits during that time; thus, claimant's claim for indemnity payments was barred under subdivision (b)(1) of this section by his failure to raise the claim within the appropriate period of time after his former employer ceased paying indemnity benefits, and the employer's gratuitous payment of indemnity benefits did not revive the statute of limitations. Kirk v. Cent. States Mfg., 2018 Ark. App. 78, 540 S.W.3d 714 (2018).

Under a plain reading of subsection (b) of this section, a workers' compensation claimant's application for additional medical benefits was not time-barred where there was no authority for the employer unilaterally imposing a pre-authorization condition on the benefits it provided for a compensable injury, the Commission's findings that the authorized treating physician's continued treatment in 2017 for claimant's right leg pain was reasonable and necessary and was sufficiently related to her right knee injury were supported by substantial evidence, and the claimant filed an application for additional benefits within one year of the 2017 treatment. Lavaca Sch. Dist. v. Hatfield, 2019 Ark. App. 360, 584 S.W.3d 262 (2019).

Workers' compensation claimant did request additional medical benefits for purposes of subsection (c) of this section even though the word “additional” was not used where a prehearing order stated on its face that some benefits had been previously paid, and a claim request cannot be considered to be both an initial request for compensation and a request for additional compensation at the same time. White Cty. Judge v. Menser, 2019 Ark. App. 523, 589 S.W.3d 384 (2019), review granted, 2020 Ark. LEXIS 42 (Jan. 23, 2020).

Although it is clear from the plain language of subsection (c) of this section that a claim for additional compensation must specifically state that it is a request for additional benefits, it does not mandate that a claim must use any magic words in doing so. In other words, a claim is not necessarily untimely if it does not use the specific word “additional”. White Cty. Judge v. Menser, 2019 Ark. App. 523, 589 S.W.3d 384 (2019), review granted, 2020 Ark. LEXIS 42 (Jan. 23, 2020).

Employer's argument that the statute of limitations was no longer tolled after a hearing was canceled was rejected where a prehearing order was filed, the parties agreed to continue the hearing to complete discovery, a hearing was not requested again until over two years later, the claim was placed on inactive status, and a final order had not been entered at that time. White Cty. Judge v. Menser, 2019 Ark. App. 523, 589 S.W.3d 384 (2019), review granted, 2020 Ark. LEXIS 42 (Jan. 23, 2020).

—Claim Barred.

When the injured employee filed his claim for additional workers' compensation benefits within the statute of limitations but the form named the incorrect employer and the employee then submitted a corrected claim form naming the correct employer one day after the limitations period expired, the employee's claim for additional benefits was barred by the statute of limitations in this section. Farris v. Express Servs., Inc., 2019 Ark. 141, 572 S.W.3d 863 (2019).

—Claim Not Barred.

Substantial evidence supported the decision that the claimant's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was a compensable injury and the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations; the claimant's gradual-onset injury did not become apparent to the claimant until October 2013, when she reported work-related symptoms to her supervisor, she had been diagnosed with severe bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as she performed repetitive gripping at work, and she filed her workers' compensation claim no later than March 2014, and nothing indicated that the Workers' Compensation Commission used the manifestation approach that had previously been rejected by the court. La-Z-Boy Mfg., Inc. v. Bruner, 2016 Ark. App. 117, 484 S.W.3d 700 (2016).

Workers' compensation claim was not time-barred even though it was filed more than two years after the date of the injury where the employer had told the employee he did not have workers' compensation insurance, the employer had actual notice of the injury on the date of the injury, and the employer's own testimony showed that he failed to post notice that he had subsequently obtained workers' compensation insurance or notify the employee of the same after the injury. Graves v. Hopper, 2018 Ark. App. 193, 547 S.W.3d 448 (2018).

—Disease.

Where there was evidence to show that claimant had quit his work more than a year before bringing action because of silicosis the court would not reverse a finding of the commission that the claim was not filed within the statutory period. Rannals v. Smokeless Coal Co., 229 Ark. 919, 319 S.W.2d 218 (1959).

In silicosis cases the statute of limitations commences to run at the time of disablement and not at the time the claimant learns he is suffering from the disease, and that disablement does not occur until the employee is unable to work and earn his usual wages. Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark. App. 333, 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982).

—Estoppel.

Where claimant testified that he never saw the statutorily required form posted anywhere on the employer's premises, it was incumbent on the employer to offer evidence to show that the required notice had been posted as required by Arkansas law, and in the absence of such evidence employer was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. Rider v. Julian Martin, Inc., 31 Ark. App. 144, 789 S.W.2d 743 (1990).

—Latent Injuries.

If injury is latent, the statute of limitations for filing of claim does not begin to run until the date the injury becomes known. Sanderson & Porter v. Crow, 214 Ark. 416, 216 S.W.2d 796 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Filing of claim for latent injury barred. Sanderson & Porter v. Crow, 214 Ark. 416, 216 S.W.2d 796 (1949) (decision under prior law); St. John v. Arkansas Lime Co., 8 Ark. App. 278, 651 S.W.2d 104 (1983).

Injury to claimant's eye was patent, not latent, and therefore, his claim for additional compensation for the complete loss of the eye was barred by the two-year statutory period of limitation from the date of the injury. Cornish Welding Shop v. Galbraith, 278 Ark. 185, 644 S.W.2d 926 (1983).

Under the latent injury theory, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the substantial character of the injury becomes known. St. John v. Arkansas Lime Co., 8 Ark. App. 278, 651 S.W.2d 104 (1983).

The fact that the initial injury was a compensable one within the meaning of the act does not necessarily mean that the statute of limitations bars the claim at the end of two years from that date; where the full extent and nature of the injury are not known, nor reasonably ought to be known, until a later date, the running of the statute of limitations may be postponed under the latent injury rule. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983).

If the employer can show to the satisfaction of the commission that the claimant knew the substantial nature of the injury or that he should reasonably be expected to have been aware of the extent and nature of his injury for more than two years his claim would be barred. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983).

Commission's finding that injury was a latent one held not supported by substantial evidence. McDonald Equip. Co. v. Turner, 26 Ark. App. 264, 766 S.W.2d 936 (1989).

A work-related noise-induced hearing-loss injury does not become compensable until (1) the injury develops or becomes apparent and (2) the claimant suffers a loss in earnings on account of the injury, which loss is conclusively presumed; because the statute of limitation does not begin to run until both elements of the rule are met, and because of the conclusive presumption as to loss of earnings, which satisfies the second element, the statute of limitation with respect to work-related noise-induced hearing loss begins to run when the hearing loss becomes apparent to the claimant. 3M v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).

The statute of limitations began to run with regard to the claimant's hearing loss when he was notified by his employer that a hearing test showed a decrease in his hearing ability, notwithstanding that he suffered no actual loss of earnings at that time. ALCOA v. Carlisle, 67 Ark. App. 61, 992 S.W.2d 172 (1999).

In the context of latent injuries, the appellate court found no language in Acts 1993, No. 796 that expressed a clear intention that it was to be applied retroactively, nor did the appellate court find that retroactive application of the Act was necessarily implied; thus, where employee had last received temporary total disability benefits for her wrist injury in 1994, and in 2000 she suffered additional complications when a pin was removed from her wrist (the pin was placed in her wrist shortly after the injury in 1992), she was entitled to have her claim for additional benefits considered under the law in effect at the time of her injury. Taylor v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 89 Ark. App. 327, 202 S.W.3d 565 (2005).

—Timeliness.

Filing held not timely. Kimpel v. Garland Anthony Lumber Co., 216 Ark. 788, 227 S.W.2d 932 (1950) (decision under prior law); Wilson v. Border Queen Kitchen Cabinet Co., 221 Ark. 580, 254 S.W.2d 682 (Ark. 1953); Shaw v. Keeshin Poultry Co., 227 Ark. 90, 296 S.W.2d 400 (1956); Key v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 228 Ark. 585, 309 S.W.2d 190 (1958); Phillips v. Bray, 234 Ark. 190, 351 S.W.2d 147 (1961); Shelby Electric Co. v. Duran, 243 Ark. 344, 419 S.W.2d 798 (Ark. 1967); Hudgens v. Southern Extrusions, Inc., 244 Ark. 470, 425 S.W.2d 718 (1968); Hopper v. Rust Eng'g Co., 251 Ark. 698, 474 S.W.2d 414 (1971); Petit Jean Air Serv. v. Wilson, 251 Ark. 871, 475 S.W.2d 531 (1972); Industrial, Inc. v. Pierce, 263 Ark. 11, 563 S.W.2d 1 (1978); Terminal Van & Storage v. Hackler, 270 Ark. 113, 603 S.W.2d 893 (1980); Seawright v. Seawright Super Saver, 1 Ark. App. 26, 613 S.W.2d 102 (1981); Perkins v. Arkansas State Hwy. Dep't, 5 Ark. App. 203, 634 S.W.2d 399 (1982); St. John v. Arkansas Lime Co., 8 Ark. App. 278, 651 S.W.2d 104 (1983); Haney v. Young Sales Corp., 22 Ark. App. 212, 737 S.W.2d 669 (1987); Garrett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 43 Ark. App. 37, 858 S.W.2d 146 (1993); Chambers v. International Paper Co., 56 Ark. App. 90, 938 S.W.2d 861 (1997).

Filing held timely. Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 206 Ark. 854, 177 S.W.2d 920 (1944); Donaldson v. Calvert McBride Printing Co., 217 Ark. 625, 232 S.W.2d 651 (1950); T.J. Moss Tie & Timber Co. v. Martin, 220 Ark. 265, 247 S.W.2d 198 (1952) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956); Parrish Esso Serv. Ctr. v. Adams, 237 Ark. 560, 374 S.W.2d 468 (1964); Jones Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Evans, 244 Ark. 242, 424 S.W.2d 880 (1968); Dura Craft Boats, Inc. v. Daugherty, 247 Ark. 125, 444 S.W.2d 562 (1969); Dresser Minerals v. Hunt, 262 Ark. 280, 556 S.W.2d 138 (1977); Browning's Restaurant v. Kuykendall, 263 Ark. 374, 565 S.W.2d 33 (1978); Desoto, Inc. v. Parsons, 267 Ark. 665, 590 S.W.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1979); Ashcraft v. Hunter, 268 Ark. 946, 597 S.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1980); Woodard v. ITT Higbie Mfg. Co., 271 Ark. 498, 609 S.W.2d 115 (1980); Shepherd v. Easterling Constr. Co., 7 Ark. App. 192, 646 S.W.2d 37 (1983); Guthrie v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 20 Ark. App. 69, 724 S.W.2d 187 (1987); Freeman v. Tiffany Stand & Furn., 20 Ark. App. 183, 726 S.W.2d 294 (1987), appeal dismissed, American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 801 S.W.2d 55 (1991); Cook v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 21 Ark. App. 29, 727 S.W.2d 862 (1987).

The plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations where he was injured in 1993, he sought benefits for treatment he received in 1999, and the record contained substantial evidence that he suffered no incapacity to earn wages during the intervening six years. Haygood Ltd. Pshp. v. Whisenant, 74 Ark. App. 185, 47 S.W.3d 277 (2001).

Employee's workers' compensation claim was within the two-year period set forth in § 11-9-702 because the employee's hearing loss stabilized in 2001 when he retired and was no longer exposed to occupational noise; thus, his claim in July 2002 was within the required time-frame. The statute of limitations did not begin to run until a scheduled injury was permanent and a rating could be attributed to the injury. Powers v. City of Fayetteville, 97 Ark. App. 251, 248 S.W.3d 516 (2007).

Claim for permanent-partial-disability benefits in 2000 was not time barred because it was filed in 1994; a hearing in 1995 did not lift the toll on the limitations period under § 11-9-702(b) because the parties agreed not to litigate the issue in 1995 where the employee was still in the healing period for a shoulder injury. Vanwagner v. Wal-Mart Stores, 368 Ark. 606, 249 S.W.3d 123 (2007).

According to the administrative law judge, the only time the claimant could prove mold to be present in her workplace was in August 2008, and she was exposed from that time until September 2008, when all employees were removed from the building, and thus as of October 2008, the claimant's exposure to mold must have ended; the claimant would have had until October 2010 to file a claim, but as her claim was filed in 2011, it was time-barred, and the decision was affirmed. Livermore v. Madison County, 2014 Ark. App. 617, 447 S.W.3d 130 (2014).

—Tolling the Statute.

Action in another state's court under its workers' compensation statute to recover money for injuries sustained by claimant tolled the statute until the termination of the action. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jordan, 234 Ark. 339, 352 S.W.2d 75 (1961).

Subsection (e) as a prerequisite to the tolling of the statute of limitations requires (1) an action at law to recover damages, (2) a denial of recovery, and (3) that the denial be on the ground that the employee and his employer were subject to this chapter. Bryan v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 246 Ark. 327, 438 S.W.2d 472 (1969); Guthrie v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 20 Ark. App. 69, 724 S.W.2d 187 (1987); Haney v. Young Sales Corp., 22 Ark. App. 212, 737 S.W.2d 669 (1987); Plunkett v. St. Francis Valley Lumber Co., 25 Ark. App. 195, 755 S.W.2d 240 (1988).

Evidence insufficient to find that statute of limitations was tolled. Bryan v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 246 Ark. 327, 438 S.W.2d 472 (1969); Haney v. Young Sales Corp., 22 Ark. App. 212, 737 S.W.2d 669 (1987).

Payment of wages to a disabled employee does not toll the statute unless the employer is aware or should be aware that it constitutes payment of compensation for the injury, and where the employee actually earns his wages by performing his regular duties after the injury, the presumption is that the wages are being paid for value received, and not in lieu of compensation. McFall v. United States Tobacco Co., 246 Ark. 43, 436 S.W.2d 838 (1969).

The running of the statute of limitations on claims for medical and hospital expenses is not tolled by a wrongful refusal by the insurance carrier to make further payments and, although the Workers' Compensation Commission has the authority to order payment of the claims regardless of this section, where it has not done so the court cannot extend the period of the statute on appeal, despite the meritoriousness of the claim. Miller v. Everett, 252 Ark. 824, 481 S.W.2d 335 (1972).

Evidence sufficient to find that statute of limitations was tolled. Mohawk Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brider, 257 Ark. 587, 518 S.W.2d 499 (1975); Mohawk Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brider, 259 Ark. 728, 536 S.W.2d 126 (1976); Salant & Salant, Inc. v. Williams, 267 Ark. 987, 593 S.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1980); Franklin County Rd. Dep't v. Nordin, 270 Ark. 177, 603 S.W.2d 477 (1980); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Lamberson, 5 Ark. App. 191, 634 S.W.2d 396 (1982); Bledsoe v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 12 Ark. App. 293, 675 S.W.2d 849 (1984), cert. denied, 284 Ark. 439, 683 S.W.2d 222 (Ark. 1985); Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Giles, 20 Ark. App. 154, 725 S.W.2d 583 (1987).

It is obvious that when this section is tolled by the actual furnishing of services, the statute is not tolled again when the services are paid for, since one transaction cannot interrupt the statute twice. Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 576 S.W.2d 216 (1979).

A claimant may not toll the statute under subsection (b) merely by refilling a prescription, since § 11-9-508 specifically says that the medication must be reasonably necessary for the injury suffered and what is considered reasonably necessary will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Alred v. Jackson Atl., Inc., 268 Ark. 695, 595 S.W.2d 249 (1980).

Payments for medicine are a part of compensation within the meaning of subsection (b) of this section for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations of this chapter. Alred v. Jackson Atl., Inc., 268 Ark. 695, 595 S.W.2d 249 (1980).

The employee's claim for additional medical benefits was not barred because the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of a claim for additional workers' compensation benefits within the statutory period. Sisney v. Leisure Lodges, Inc., 17 Ark. App. 96, 704 S.W.2d 173 (1986); Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Giles, 20 Ark. App. 154, 725 S.W.2d 583 (1987); Cook v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 21 Ark. App. 29, 727 S.W.2d 862 (1987).

An action at law for damages need not be filed within the period prescribed by subdivision (a)(1) in order to give effect to the tolling provision in subsection (e). Guthrie v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 20 Ark. App. 69, 724 S.W.2d 187 (1987).

Subsection (e) does not apply to the filing of a claim before the administrative agency in another state which administers its workers' compensation laws. Subsection (e) was not intended to apply to claims for statutory benefits for industrial injuries filed before the workers' compensation agencies of sister states but was designed to allow an extension of the period of limitations for the filing of claims by those who mistakenly pursued tort claims against their employers, when in fact the exclusive remedies afforded for their injuries were under the Workers' Compensation Act. Haney v. Young Sales Corp., 22 Ark. App. 212, 737 S.W.2d 669 (1987).

The furnishing, by an employer, of replacement medicine to an injured employee is payment of “compensation” and thus tolls the statute of limitations applicable to a workers' compensation claim. Northwest Tire Serv. v. Evans, 295 Ark. 246, 748 S.W.2d 134 (1988).

Where a claim for additional compensation was filed on January 14, 1992, and the injury occurred on October 26, 1987, obviously more than two years prior to the filing, the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, because the employee's visit to his physician in September, 1991, tolled the statute for one year under subsection (b) of this section; the date of the last payment of compensation has been equated with the date of the furnishing of medical services. Conway Printing Co. v. Higdon, 45 Ark. App. 185, 873 S.W.2d 172 (1994).

The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant sustains an actual loss of earnings. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 63 Ark. App. 160, 975 S.W.2d 863 (1998), rev'd, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).

A request for a change of physician can constitute a claim for additional compensation and toll the statute of limitations. Spencer v. Stone Container Corp., 72 Ark. App. 450, 38 S.W.3d 909 (2001).

Medical treatments received by the claimant in 1997 and 1998 following a 1992 injury did not toll the statute of limitations because there was substantial evidence to support the finding that the treatments at issue were related primarily to asthma and bronchitis and were not reasonably necessary in connection with her 1992 injuries. Spencer v. Stone Container Corp., 72 Ark. App. 450, 38 S.W.3d 909 (2001).

Employee's claim for additional benefits was barred as an initial claim for benefits was decided by a prior 2000 decision that was not appealed; the prior claim did not toll the statute of limitations in this section when employee made an additional claim for benefits in 2004. Barnes v. Fort Smith Pub. Schs., 95 Ark. App. 248, 235 S.W.3d 905 (2006).

Prehearing order, which stated that a workers' compensation claimant was seeking, among other things, additional temporary total disability benefits and wage-loss benefits in excess of his already established permanent impairment rating, tolled the running of the statute of limitations under subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) of this section. Bryant Sch. Dist. v. Aylor, 2011 Ark. App. 173, 381 S.W.3d 895 (2011).

Worker's generic Form AR-C was insufficient to toll the limitations period in subsection (b) of this section where she did not specifically list that she suffered neck and shoulder injuries, chose to leave her claim for injuries open-ended, and by checking all the boxes on the form, she provided no information about the type of claim asserted. Wal-Mart Assocs. v. Armstrong, 2017 Ark. App. 175, 516 S.W.3d 310 (2017).

—Waiver.

Employer did not assert his defenses of failure of employee to give notice and running of the statute of limitations at the initial hearing, and they could not be raised for the first time on appeal. International Paper Co. v. Langley, 251 Ark. 859, 475 S.W.2d 686 (1972).

Sufficiency.

Report of employer to commission that employee had been killed and advising commission that deceased had been supporting his father followed by letters between commission and insurer relative to investigation did not constitute filing of a claim, since no request or demand was made for payment by dependents. Little v. Smith, 223 Ark. 601, 267 S.W.2d 511 (1954).

Time of Injury.

This section limits the two-year period from the date of the accident, and not from the date the injury was discovered. Furr v. Harding Glass Co., 240 Ark. 92, 398 S.W.2d 215 (1966).

For purposes of determining the limitations period on claims for additional compensation, injury means the state of facts which first entitled the claimant to compensation, so that if the injury does not develop until some time after the accident, the cause of action does not arise until the injury develops or becomes apparent. Cornish Welding Shop v. Galbraith, 278 Ark. 185, 644 S.W.2d 926 (1983); Freeman v. Tiffany Stand & Furn., 20 Ark. App. 183, 726 S.W.2d 294 (1987), appeal dismissed, American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 801 S.W.2d 55 (1991).

The date of the accident and the date of the injury are not necessarily the same. St. John v. Arkansas Lime Co., 8 Ark. App. 278, 651 S.W.2d 104 (1983).

Disability is defined as incapacity because of injury to earn, in the same or any other employment, the wages the employee was receiving at the time of his injury. Freeman v. Tiffany Stand & Furn., 20 Ark. App. 183, 726 S.W.2d 294 (1987), appeal dismissed, American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 801 S.W.2d 55 (1991).

The date of the accident and the date of the injury are not necessarily the same, because the time of the injury means a compensable injury, and an injury does not become compensable until the claimant suffers a loss in earnings. Hall's Cleaners v. Wortham, 38 Ark. App. 86, 829 S.W.2d 424, aff'd, 311 Ark. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992).

Claim for compensation for disability on account of an injury should be barred unless filed within two years of the compensable injury; the date of the compensable injury is defined as the date an injury was caused by an accident as set forth in subdivision (5). Cromwell v. Univ. of Ark., 76 Ark. App. 5, 61 S.W.3d 864 (2001).

Although the claimant claimed that her last injurious mold exposure was in June 2011 because mold testing showed that mold levels were at acceptable levels, the statute is worded in terms of injurious exposure, and acceptable levels of mold would not be comparable to injurious exposure; the administrative law judge explained why he gave no real weight to the testing the claimant offered, and the decision that the claim was time-barred was affirmed. Livermore v. Madison County, 2014 Ark. App. 617, 447 S.W.3d 130 (2014).

Cited: Heekin Can Co. v. Watson, 239 Ark. 1152, 396 S.W.2d 929 (1965); Barentine v. Gleghorn Oil Co., 254 Ark. 182, 492 S.W.2d 242 (1973); Ethridge v. Alexander Brown & Associates, 258 Ark. 444, 527 S.W.2d 591 (1975); Houston Contracting Co. v. Young, 267 Ark. 44, 589 S.W.2d 9 (1979); Ashcraft v. Quimby, 2 Ark. App. 332, 621 S.W.2d 230 (1981); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Logan, 13 Ark. App. 116, 680 S.W.2d 720 (1984); Glenn v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 293 Ark. 499, 739 S.W.2d 161 (1987); Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 25 Ark. App. 66, 752 S.W.2d 288 (1988); Banquet Foods v. McGlothin, 26 Ark. App. 130, 760 S.W.2d 880 (1988); Arkansas Hwy. & Transp. Dep't v. Gideon, 28 Ark. App. 84, 770 S.W.2d 677 (1989); Montgomery v. Delta Airlines, 31 Ark. App. 203, 791 S.W.2d 716 (1990); Larzelere v. Reed, 35 Ark. App. 174, 816 S.W.2d 614 (1991); Cheshire v. Foam Molding Co., 37 Ark. App. 78, 822 S.W.2d 412 (1992); Vanwagner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 95 Ark. App. 173, 234 S.W.3d 893 (2006); Estrada v. AERT, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 652, 449 S.W.3d 327 (2014).