Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Recovery of Computer-Assisted Research Costs as Part of or in Addition to Attorney's Fees Under State Law. 33 A.L.R.6th 305.

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages, Fifth Edition, Chapter 30: Real Property, 2004 Arkansas L. Notes 9.

Ark. L. Rev.

Note, Crockett and Brown, P.A. v. Courson: Determining the Fee of an Attorney Discharged “For Cause,” 47 Ark. L. Rev. 725.

Recent Development, Attorney's Fees — Prevailing Party Status BKD, LLP v. Yates, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 1005.

Mark James Chaney, Recent Developments: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds Attorney's Fees and Costs Available to Prevailing Parties in Wrongful-Discharge Actions Under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 193 (2014).

Britta Palmer Stamps, Recent Developments: Attorney's Fees — Fees May Be Awarded Under Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act Regardless of Overall Prevailing Party, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 1111 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Attorneys, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 539.

Survey — Miscellaneous, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 219.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.

Stephanie Mantell, Note: Fee-Shifting Statutes and Landlord-Tenant Law—A Call for the Repeal of the English Rule “Loser Pays” System Regarding Contract Disputes and Its Effect on Low-Income Arkansas Tenants, 39 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 105 (2016).

Case Notes

In General.

Power to award attorney's fees under this section does not mean that the court can do so without first informing its discretion as to the reasonableness of the requested amount; in a wrongful termination case where the employer prevailed, the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded a substantial attorney's fee in the employer's favor before receiving any evidence regarding the work counsel had performed and before giving the employees a meaningful opportunity to challenge the fee. McCabe v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 2019 Ark. App. 566, 591 S.W.3d 335 (2019).

Construction.

This section covers the same subject as § 23-89-207 and aids in determining legislative intent for that section. Wenrick v. Crater, 315 Ark. 361, 868 S.W.2d 60 (1993).

The legislature's use of the word “may” in this section indicates that the legislature intended a court's award of attorney's fees pursuant to this section to be permissive and discretionary with the court rather than mandatory. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Tobi Eng'g, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

Trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party under this section, then ruling they were not recoverable as a “preliminary expense” under § 14-92-238; the attorney's fees and costs were not “preliminary expenses” and, hence, not subject to a tax levy against the district's land. Perkins v. Cedar Mt. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 43, 360 Ark. 50, 199 S.W.3d 667 (2004).

Applicability.

Statutes such as this section providing for attorney's fees to be taxed as costs are to be given retrospective application. Fayetteville v. Bibb, 30 Ark. App. 31, 781 S.W.2d 493 (1989).

This section, defining costs as including discretionary attorney's fees in certain cases, must be applied by federal court in a diversity case. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Tobi Eng'g, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Ark. 1990).

Plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees where he brought an action to recover on a materialman's lien, unjust enrichment and detrimental reliance and not on any of the instruments or contracts expressly listed in this section, and where plaintiff obtained only partial relief on its detrimental reliance claim and could not be said to have prevailed on its unjust enrichment claim. Westside Galvanizing Services, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 921 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1990).

This statute allows a trial court to assess a reasonable attorney's fee and is inapplicable upon appeal. University Hosp. v. Undernehr, 307 Ark. 445, 821 S.W.2d 26 (1991); 215 Club v. Devore, 311 Ark. 309, 843 S.W.2d 317 (1992); Precision Steel Whse., Inc. v. Anderson-Martin Mach. Co., 313 Ark. 258, 854 S.W.2d 321 (1993).

This section does not embrace tort actions such as deceit. Stein v. Lukas, 308 Ark. 74, 823 S.W.2d 832 (1992).

An attorney discharged with or without cause can recover the reasonable value of his or her services to the date of discharge. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

This section does not provide for a reasonable attorney's fee in tort actions. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Morgan, 312 Ark. 225, 850 S.W.2d 297 (1993).

While this section allows for attorney's fees in breach of contract cases, it does not allow attorney's fees in tort actions. Security Pac. Hous. Servs., Inc. v. Friddle, 315 Ark. 178, 866 S.W.2d 375 (1993).

A written agreement, specifically providing for the payment of attorney's fees incurred, is enforceable in accordance with its terms, and is independent of the statutory authorization providing for attorney's fees under the circumstances covered by this section. Griffin v. First Nat'l Bank, 318 Ark. 848, 888 S.W.2d 306 (1994).

This section is a general statute providing for the recovery of attorney's fees in actions on breach of contract, and a general statute does not apply where there is a specific statute covering a particular subject matter. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ark. App. 136, 892 S.W.2d 519 (1995).

As this section does not mention insurance policies or provide for attorney's fees for either insureds or insurers, it does not allow an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing insurer in an action seeking recovery for a claim under a policy. Village Mkt., Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 227, 975 S.W.2d 86 (1998).

Attorney’s fees should not have been awarded in an action involving a mortgagee's failure to cancel a mortgage because the action was not primarily based on contract; the action was based on a violation of § 18-40-104 and negligence. Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp. v. Hopkins, 82 Ark. App. 91, 114 S.W.3d 757 (2003).

Trial court abused its discretion in awarding all of appellees' requested attorney’s fees where only one of their causes of action provided for fees; nothing in this section or § 4-88-113(f) provides that a party is entitled to an award of all fees in cases where multiple claims have been pursued. FMC Corp. v. Helton, 360 Ark. 465, 202 S.W.3d 490 (2005).

Fireman who was reinstated to his previous rank and awarded backpay following a suspension and demotion in a disciplinary proceeding was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party because the fireman had no contract with the fire department; thus, this section was not applicable. City of Little Rock v. Hudson, 366 Ark. 415, 236 S.W.3d 509 (2006).

Attorney’s fee award, pursuant to this section, was premature because the prevailing party could not be determined until the end of the breach of contract action. Heflin v. Brackelsberg, 2010 Ark. App. 261, 374 S.W.3d 755 (2010).

Appellate court did not need to address if this section applied to an action for termination of alimony based on the cohabitation provision of a property-settlement agreement, as a trial court has inherent power to award attorney's fees in domestic-relations cases and whether the circuit court should award such fees and the amount thereof are matters within the circuit court's discretion. Collins v. Collins, 2015 Ark. App. 526 (2015).

Award of attorney's fees affirmed, but as the case was a judicial proceeding that involved the administration of a trust, attorney's fees should have been awarded under § 28-73-1004 rather than under this section. Reed v. Smith, 2018 Ark. App. 313, 551 S.W.3d 407 (2018).

Attorney's Duty.

The burden of obtaining a ruling from the trial court is on the attorney requesting fees; any objections and matters left unresolved below are waived and may not be raised on appeal. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

Bankruptcy.

A creditor's status as unsecured does not bar it from asserting a claim in bankruptcy court for attorney's fees under this section. In re Hunter, 203 B.R. 150 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996).

Mortgage lien was not perfected and could be avoided by a trustee under 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 544(a) and 550(a), who was also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, because an acknowledgement that did not comply with §§ 16-47-106 and 16-47-101 did not provide constructive notice. The omission of the debtor's name alone would not have been fatal, as the omitted information could have been filled in by reference to the document as a whole; however, omission of the name plus the use of a different gender led to an ambiguity that would have required extrinsic evidence. Williams v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Stewart), 422 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2009).

Chapter 12 debtors' in possession 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 cause of action allowed the debtors to set aside creditor bank's mortgage lien due to the debtors' bona fide purchaser status, but was a cause of action peculiar to the Bankruptcy Code and differed from the types of actions which this section addressed. Thus this section was inapplicable to the avoidance action and the debtors were not entitled to their attorney's fees. Caine v. First State Bank of Crossett (In re Caine), 462 B.R. 688 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2011), aff'd, No. 1:12-CV-1012, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43360 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2014).

Where LLC's operating agreement provided that in a dispute between members, the losing party would pay the prevailing party reasonable costs and expenses, and where the LLC and its member also claimed attorney's fees under Arkansas statute providing for a prevailing party fee award in a breach of contract action, and where judgment debt was found dischargeable under one provision of Bankruptcy Code and nondischargeable under two other sections, then remand was required for bankruptcy court to determine whether the fee provision in the operating agreement rendered all or any part of the fee award part of the nondischargeable debt. Clear Sky Props. LLC v. Roussel (In re Roussel), 504 B.R. 510 (E.D. Ark. 2013).

Bankruptcy court awarded a bank attorney’s fees and costs it incurred to enforce a settlement agreement it entered with a husband and wife who declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy because the husband and wife had not timely fulfilled their obligations under the agreement in an attempt to persuade the bank to accept changes to the agreement; although a Chapter 11 trustee argued that the husband and wife had substantially complied with their obligations under the agreement and the concept of substantial compliance was recognized in Arkansas law, the bank had bargained for strict compliance. In re Griffin, 509 B.R. 864 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2014).

Breach of Contract.

Although the supreme court held in O'Bar v. Hight, 169 Ark. 1008, 277 S.W. 533 (1925), that a covenantee could not recover attorney's fees from the covenantor in an action for breach of warranty, Act 800 of 1989 amended this section to permit a trial court to allow a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in an action for breach of contract. Murchie v. Hinton, 41 Ark. App. 84, 848 S.W.2d 436 (1993).

A warranty deed should be considered a contract between a grantor and his grantee who has accepted it for the purposes of this section. Murchie v. Hinton, 41 Ark. App. 84, 848 S.W.2d 436 (1993).

Since an implied-in-law contract, or quasi-contract, is indeed no contract at all, there was no authority for an award of attorney’s fees. Friends of Children, Inc. v. Marcus, 46 Ark. App. 57, 876 S.W.2d 603 (1994).

Where defendant prevailed against plaintiff's allegations that they breached their lease terms, the trial court was authorized to award reasonable attorney's fees under this section. Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Prod. Co., 320 Ark. 298, 896 S.W.2d 867 (1995).

The circuit court was authorized to award attorney’s fees not subject to a specified limit where the plaintiff's action was for breach of contract. Marshall Sch. Dist. v. Hill, 56 Ark. App. 134, 939 S.W.2d 319 (1997).

It was too late for the plaintiff to attempt to recharacterize her suit as one for breach of contract in order to trigger an attorney's fee award under this section where she previously characterized the suit as one for illegal exaction and entered into a settlement which provided for attorney's fees under § 26-35-902(a), which authorizes attorney's fees in illegal exaction cases. Barnhart v. City of Fayetteville, 335 Ark. 57, 977 S.W.2d 225 (1998).

This section does not allow the discretionary award of attorney's fees to a prevailing insurer in an action for breach of contract. Employers Surplus Ins. Co. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 338 Ark. 299, 993 S.W.2d 481 (1999).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to municipal improvement districts in a suit where the districts prevailed over the trustee of a public bond financing by proving a breach of contract claim against the trustee, resulting in reimbursement to bond funds of attorney's fees expended by the trustee in unwarranted litigation. First United Bank v. Phase II, Edgewater Addition Residential Prop. Owners Improvements Dist. No. 1 of Maumelle, 347 Ark. 879, 69 S.W.3d 33 (2002).

Where court found that the damages sought by home buyers were for the costs of correcting defects to the house, the complaint stated a cause of action on the contract; the buyers' action for breach of the implied warranty of fitness and habitability was an action in contract and, thus, the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to a home builder. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

In homeowners' defective construction case, the builder was entitled to a directed verdict because the statute of limitations had expired and, as it was an action “in contract” concerning the implied warranty of habitability, the trial court properly awarded the builder attorney's fees under this section. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Because the trial court did not give its reasons for failing to award tenants, the prevailing parties in litigation over an alleged breach of a lease, their attorney's fees, the case was remanded for the court to consider whether to make such an award. Vereen v. Hargrove, 80 Ark. App. 385, 96 S.W.3d 762 (2003).

Where the homeowner alleged that the builder breached an implied warranty because the home's foundation was defective due to the soil properties and sought damages in the amount of repairs made by the homeowner, the case was a contract action, as opposed to a tort action, and provided the trial court with a basis to award the builder, the prevailing party, attorney’s fees under this section. Curry v. Thornsberry, 81 Ark. App. 112, 98 S.W.3d 477 (2003), aff'd, 354 Ark. 631, 128 S.W.3d 438 (2003).

Minor should have been allowed to recover attorney’s fees in his action against a bank because the action sounded in contract; the bank's obligations would not have arisen had it not entered into a contract with the minor's guardian to accept funds' deposit. Jiles v. Union Planters Bank, 90 Ark. App. 245, 205 S.W.3d 187 (2005).

Plaintiff borrowers' argument that defendant bank's fee request was excessive because it included fees and costs on appeal was well-taken; fees could not be awarded on appeal of a contract case pursuant to this section. Even if there was authority to allow the fees, the court would have exercised its discretion not to do so in the instant case because on remand, the court granted summary judgment on an issue that could have been, but was not, argued in the appeals court and the failure to raise the issue earlier resulted in an unnecessary round of litigation following appeal. Mountain Pure LLC v. Bank of Am., No. 4:02CV00100 JLH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115227 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 2008).

Although plaintiff borrowers' breach of contract claim was submitted to arbitration, the court concluded that their remaining promissory estoppel claim was based on contract, and the court could not find any material way in which the briefs and arguments would have differed had there been no count alleging promissory estoppel; consequently, the court concluded that the action litigated was based primarily on the breach of contract claim so that fees could be awarded pursuant to this section to defendant bank as prevailing party. Mountain Pure LLC v. Bank of Am., No. 4:02CV00100 JLH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115227 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 2008).

In an action for breach of contract arising from an employment agreement and purchase agreement, the jury rendered a verdict for the company but the trial court denied its motion for attorney’s fees under this section. The trial court held that this section did not apply because the parties intended that in the event of dispute arising out of the agreements, each party would bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. Asbury Auto. Used Car Ctr. v. Brosh, 375 Ark. 121, 289 S.W.3d 88 (2008).

Award of attorney's fees under this section was proper because the debtor claimed the bank violated the promissory note when it failed to release the lien on the property after full payment. First State Bank of Crossett v. Fowler, 427 B.R. 1 (W.D. Ark. 2010).

Where the debtor objected to her deed of trust secured creditor's claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 502(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007, asserting breach of contract, and the claim was in part unenforceable due to the miscalculation of charges and interest, and misapplied payments, the debtor was entitled to an award of damages and reasonable attorney's fees for breach of contract under this section. Bateman v. S. Dev. Corp. (In re Bateman), 435 B.R. 600 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010).

Although a commercial tenant was a prevailing party in a breach of lease action against a landlord, and allowed to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, the trial court reduced the tenant's attorney fee request without explanation or reference to certain factors, which warranted a remand. Conway Commer. Warehousing, LLC v. FedEx Freight East, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 51, 381 S.W.3d 94 (2011).

Trial court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to real estate buyers in their breach of contract action because their request for fees was based on a contractual provision, not the statute; hence, the buyers' inclusion of a tort claim for damages was no impediment to an award of fees authorized under the real estate contract. Marx Real Estate Invs., LLC v. Coloso, 2011 Ark. App. 426, 384 S.W.3d 595 (2011).

In this breach of contract action, plaintiff was entitled to an attorney’s fee award in the amount of one-third of the total judgment because the attorneys were experienced and reputable attorneys with superior legal skills, the legal issues in this case arose from complicated and hotly disputed factual questions, and plaintiff entered a one-third contingency fee agreement with counsel. Razorback Concrete Co. v. Dement Constr. Co. LLC, No. 3:07CV00135 SWW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76761 (E.D. Ark. June 4, 2012).

Trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to appellees because its dismissal of appellant's complaint under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was improper; appellant alleged facts sufficient to support the application of fraudulent concealment and that the statutes of limitation were tolled. Russenberger v. Thomas Pest Control, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 86, 394 S.W.3d 303 (2012).

Appellee was properly awarded attorney’s fees because employees' breach of contract and wrongful discharge claims sounded in contract and appellee prevailed; the wrongful discharge claim was based on a violation of public policy. Marlow v. United Sys. of Ark., Inc., 2013 Ark. 460 (2013).

District court correctly determined that the award of attorney's fees was appropriate in this case because appellant's primary focus was its claim that appellee breached a contract with appellant as the first count of the complaint was for breach of an express contract and Count II raised a claim of breach of an implied contract. Futurefuel Chem. Co. v. Lonza, Inc., 756 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2014).

In a breach of contract action, the Supreme Court was unable to discern exactly on what basis the circuit court denied appellee's motion for attorney’s fees under this section; therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit court for the limited purpose of making findings that would enable it to review the circuit court's fee decision. Arkansas Realtors Ass'n v. Real Forms, LLC, 2014 Ark. 385, 442 S.W.3d 845 (2014).

Damages could only have been for the breach of contract claim, and appellee was the prevailing party on that claim, and thus the award of attorney’s fees to appellee was allowable under the statute and was within the discretion of the circuit court. Cozart v. Logue, 2014 Ark. App. 626, 447 S.W.3d 133 (2014).

Where a hospital was entitled to recovery in its breach of contract suit against a doctor because the balance due on a promissory note was payable when the doctor resigned, and the doctor's shoulder injury did not excuse his obligation to pay the remaining note debt, the hospital was entitled to recovery of its attorney's fees; the contractual attorney's fees provision was enforceable independent of the statutory authorization, and, in any event, the hospital was clearly the prevailing party. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Halterman, 867 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the sellers of a business attorney's fees as the prevailing party on their breach of contract claim against the buyer of the business; although there were conversion claims involved and substantially more money was awarded for the tort claims than for the breach-of-contract claims, the action was based primarily in contract and the trial court considered the relevant factors in determining the amount of the attorney's fee award. DWB, LLC v. D&T Pure Trust, 2018 Ark. App. 283, 550 S.W.3d 420 (2018).

Case Law Factors.

Case law factors were not referred to in the denial of one company's motion for attorney’s fees, and thus the court reversed and remanded on this point so the proper analysis could be conducted. Knesek v. Cameron Hubbs Constr., Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 380 (2013).

Computation of Fees.

Although there is no fixed formula in determining the computation of attorney's fees, the courts should be guided by recognized factors in making their decision, including the experience and ability of the attorney, the time and labor required to perform the legal service properly, the amount involved in the case and the results obtained, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, the time limitations imposed upon the client or by the circumstances, and the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990).

Among the pertinent considerations in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee, not specifically fixed by contract, are: (1) the attorney's judgment, learning, ability, skill, experience, professional standing and advice; (2) the relationship between the parties; (3) the amount or importance of the subject matter of the case; (4) the nature, extent and difficulty of services in research; (5) the preparation of pleadings; (6) the proceedings actually taken and the nature and extent of the litigation; (7) the time and labor devoted to the client's cause, the difficulties presented in the course of the litigation and the results obtained. In making these determinations, both the trial court's and the appellate court's experience and knowledge of the character of such services may be used as a guide. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

There is no requirement that the trial judge consider his own experience and knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of a fee. Harper v. Shackleford, 41 Ark. App. 116, 850 S.W.2d 15 (1993).

Any attorney's fees awarded should be reasonable; there are established principles which a court should use in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee and, among others, these should include consideration of whether or not the actions taken by a party seeking such fees were meritorious and successful. Griffin v. First Nat'l Bank, 318 Ark. 848, 888 S.W.2d 306 (1994).

Where the trial court properly found that a company was entitled to attorney’s fees, but reduced the hourly rate charged without explanation, the appellate court remanded the matter back to the trial court to determine if the reduction in the hourly rate was proper. Swink v. Lasiter Constr., Inc., 94 Ark. App. 262, 229 S.W.3d 553 (2006).

In members' breach of contract action against a country club, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to the members in the amount of $6,000, even though their total recovery was only $5,242, because there was no fixed formula in determining what was a reasonable attorney’s fee. Millwood-RAB Mktg., Inc. v. Blackburn, 95 Ark. App. 253, 236 S.W.3d 551 (2006).

In awarding an attorney's fee pursuant to this statute, the court reduced the amount requested by 50% because it was a relatively simple slip and fall case, a discount was required for nonsuit in state court, the billing reflected too much time on discovery and other projects, and fees incurred reflected missed opportunities for compromise. Mo. & N. Ark. R.R. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-8-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139204 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 27, 2013).

Sufficient findings were not made for the court to review the amount awarded, and the court remanded and left the fee calculation issue to the trial court's discretion. Avery v. Warren Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 392 (2013).

Counter-claimant was entitled to attorney's fees under this section for the portion of a lawsuit primarily driven by the contract claims, as well as fees for work primarily driven by the trade secret claims, pursuant to § 4-75-607. The trial court determined that the counter-claimant was entitled to $2,174,073.11 in attorney's fees. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cuker Interactive, LLC, No. 5:14-CV-5262, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55242 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2018).

—Procedure.

Trial court's decision concerning entitlement to fees under this section required an inquiry separate from its decision on the merits of the underlying action — an inquiry which could not commence until party prevailed in the underlying action. Marsh & McLennan v. Herget, 321 Ark. 180, 900 S.W.2d 195 (1995).

Contingency Fees.

Award of attorney’s fees under this section in favor of a freight agent in its breach of contract suit against a carrier was proper even though it was based on a contingency fee that was significantly larger than the lodestar figure, as the district court considered all relevant factors in determining the amount of fees, such as counsel's experience, reputation, and skills; the degree to which the agent prevailed; and the time that counsel spent on the case, which included a six-month period where he turned away other clients. All-Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2009).

As long as a trial court is guided by the relevant factors, fee awards based in part on a contingency agreement are permissible under Arkansas law. The fact that the agreed upon fee was a contingency fee does not automatically entitle the attorney to that amount under this section. All-Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2009).

Court's Authority.

A trial court may not award an attorney's fee for services performed by an attorney on appeal after the case in which the fee is sought has been returned to the trial court by a mandate which does not order the fee. National Cashflow Systems, Inc. v. Race, 307 Ark. 131, 817 S.W.2d 876 (1991).

Where the additional award of costs on appeal was not awarded at the direction of the appellate court, was not of a ministerial nature, and was for the services of the prevailing party's attorney on appeal, the trial court was without authority to award attorney’s fees following the appeal. Race v. National Cashflow Sys., 34 Ark. App. 261, 810 S.W.2d 46 (1991), aff'd, National Cashflow Systems, Inc. v. Race, 307 Ark. 131, 817 S.W.2d 876 (1991).

This section permits trial courts, but not appellate courts, to assess attorney’s fees. Millwood-RAB Mktg., Inc. v. Blackburn, 95 Ark. App. 253, 236 S.W.3d 551 (2006).

Declaratory Judgment.

Statutory attorney's fees under this section were not available in an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act; however, costs were available under § 16-111-111. Hanners v. Giant Oil Co. of Ark., Inc., 373 Ark. 418, 284 S.W.3d 468 (2008).

Discretion of Court.

The word “may” is usually employed as implying permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, action or conduct and is construed in a permissive sense unless necessary to give effect to an intent to which it is used; and within the context in which the word “may” is employed in this section, allowance of attorney's fees is permissive and discretional with the trial court. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990).

This section is clearly not mandatory and the decision whether to award attorney’s fees in cases governed by this section is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Logue v. Seven-Hot Springs Corp., 926 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1991).

While this section allows for the award of attorney's fees in certain civil actions, including actions for breach of contract, the decision whether to award a fee in such cases is a decision within the trial court's discretion. Security Pac. Hous. Servs., Inc. v. Friddle, 315 Ark. 178, 866 S.W.2d 375 (1993).

Since the award of attorney's fees is discretionary under this section, and since neither party cited authority or presented argument indicating that the trial court abused its discretion, there was no abuse of discretion in denying attorney's fees pursuant to this section. Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co., 322 Ark. 751, 911 S.W.2d 586 (1995).

The statute is permissive and the award of attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the trial court. Ouachita Trek & Dev. Co. v. Rowe, 341 Ark. 456, 17 S.W.3d 491 (2000).

Language in buyer's e-mail did not constitute a sufficient writing for purposes of the statute of frauds because it did not evince an agreement between retailer/buyer and importer/seller on price markdowns; attorney’s fees in contract dispute were discretionary. General Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 320 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2003).

Under this section, no award of fees was mandatory, and an insurer was not entitled to attorney’s fees simply because it prevailed. Angelo Iafrate Constr., LLC v. Potashnick Constr., Inc., 370 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2004).

Beverage distributor was not improperly denied attorney's fees pursuant to this section after it had obtained a judgment against a beverage producer for breach of contract because no award of attorney's fees was mandatory under this section, the distributor was not considered a prevailing party by the district court since the producer had prevailed on a counterclaim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the distributor asserted no facts to support its contention that it merited an award of attorney's fees under this section despite its own breaching conduct. Southern Wine & Spirits of Nev. v. Mt. Valley Spring Co., 712 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2013).

Certain appellants failed to cite any evidence that demonstrated that the circuit court abused its broad discretion in not awarding them attorney’s fees, and as the award of attorney’s fees is discretionary and not mandatory, there was no abuse of discretion in granting appellee attorney’s fees and in denying of attorney’s fees to appellants. Cozart v. Logue, 2014 Ark. App. 626, 447 S.W.3d 133 (2014).

Election of Remedies.

The policy concern supporting the election doctrine (which operates to preclude a complainant from receiving an award that over-compensates and over-restores him for his injury by permitting recovery on two different theories) is not a valid consideration with respect to a fee request. Childs v. Adams, 322 Ark. 424, 909 S.W.2d 641 (1995).

Evidence.

The failure of an attorney to keep detailed time records is not fatal to his claim. Harper v. Shackleford, 41 Ark. App. 116, 850 S.W.2d 15 (1993).

Explanation by Court.

Court reversed and remanded the partial award of fees to a company, given that the trial court provided no explanation for granting less than one third of the fee request and the court could not determine why. Knesek v. Cameron Hubbs Constr., Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 380 (2013).

Fees Allowed.

Where plaintiff was awarded relief for failure to promote and back pay, the recovery he received was pay for labor or services and recovery could be had for attorney's fees. City of Fort Smith v. Driggers, 305 Ark. 409, 808 S.W.2d 748 (1991).

As the holding of the trial court was that there was an employment contract which was breached, the awarding of an attorney's fee was not improper. Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 305 Ark. 566, 810 S.W.2d 910 (1991).

Fee award held reasonable. Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993).

Appellees, guarantors, pursuant to contract and this section, awarded reasonable attorney's fees. Arkansas Indus. Dev. Comm'n v. FABCO of Ashdown, Inc., 312 Ark. 26, 847 S.W.2d 13 (1993).

Where the trial judge agreed with a crop lender that its security interest in a government crop check was superior to the farm owner's, an award of attorney's fees in that contract claim was appropriate, however, the trial judge erred in awarding attorney's fees regarding a conversion claim. Nef v. Ag Servs. of Am., Inc., 79 Ark. App. 100, 86 S.W.3d 4 (2002).

Attorney's fees were properly awarded to a prevailing party in an action seeking an accounting of a partnership's assets because the partnership was based on a contract. Harrison v. Harrison, 82 Ark. App. 521, 120 S.W.3d 144 (2003).

In a case where a teacher alleged that a school district breached its contract with the teacher by violating the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act (TFDA) and that such breach entitled him to all the monetary benefits which he had under the 1999-2000 contract, plus interest and attorney's fees, because the district failed to provide written notice of the problems or evaluations as required by § 6-17-1504 of the TFDA, the district failed to strictly comply with the statutory provisions of the TFDA and the teacher's contract was renewed by operation of law; however, the teacher's refusal to mitigate his damages limited his damages to the difference in what he earned under the 1999-2000 contract and what he could have earned had he accepted the offer of the district, but the teacher was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to this section. Sheets v. Dollarway Sch. Dist., 82 Ark. App. 539, 120 S.W.3d 119 (2003).

Although attorney’s fees were not available in a contract recission case, the case began as a proceeding to foreclose on a home and enforce a promissory note and the buyers prevailed on those grounds; therefore, they were the prevailing party in a foreclosure action entitling them to attorney’s fees. Hudson v. Hilo, 88 Ark. App. 317, 198 S.W.3d 569 (2004).

Defendant insurer was liable under the policy it issued to manufacturer for sums awarded to plaintiff farmers as attorney's fees in the underlying action by the farmers against the manufacturer for crop damage because, in addition to coverage for those sums insured became legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage to which the insurance applied, the policy also covered certain “supplementary payments” and the attorney's fee award was part of the “costs” taxed against the manufacturer in the underlying lawsuit; as such, the award was a “supplementary payment” covered under the policy. Ferrell v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005).

Where supplier's bank wrongly encoded a check and supplier's claim against the supplier's bank was premised on its failure to use ordinary care in complying with the Uniform Commercial Code, attorney's fees were warranted because the amount of the claim was readily ascertainable. Douglas Cos. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of Texarkana, 419 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 2005).

Trial court did not err in awarding home sellers attorney’s fees in buyers' action against sellers for breach of contract and fraud because the issue of whether the action was primarily a contract action in which attorney’s fees were authorized was moot; buyers paid the attorney’s fees and, in the absence of an explanation for the payment of a satisfaction of judgment, the court considered it as having been voluntarily paid, thus rendering the appeal of that judgment moot. Barringer v. Hall, 89 Ark. App. 293, 202 S.W.3d 568 (2005).

In a domestic relations case, the trial court appropriately granted an ex-wife's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to this section and § 9-12-309 because her ex-husband, in challenging the attorney's fee award, offered only his own reasoning and the language of the statutes in support of his argument; he cited no legal authority in support of his position, which was a sufficient reason to affirm the trial court's ruling. Artman v. Hoy, 370 Ark. 131, 257 S.W.3d 864 (2007).

Award of attorney’s fees to a corporation in a breach of contract action against a home builder was not unreasonable merely because the fee award was nearly the sum of the judgment. Crown Custom Homes, Inc. v. Buchanan Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 442, 319 S.W.3d 285 (2009).

In buyers' declaratory-judgment action, attorney’s fees were properly awarded to buyers under this section because the case involved a contract action—either through the seller's counterclaim or the fact that the declaratory-judgment action arose from the seller's breach of contract. Screeton v. Asco Vending, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 230, 374 S.W.3d 749 (2010).

As appellee was the prevailing party in a lawsuit involving a breach-of-contract claim, it was properly awarded attorney’s fees under this section. Crockett v. C.A.G. Invs., Inc., 2011 Ark. 208, 381 S.W.3d 793 (2011).

District court's calculation of an attorney’s fee award was supported by the detailed affidavits and time sheets attached to appellees' motion for attorney’s fees; because the case involved a complicated factual background, the potential for millions of dollars in liability, and a 10 count initial complaint that included 555 pages of exhibits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Retro TV Network, Inc. v. Luken Communs., LLC, 696 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2012).

Because counsel for defendants were experienced attorneys with excellent legal skills, potentially millions of dollars were at stake and defendants prevailed on all of plaintiff's claims, and the attorneys charged reasonable hourly rates, under this section, counsel for defendants were entitled to an award of $46,795 in attorney’s fees. Retro TV Network, Inc. v. Luken Communs., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00489-SWW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27679 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 2, 2012), aff'd, 696 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2012).

Even though the underlying case was in the nature of a quiet title action, it was necessitated by a dispute regarding the terms of leases covering the owners' property, and they sought fees, and the trial court limited the award of fees to those associated with the settlement agreement; the dispute arose out of the language in a lease, which was in the nature of a contract, and the manner in which the trial court decided the issue was not error. Stephens Prod. Co. v. Blackard, 2013 Ark. App. 530 (2013).

Damages awarded were based in contract, and the circuit court used equity to put the parties back where they were prior to the execution of the contract, rather than money damages to compensate for any tort liability; because appellants did not challenge the reasonableness of the fees awarded and the circuit court properly considered the appropriate factors, there was no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney's fees. Gladden v. Trustees of Pruitt Family Trust, 2015 Ark. App. 680, 477 S.W.3d 530 (2015).

In this action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, the creditor was awarded the sum of $2,000 in attorney's fees where the debtor conceded that (1) he wholly failed to perform under the terms of the contract and was in breach, and (2) his inability to obtain materials and pay employees, both circumstances attendant to the creditor closing its business, occasioned the default. Coleman v. Fields (In re Fields), 544 B.R. 156 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2016).

In a case involving the conveyance of mineral rights, litigation was contentious and presented novel and difficult issues, and the circuit court clearly considered the reasonable fee factors and did not abuse its discretion in awarding $17,500 in attorney's fees and $165 in costs to appellees. Mt. Pine Timber, Inc. v. Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 197, 487 S.W.3d 832 (2016).

In this case, the vast majority of the work was related to issues primarily based in contract, and it is certainly common and allowable for more than one lawyer to work on a case--especially a difficult one; the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney's fees. Patton Hospitality Mgmt., LLC v. Bella Vista Vill. Coopershares Owners Ass'n, 2016 Ark. App. 281, 493 S.W.3d 798 (2016).

Although dismissal was prompted by appellee's request for summary judgment on its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the resolution of each of the claims hinged on the interpretation of two contracts, and thus the action was clearly based primarily in contract, and the circuit court was authorized to award a reasonable attorney's fee. Patton Hospitality Mgmt., LLC v. Bella Vista Vill. Coopershares Owners Ass'n, 2016 Ark. App. 281, 493 S.W.3d 798 (2016).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a credit card holder attorney's fees where the trial court considered his counterclaims of conversion, outrage, and abuse of process as an integral part of his defense to the credit card company's breach of contract action, and he had successfully defended against the breach of contract action. Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Davenport, 2017 Ark. App. 105, 513 S.W.3d 880 (2017).

In an air-bag explosion case, in which a default judgment was entered against the car manufacturer, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $5,000 in attorney's fees, given the allegations of breach of express warranty and contract in the complaint. Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Harlan, 2017 Ark. App. 203, 518 S.W.3d 89 (2017).

Because the complaint was brought as a breach-of-contract action, the award of attorney's fees to the purchaser, as the prevailing party, was appropriate; the seller's lawsuit was filed as a breach-of-contract action and sounded entirely in contract, and the mere fact that the parties agreed to rescind that contract did not defeat the original nature of the action. Thompson v. Broussard, 2017 Ark. App. 423, 526 S.W.3d 899 (2017).

Fees Denied.

The trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees in an interpleader action. Construction Mach. v. Roberts, 307 Ark. 252, 819 S.W.2d 268 (1991).

An appeal from a decision of the Civil Service Commission is an action which does not fall within the language of this section and therefore attorney's fees are not authorized. City of Little Rock v. Quinn, 35 Ark. App. 77, 811 S.W.2d 6 (1991).

Where the contract for or purchase of materials was made by previous owners and the suit was a suit in rem against the property, the only recovery that could be made by the plaintiff was under the section that grants a lien against the property for materials and labor furnished, § 18-44-101, which does not provide that the supplier of the materials or labor has a lien for attorney's fees, so that attorney's fees were not recoverable. Transportation Properties, Inc. v. Central Glass & Mirror of N.W. Ark., Inc., 38 Ark. App. 60, 827 S.W.2d 667 (1992).

Costs for depositions, expert fees and travel expenses are not allowable. Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Prod. Co., 320 Ark. 298, 896 S.W.2d 867 (1995).

Award of attorney's fees was reversed where the plaintiff's action was based primarily in tort. Meyer v. Riverdale Harbor Mun. Prop. Owners Improvement Dist. No. 1, 58 Ark. App. 91, 947 S.W.2d 20 (1997).

The chancery court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award cross-appellants attorney's fees where their argument was nothing more than an assertion that they were entitled to attorney's fees because of the manner in which they prevailed, that is, by winning a motion to dismiss at the chancery court level. Jones v. Abraham, 67 Ark. App. 304, 999 S.W.2d 698 (1999), aff'd, 341 Ark. 66, 15 S.W.3d 310 (2000), overruled in part, Lamontagne v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. 190, 366 S.W.3d 351 (2010).

Attorney's fees were properly denied in an action to enforce an oral contract to make a will where the trial court found that the plaintiffs acted in good faith and that their attorneys did an excellent job under the constraints of Arkansas law and the rules of evidence and the fact that they were trying to prove something that occurred years and years ago with deceased witnesses. Jones v. Abraham, 341 Ark. 66, 15 S.W.3d 310 (2000).

Where mental health facility obtained a default judgment against psychiatrist and was awarded $775,000 for indemnification, because the trial court's order offered no statutory authority for awarding attorney’s fees to the mental health facility, and because that award was contrary to the general rule against awarding such fees in the absence of a statute or rule, that portion of the trial court's order was reversed. Jean-Pierre v. Plantation Homes of Crittenden County, Inc., 350 Ark. 569, 89 S.W.3d 337 (2002).

Attorney's fees were not awarded in an action seeking specific performance of a real estate contract because itemized bills were not provided to the circuit court and there was no showing as to why allegedly privileged information contained therein could not have been redacted. Van Carr Enters. v. Hamco, Inc., 365 Ark. 625, 232 S.W.3d 427 (2006).

Although two writings entered into for the construction of a house were not valid contracts, once the house was built and the debtors moved in, that took the contract out of § 4-59-101(a)(4), the statute of frauds, and based on the debtors' testimony regarding the parties' oral agreement with respect to the price to be paid, which the court found credible, the creditors' proof of claim for an additional amount was disallowed. Although the debtors were the prevailing party, they were not entitled to attorney’s fees under this section, as both parties were responsible for an incoherent agreement with no agreed upon purchase price. In re Cameron, 452 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).

As claims by an estate executrix of fraud, estoppel, and fiduciary-duty were paramount, and a contract claim was not the primary basis for the action, the trial court properly refused to awarded attorney’s fees to the prevailing party pursuant to this section. Gibbs v. Bumgarner, 2012 Ark. App. 81 (2012).

In an action seeking the cancellation of a lease, assignment, and deed, attorney's fees should not have been awarded because the litigation did not concern a breach of these documents. The issue was whether there were innocent purchasers of property. Walls v. Humphries, 2013 Ark. 286, 428 S.W.3d 517 (2013).

In an action to enforce an oral contract for services performed by a consulting company for an investment company, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the consulting company attorney's fees under this section as the prevailing party because the investment company's defense was taken in good faith. Steve's Outdoor Invs., LLC v. Reynolds Forestry Consulting-RFC, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 40 (2013).

While a debtor prevailed in an action brought under 11 U.S.C. § 525(b)(3) based on his employer terminating his employment solely because of the debtor's nonpayment of his obligation to the employer, the debtor was not entitled to attorney's fees because this section was inapplicable and the debtor was not able to direct the court to a basis for fees under a specific statute, rule, or other ground. Dwelle v. Arvest Bank (In re Dwelle), No. 6:12-bk-71728, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4514 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. May 27, 2015).

Circuit court properly denied an attorney's request for attorney's fees under this section because the attorney was not the prevailing party where the insurer's payment to the attorney was not made as a result of an adjudication by the circuit court resolving the merits of the issue. Swindle v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2015 Ark. 241, 464 S.W.3d 905 (2015).

Attorney's fees could not be recovered because no contract existed between the parties. Anderson's Taekwondo Ctr. Camp Positive, Inc. v. Landers Auto Group No. 1, Inc., 2015 Ark. 268 (2015).

Insured was not entitled to relief against an insurer under this section because the insured (1) did not bring a contract claim in a pleading or point to a contractual provision the insurer did not perform, and (2) first raised breach of contract in the insured's reply in opposition to the insurer's summary judgment motion. Cooper v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 827 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2016).

Circuit court erred in awarding a son attorney's fees because the litigation did not concern a breach of a contract but alleged a quiet title action; the quiet-title statutes do not authorize attorney's fees, and in the absence of statutory authority, attorney's fees are not available. Stokes v. Stokes, 2016 Ark. 182, 491 S.W.3d 113 (2016).

Circuit court erred in awarding a son attorney's fees because the son asserted an unjust-enrichment claim and thus was not entitled to attorney's fees. Stokes v. Stokes, 2016 Ark. 182, 491 S.W.3d 113 (2016).

Circuit court erred in awarding the sibling attorney's fees under this section; although the sibling's action referenced a warranty deed between the sibling and the father, the sibling did not allege that there had been a breach of contract, but merely sought reformation of the deed to reflect the property's correct legal description. Alexander v. Alexander, 2016 Ark. App. 554 (2016).

Where sister filed suit to dissolve a family farming partnership, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying two partners' requests for attorney's fees against the sister where the requesting partners never submitted time records or actual fees charged and paid. Hitt v. Lyle, 2020 Ark. App. 124 (2020).

Insurance.

Recovery of attorney's fees to insureds in an insurance-contract action is exclusively available under § 23-79-208, and an award under this section is prohibited; because this section does not contain a condition on a fee award, § 23-79-208 falls squarely within this section's exception that it does not apply when attorney's fees are “otherwise provided by law.” Gafford v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2015 Ark. 110, 459 S.W.3d 277 (2015).

Mandamus Actions.

Circuit court did not have discretion to award attorney's fees because a city prevailed on its petition for a writ of mandamus, not a breach-of-contract action, and nothing in Arkansas's statutory law on mandamus actions permitted recovery of attorney's fees even if a writ of mandamus was an action to enforce an underlying agreed order. Lonoke County v. City of Lonoke, 2013 Ark. 465, 430 S.W.3d 669 (2013).

Not Requested.

Although appellants claimed the trial court erred in not awarding them attorney’s fees under this section, the court could not discern that they filed a motion or otherwise requested such fees, there was no specific prayer for such in the complaint, and the trial court did not rule on the issue; a party could not complain on appeal about the trial court not granting a particular kind of relief when it was not requested. Grisanti v. Zanone, 2009 Ark. App. 545, 336 S.W.3d 886 (2009).

Prejudgment Interest.

Attorney was not entitled to an award of prejudgment interest in a fee dispute with a client because the court set the attorney's fee as a percentage of the future sales proceeds of a real estate property that the attorney obtained for a client in a dispute; thus, the fee could not be determined until the future sale of the property. Moreover, the attorney was not a prevailing party for the purpose of an award of attorney's fees. Adams v. Howard, 2014 Ark. App. 328, 436 S.W.3d 473 (2014).

Preservation for Review.

Trial court awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees, but the defendant did not object and failed to make a record before the trial court as required, and thus the appellate did not address the attorney’s fee issue. Washington v. Kingridge Enters., 2014 Ark. App. 705, 450 S.W.3d 685 (2014).

In upholding an award of attorney's fees under this section, the Supreme Court concluded that appellant's claim that certain meeting minutes did not fall into any of the categories outlined by this section was not preserved for the Supreme Court's review because appellant failed to make this argument to the superior court. Miracle Kids Success Acad., Inc. v. Maurras, 2019 Ark. 146, 573 S.W.3d 533 (2019).

Because there was no indication in the record that a landowner challenged—in a postjudgment motion or otherwise—a circuit court's failure to make specific findings when it awarded attorney's fees to a contractor, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. Reynolds Forestry Consulting & Real Estate, PLLC v. Colbey, 2019 Ark. App. 209, 575 S.W.3d 176 (2019).

Prevailing Party.

Where six of the seven counts contained in plaintiff's complaint were dismissed on defendant's motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief and jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on remaining count, plaintiff was the “prevailing party” under this section. ERC Mtg. Group, Inc. v. Luper, 32 Ark. App. 19, 795 S.W.2d 362 (1990).

Even though defendant was simply defending the cause of action on the basis that no contract existed between the parties, defendant was a prevailing party within the meaning of the statute and entitled to attorney's fees. Cumberland Fin. Group, Ltd. v. Brown Chem. Co., 34 Ark. App. 269, 810 S.W.2d 49 (1991).

Although the original request for fees was based on claims dismissed before trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the prevailing parties their attorney's fees under this section. TCBY Sys. v. RSP Co., 33 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 1994).

The chancellor did not abuse her discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the party she determined to be the prevailing party in a breach of contract action. Gill v. Transcriptions, Inc., 319 Ark. 485, 892 S.W.2d 258 (1995).

A third-party beneficiary may recover attorney's fees under this section. Little Rock Wastewater Util. v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 321 Ark. 303, 902 S.W.2d 760 (1995).

The court properly ruled that its award of attorney's fees could be recovered only from an estate's personal representative and not from the estate where three of the four of the cases were dismissed or nonsuited and, therefore, there was no prevailing party in those three cases. Boatmen's Trust Co. v. Buchbinder, 343 Ark. 1, 32 S.W.3d 466 (2000).

One must prevail on the merits in order to be considered a prevailing party; a dismissal without prejudice does not sufficiently conclude the matter such that a determination of the prevailing party can be stated with certainty. Burnette v. Perkins & Assocs., 343 Ark. 237, 33 S.W.3d 145 (2000).

In a landlord/tenant dispute pertaining to a fraternity house, the trial court erred in determining that there was no prevailing party where the fraternity prevailed on its claim for conversion of property and breach of lease, the officers of the fraternity prevailed in defending third-party claims by the landlord, and where the landlord was entitled to only $2,000, rather than the $40,000 sought, for damages. Marcum v. Wengert, 344 Ark. 153, 40 S.W.3d 230 (2001).

Award of an attorney's fee to husband as the “prevailing party” in company's action to recover on a credit card was improper because the company was the prevailing party where judgment was rendered in its favor on its complaint for a money judgment regarding the credit card account; as husband was ordered to pay a money judgment that he did not appeal, the trial court erred in declaring husband to be the prevailing party for purposes of this section. C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC v. Whittington, 90 Ark. App. 213, 205 S.W.3d 157 (2005).

Appellate court affirmed trial court's order denying attorney’s fees to a firm as the fact that the firm prevailed on the forum selection clause issue did not mean that it was the prevailing party as to the substantive issues, and the former partner's involuntary dismissal of the case without prejudice did not cause the firm to be the prevailing party where the substantive issues remained. BKD, LLP v. Yates, 367 Ark. 391, 240 S.W.3d 588 (2006).

Sixty-five thousand dollar attorney's fee award in a breach of contract case was upheld on review because the assertion of an unsuccessful counterclaim did not mean that a health organization was not the prevailing party where it successfully defended against doctor's contract claim; moreover, the amount was reasonable considering the legal expenses incurred. Perry v. Baptist Health, 368 Ark. 114, 243 S.W.3d 310 (2006).

When a corporation sought a retainage from a contractor, but the contractor refused to return the money because of alleged deficiencies in the corporation's work, the circuit court properly awarded attorney's fees to the contractor because the contractor was the prevailing party, as it had received three-fourths of the money at issue. CJ Bldg. Corp. v. TRAC-10, 368 Ark. 654, 249 S.W.3d 793 (2007).

Because the physician prevailed on two of the three issues he raised against the doctor and the professional association he, therefore, came out “on top” at the end of the case for purposes of this section. Further, the district court awarded the physician $12,000 in attorney's fees for successfully defending against the breach of contract counterclaim and did not abuse its discretion in so doing. Baptist Health v. Smith, 536 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2008).

An award of attorney's fees to the landowners as the prevailing party under this section in a lease dispute, was affirmed although the judgment was reversed on appeal because a farm did not preserve its prevailing party argument made on appeal of a denial of a motion to vacate the award under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Seidenstricker Farms v. Doss, 374 Ark. 123, 286 S.W.3d 142 (2008).

Trial court erred in a breach of contract action in holding that a buyer was not entitled to attorney’s fees after judgment was rendered in its favor because the language of the purchase agreement did not indicate that the parties intended that each party would pay its own attorney’s fees and costs in the event of litigation. Asbury Auto. Used Car Ctr. v. Brosh, 2009 Ark. 111, 314 S.W.3d 275 (2009).

Sellers who asserted a successful breach-of-contract claim against a buyer who moved into a home without paying the balance due were the prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees because even though the buyer prevailed on some warranty claims for unfinished household repairs, the sellers came out on top in the end. Carroll v. UV Props., LLC, 2009 Ark. App. 599 (2009).

In an action by home buyers against the sellers for recovery of the earnest money, in which the sellers asserted a counterclaim for damages for breach of contract, which resulted in a decision that the sellers were not entitled to damages but were entitled to keep the earnest money, neither party was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney's fees under this section or the terms of the parties' real estate contract, or for costs under Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Brackelsberg v. Heflin, 2011 Ark. App. 678, 386 S.W.3d 636 (2011).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the client was the prevailing party where she successfully defended the breach-of-contract claim; the court limited the fee award and a successful defendant in a contract action could be considered a “prevailing party” for the purposes of this section. Harrill & Sutter P.L.L.C. v. Kosin, 2012 Ark. 385, 424 S.W.3d 272 (2012).

Trial court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to the purchaser of an accounting office in a breach of contract action because the purchaser was the prevailing party; while the trial court dismissed the purchaser's claims for fraud, reimbursement of the purchase money for the building, and tortious interference, it awarded the purchaser all of the purchaser's requested fees. Spann v. Lovett & Co., 2012 Ark. App. 107, 389 S.W.3d 77 (2012).

While appellants were granted summary judgment on individual claims against them, appellee recovered a judgment against appellants' company, and thus appellee was a prevailing party in terms of the entirety of the case; thus, the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for attorney’s fees. Armstrong Remodeling & Constr., LLC v. Cardenas, 2012 Ark. App. 387, 417 S.W.3d 748 (2012).

Because the only issue remaining for trial was whether the rail service should be liable for the employer's share of a settlement amount, and at trial the district court determined that the rail service was not liable for any additional amount, the district court did not err when it found that the employer was not a prevailing party under this section. Rice v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 712 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 2013).

Because appellee prevailed in a breach of contract action under the theory of collateral estoppel, he was the prevailing party and an award of attorney’s fees to him was not in error. Rose v. Nutt, 2013 Ark. App. 688 (2013).

It was necessary to remand for a determination of whether defendant was entitled to attorney’s fees on its counterclaim under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act because a party who prevailed on a cause of action to recover actual damages under the Act was eligible for an award of attorney’s fees, in the discretion of the court, even when another party was the prevailing party in the overall action for purposes of the statute. G&K Servs. Co. v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc., 766 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2014).

Because the circuit court erred in denying a surety's motion for directed verdict, a subcontractor was no longer the prevailing party and was not entitled to attorney's fees under either the subcontractor or the attorney-fee statute, and it was not the “successful party” entitled to attorney's fees under the materialmen's lien statute. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Sweet's Contr., Inc., 2014 Ark. 484, 450 S.W.3d 229 (2014).

Trial court erred in finding that the consignees were not the prevailing parties and, consequently, denying their motion for attorney’s fees because, even though the jury awarded no damages, the consignees prevailed in the consignor’s breach-of-contract claim against them and in their breach-of-contract counterclaim against the consignor. Sluyter v. Toney, 2014 Ark. App. 247 (2014).

Circuit court, which awarded attorney's fees to a city pursuant to this section, erred in its analysis of determining the prevailing party; when considered as a whole, the contractor was the prevailing party because it was declared entitled to 100% of the amount it claimed in the litigation while the city was awarded only 53% of the amount it sought. Southern Bldg. Servs. v. City of Fort Smith, 2014 Ark. App. 437, 440 S.W.3d 346 (2014).

Appellees successfully held shareholders liable for breach of warranty of title in a case involving the conveyance of mineral rights; although appellees did not receive the full amount of damages they requested, they prevailed on their breach of warranty claim, and thus the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellees were the prevailing party in the action. Mt. Pine Timber, Inc. v. Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 197, 487 S.W.3d 832 (2016).

Rescission.

Remedy of rescission in a contract case does not foreclose this section's authorization for attorney's fees in a breach-of-contract case. Where a trial court's order and its oral findings indicate that a case sounded primarily in contract, rather than in tort, and the trial court was misled by dicta in case law, a remand was necessary for the reconsideration of a motion for fees. Beck v. Inter City Transp., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 370, 417 S.W.3d 740 (2012).

Reversal of Judgment.

Where trial court relied on this section in authorizing award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, the Supreme Court, in reversing judgment, also reversed the award of attorney's fees. Brookside Village Mobile Homes v. Meyers, 301 Ark. 139, 782 S.W.2d 365 (1990).

Since the judgment in favor of the prevailing party was reversed, the award of the attorney's fee was also reversed. American States Ins. Co. v. Tri Tech, Inc., 35 Ark. App. 134, 812 S.W.2d 490 (1991).

Assignee of trucking companies stood in the companies' position and was subject to any defenses a transportation company had against the companies, including fraud, and the trial court erred in finding otherwise; in addition, because the assignee was no longer a prevailing party, the appellate court also reversed the award of attorney’s fees under this section. Am. Transp. Corp. v. Exch. Capital Corp., 84 Ark. App. 28, 129 S.W.3d 312 (2003).

Where litigants failed in an action on a trust and the trial court dismissed their cross-claims for waste, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty, and rejected their arguments regarding the interpretation of the trust instrument, the trial court erred in awarding them conditional attorney's fees. Bailey v. Delta Trust & Bank, 359 Ark. 424, 198 S.W.3d 506 (2004).

School district was not required under this section to pay a county an attorney's fee because an order directing the district to reimburse the county for overtime pay provided by the county to the county clerk for work related to a school district election was reversed. Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Fluker, 371 Ark. 574, 268 S.W.3d 879 (2007).

Standard of Review.

Due to the trial judge's intimate acquaintance with the record and the quality of service rendered, the appellate court usually recognizes the superior perspective of the trial judge in assessing the applicable factors. Accordingly, an award of attorney's fees will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990).

Supreme court affirmed the circuit court's order denying a general contractor's motion for attorney's fees because the general contractor challenged the ruling that it was not the prevailing party, but it did not challenge the alternative, independent ruling that it could not be awarded attorney's fees due to its conduct in the case. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Sweet's Contr., Inc., 2014 Ark. 484, 450 S.W.3d 229 (2014).

Summary Judgment.

In a subcontractor's fraudulent inducement suit against a contract, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the contractor $40,000 in attorney's fees under this section, although the contractor prevailed on summary judgment, given the volume of discovery that was necessary before the contractor could determine that the subcontractor had violated § 17-25-103, defeating the subcontractor's claims. Meyer v. CDI Contrs., LLC, 102 Ark. App. 290, 284 S.W.3d 530 (2008).

Award of $200,000 in attorney's fees and costs to defendants was vacated on appeal from summary judgment because defendants were no longer the prevailing party in an action based on a non-compete contract; there was a genuine dispute of material fact about whether defendant employees' former employer assigned defendants' non-compete agreements to plaintiff. Stuart C. Irby Co. v. Tipton, 796 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2015).

Teachers.

An action brought pursuant to the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, § 6-17-1501 et seq., is both a civil action and a claim for labor or services, and thus covered by this section. Junction City Sch. Dist. v. Alphin, 56 Ark. App. 61, 938 S.W.2d 239 (1997); Hall v. Kingsland Sch. Dist., 56 Ark. App. 110, 938 S.W.2d 571 (1997).

Actions brought pursuant to the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 1983, § 6-17-1501 et seq., are actions in contract for labor or services such that attorney's fees may be awarded by the trial court pursuant to this section. Love v. Smackover Sch. Dist., 329 Ark. 4, 946 S.W.2d 676 (1997).

Court found no abuse of discretion in the decision to limit the attorney’s fees award to the work done on a teacher fair dismissal case, and the court affirmed the holding that services regarding the teacher's criminal case, child maltreatment case, and teacher license case should have been disallowed. Avery v. Warren Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 392 (2013).

Time Limitations.

There is no statute or local court rule that prescribes any specific time limit on a motion for an attorney's fee under this section. Therefore, because the essence of waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, it was impossible to waive right to request a fee award under this section by filing motion more than 30 days after the underlying judgment was rendered. Marsh & McLennan v. Herget, 321 Ark. 180, 900 S.W.2d 195 (1995).

District court's verdict was reversed on appeal where the applicable statute of limitations began to run at the latest date the plaintiff lessor learned its land had suffered a remediable injury, though it did not yet know the extent of the injury; thus, the award of attorney's fees was reversed and remanded for further consideration. Highland Indus. Park, Inc. v. BEI Def. Sys. Co., 357 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2004).

Trial court did not err in denying terminated county employee's motion for an award of attorney's fees as her motion seeking attorney's fees was not timely filed; the same result held true even if the time was measured from the denial of the county's motion for JNOV because the fee motion was filed 21 days after the order denying the motion was entered. Crawford County v. Jones, 365 Ark. 585, 232 S.W.3d 433 (2006).

Tort Action.

When the prevailing party's claim is based in tort, an award of attorney's fees cannot be justified under this section. Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 867 S.W.2d 446 (1993).

Where a case was submitted to the jury on alternate theories, both contract and tort, and the jury based its award on the tort theory, the trial judge did not err in declining to award attorney's fees. Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 867 S.W.2d 446 (1993).

Attorney's fees denied where the action was one for replevin and, alternatively, for conversion of two trucks; this section does not allow attorney's fees in tort actions. McQuillan v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 331 Ark. 242, 961 S.W.2d 729 (1998).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney's fees in a conversion action. Brown v. Blake, 86 Ark. App. 107, 161 S.W.3d 298 (2004).

Attorney’s fees should not have been awarded under this section because the action was not primarily based in contract; the case sounded primarily in tort because, in order for a cause of action for legal malpractice to be maintained, the contractual relationship requirement in § 16-22-310 had to be met. The core dispute was whether there was an oral contract to make a claim against an attorney and his legal-malpractice carrier. Howard v. Adams, 2012 Ark. App. 562, 424 S.W.3d 337 (2012).

Although attorney's fees and costs were recoverable under this section for successfully defending a contract claim, fees and costs associated with a third-party negligence claim were not recoverable. Carter v. Cline, 2013 Ark. 398, 430 S.W.3d 22 (2013).

Cited: Damron v. University Estates, Phase II, Inc., 295 Ark. 533, 750 S.W.2d 402 (1988); Meyers Gen. Agency v. Lavender, 301 Ark. 503, 785 S.W.2d 28 (1990); Lockley v. Easley, 302 Ark. 13, 786 S.W.2d 573 (1990); Eddings v. Lippe, 304 Ark. 309, 802 S.W.2d 139 (1991); Woodhaven Homes, Inc. v. Kennedy Sheet Metal Co., 304 Ark. 415, 803 S.W.2d 508 (1991); McElroy v. Grisham, 306 Ark. 4, 810 S.W.2d 933 (1991); Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992); Loewer v. National Bank, 311 Ark. 354, 844 S.W.2d 329 (1992); P.A.M. Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 315 Ark. 234, 868 S.W.2d 33 (1993); Hardison v. Jackson, 45 Ark. App. 49, 871 S.W.2d 410 (1994); Mason v. Jackson, 323 Ark. 252, 914 S.W.2d 728 (1996); City of Ozark v. Nichols, 56 Ark. App. 85, 937 S.W.2d 686 (1997); Nettleton Sch. Dist. v. Owens, 329 Ark. 367, 948 S.W.2d 94 (1997); Milligan v. Circuit Court, 331 Ark. 439, 959 S.W.2d 747 (1998); Arkansas Okla. Gas Corp. v. Waelder Oil & Gas, Inc., 332 Ark. 548, 966 S.W.2d 259 (1998); State Auto Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swaim, 338 Ark. 49, 991 S.W.2d 555 (1999); Bharodia v. Pledger, 66 Ark. App. 349, 990 S.W.2d 581 (1999); Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc., 337 Ark. 247, 987 S.W.2d 722 (1999); Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 338 Ark. 410, 994 S.W.2d 468 (1999); Stilley v. James, 347 Ark. 74, 60 S.W.3d 410 (2001); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 347 Ark. 184, 60 S.W.3d 458 (2001); GMAC v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 329 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2003); BAAN, United States v. USA Truck, Inc., 82 Ark. App. 202, 105 S.W.3d 784 (2003); Hickman v. Kralicek Realty & Constr. Co., 84 Ark. App. 61, 129 S.W.3d 317 (2003); Patton v. TPI Petroleum, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 921 (E.D. Ark. 2005); Taylor v. George, 92 Ark. App. 264, 212 S.W.3d 17 (2005); Sluyter v. Hale Fireworks P'ship, 370 Ark. 511, 262 S.W.3d 154 (2007); Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Fluker, 371 Ark. 574, 268 S.W.3d 879 (2007); Medical Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis Enters., 373 Ark. 525, 285 S.W.3d 233 (2008); Hearne v. Banks, 2009 Ark. App. 590, 376 S.W.3d 444 (2009); Booth v. Riverside Marine Remanufacturers, 2010 Ark. App. 366, 376 S.W.3d 450 (2010); Bonds v. Hunt, 2010 Ark. App. 415, 379 S.W.3d 57 (2010); Dunn v. Womack, 2011 Ark. App. 393, 383 S.W.3d 893 (2011); Worley v. City of Jonesboro, 2011 Ark. App. 594, 385 S.W.3d 908 (2011); Piping Indus. Co. v. Future Fuel Chem. Co., 2013 Ark. App. 549 (2013); Trakru v. Mathews, 2014 Ark. App. 154, 434 S.W.3d 10 (2014); Liberty Bank of Ark. v. Byrd, 2016 Ark. App. 86, 482 S.W.3d 746 (2016); Watson Chapel Sch. Dist. v. Vilches, 2016 Ark. App. 87, 482 S.W.3d 755 (2016); One Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Lenderman, 2017 Ark. App. 42, 512 S.W.3d 651 (2017).