Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-104 (2026)
Actions with limitation of one year
The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action shall accrue and not thereafter:
- All special actions on the case;
-
Actions for:
- Assault and battery; and
- False imprisonment;
- All actions for words spoken slandering the character of another;
- All actions for words spoken whereby special damages are sustained; and
- All actions for damages suffered by a consumer as a result of any act or omission of a home inspector relating to a home inspection report.
History. Rev. Stat., ch. 91, § 7; C. & M. Dig., § 6951; Pope's Dig., § 8929; Acts 1967, No. 471, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 37-201; Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 46, § 7; 2003, No. 1328, § 3.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2003, No. 1328, § 5, provided:
“All regulations adopted by the Homes Inspector Advisory Board under § 17-52-107 shall remain in effect until the new Arkansas Inspector Registration Board adopts regulations, unless the regulations conflict with this act.”
Publisher's Notes. With regard to the words “special actions on the case”, see ARCP 2, which provides for one form of action.
Acts 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), No. 46, § 8, provided that § 7 of the act does not apply to litigation pending before the effective date of the act.
Amendments. The 2003 amendment added (5); and made related and stylistic changes.
Cross References. Arkansas Home Inspectors Registration Act, § 17-52-301 et seq.
Research References
ALR.
When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of negligent act or omission. 11 A.L.R.6th 1.
When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time of occurrence of sustaining damage or injury and other theories. 12 A.L.R.6th 1.
When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Statement of rule and application of rule to providing client with allegedly negligent advice or failing to advise. 13 A.L.R.6th 1.
When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to conduct of litigation and delay or inaction in conducting client's affairs. 14 A.L.R.6th 1.
Timeliness of action under medical malpractice statute of repose, aside from effect of fraudulent concealment of patient's cause of action. 14 A.L.R.6th 301.
When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to property, estate, corporate, and document cases. 15 A.L.R.6th 427.
When statute of limitations begins to run on action against attorney for malpractice based upon negligence-View that statute begins to run from time client discovers, or should have discovered, negligent act or omission-Application of rule to negligent misrepresentation, failure to supervise junior counsel, conflict of interest, billing disputes, and unspecified acts of negligence. 16 A.L.R.6th 653.
When statute of limitations begins to run in case of dental malpractice. 17 A.L.R.6th 159.
Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Deception as Estopping Reliance on Nonmedical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. 98 A.L.R.6th 417 (2014).
Accrual of Claims for Continuing Trespass or Continuing Nuisance for Purposes of Statutory Limitations. 14 A.L.R.7th Art. 8 (2015).
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Survey, Family Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 631.
Case Notes
Purpose.
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to encourage the prompt filing of claims by allowing no more than a reasonable time within which to make a claim so a defendant is protected from having to defend an action in which the truth-finding process would be impaired by the passage of time. McEntire v. Malloy, 288 Ark. 582, 707 S.W.2d 773 (1986).
Alienation of Affections.
Prior to the 1967 amendment, this section did not apply in a suit for alienation of affections, the court holding that there was a clear distinction between the two separate torts of alienation of affection and criminal conversation. Gibson v. Gibson, 240 Ark. 827, 402 S.W.2d 647 (1966).
Plaintiffs' suit for alienation of a child's affection was barred by this section since the suit was filed well beyond the one year limit. Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1981)Criticized byPoindexter v. Armstrong, 934 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Ark. 1994).
Assault and Battery.
Cause of action not barred by one year statute of limitation, but subject to three year statute of limitation. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Mynott, 83 Ark. 6, 102 S.W. 380 (1907); Jefferson v. Nero, 225 Ark. 302, 280 S.W.2d 884 (1956).
An action for damages for shooting another person is an assault and battery and barred in one year even though there could have been a conviction for a higher crime. McAlister v. Gunter, 164 Ark. 611, 262 S.W. 636 (1924).
Where no special relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant and damages claimed by plaintiff were the result of alleged assault and battery, action is governed by the one year statute of limitations. Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ark. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. Ark. 1961).
Where the plaintiff was severely beaten by her husband in 1982, but did not discover the extent of her injuries until 1984, and she filed a personal injury action in 1985, the statute of limitations began to run when the battery was allegedly committed and the judge was correct in dismissing the action. McEntire v. Malloy, 288 Ark. 582, 707 S.W.2d 773 (1986).
Action for civil damages arising from a shooting involved a battery, not a trespass, and was barred when not brought within the limitations period. Andrews v. McDougal, 292 Ark. 590, 731 S.W.2d 779 (1987).
Allegations that a doctor had improperly touched, examined, and otherwise fondled plaintiffs' breasts during a physical examination did not allege a complaint of battery, governed by the one-year statute of limitations in this section, but stated a cause of action for the tort of outrage, which is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in § 16-56-105. McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466, 963 S.W.2d 583 (1998).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the owners of a trailer park because the gravamen of the tenant's claim was for assault and battery and/or negligence, not breach of contract, and the claim was therefore untimely where the tenant filed his complaint over four years after the incident, and no breach of contract was alleged that would bring the action under the five-year statute of limitations. The rental form, which was not specific to the tenant, contained no promise, specific or general, on the part of the owners to protect the tenant from harm. Moody v. Tarvin, 2016 Ark. App. 169, 486 S.W.3d 242 (2016).
Civil Rights Violation.
Allegation of deprivation of rights in violation of federal statute must bring action within statute of limitations most analogous to claim, which in this case would be as provided in § 16-56-105 rather than one year as provided in this section. Reed v. Hutto, 486 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1973).
Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accruing within a particular state are to be governed by that state's general personal-injury statute of limitations, not by statutes covering particular torts such as this one-year statute of limitations. The general personal-injury statute of limitations of three years governs § 1983 actions. Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992).
Contractual Interference.
The limitation period for a contractual interference claim is three years, not one year. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).
Deceit.
Although similar to an action for defamation, an action for deceit is distinct and is covered by the three year statute of limitations, not the one year statute. Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).
Defamation.
In an action to recover damages for unrecorded defamation of character and reputation, the complaint stated a cause of action for slander which was barred by the one year statute of limitations. Parkman v. Hastings, 259 Ark. 59, 531 S.W.2d 481 (1976).
False Imprisonment, Etc.
Under this section an action alleging false imprisonment must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. Gilpin v. Tack, 256 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Ark. 1966).
Complaint asserting false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress was barred by the one year statute of limitations applicable to actions for false imprisonment and for assault and battery, and since no facts were alleged that would make the assertion of mental and emotional distress anything more than an element of damage flowing from the imprisonment and mistreatment, the same one year statute would apply. Turner v. Baptist Medical Center, 275 Ark. 424, 631 S.W.2d 275 (1982).
Husband and Wife.
Where wife's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, her husband's claim for damages based on wife's cause of action is also barred. Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Ark. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. Ark. 1961).
Invasion of Privacy.
Only torts not enumerated in this section have the three year limitation period of § 16-56-105. The reason there must be a short limitation period of one year for actions based on spoken words which allegedly constitute invasion of privacy is simple: there is no written proof of the claim and such an action ought to be quickly resolved. This effects the underlying purpose of statutes of limitations; that is, to settle claims within a reasonable period of time after they arise and while the evidence is fresh in the witnesses' minds. Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984).
Malpractice.
The statute of limitations begins to run at the time the act of malpractice occurs, not from the time it is discovered. Courtney v. First Nat'l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989).
Personal Injuries.
An action by a husband for damages suffered in consequence of wrongful injury to his wife is not barred in one year. Emrich v. Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co., 71 Ark. 71, 70 S.W. 1035 (1902).
An action by a parent for damages for seduction of child is tort action for personal injuries, and the one-year statute does not apply. Breining v. Lippincott, 125 Ark. 77, 187 S.W. 915 (1916).
Slander.
Subdivision (4) provides that actions for slander shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues, which is the time of publication. Pinkston v. Lovell, 296 Ark. 543, 759 S.W.2d 20 (1988).
Plaintiffs' slander claim was time-barred where it was not brought within one year of publication and where the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the defendants acted to fraudulently conceal the allegedly slanderous statement. Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 937 S.W.2d 653 (1997).
Employee's complaint, filed on January 24, 2008, alleged that the slanderous statements were made on or about January 15, 2006; because the complaint was filed more than one year after the occurrence of the allegedly slanderous statements, the employee's defamation claim against the partnership was barred by the statute of limitations. Roeben v. BG Excelsior Ltd. P'ship, 2009 Ark. App. 646, 344 S.W.3d 93 (2009).
Special Actions on the Case.
The words “all special actions on the case” are limited to actions for criminal conversation. Emrich v. Little Rock Traction & Elec. Co., 71 Ark. 71, 70 S.W. 1035 (1902). See also Cockrill v. Cooper, 86 F. 7 (8th Cir. 1898).
Wrongful Killing.
This section has no applicability to an action brought under § 16-62-101 for wrongful killing. Saint Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Robertson, 103 Ark. 361, 146 S.W. 482 (1912).
Cited: Heuer v. Basin Park Hotel & Resort, 114 F. Supp. 604 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Crawford v. General Contract Corp., 174 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970); Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977); Phillips v. Sugrue, 800 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Ark. 1992); Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993); O'Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 942 S.W.2d 854 (1997); Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094 (1997).