Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-114 (2026)

Case Notes

In General.

The defense of the statute of limitations is a valid or meritorious one such as will support the vacation of a judgment. Berringer v. Stevens, 145 Ark. 293, 225 S.W. 14 (1920).

Judgment lien expires within three years after its rendition, unless revived, but judgment creditor may issue an execution on the judgment at any time within ten years after its rendition. Bird v. Kitchens, 215 Ark. 609, 221 S.W.2d 795 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 892, 70 S. Ct. 241 (1949).

This section does not provide for revival of the statute of limitations for actions on a judgment by a subsequent acknowledgment of debt. Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999).

Under § 16-65-501, the dealership owner's writ of scire facias to revive a ten-year-old judgment against the partner should have been granted because the owner's 1993 judgment had not been satisfied; the partner had twice tendered the cash and stock certificates but, despite his efforts, he had been unable to extinguish his judgment debt. Carder Buick-Olds Co. v. Wooten, 2009 Ark. App. 310, 308 S.W.3d 156 (2009).

Accrual of Action.

The cause of action accrues upon the rendition of the judgment, but the issuance of process or payment on a judgment will toll the statute and form a new period from which it will run. Koontz v. La Dow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 S.W. 686 (1918).

The date of payment on a judgment is the time from which a new period of life for ten years begins to run. Pepin v. Hoover, 205 Ark. 251, 168 S.W.2d 390 (1943).

A cause of action on a judgment accrues on the date the judgment is rendered. A. Karcher Candy Co. v. Hopkins, 211 Ark. 810, 202 S.W.2d 588 (1947).

Child Support.

This section does not apply to the recovery of delinquent child-support payments since the order for child-support is not a final decree. Brun v. Rembert, 227 Ark. 241, 297 S.W.2d 940 (1957).

In actions for child-support arrearages, the limitation period found in § 9-14-236 applies, not the ten-year statute in this section. Cole v. Harris, 330 Ark. 420, 953 S.W.2d 586 (1997).

While § 9-14-234 provides that child support installments payable through the court registry become final judgments as they accrue, this section's general ten-year statute of limitations does not apply to actions to collect such arrearages; instead, the limitations period found at § 9-14-236(c) governs. Sanderson v. Harris, 330 Ark. 741, 957 S.W.2d 685 (1997).

Enforcement of a judgment for accrued child support arrearages was barred where the judgment was rendered in July, 1985, the only proven payment on the judgment was a garnishment in September, 1985, and no action was commenced within 10 years from that date. Malone v. Malone, 338 Ark. 20, 991 S.W.2d 546 (1999).

Criminal Proceedings.

This statute has no relation to criminal proceedings. Stocks v. State, 171 Ark. 835, 286 S.W. 975 (1926).

Estate Administration.

Probate allowances are within this statute; while the statute does not operate to bar a judgment during the course of administration, it commences running when the administrator is discharged. Brown v. Hanauer, 48 Ark. 277, 3 S.W. 27 (1886), overruled in part, Price v. Price, 253 Ark. 1124, 491 S.W.2d 793 (1973).

Statute does not begin to run against claim against estate until administration has been closed. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

Even though a claim against an estate may be considered a judgment and the ten-year statute govern, where administratrix sold real property of estate to herself subject to lien for attorney's fee, there was a waiver of the claim against the estate in favor of the contractual lien in the deed and rights were barred by delay of eight years. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

Foreign Judgments.

Even though Arkansas provides a ten-year period for the enforcement of all judgments which also applies to judgments revived in this state, where a judgment was revived in Illinois under that state's 20-year statute of limitations, and registration and enforcement were then sought in Arkansas, this state would give full faith and credit to the validly revived Illinois judgment. Durham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Services/Child Support Enforcement Unit, 322 Ark. 789, 912 S.W.2d 412 (1995).

Trial court properly denied property owners' motion to quash judgment holder's motion to execute a Missouri judgment by forcing the sale of Arkansas real estate; the Arkansas statute of limitations applied because the Missouri statute of limitations, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516.350, was procedural in nature as it only worked to extinguish the judgment holders' remedy and the action was timely under the Arkansas statute. Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 139 S.W.3d 500 (2003).

Petition to revive a foreign judgment was not barred by the running of the statute of limitations under this section because the application was filed well within the 10 year period of a judgment that was registered in 2003; even if a judgment filed in 2001 was the appropriate judgment to begin the running of the limitations period, the application was still timely because it was filed exactly 10 years from the date the judgment. The day that the judgment was entered was not counted in computing the limitations period. Bird v. Shaffer, 2012 Ark. App. 464 (2012).

Justices of Peace.

This section applies to judgments of justices of the peace; the provision of § 16-19-1002 against issuing execution after five years does not prevent suits on the judgment nor bar recovery. Hicks v. Brown, 38 Ark. 469 (1881); Trammell v. Anderson, 52 Ark. 176, 12 S.W. 328 (1889).

Municipal Courts.

This section applies to judgments of municipal courts. A. Karcher Candy Co. v. Hopkins, 211 Ark. 810, 202 S.W.2d 588 (1947).

Property Settlement Agreement.

Where the property settlement agreement was an independent contract that was incorporated into the court decree, it did not merge into the decree and was, therefore, subject to the five-year statute of limitations in § 16-56-111, and not the ten-year limitations period under this section. Meadors v. Meadors, 58 Ark. App. 96, 946 S.W.2d 724 (1997).

Public Administrator.

Where final settlement as public administrator was approved by the probate court, a suit thereon filed seven years later was not barred by the ten year statute although the sheriff went out of office more than ten years before suit was filed. Elmore v. Bishop, 184 Ark. 243, 42 S.W.2d 399 (1931).

Since creditor could enforce his judgment with a remedy of a resulting trust, the district court erred in finding that his claim was time-barred by the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfers Act, § 4-59-201 et seq.; the allegations were sufficient to argue that a resulting trust was formed, and the creditor, who was entitled to step into the debtor's shoes, timely filed his claim within the 10 years for enforcing a judgment against the defendant, the trustee/title holder of real property held for the benefit of the debtor. Imperato v. McMinn, 406 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2005).

Suspension of Statute.

While a judgment is enjoined, a statute does not run, and intermediate executions and payments form new points for the running of the statute. Lindsay v. Merrill, 36 Ark. 545 (1880).

Process may be issued at any time before the enforcement of a judgment is barred, and a break in the running of the statute of limitations will constitute the commencement of a new period not only for an action to enforce the judgment but for the issuance of process. Koontz v. La Dow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 S.W. 686 (1918).

Worker's Compensation.

While a two-year statute of limitations applied to the filing of a claim for workers' compensation benefits, pursuant to § 11-9-702(a)(1), that limitations period did not apply to bar the employee's claim against the employer where the employee was not filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits, but instead was seeking to enforce an Illinois judgment he had already received based on an injury he sustained in Illnois while working for the employer; in that case, this section's 10-year limitations period for enforcement of judgments applied. Dodson v. Taylor, 346 Ark. 443, 57 S.W.3d 710 (2001).

Cited: A. Baldwin & Co. v. Williams, 74 Ark. 316, 86 S.W. 423 (1905); Martin v. H.T. Simon, Gregory & Co., 86 Ark. 280, 110 S.W. 1046 (1908); Koontz v. La Dow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 S.W. 686 (1918); Epperson v. Singleton, 247 Ark. 1006, 449 S.W.2d 203 (1970).