Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Propriety of lesser included offense charge of voluntary manslaughter to jury in state murder prosecution — Twenty-first century cases. 3 A.L.R.6th 543.

Admissibility of Suicide Note in Criminal Proceedings. 13 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2015).

Ark. L. Rev.

Allowing Fetal Wrongful Death Actions in Arkansas: A Death Whose Time Has Come?, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 465.

Case Note, Criminal Liability for Attempting to Inflict the AIDS Virus: Possibilities in Arkansas' Future, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 505.

Recent Development: Arkansas Criminal Law — Felony Manslaughter as a Lesser-Included Offense, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 1017.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Criminal Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 137.

Note, Fetus Not a “Person” as Term is Used in Manslaughter Statute, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 403.

Survey — Criminal Procedure, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 187.

Survey — Criminal Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 753.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Criminal Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 849.

Case Notes

Construction.

An unborn viable fetus is not a “person” as that term is used in subdivision (a)(3) of this section. Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987).

Accomplices.

No accomplice criminal responsibility results from supplying an intoxicant to one allegedly responsible as a principal for violations of subdivision (a)(1) of this section, § 5-13-204(a), or § 27-53-101(a)(1). Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993).

Employer held civilly liable where an employee killed his employer's neighbor when the neighbor pointed a gun at the employer; the employee was liable for manslaughter and his employer was an accomplice to that manslaughter. Costner v. Adams, 82 Ark. App. 148, 121 S.W.3d 164 (2003).

Course of Conduct.

Conduct upon which the state based charges of manslaughter and second degree battery, a car wreck, was not a single, continuous and uninterrupted act out of which the defendant could only be prosecuted for one offense; neither manslaughter nor second degree battery is specifically defined as a continuing course of conduct. Lawrence v. State, 39 Ark. App. 39, 839 S.W.2d 10 (1992).

Double Jeopardy.

Where one victim was not dead at the time of manslaughter conviction based on death of another victim of the same incident, subsequent prosecution for manslaughter of second victim was not barred. This “not yet consummated” exception to a defendant's right not to be tried twice for the same offense does not violate the principle of former jeopardy. Tackett v. State, 294 Ark. 609, 745 S.W.2d 625 (1988).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. Pixley v. State, 203 Ark. 42, 155 S.W.2d 710 (1941); Ramick v. State, 212 Ark. 700, 208 S.W.2d 3 (1948); Cooley v. State, 213 Ark. 503, 211 S.W.2d 114 (1948); Connelly v. State, 233 Ark. 826, 350 S.W.2d 298 (1961); Griffin v. State, 239 Ark. 431, 389 S.W.2d 900 (1965); Cook v. State, 248 Ark. 332, 451 S.W.2d 473 (1970); Hathcock v. State, 256 Ark. 707, 510 S.W.2d 276 (1974) (preceding decisions under prior law); Limber v. State, 264 Ark. 479, 572 S.W.2d 402 (1978); Bevills v. State, 264 Ark. 846, 575 S.W.2d 443 (1979); Kirkendall v. State, 265 Ark. 853, 581 S.W.2d 341 (1979); Dixon v. State, 268 Ark. 471, 597 S.W.2d 77 (1980); Darville v. State, 271 Ark. 580, 609 S.W.2d 50 (1980); Smith v. State, 3 Ark. App. 224, 623 S.W.2d 862 (1981); Worring v. State, 2 Ark. App. 27, 616 S.W.2d 23 (1981); Wood v. State, 20 Ark. App. 61, 724 S.W.2d 183 (1987); Booth v. State, 26 Ark. App. 115, 761 S.W.2d 607 (1988), cert. denied, Booth v. Arkansas, 490 U.S. 1047, 109 S. Ct. 1956, 104 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1989); Bargery v. State, 37 Ark. App. 118, 825 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

In a trial for murder, it was not error for the court to have submitted the issue of manslaughter to the jury if the proof would have supported a finding that defendant was guilty of a higher degree of homicide than that for which he was convicted. Patrick v. State, 245 Ark. 923, 436 S.W.2d 275 (1969) (decision under prior law).

In a murder prosecution where defendant attempted to show that he should only be convicted of manslaughter because he caused a death under circumstances that would have been murder but for the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable excuse, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a counselor, who was concededly an expert in the field of social work, to give an opinion as to the defendant's mental condition. Wilburn v. State, 289 Ark. 224, 711 S.W.2d 760 (1986).

The defendant was properly convicted of first degree murder, rather than manslaughter, notwithstanding his contention that he shot the victim under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was reasonable excuse, where (1) after having sex with the victim in his car and leaving the area, the defendant discovered that his wallet was missing, (2) the defendant went back to the area and found his wallet on the ground, with cash missing, (3) the defendant went home, got his gun and then found the victim and accused her of taking his money, (4) she stated that she did not have his money and taunted him, saying that she did not believe he would shoot her, and (5) the defendant then shot her three times. Franks v. State, 342 Ark. 167, 27 S.W.3d 377 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for manslaughter because two people in a motor home were killed when defendant drove a fully loaded commercial vehicle weighing over 82,000 pounds, while under the influence of methamphetamine, into the oncoming-traffic lane, striking the motor home, and ultimately driving through it. Defendant never attempted to brake prior to the accident or to return to the proper lane of traffic. Hoyle v. State, 371 Ark. 495, 268 S.W.3d 313 (2007), rehearing denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 12 (Jan. 10, 2008).

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of manslaughter in violation of subdivision (a)(3) of this section because the state presented sufficient evidence to corroborate defendant's confession since the corpus delicti rule, § 16-89-111(d), required a showing that the crime occurred, and the state made the requisite showing; the evidence showed that the victim died hours after defendant admittedly went to his apartment, that the victim's apartment was in a state of disarray, which could have been interpreted as circumstantial evidence of a struggle, that blood was found in an area not in the immediate vicinity of where the victim ultimately passed away, and that the medical examiner would have ruled the victim's death a homicide had he known that he had been punched in the head five times. Freeman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 90 (2010).

Appellant's conviction for manslaughter was affirmed because while a no-knock, nighttime search warrant was executed at appellant's apartment, shots were fired as soon as the SWAT team hit the door, the police returned fire, two police officers were shot, and two persons inside the residence were shot. Porter v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 139 (2012).

Extreme Emotional Disturbance.

Instruction on manslaughter properly refused where there was proof of intense anger on the part of defendant, but there was no proof of provocation in the form of physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon, as anger alone does not constitute extreme emotional disturbance. Spann v. State, 328 Ark. 509, 944 S.W.2d 537 (1997).

Elements of emotional disturbance include external events, but not mental diseases or defects; therefore, expert testimony was not admissible in a murder trial to show that defendant was mildly mentally retarded and had a schizo-affective disorder in order to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Bankston v. State, 361 Ark. 123, 205 S.W.3d 138 (2005).

In order for a jury to be instructed on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter, there must be evidence that the defendant killed the victim in the moment following some kind of provocation, such as physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon; passion alone will not reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. Boyle v. State, 363 Ark. 356, 214 S.W.3d 250 (2005).

Where the evidence at defendant's murder trial showed defendant drove up to the victim's house, the victim approached the car and the two spoke briefly, defendant pulled out a gun, the victim began backing away, and defendant shot and killed the victim, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter because the facts failed to demonstrate an extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable excuse; although defendant testified that statements made by the victim on a prior occasion and the victim's failure to run when defendant pulled out his gun led him to believe that the victim was armed, the evidence showed that defendant was the one who approached the victim and that their initial contact was a mere exchange of words in normal voices. Defendant's perceived threat in this situation did not provide a reasonable excuse for him to shoot the victim under a claim of extreme emotional disturbance because it was clear that defendant was free to drive away at any time; further, the victim was backing away from the car when defendant began to shoot, and he was unarmed. Taylor v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 627, 331 S.W.3d 597 (2009).

There was no evidence that the victim provoked defendant physically or otherwise to have caused the requisite extreme emotional disturbance as referenced in the statute. Bowden v. State, 2014 Ark. 168 (2014).

In a case where defendant was convicted of reckless conduct manslaughter, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give an instruction on extreme-emotional-disturbance-manslaughter because the evidence failed to show that defendant was provoked by the victim or that the victim was threatening defendant or attempting to commit violence on defendant at the time of the murder, as defendant testified that he did not know the victim and that he had not intended to shoot anyone; and, although defendant did respond to a physical fight prior to the shooting, the victim was not a party to that fight and thus was not the source of any provocation that might have spurred or incited defendant to fire his gun. Williams v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 262 (2015).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to present a proper jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter; although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, petitioner had initiated a second encounter with a firearm in tow and thus he had invited the provocation that led to the victim's death and was not entitled to a jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance. Further, even assuming trial counsel was deficient, petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. Douglas v. State, 2019 Ark. 57, 567 S.W.3d 483 (2019).

First-Degree Battery.

The mere fact that the jury convicted the defendant of manslaughter, which required proof of reckless conduct, did not require a conclusion that the jury could not also have found him guilty of first-degree battery, an offense that requires a more culpable mental state, with respect to the survivor of the automobile accident that the defendant caused. Nolen v. State, 278 Ark. 17, 643 S.W.2d 257 (1982).

Indictment or Information.

Indictment held to sufficiently charge the defendant knew that the poison which he procured and delivered to the deceased was to be used by her for the purpose of suicide and it was given to her for that purpose. Farrell v. State, 111 Ark. 180, 163 S.W. 768 (1914) (decision under prior law).

A prosecution for manslaughter on an information did not violate the state or federal constitutions. Washington v. State, 213 Ark. 218, 210 S.W.2d 307, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 884, 69 S. Ct. 232, 93 L. Ed. 423 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Information held to adequately state the crime with which the defendant was charged. Smith v. State, 231 Ark. 235, 330 S.W.2d 58 (1959) (decision under prior law).

Section 20-17-101, defining when one is legally dead and requiring that a determination of death shall be made in accordance with accepted medical standard, does not require that proof of death for the purposes of criminal prosecution be made only by autopsy evidence or by specific medical opinion. Wood v. State, 20 Ark. App. 61, 724 S.W.2d 183 (1987).

Instructions.

Instruction on requisite state of mind — held to constitute a correct statement of the law. Nagel v. State, 179 Ark. 625, 17 S.W.2d 317 (1929) (decision under prior law).

Where evidence was such that it would have supported a conviction of a more severe degree of homicide, defendant was not entitled to reversal because court instructed on first degree murder and refused to instruct on manslaughter. Bingley v. State, 235 Ark. 982, 363 S.W.2d 530, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 909, 84 S. Ct. 202, 11 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Instruction defining murder in the second degree held proper, as it was necessary that murder be defined in order that the jury could determine whether defendant was guilty of manslaughter. Tiner v. State, 239 Ark. 819, 394 S.W.2d 608 (1965) (decision under prior law).

Refusal or failure to instruct on manslaughter held proper. Freeman v. State, 240 Ark. 915, 403 S.W.2d 61 (1966); Williams v. State, 250 Ark. 859, 467 S.W.2d 740 (1971) (preceding decisions under prior law); Sargent v. State, 272 Ark. 336, 614 S.W.2d 503 (1981).

The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury upon § 5-2-620, where the jury was instructed pursuant to AMCI 4105, which required the State to overcome defendant's reliance on self-defense of his person by a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark v. State, 15 Ark. App. 393, 695 S.W.2d 396 (1985).

Failure to give proffered instruction on manslaughter held error. Williams v. State, 17 Ark. App. 53, 702 S.W.2d 825 (1986).

The trial judge did not err in refusing to give the defendant's requested instruction on accident where the defendant's argument that the shooting was accidental could have been, and was, addressed to each charge of first degree murder, second degree murder, and manslaughter, and its appropriately defined mental state, and all requisite mental states were before the jury in proper instruction. Sims v. State, 19 Ark. App. 45, 716 S.W.2d 774 (1986).

Where evidence was sufficient that the jury could find an extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable excuse, and thus it could have found defendant guilty of manslaughter rather than murder in the first degree, a manslaughter instruction was warranted and failure to give the manslaughter instruction was prejudicial. Rainey v. State, 310 Ark. 419, 837 S.W.2d 453 (1992).

Where defendant admitted to shooting the unarmed victim once in the back causing paralysis and shooting the victim a second time while he was incapable of moving or causing harm to defendant, it is clear that a justification defense is inconsistent with the “recklessly causing” element found in the offense of manslaughter, and there was no rational basis for giving the manslaughter instruction. Cobb v. State, 340 Ark. 240, 12 S.W.3d 195 (2000).

Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder was improper where the evidence warranted a manslaughter instruction that should have been presented to the jury; defendant requested the manslaughter instruction based upon the premise that he caused the victim's death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable excuse, and the evidence entitled defendant to the manslaughter instruction. Whittier v. State, 84 Ark. App. 362, 141 S.W.3d 924 (2004).

In defendant's first-degree murder case, the court erred by refusing a requested manslaughter instruction under subdivision (a)(1) where (1) there was evidence that defendant got into an argument with his wife that escalated into physical violence, (2) when she began hitting him and threatening to kill him, defendant reacted by putting her in a headlock, or possibly choking her, or putting his arms around her neck, and (3) he did not let go until she died; based on the evidence, the jury could have found that defendant assaulted his wife under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable excuse. Wyles v. State, 357 Ark. 530, 182 S.W.3d 142 (2004).

Defendant's capital-murder conviction was appropriate and there was no basis for giving the jury defendant's requested manslaughter instruction, per subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Although defendant argued that there was evidence that he was provoked to shoot the victim, defendant pointed to no evidence that the victim's actions in fighting defendant's brother were calculated to provoke defendant to take action. Jackson v. State, 375 Ark. 321, 290 S.W.3d 574 (2009).

In addition to instructions on the elements of capital murder, the jury was instructed on lesser included offenses of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter, and defendant not assert that the model jury instructions inaccurately reflected the law; thus, despite his contention that his proffered instructions were more inclusive and a more clear statement of the law on the various issues, the trial court did not err in refusing to submit them to the jury in his capital murder case. Adams v. State, 2009 Ark. 375, 326 S.W.3d 764 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1021, 130 S. Ct. 1922, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010).

Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder because there was no evidence that the victim actually threatened defendant with a gun at the time of the murder and because the only testimony of threats made by the victim against defendant came from defendant's own testimony; even if the court were to accept defendant's self-serving testimony as evidence to support a manslaughter instruction, the threats as testified to by defendant did not provide a basis for the manslaughter instruction because mere threats, where the person making the threats was unarmed and was neither committing nor attempting to commit violence on defendant the time of the killing, were insufficient to lessen defendant's culpability for murder. Where there was no evidence that the victim was armed and no evidence that he was violently assaulting defendant when defendant shot him, defendant failed to establish provocation sufficient to justify his actions; defendant was thus not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. Pollard v. State, 2009 Ark. 434, 336 S.W.3d 866 (2009).

Defendants were not entitled to a manslaughter instruction unless there was a showing that defendants killed the victim in the moment following provocation, and here, defendant did not kill his mother at that time, but instead had to drive to another county, get a shovel out of his mother's shed, then beat down the back door to her home before beating her to death. Bowden v. State, 2014 Ark. 168 (2014).

Trial court did not err in instructing the jury on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter because the court did not delegate its duty to instruct the jury to counsel, as defendant alleged on appeal, as it was the court, not counsel, that gave the jury the agreed upon instructions. Sims v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 312 (2014).

Facts of this case did not give rise to the provocation necessary to warrant the giving of an extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter instruction, as there was no evidence that the victim was armed, and even assuming that the victim's crude and taunting words about defendant's child constituted a threat, case law held that mere threats were insufficiently provocative when the person killed was not armed and committing a violent act against the defendant, and thus the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give this instruction. Cody v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 686, 449 S.W.3d 712 (2014).

Circuit court did not err in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief because appellant could not establish that prejudice resulted from counsel's failure to request an instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter since the jury returned a guilty verdict on the greater offense of first-degree murder. Sims v. State, 2015 Ark. 363, 472 S.W.3d 107 (2015).

Circuit court did not err in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief because appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; the instruction on extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter complied with the Supreme Court's ruling in a case that took place one month before appellant's trial, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to have the foresight to predict all revisions to the instructions that were not directly mandated by that decision. Sims v. State, 2015 Ark. 363, 472 S.W.3d 107 (2015).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct on attempted reckless manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder because the crime of attempted reckless manslaughter is inherently contradictory. The attempted offense involved an intentional act, and it would have been illogical to ask the jury to find that defendant intended to act recklessly or that he purposely engaged in conduct that was a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in acting recklessly. Even if the instruction was based on sound law, there was no rational basis for giving it in this case where defendant's actions in running over people were intentional, regardless of whether he intended to bring about the particular result of death. Allen v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 360, 465 S.W.3d 9 (2015).

Defendant, charged with first-degree murder, was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction because defendant's interactions with a third person after defendant committed a murder did not show what defendant's mental state was when he shot the victim. Dixon v. State, 2019 Ark. 245, 581 S.W.3d 505 (2019).

Intent.

Where one struck another with intent merely to inflict chastisement and death resulted from some peculiarity in the deceased's constitution or other unexpected incident, the result was manslaughter merely; but where death naturally ensued from the force or manner of instrumentality of the chastisement and the chastisement was made regardless of its probable result in death, the jury was authorized to find deliberation and specific intent to take life and consequently to convict of murder in the first degree. Rosemond v. State, 86 Ark. 160, 110 S.W. 229 (1908) (decision under prior law).

A homicide could be reduced from murder to manslaughter unless the assault was made with an intent to kill. Young v. State, 99 Ark. 407, 138 S.W. 475 (1911) (decision under prior law).

The intent to kill was unnecessary to constitute manslaughter. Seabourn v. State, 236 Ark. 175, 365 S.W.2d 133 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Lesser-Included Offenses.

Negligent homicide, which requires a lesser culpable mental state than manslaughter, is a lesser included offense of manslaughter. Lowe v. State, 264 Ark. 205, 570 S.W.2d 253 (1978).

Battery in the second degree and battery in the third degree require proof that a deadly weapon was used; in contrast, use of a deadly weapon is not necessary for the commission of manslaughter. Since battery in the second degree and third degree require proof of an element not an element of proof of manslaughter, they are not lesser included offenses of manslaughter. Tackett v. State, 298 Ark. 20, 766 S.W.2d 410 (1989), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002).

Where the circuit court acquired jurisdiction over a juvenile, criminal defendant, upon the filing of a first degree murder charge, it retained jurisdiction to convict and sentence for the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Walker v. State, 309 Ark. 23, 827 S.W.2d 637 (1992).

Felony manslaughter added an additional element to felony murder relating to the perpetration of the murder itself and, therefore, was not a lesser-included offense of capital murder or first-degree murder. Cook v. State, 77 Ark. App. 20, 73 S.W.3d 1 (2002).

For defendant to be entitled to an instruction on manslaughter under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the evidence had to reveal that the murder was the result of a provocation leading to an extreme emotional disturbance; the instruction was not appropriate in the absence of any proof of provocation from the victim herself. MacKool v. State, 363 Ark. 295, 213 S.W.3d 618 (2005).

Circuit court erred in instructing the jury on felony manslaughter as a lesser included offense of capital felony murder, because the “extreme indifference” element was not a culpable mental state relating to a specific homicide victim but merely described the dangerous circumstances generally set in motion by defendant, and since the “extreme indifference” standard was not a mens rea related to a specific victim, it could not support a lesser included offense based on a less culpable mental state; the sole mens rea element in capital felony murder and first degree felony murder related to the underlying felony and not to the homicide itself. Perry v. State, 371 Ark. 170, 264 S.W.3d 498 (2007).

Defendant's convictions for manslaughter, in violation of subdivision (a)(3) of this section, were modified to the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide under § 5-10-105(b)(1) because defendant's acts of crossing the center line, tailgating, and averting defendant's eyes from the road constituted negligence, not recklessness under § 5-2-202(3). Rollins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 110, 302 S.W.3d 617 (2009), rev'd, 2009 Ark. 484, 347 S.W.3d 20 (2009).

In a case in which a jury convicted defendant of capital murder in the shooting death of his ex-wife, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on reckless manslaughter and negligent homicide. Defendant, who fired once into a residence, mortally striking his ex-wife in the back, offered no rational basis to support giving either instruction on the basis that his actions were reckless or negligent. Jones v. State, 2012 Ark. 38, 388 S.W.3d 411 (2012).

In a prosecution of defendant on two counts of first-degree murder, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the charge of manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. The record did not reveal any provocation, such as physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon, by either victim. Davis v. State, 2015 Ark. 284 (2015).

Circuit court did not err in denying a jury instruction on the extreme-emotional-disturbance formulation of manslaughter pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section where there was no factual basis to show that defendant killed a corrections officer in a moment following provocation, and his argument that prison was stressful and that a reasonable person would have done the same thing was not convincing. Johnson v. State, 2016 Ark. 156, 489 S.W.3d 668 (2016).

Provocation, Justification, Etc.

Homicide committed in a sudden heat of passion could constitute manslaughter. Perrymore v. State, 73 Ark. 278, 83 S.W. 909 (1904); Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W. 409 (1905) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Invited provocation would not reduce the crime to manslaughter, when defendant has not attempted to retire from the encounter, although it was otherwise where the assault was returned by violence beyond what was proportionate to the aggression. Noble v. State, 75 Ark. 246, 87 S.W. 120 (1905) (decision under prior law).

Provocation on the part of one person does not justify his killing another. Dow v. State, 77 Ark. 464, 92 S.W. 28 (1906) (decision under prior law).

Mere words, however abusive, would not reduce the degree of homicide to manslaughter. Dow v. State, 77 Ark. 464, 92 S.W. 28 (1906); Wheatley v. State, 93 Ark. 409, 125 S.W. 414 (1910) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Threats or menaces would not reduce a homicide to manslaughter, where the person killed was unarmed and not attempting to commit violence. Clardy v. State, 96 Ark. 52, 131 S.W. 46 (1910) (decision under prior law).

The passion must have been caused by provocation apparently sufficient to cause such passion, in order to have reduced the homicide to manslaughter. Clardy v. State, 96 Ark. 52, 131 S.W. 46 (1910); Downey v. Duff, 106 Ark. 4, 152 S.W. 1010 (1912) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Killing in heat of passion could reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter; and defendant was entitled to show the existence of passion, fear or terror. Collins v. State, 102 Ark. 180, 143 S.W. 1075 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant shot and killed under the belief that he was about to be assaulted, but acted too hastily and without due care, he was guilty of manslaughter. Bruder v. State, 110 Ark. 402, 161 S.W. 1067 (1913) (decision under prior law).

A defendant could show the existence of passion unless he sought the difficulty with malice toward deceased. Price v. State, 114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914) (decision under prior law).

Where one friend teases another, there is no reasonable excuse for a state of emotional disturbance so great as to excuse killing. Testimony that defendant became irritated or annoyed because the victim teased him did not constitute evidence of extreme emotional disturbance, and, even if defendant's irritation from being teased could somehow constitute extreme emotional disturbance, there was no proof that it was reasonable. Frazier v. State, 309 Ark. 228, 828 Ark. 838, 828 S.W.2d 838 (1992).

The defense of justification is conditioned on a reasonable belief on the part of the actor that unlawful physical force is about to be inflicted on him. Bargery v. State, 37 Ark. App. 118, 825 S.W.2d 831 (1992).

During defendant's trial for attempted murder, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter, in violation of subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section and § 5-3-201(b), because defendant's self-serving testimony was the only evidence of provocation presented; the evidence corroborated the victim's testimony that defendant stabbed the victim with a knife. Townsell v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 754 (2010).

To the extent defendant argued that a doctor's testimony was relevant to prove that defendant believed his mother was poisoning him and his stepfather, and that such belief was provocation, his argument was not well taken, as even the doctor opined that defendant was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior and had the ability to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law if he chose to do so. Bowden v. State, 2014 Ark. 168 (2014).

In a trial for manslaughter under this section, the circuit court erred when it did not instruct the jury on justification because, under § 5-2-614, if defendant was reckless or negligent in forming the belief that force was necessary, then, and only then, was the defense unavailable; however, if defendant was not reckless or negligent in forming his belief, the defense was available, and that was a decision for the jury. Schnarr v. State, 2018 Ark. 333, 561 S.W.3d 308 (2018).

Reckless Conduct.

Evidence held sufficient that the defendant's conduct was reckless. Smith v. State, 3 Ark. App. 224, 623 S.W.2d 862 (1981).

Where defendant's conduct evidenced an overall state of mind which far exceeded “gross deviation from the standard of care,” there was no rational basis for a manslaughter instruction on the chance that the jury might consider his conduct reckless as opposed to purposeful or knowing. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702.

Defendant recklessly caused the death of her baby by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death might occur if she did not feed the baby more often. Miles v. State, 59 Ark. App. 97, 954 S.W.2d 286 (1997).

Second-degree murder conviction was affirmed because defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter; defendant's act of shooting into an ex-spouse's occupied vehicle did not constitute recklessness. Bankston v. State, 361 Ark. 123, 205 S.W.3d 138 (2005).

Even if a circuit court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of witnesses under Ark. R. Evid. 803(3), the error was harmless as to the offense of manslaughter; the evidence showed that defendant, while intoxicated, pressed a loaded shotgun firmly against the back of the victim's neck when the shotgun discharged and that the shotgun discharges when the hammer has been pulled back and the trigger is pulled, and the jury acquitted defendant of causing the victim's death either with the purpose to do so or knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Davis v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 383, 555 S.W.3d 892 (2018).

Reckless Driving.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of two counts manslaughter stemming from a head-on collision in which two people were killed because it showed that defendant had been driving erratically prior to the crash, had tailgated another driver for 15 miles, drove fast on a curving highway, and crossed over the center line while looking over his shoulder. There was further testimony establishing that defendant did not attempt to stop or swerve as he drove headfirst into the victims' vehicle, and additional proof was presented from which the jury could infer that, at some point within the eight hours proceeding the drawing of defendant's blood four hours after the accident, defendant had ingested cocaine. Rollins v. State, 2009 Ark. 484, 347 S.W.3d 20 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's manslaughter convictions under subdivision (a)(3) of this section and § 5-2-202(3) given defendant's ingestion of 11 controlled substances prior to driving her SUV across the center line, running two vehicles off the road before striking the victims' car, which had pulled onto the shoulder. Dail v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 184 (2013).

Sentence.

Where the defendant was jointly tried for the death of an adult and a viable fetus, and the state erroneously introduced evidence concerning the viability of the fetus at various stages of gestation, and then presented detailed evidence about the death of the fetus as a result of “slow asphyxiation” caused by a “shearing” of the umbilical cord, the erroneous evidence would not have influenced the jury on the question of guilt or innocence, but could have improperly influenced the jury in fixing the sentence; therefore, the sentence was reduced to the minimum the jury could have set for the offense of which the defendant was convicted. Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987).

Trial court lacked authority to impose a 10-year enhanced sentence on defendant for committing manslaughter in the presence of a child because the sentence was illegal where manslaughter was not referenced in the enhancement statute. Hart v. State, 2014 Ark. 250 (2014).

Defendant's sentence for manslaughter was illegal on its face, as the judgment reflected a sentence of zero years' imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction, a Class C felony, which required a three-year minimum; however, as the State did not file a notice of appeal or of cross-appeal, the legality of the manslaughter sentence could not be considered. Blackwell v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 96, 455 S.W.3d 848 (2015).

Speedy Trial.

The crime of manslaughter is not consummated until the death of the victim, and so defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial on manslaughter charges where charges were brought within 2 months of victim's death, which occurred more than 4 years after the incident which caused her to go into a vegetative coma. Takeya v. Didion, 294 Ark. 611, 745 S.W.2d 614 (1988).

Underlying Felonies.

In a fleeing and manslaughter case where an officer died during a high speed pursuit of defendant, who fled from a store after stealing candy, the trial court did not err by submitting a manslaughter instruction as fleeing under § 5-54-125 was an appropriate underlying felony to support a conviction under this section. Fondren v. State, 364 Ark. 498, 221 S.W.3d 333 (2006).

During defendant's trial, the court properly gave an instruction to the jury regarding manslaughter, in violation of subdivision (4)(A) of this section, after an officer was killed in a high-speed chase because while the manslaughter charge might have arisen from the same events as felony fleeing, in violation of § 5-54-125, the legislature clearly intended that fleeing be punishable as a separate offense. Fondren v. State, 364 Ark. 498, 221 S.W.3d 333 (2006).

Any felony will support a conviction for manslaughter. Fondren v. State, 364 Ark. 498, 221 S.W.3d 333 (2006).

Cited: Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977); West v. State, 265 Ark. 52, 576 S.W.2d 718 (1979); Westbrook v. State, 265 Ark. 736, 580 S.W.2d 702 (1979); Jones v. State, 1 Ark. App. 318, 615 S.W.2d 388 (1981); Harmon v. State, 277 Ark. 265, 641 S.W.2d 21 (1982); Knappenberger v. State, 278 Ark. 382, 647 S.W.2d 417 (1983); Ethridge v. State, 9 Ark. App. 111, 654 S.W.2d 595 (1983); Biniores v. State, 16 Ark. App. 275, 701 S.W.2d 385 (1985); Rode v. Lockhart, 675 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Sparks v. State, 25 Ark. App. 190, 756 S.W.2d 911 (1988); Starling v. State, 301 Ark. 603, 786 S.W.2d 114 (1990); Smith v. State, 30 Ark. App. 111, 783 S.W.2d 72 (1990); McDonald v. State, 42 Ark. App. 37, 852 S.W.2d 833 (1993); Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 871 S.W.2d 562 (1994); Bradley v. State, 320 Ark. 100, 896 S.W.2d 425 (1995); Green v. State, 323 Ark. 635, 916 S.W.2d 756 (1996); Cooper v. State, 324 Ark. 135, 919 S.W.2d 205 (1996); Holian v. State, 2013 Ark. 7 (2013); Starling v. State, 2016 Ark. 20, 480 S.W.3d 158 (2016).