Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-310 (2026)

Case Notes

Applicability.

There is nothing in this section, or §§ 5-2-301 — 5-2-309 or 5-2-311 — 5-2-316 to indicate that it should have any retroactive or retrospective effect; therefore, Subsection (b) has no application to defendant, who was committed to the state hospital until restored to reason more than three years before this section went into effect. Campbell v. State, 265 Ark. 77, 576 S.W.2d 938 (1979).

This section concerns an accused who is being held on a pending charge but is “unfit to proceed,” and where defendant had been acquitted of murder charge on grounds of mental disease so that there were no criminal charges pending against the defendant nor could there ever be any criminal charges brought against him for that particular offense, the section would be inapplicable; and confinement should have been ordered pursuant to the statute governing civil commitment. Stover v. Hamilton, 270 Ark. 310, 604 S.W.2d 934 (1980).

Annual Report.

The director of the Arkansas State Hospital has a duty under the statute to file the annual report for an accused who was committed after being found incompetent to stand trial. Coley v. Clinton, 479 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Ark. 1979).

Application for Release.

Patients of the Arkansas State Hospital who were committed for a sufficient length of time under procedures for commitment of persons charged with crime clearly had a right, under the Code, to present an application for release to the committing trial court, or to contest a report by the director of the State Hospital which stated that the patient should remain hospitalized. Coley v. Clinton, 479 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Ark. 1979).

Dismissal of Charges.

Where the report of a staff psychologist at a state hospital where the defendant was committed did not address the issue of defendant's fitness to proceed, or whether the defendant was dangerous to himself or the person or property of others, the trial court was correct in denying defendant's petition asking that the charges against him be dismissed because he would never be competent to stand trial. Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992).

Circuit court does not have the authority under this section to dismiss charges against an unfit defendant; the plain language of this section involves only the situation in which a criminal defendant has regained his or her fitness to stand trial. Therefore, the dismissal of second-degree battery and second-degree assault charges was improper since there was no evidence that defendant had become competent to stand trial. State v. Thomas, 2014 Ark. 362, 439 S.W.3d 690 (2014).

Parties agreed that the circuit court's dismissal of the case under this section was error but the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider its dismissal, reinstate the case, and set a status hearing as the State did not file an appeal, a motion for a new trial, or any other written motion to reconsider within 30 days of entry of the order. Schepp v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 677, 536 S.W.3d 663 (2017).

Circuit court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider its decision dismissing the charges against defendant and to set the case for a status hearing on defendant's fitness for trial where the State filed neither a motion nor an appeal within 30 days of entry of the order of dismissal. Rosales-Almenar v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 678 (2017).

Jurisdiction.

Where the accused was never acquitted by the circuit court, but was found to be unable to cooperate effectively with his attorney in the preparation of his defense and proceedings against him were suspended, the circuit court never lost jurisdiction to the probate court. Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992).

Length of Detention.

Although the defendant was in the state hospital for a period longer than the one-year period that a circuit court can commit a person who lacks fitness to proceed, commitment had a dual purpose, mental evaluation and medical recuperation, and even if the commitment violated this section, an illegal detention will not void a subsequent conviction. Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992).

Where a pretrial detainee who suffered from acute psychosis died after he was returned to jail because there was no available hospital bed, his right to be free from deliberate indifference on the part of the county sheriffs was not violated as the detention at issue was less than five days. Winters v. Ark. Dept' of Health & Human Servs., 437 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Ark. 2006), aff'd, 491 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2007).

Speedy Trial.

Exclusion from the 12-month speedy-trial period of the time period between when defendant was committed for restoration until he was determined to be competent was appropriate; the circuit court was unable to determine that defendant was fit to proceed during that time primarily because defendant refused to submit to an evaluation. Newman v. Cottrell, 2016 Ark. 413, 503 S.W.3d 74 (2016).

Suspension of Proceedings.

Where doctor determined that defendant demonstrated a fully-developed, persecutory-type delusion, the court suspended defendant's trial for attempting to commit capital murder, however, the proceedings commenced when two doctors testified that defendant did not lack the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist effectively in his own defense; further, an additional mental-health evaluation was not warranted when defendant later claimed he was hearing voices. Steward v. State, 95 Ark. App. 6, 233 S.W.3d 180 (2006).