Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

What is “Property of Another” Within Statute Proscribing Larceny, Theft, or Embezzlement of Property of Another. 57 A.L.R.6th 445.

What Is “Intent to Deprive” Sufficient to Establish Liability for Civil, or Statutory, Theft, 35 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Criminal Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 559.

Case Notes

Deception.

The crucial element of intent to deceive may be proven in many ways, such as by showing the nature of the false impressions or misrepresentations, by showing that the deceived party lacked the present or future ability to make good his representations, or by demonstrating an ongoing scheme or pattern of deception. Hixson v. Housewright, 642 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1981).

For attempted theft by deception, the only issues are the defendant's state of mind and his belief as to what the facts are, not whether an item taken has actual value or whether the defendant actually deceived the victim. Wilson v. State, 56 Ark. App. 47, 939 S.W.2d 313 (1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft by deception because defendant entered into a scheme to defraud by inflating a tax refund amount and then diverting the difference to an account she owned; there was substantial evidence that defendant knowingly obtained the property of another by deception. The taxpayer did not agree to have any of her refund deposited into any other account, and defendant was not forthcoming with information about the separate account, despite the taxpayer's multiple inquiries. McClellan v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 725, 452 S.W.3d 116 (2014).

Substantial evidence supported appellant's theft of property convictions under § 5-36-103(a)(2) where the evidence allowed the jury to infer that he accepted boat deposits from victims, he was well aware of the lack of manpower at his boat manufacturing business and the increasing number of complaints against it, and he had taken on new business without regard for unfilled orders and had used the deposits to keep the business afloat. Flemister v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 180, 487 S.W.3d 386 (2016).

Evidence supported the jury's conclusion that defendant employed a scheme to defraud, for purposes of § 5-36-103, where patients testified that defendant had represented herself as a doctor, despite having no medical training or credentials from any United States institution, she charged patients for tests but did not show them the actual results, and she affirmatively and falsely represented that patient expenses would be reimbursed by insurance or Medicare. Gervais v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 161, 544 S.W.3d 590 (2018).

Deprivation.

Evidence held to establish clearly that defendant made use of the funds received for purposes other than for what was promised, consequently, those persons who had paid money to the defendant for the delivery of certain goods were deprived of the use and benefit of their property. Hixson v. State, 266 Ark. 778, 587 S.W.2d 70 (1979), cert. denied, Hixson v. Arkansas, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1030, 62 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1980).

Jurisdiction in Arkansas was proper for defendant's theft trial because sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to show that defendant took unauthorized control of a vehicle in West Memphis. King v. State, 361 Ark. 402, 206 S.W.3d 883 (2005), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 368 (June 15, 2006).

Evidence was sufficient to prove the theft element of aggravated robbery; evidence showed that defendant used physical force to at least temporarily deprive victim of her car, which was sufficient proof. Winston v. State, 368 Ark. 105, 243 S.W.3d 304 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and theft were proper because deprivation of property required only disposal under circumstances that made its restoration unlikely under subdivision (4)(C) of this section. Thus, defendant's actions in attempting to sell the victim's property following the homicide clearly showed a purpose to commit theft. Young v. State, 371 Ark. 393, 266 S.W.3d 744 (2007).

Deprive.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for theft of property; although defendant argued that he did not intend to deprive the owner of the property but only temporarily used the van for medical purposes, his argument was misplaced, as the theft statute made no exception for a temporary deprivation, and the jury could have concluded that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property, as the owner testified that tools were missing from the vehicle after it was recovered. Wolfe v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 338, 549 S.W.3d 926 (2018).

Instructions.

Where the evidence adduced established that the municipal clerk's office was deprived of property valued at $4,675.20 and there was no evidence tending to disprove one of the elements of Class B felony theft of property, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on misdemeanor theft of property. LeFlore v. State, 17 Ark. App. 117, 704 S.W.2d 641 (1986).

Obtain.

Directed verdict was properly denied as to the charge of Class B felony theft of property because substantial evidence supported that defendant brought about a transfer of a laptop by threat of serious physical injury when he pointed a firearm at the laptop owner's roommate and then grabbed the laptop. Hinton v. State, 2015 Ark. 479, 477 S.W.3d 517 (2015).

Word “obtain” as used in the theft-by-deception statute, § 5-36-103(a)(2), simply does not have the continuation component inherent in the word “retain”. “Obtain” connotes a singular, discrete taking of possession that occurs at a given time, and theft by deception is generally not a continuing offense. State v. Gray, 2016 Ark. 411, 505 S.W.3d 160 (2016).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of committing theft of automobile by threat where the victim's testimony established that defendant took unauthorized control of her automobile by threatening to cause physical injury to her by hitting her in the face and displacing her from the driver's seat, he continued to exercise unauthorized control by not allowing the victim to drive and refusing to let her out, and after the victim escaped, defendant continued to drive the automobile until he was pursued by the police, abandoned the vehicle, and fled on foot. Brown v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 480, 531 S.W.3d 417 (2017).

Property of Another Person.

“Property of another person” includes property in which a person has a proprietary interest; thus money victim held for church in her capacity as church treasurer was “property of another”, and could be aggregated with victim's own money to determine grade of offense. Phillips v. State, 297 Ark. 368, 761 S.W.2d 933 (1988).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendants of breaking or entering and theft of property where (1) a prosecution witness testified that she saw defendants break into an apartment and take a table; (2) a police officer observed that the security door had been pried open and the wooden door was kicked in; and (3) a defense witness testified that they took the table for their own use, that none of them owned it, and that there was an owner, but no one knew where the owner was. Bush v. State, 90 Ark. App. 373, 206 S.W.3d 268 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated-robbery conviction under § 5-12-103(a)(3) where although it was illegal for the victim to possess the marijuana, it clearly had value, was subject to possession, and thus, fell within the definition of property and property of another person as set forth in this section. Gould v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 543, 444 S.W.3d 408 (2014).

Service.

Defendant was charged with theft of services for his failure to pay the bail-bond company $7,570. The circuit court granted him a directed verdict because the definition of “services” under § 5-36-104 did not include the services provided by bail-bonding companies; additionally, the court found that the bail bond contract did not constitute “professional services” as that term was used in subdivision (9) of this section. State v. Williams, 2013 Ark. 164 (2013).

Value.

Evidence of value held sufficient to support conviction. Boone v. State, 264 Ark. 169, 568 S.W.2d 229 (1978) (decision under prior law).

Testimony regarding the value of the stolen property held not sufficient to prove that a lawnmower was worth more than $100. Riley v. State, 267 Ark. 916, 593 S.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1979).

An owner's testimony as to stolen property's original cost does not meet the test for proving value since it is the owner's present interest in the property that the law seeks to protect. Hughes v. State, 3 Ark. App. 275, 625 S.W.2d 547 (1981).

Evidence held insufficient to establish value under this section and not sufficient to support a conviction for theft of property. Hughes v. State, 3 Ark. App. 275, 625 S.W.2d 547 (1981).

Where a gold and silver dealer testified that the stolen gold rings which defendant attempted to sell him were worth far more than $100, his testimony was properly admitted as a positive statement of value by one qualified as an expert. Jones v. State, 6 Ark. App. 7, 636 S.W.2d 880 (1982).

Court properly allowed the owner of gold rings to testify as to the price he paid for them prior to the theft, since the purchase price was not too remote and it bore a reasonable relation to the present value of the gold rings. Jones v. State, 6 Ark. App. 7, 636 S.W.2d 880 (1982).

Although checks do not have a readily ascertainable market value, they can be valued for purposes of the theft of property statute under subdivision (11)(A)(iii) of this section. LeFlore v. State, 17 Ark. App. 117, 704 S.W.2d 641 (1986).

The term “actor”, as used under subdivision (12)(B), is intended to include all persons who have committed any form of theft set out in this chapter, including theft by receiving. Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 606, 780 S.W.2d 567 (1989).

Under subdivision (12)(B) an accused or defendant is entitled to deduct the amount of consideration he or she paid for the misappropriated property. Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 606, 780 S.W.2d 567 (1989).

“Value” is the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense, or, if the market value of the property cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after the offense. Chase v. State, 46 Ark. App. 261, 879 S.W.2d 455 (1994).

Although witness did not testify specifically to the retail price of the merchandise at the time of the offense, she did testify to the value of the merchandise based on the wholesale cost, which was sufficient to establish the value of the property and therefore sufficient to support the defendant's theft conviction. Christian v. State, 54 Ark. App. 191, 925 S.W.2d 428 (1996).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of criminal attempt to commit theft of property where the victim testified as to the purchase price of the boat motor, his use and maintenance of it, and its condition at the time of the crime. Wright v. State, 80 Ark. App. 114, 91 S.W.3d 553 (2002).

There was insufficient evidence to have convicted defendant of theft of property with a value greater than $500 but less than $2,500 where the only witness, a mechanic, stated car was not worth $50, there was no evidence of what the victim had paid for the car, and the State produced only photographs of the car at trial; however, there was there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of misdemeanor theft, which carried a term of one year's imprisonment. Reed v. State, 353 Ark. 22, 109 S.W.3d 665 (2003).

Under § 5-36-103, the state failed to produce substantial evidence as to the value of the stolen property; however, the state produced substantial evidence to support a finding that defendant acted with the requisite intent to commit the offense of theft of property, a class A misdemeanor. Gines v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 628 (2009).

In a case in which defendant was convicted on theft of property, in violation of § 5-36-103, even if he had preserved his claim that the evidence was insufficient to show that the value of the property was $2,500 or more, his conviction would be affirmed. The victim's testimony that he purchased the big-screen television for $1800 only four months prior to it being stolen was a factor that the court, as fact-finder, was permitted to consider, and the victim also testified that other items were stolen, including thousands of dollars in jewelry. Walker v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 63 (2010).

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of theft of property with a value less than $2,500 but more than $500 in violation of § 5-36-103(a)(1) and (b)(2)(A) for stealing merchandise from a department store because a manager's testimony, in conjunction with the testimony of another employee, who was also a manager, was sufficient to lay the foundation for the introduction of a register receipt under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule, Ark. R. Evid. 803(6), as proof of the value of the stolen merchandise; the employee's testimony indicated that he knew the recovered items were stolen because they did not bear certain labels or electronic receipts that the store regularly places on all merchandise, the manager testified that he knew the value of the stolen merchandise by following the store's standard practice of adding up the value by ringing it up on the store's register, and the receipt bore an electronic date and time stamp, as well as other numeric information about the merchandise, including the label information from each item. Pace v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 491, 375 S.W.3d 751 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for theft of property under § 5-36-103(a)(1) was appropriate because the state's proof that the items he stole had a value in excess of $500 was adequate, under subdivision (12)(A)(i) of this section. The items were mostly purchased less than a year before the burglary, the purchase price so greatly exceeded the $500 statutory value threshold, and thus, the victim's testimony constitutes substantial evidence of value. Vault v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 283 (2012).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving, a Class D felony, was proper because the State proved that the stolen trailer's value, as defined in subdivision (12)(A)(i) of this section, was in excess of $1,000; the owner of a trailer dealership testified that the owner sold the trailer at issue to the victim for $1,475 and even with the damage to the trailer, it would still be worth over $1,000. Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 615 (2012).

Defendant's conviction for theft of property as a Class B felony was supported by the evidence because there was evidence that the car was valued at $2,500 or more under subdivision (12)(A)(i) of this section; the car was four years old, and the victim stated that the victim paid $20,000 for it. Moore v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 107 (2013).

Circuit court did not err in finding that the State had met its burden of proving the vehicle had a fair market value of more than $1,000 when defendant stole it; the owner testified that she had paid $3,900 for the vehicle approximately one year before it was stolen and that she would have been willing to sell it at the time of the theft for $3,000, and her testimony in conjunction with an officer's testimony describing the high-speed chase and a video, which captured the attempted traffic stop and the ensuing pursuit, allowed the circuit court to observe the stolen vehicle and make a determination that it met the minimum statutory value under § 5-36-106. Beene v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 493, 588 S.W.3d 748 (2019).

Cited: Stanley v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1979); Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W.2d 434 (1979); Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979); Wiley v. State, 268 Ark. 552, 594 S.W.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1980); Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980); State v. Jamison, 277 Ark. 349, 641 S.W.2d 719 (1982); Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987); Hardcastle v. State, 25 Ark. App. 157, 755 S.W.2d 228 (1988); Muhammed v. State, 27 Ark. App. 188, 769 S.W.2d 33 (1989); Coley v. State, 302 Ark. 526, 790 S.W.2d 899 (Ark. 1990); Sullivan v. State, 32 Ark. App. 124, 798 S.W.2d 110 (1990); Jackson v. State, 37 Ark. App. 160, 826 S.W.2d 307 (1992); Higgins v. State, 326 Ark. 1030, 936 S.W.2d 740 (1996); Cox-Hilstrom v. State, 58 Ark. App. 109, 948 S.W.2d 409 (1997); Greer v. State, 77 Ark. App. 180, 72 S.W.3d 893 (2002); Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003); McEntire v. State, 363 Ark. 473, 215 S.W.3d 658 (2005); Russell v. State, 367 Ark. 557, 242 S.W.3d 265 (2006); Gillean v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 698, 478 S.W.3d 255 (2015).