Rivenbark v. Com. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & P., 501 A.2d 1110 (Pa. 1985). · Go Syfert
Search
Rivenbark v. Com. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & P., 501 A.2d 1110 (Pa. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 2011 · …the period of recommitment set by the board, which may be less than the unexpired term of the parolee's sentence, simply establishes a new parole eligibility date for the parolee-it does not entitle him to release after that period of time. ✓
298 citation events (66 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Swiggett v. Batcho (paed, 2011-10-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Swiggett v. Batcho (2×)
E.D. Pa. · 2011 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the period of recommitment set by the board, which may be less than the unexpired term of the parolee's sentence, simply establishes a new parole eligibility date for the parolee-it does not entitle him to release after that period of time.
cited Cited as authority (rule) A.H. Walker v. PPB
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
Rivenbark v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1112-13 (Pa. 1985); McClure v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 461 A.2d 645, 647 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R. Williams v. PBPP
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
In Passarella, we specifically considered 9 See Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Pa. 1985) (holding that “a parolee may not be recommitted as a technical violator based upon an act constituting a new crime of which he is convicted”). 10 whether to apply Penjuke retroactively to earlier Board decisions, as Williams requests that we do here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Gravatt, D.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · confidence medium
"Recomrnitrnent is an administrative determination that the parolee should be reentered to serve all or part of the unexpired term of his original sentence." Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board ofProbation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 253 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1985) (footnote omitted).[ ... ] We interpret Randall as providing a bright-line rule that a defendant may be impeached with a crime involving dishonesty for which he has been imprisoned within ten years of trial regardless of whether his last period of imprisonment for that crime was imposed at the original sentencing hearing or at a hearing o…
cited Cited as authority (rule) R. Disco v. PA BPP
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2018 · confidence medium
Id. (quoting Rivenbark v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Pa. 1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Com. v. Barnhart, L.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
“Parole is a penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside the prison walls; it does not affect the sentence.” Id. at 1112 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D. Edwards v. PBPP
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Young v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 409 A.2d 843 , 847 n.8 (Pa. 1979); Rivenbark v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1112-13 (Pa. 1985); Gaito, 412 A.2d at 570-71 ; Malarik v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 25 A.3d 468, 469 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Richards v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 20 A.3d 596, 598-600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); White v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 833 A.2d 819, 821 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Torres v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 765 A.2d 418, 423 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); Boswell v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 512 A.2d 66, 68-70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986); U.S. v. Cavell, 425 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D. Godwin v. PBPP (2×)
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Oliver (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
“Parole is a penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside the prison walls; it does not affect the sentence.” Id. at 1112 (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) T. Love v. PA BPP
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Pa. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Barndt
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2013 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Pa.Super. 514 , 680 A.2d 884, 887 (1996); cf. Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1112 (1985) (holding that “[t]he granting and rescinding of parole are purely administrative functions,” that “a parole revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution,” and that parole “does not affect the [underlying] sentence”). 12 Thus, Abraham and the Pennsylvania case law discussed therein collectively suggest that counsel’s failure to advise his client regarding the collateral consequence of parole revocation in an un…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yates v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2012 · confidence medium
“Recommitment” has been specifically defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as “an administrative determination that the parolee should be reentered to serve all or part of the unexpired term of his original sentence.” Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 253 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1985) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abrams v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2007 · confidence medium
Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 253 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1985), citing Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa.Cmwlth. 38 , 483 A.2d 1044 (1984). 3 .When parole is revoked, whether for technical or criminal violations of the conditions for parole, the Board imposes a specific period of time that must be served in prison and credited to the sentence being served on parole before the prisoner will again be considered for parole on that sentence.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. Department of Corrections
M.D. Penn. · 2003 · confidence medium
Id. at 1114. 3 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bensh
Vt. · 1998 · confidence medium
See Glover v. Parole Bd., 638 A.2d 929, 930 (N.J. 1994) (holding that parole must be administered within terms of court-imposed sentence); Rivenbark v. Board of Probation & Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parry v. Rosemeyer
3rd Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
CON ANN. § 331.1; Rivenbark v. Board of Probation and Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Pa. Nevertheless, the similarities between the two are greater than the differences.0 Unlike a term of special parole, a term of probation is imposed in lieu of, than in addition to, a normal sentence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas G. Parry Bh-2648 v. Frederick Rosemeyer
3rd Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
It is true that in Pennsylvania, an order of probation is one of the sentencing alternatives available to a judge, 42 Pa.Cons.StatANN. §§ 9721-22, while parole is an administrative *117 procedure, not a judicial one — it does not affect the sentence, see 61 PaStat.Ann. § 331.1; Rivenbark v. Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Jackson
Pa. · 1991 · confidence medium
We held in Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 253 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1985), “Recommitment is an administrative determination that the parolee should be reentered to serve all or part of the unexpired term of his original sentence.” There is no question, then, that time served after a parole violation is time served for the original conviction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Jackson (2×)
Pa. · 1989 · confidence medium
"Recommitment is an administrative determination that the parolee should be reentered to serve all or part of the unexpired term of his original sentence." Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 253 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1985) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. McDermott (2×)
Pa. · 1988 · confidence medium
See also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. —, —, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168 , 97 L.Ed.2d 709, 718 (1987) (reaffirming the conditional liberty characterization); Rivenbark v. Commonwealth, Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 252 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1985), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, supra. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that neither Pa.R.Crim.P. 4005 nor Pa.R.Crim.P. 4010(B)(1) apply to parole revocation proceedings or appeals from parole revoca tion.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patrick v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (2×)
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 1987 · confidence medium
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined "parole" as "a penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside of prison walls; it does not *129 affect the sentence. " (Emphasis added.) Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 252-253 , 501 A.2d 1110, 112 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wagner v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 1987 · confidence medium
In Rivenbark our Supreme Court held: Subsection (b) of Section 21.1 of the Board of Parole Act 11 specifically excludes from recommitment as a technical violator one who has violated *409 the terms and conditions of his parole ‘by the commission of a new crime of which he is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which he pleads guilty or nolo contendere in a court of record.’ 509 Pa. at 255 , 501 A.2d at 1114 (footnote added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reber v. Commonwealth
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 1986 · confidence medium
Rivenbark v. Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 255 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1985); Commonwealth v. Rieck Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52 , 213 A.2d 277 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pickert v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (2×)
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 1986 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court in Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 255 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1985) stated that, “a parolee may not be recommitted as a technical violator based upon an act constituting a new crime of which he is convicted.” The Supreme Court further stated that section 21.1 of. the Act prohibited the board from recommitting a parolee to separate terms of backtime “as both a convicted parole violator and a technical parole violator if the technical violation is based upon the same act as is the conviction supporting the conviction violation.” Riv…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bennett v. Commonwealth (2×)
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 1986 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court recently held in Rivenbark v. Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 255 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1985), that, “a parolee may not be recommitted as a technical violator based' upon an act constituting a new crime of which' he is convicted.” In Rivenbark , the petitioner’s new conviction was a violation of federal firearms law.
cited Cited "see" D. Phillips v. PPB
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivenbark v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 501 A.2d 1110 , 1113 n.4 (Pa. 1985); Mickens- Thomas v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 699 A.2d 792, 796-97 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
discussed Cited "see" Montanez v. Thompson (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivenbark v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110 , 1113 n. 4 (Pa.1985) ("The period of recommitment set by the Board, which may be less than the unexpired term of the parolee's sentence, simply establishes a new parole eligibility date for the parolee— it does not entitle him to release after that period of time.
discussed Cited "see" Montanez v. Thompson (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivenbark v. Com., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110 , 1113 n. 4 (Pa.1985) (“The period of recommitment set by the Board, which may be less than the unexpired term of the parolee’s sentence, simply establishes a new parole eligibility date for the parolee — it does not entitle him to release after that period of time.
examined Cited "see" Kester v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole (4×)
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110 (1985) (rescission of parole is purely administrative function); Chapman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 49, 484 A.2d 413 (1984) (parole revocation proceedings are civil administrative matters rather than criminal prosecutions); Hossback v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 80 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 344, 471 A.2d 186 (1984) (parole revocation is not part of criminal prosecution).
discussed Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Vealey (2×)
Pa. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rivenbark v. Comm. Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110 (1985).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Gunter v. Constitution State Service Co. (4×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
Hatcher v. Travelers Insurance Co., 421 Pa.Super. 225 , 617 A.2d 808, 810 (1992). *303 Lastly, we add the precept that "[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); see also Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 509 Pa. 248 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Babac v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board (2×)
Pa. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 255 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Co. (2×)
Pa. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 255 , 501 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1985).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Harry RIVENBARK, Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Dec 10, 1985.
501 A.2d 1110
Nix, C.J., and Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala and Papadakos.
Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 80%
Citer courts: E.D. Pennsylvania (2)

[*249] [*250] John R. Merrick, Public Defender, William G. Brown, Asst. Public Defender, Juan R. Sanchez, West Chester, Leonard Sosnov, Philadelphia, for amicus — Phila. Defenders Assn.

Robert A. Greevy, Chief Counsel, Arthur R. Thomas, Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION

McDERMOTT, Justice.

The issue in this case is whether, under the terms of the Pennsylvania Board of Parole Act,[1] a parolee may be recommitted[*251] to separate terms of "backtime" as both a convicted parole violator and a technical parole violator if the technical violation is based upon the same act as is the conviction supporting the conviction violation.

Appellant, Harry Rivenbark, was sentenced in 1976 to serve concurrent terms of two to ten years on a forgery conviction and three to ten years on convictions for burglary, theft and criminal conspiracy. On August 22, 1979, he was placed on parole by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board). On August 4, 1981, appellant was arrested on federal charges for the possession of a firearm and was placed in the Philadelphia Detention Center. A federal grand jury indicted appellant on the federal charge on August 12, 1981.

Thereafter, the Board lodged a detainer warrant against appellant for violating conditions of his parole by possessing a firearm and because of the new criminal charges. A preliminary/detention hearing was held on October 2, 1981, and the Board ordered appellant detained pending disposition of the criminal charges, with the return of appellant as a technical parole violator when available, and a violation hearing to be scheduled when appropriate.

Appellant was subsequently sentenced to a federal term of two years on the firearms conviction. The Board's warrant remained lodged during his term of federal custody. Upon his release from federal custody in 1983, appellant was returned to the custody of Board agents.[2] On May[*252] 23, 1983, appellant was afforded a violation and revocation hearing. The Board ordered appellant recommitted as a technical violator to serve nine months and as a convicted parole violator to serve eighteen months, for a total of twenty-seven months on backtime. The technical violation was the possession of a firearm, while the conviction violation arose from the federal conviction based upon the same act. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the actions of the Board.

Appellant contends that the imposition of separate periods of recommitment based upon the same act violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.[3] The prohibition of double jeopardy consists "of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969) (footnotes omitted).

The first two enumerated protections are inapplicable since a parole revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The granting and rescinding of parole are purely administrative functions. Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581, 28 A.2d 897 (1942). Parole is a penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation[*253] outside the prison walls; it does not affect the sentence. Id.; Commonwealth ex rel. Sparks v. Russell, 403 Pa. 320, 169 A.2d 884 (1961). The Board does not convict the parolee of any crime at a parole revocation hearing. Rather it determines whether the parolee has violated the terms and conditions of his parole, thereby demonstrating himself unfit for that mode of correctional rehabilitation.

Nor were the two periods of recommitment multiple punishments for the same offense. A recommitment is not a second punishment for the original offense; it has no effect on the original judicially-imposed sentence. Recommitment is an administrative determination that the parolee should be reentered to serve all or part of the unexpired term of his original sentence.[4]

Unlike those lower courts which have considered the issue of whether a parolee may be recommitted as both a technical and convicted parole violator based upon the same act,[5] we do not end our analysis of the issue upon the determination that such recommitments are not violative of double jeopardy. The availability of parole is not a constitutional guarantee. Parole is a method of rehabilitation enacted as the public policy of the Commonwealth pursuant to[*254] the General Assembly's exclusive power to determine the penological system of the Commonwealth. See: Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, supra. Thus, any analysis of claimed rights and privileges connected with parole requires that we review the underlying statutory basis of the parole system.

Section 21.1 of the Pennsylvania Board of Parole Act[6] distinguishes convicted violators from technical violators. Subsection (a) of Section 21.1 which describes conviction violators, and subsection (b), which describes technical violators, provide in pertinent part:

(a) Convicted Violators. Any parolee under the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Board of Parole released from any penal institution of the Commonwealth who, during the period of parole or while delinquent on parole, commits any crime punishable by imprisonment, for which he is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which he pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time thereafter in a court of record may, at the discretion of the board, be recommitted as a parole violator. If his recommitment is so ordered, he shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which said parolee would have been compelled to serve had he not been paroled, and he shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole.

.....

(b) Technical Violators. Any parolee under the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Board of Parole released from any penal institution in the Commonwealth who, during the period of parole, violates the terms and conditions of his parole, other than by the commission of a new crime of which he is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which he pleads guilty or nolo contendere in a court of record, may be recommitted after hearing before the board. If he is so recommitted, he shall be given credit for the time served or parole in good standing[*255] but with no credit for delinquent time, and may be reentered to serve the remainder of his original sentence or sentences.

61 P.S. § 331.21a (emphasis added).

The Statutory Construction Act of 1972[7] instructs, "[W]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). In such case the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Commonwealth v. Rieck Investment Corporation, 419 Pa. 52, 213 A.2d 277 (1965). Subsection (b) of Section 21.1 of the Board of Parole Act specifically excludes from recommitment as a technical violator one who has violated the terms and conditions of his parole "by the commission of a new crime of which he is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which he pleads guilty or nolo contendere in a court of record." This language is clear and free of all ambiguity. The statute unambiguously expresses the legislature's intent that a parolee may not be recommitted as a technical violator based upon an act constituting a new crime of which he is convicted.

Appellant's recommitment as a technical violator was based upon an act, possessing a firearm, which constituted a new crime of which he was convicted. Consequently, the Board's action in recommitting appellant as a technical violator was beyond the authority the General Assembly has granted the Board to recommit parolees, and for that reason appellant's recommitment order must be vacated, and this case remanded to the Board for a reconsideration of appellant's period of recommitment.

The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and this case is remanded to the Board of Probation and Parole for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1 Act of August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, § 1 et seq., as amended, 61 P.S. § 331.1 et seq.
2 Appellant contends that his period of recommitment for the technical parole violation should have commenced when the Board lodged its detainer against him on September 15, 1981. Section 21.1(b) of the Board of Parole Act, 61 P.S. § 331.21a, states that the period of recommitment for a technical violation commences on the date the parolee is taken into custody on the warrant of the Board. At the time the detainer was lodged appellant was in custody on the basis of the federal charges and remained in custody on that basis until he was placed in the custody of Board agents in April, 1983, after his release from a federal correctional institute in Texas. Thus, appellant's period of recommitment as a technical violator did not commence until April 1983. See, Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 488 Pa. 397, 412 A.2d 568 (1980); Carter v. Rapone, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 160, 394 A.2d 1092 (1978); Davis v. Cuyler, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 488, 394 A.2d 647 (1978).
3 The double jeopardy protection of the Fifth Amendment has been made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). Appellant does not contend that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 10, provides any greater protection than the Federal Constitution with regard to this issue. Nor do we perceive any basis for such a claim. See generally: Commonwealth v. Henderson, 482 Pa. 359, 393 A.2d 1146 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 482 Pa. 333, 393 A.2d 1133 (1978).
4 Section 21.1 of the Act, 61 P.S. § 331.21a, places the decision of whether to recommit a parolee guilty of either a conviction violation or a technical violation in the discretion of the Board. However, once recommitment for a conviction violation is ordered, subsection (a) of Section 21.1 mandates that the parolee "shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which said parolee would have been compelled to serve had he not been paroled, and he shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole." The period of recommitment set by the Board, which may be less than the unexpired term of the parolee's sentence, simply establishes a new parole eligibility date for the parolee—it does not entitle him to release after that period of time. Upon completion of this period of backtime, the parolee has the right to again apply for parole and have his application considered by the Board. Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa.Cmwlth. 38, 483 A.2d 1044 (1984).
5 McClure v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 75 Pa. Cmwlth. 176, 461 A.2d 645 (1983); Hughes v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 87, 473 A.2d 225 (1984); Gundy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 82 Pa.Cmwlth. 618, 478 A.2d 139 (1984).
6 Act of August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, § 21.1 added August 24, 1951, P.L. 1401, § 5, as amended, June 28, 1957, P.L. 429, § 1, 61 P.S. § 331.21a.
7 Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq.