red
Negative treatment
Superseded by statute
18.9 score
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 37 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Commonwealth v. Haines
See, e.g., Ibrahim, 127 A.3d at 824 (finding probable cause where officer observed appellant "drive his bicycle westbound on a road that requires all traffic to proceed in the eastbound direction”); Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1292 (finding probable cause where trooper’s dashboard camera video showed appellant’s vehicle touch white fog line and cross yellow center line); but cf. Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1117-18 (1995) *456 (finding no. probable cause for speeding where officer paced vehicle for two-tenths of a mile when statute required speed pacing for at least thre…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Com. v. Karam, J.
On the other side, the privacy interest of the individual has been cogently articulated by the United States Supreme Court[.] Id. at 607-08 (quoting Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (Pa. 1995) superceded by statute as stated in Holmes, 14 A.3d 89 ).3 At the suppression hearing, Trooper Downs testified that Appellant’s motorcycle was weaving from left to right as Trooper Downs followed.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Com. v. Fredericks, S.
On appeal, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 668 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa. 1995), superseded on other grounds by statute, Act of Sept. 30, 2003, P.L. 120, No. 24 § 17 (amending 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(b)), and contends Trooper Zaykowski lacked probable cause to stop him for speeding.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Perini
Section 6308(b) was amended on February 1,2004, changing the standard from “articulable and reasonable grounds,” which is tantamount to probable cause, Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (Pa. 1995), to the less stringent “reasonable suspicion,” but the officer must have more than a hunch as the basis of the stop.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Holmes
(2×)
Commonwealth v. Gleason, 567 Pa. 111 , 785 A.2d 983, 986 (2001); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116-17 (1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Chase
(2×)
Commonwealth v. Gleason, 567 Pa. 111 , 785 A.2d 983, 986 (2001); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116-17 (1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Hilliar
However, the articula-ble and reasonable grounds standard, which our Supreme Court equated with probable cause, see Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995), emanated from the prior version of Section 6308(b), which was revised in 2003 when the legislature replaced it with the less stringent standard of "reasonable suspicion." Second, in Andersen , there is no mention of the police officer making any observation of the physical characteristics of the driver. 2 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Fulton
In Gleason , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995), that a police officer must have probable cause to believe that a driver has violated a provision of the Motor Vehicle Code in order to justify a traffic stop of the vehicle.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Anderson
According to Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 543 Pa. 612 , 673 A.2d 915 (1996), that means that a police officer may stop a vehicle if he has “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that a violation of the Vehicle Code ha[s] occurred.” Id. at 618 , 673 A.2d at 918 (citing Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 552 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116-17 (1995)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Ulman
Id. at 1116. ¶ 14 Subsequently, the Legislature amended 75 Pa.C.S.A § 6308(b) to clarify that whenever an officer “has reasonable suspicion that a violation of [the.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Yeckley
With these constitutional protections in mind regarding a traffic stop, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has provided the following guidance: “If the alleged basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of this Commonwealth, it is in cumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.” Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Anderson
(2×)
Commonwealth v. Slonaker, 795 A.2d 397, 400 (Pa.Super.2002) ( quoting Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Spieler
Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995) (quoting Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 58-59 , 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Sands
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Most importantly, the court noted that “this is not a case where further investigation would lead to a discovery of a violation of the Vehicle Code” because “there is no further evidence that could be obtained from a subsequent stop and investigation” which “would warrant a citation for driving at an unsafe speed.” Id. at 1118. ¶ 13 Whitmyer spawned a progeny of cases that dealt with an officer’s authority to stop a vehicle pursuant to the prior version of 75 Pa.C.S. § 6808(b).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Davenport
Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116-17 (1995).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Almodovar
“Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Cook
Id. at 1116 (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875, 879 (1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Wilbert
Therefore, where the basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a determination of whether there has been compliance with the Vehicle Code, the officer initiating the stop must articulate specific facts possessed by him or her at the time of the of the stop which would provided probable cause to believe a violation of the vehicle code had occurred. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 549-51 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995). ¶ 7 During the suppression hearing, Mullen stated her primary grounds for stopping Appellant’s vehicle was his erratic driving.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Butler
Our Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995): If the alleged basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of this Commonwealth, it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Lindblom
When previously faced with these two competing interests, we held “that a stop of a single vehicle is unreasonable where there is no outward sign the vehicle or the operator are in violation of the Vehicle Code[.] [B]efore the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion.” Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551-52 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116-7 (1995) (some citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Bolton
Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116-1117 (1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Battaglia
(2×)
Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995) (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Slonaker
(4×)
Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995) (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). ¶ 9 Trooper Marasco testified at the suppression hearing that he observed Appellant’s driving for five miles, that Appellant’s vehicle fully crossed the white fog line three times during the five mile stretch, and that the wheels of Appellant’s vehicle remained there for several seconds each time.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Wituszynski
(2×)
In reviewing this standard, this Court noted the following in Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995), If the alleged basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of this Commonwealth, it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Palmer
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 543 Pa. 612, 618-620 , 673 A.2d 915, 918-919 (1996) (holding that trial court properly suppressed evidence where officer did not possess articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant violated Motor Vehicle Code; the officer did not see defendant drive erratically, commit a traffic violations or engage in any conduct indicating that he was under the influence of alcohol); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 552-553 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1117-1118 (1995) (finding stop based on alleged violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361 invalid where there was no o…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Korenkiewicz
(2×)
Id. ¶2 In this case, we must determine whether, at the time he activated the overhead lights on his marked police vehicle, Officer Steven Wassell possessed sufficient information to support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant, William Korenk-iewicz, was “presently involved in criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995) (determination of reasonable suspicion may be made only on the basis of information actually possessed by police officer).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Hynes
In our Commonwealth, police officers are vested with the authority to stop a vehicle only if there are “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the vehicle code.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 552 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1117 (1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Sebek
(2×)
In our Commonwealth, police officers are vested with the authority to stop a vehicle if there are "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of this title." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 552 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1117 (1995).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Leighty
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1117 (1995), our Supreme Court noted that, “The legislature has vested police officers with the authority to stop vehicles whenever they have ‘articula-ble and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation’ of the Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).” Our high court then applied that standard in assessing whether the police officer had a “justifiable basis for stopping” Whitmyer.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Commonwealth v. Silfies
Further, the Vehicle Code also grants police officers the right to briefly detain an individual for the purpose of checking the relevant license, registration and insurance information when there are “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of [the Vehicle Code].” 2 75 Pa.C.S. §6308(b); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1117 (1995); Commonwealth v. Gommer, 445 Pa. Super. 571, 576 , 665 A.2d 1269, 1271 (1995); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 444 Pa. Super. 170, 176 , 663 A.2d 728, 731 (1995); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 415 Pa. Super. 252, 259 , 609 A.2d 1…
discussed
Cited "see"
J.R. Regula v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing
See Com. v. Whitmyer, 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (Pa. 1995), superseded by statute, Act of September 30, 2003, P.L. 120, as recognized in Com. v. Holmes, 14 in his lane, crossing the double yellow and fog lines on several occasions, and, unlike in Osselburn, Licensee did not present any evidence to challenge the officer’s testimony or motive.
discussed
Cited "see"
J.R. Regula v. PennDOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing
See Com. v. Whitmyer , 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 , 1116 (1995), superseded by statute , Act of September 30, 2003, P.L. 120, as recognized in Com. v. Holmes , 609 Pa. 1 , 14 A.3d 89 (2011) (concluding that the "semantic difference" between the probable cause standard and the "articulable and reasonable grounds" are, when balancing the underlying interests, a "distinction without a difference").
discussed
Cited "see"
Commonwealth v. Montini
(2×)
See Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 , 668 A.2d 1113 (1995); Commonwealth v. Leighty, ___ Pa.Super. ___, 693 A.2d 1324 (1997).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
McKinley v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP.
(2×)
Compare Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 551 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995) (equating Section 6308(b)'s reasonable grounds requirement with probable cause), with Banner v. PennDOT, 558 Pa. 439, 446 , 737 A.2d 1203, 1207 (1999) (distinguishing Section 1547's reasonable grounds requirement from probable cause).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
PENNSYLVANIA ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS; Albert C. Krempa, Jr., CLU, Ch FC; Professional Insurance Agents Association of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware, Inc.; Robinson-Conner, Inc.; Independent Insurance Agents of Pennsylvania; and Travis B. Young & Son Agency.
v.
Constance B. FOSTER, as Statutory Liquidator of Pennsylvania Independent Business Association ("PIBA"), National Independent Business Association ("NIBA"), The American Independent Business Alliance ("AIBA"), NIBA Group Benefits Trust, and AIBA Group Benefits Trust, collectively known as "AIBA," Appellants.
v.
Constance B. FOSTER, as Statutory Liquidator of Pennsylvania Independent Business Association ("PIBA"), National Independent Business Association ("NIBA"), The American Independent Business Alliance ("AIBA"), NIBA Group Benefits Trust, and AIBA Group Benefits Trust, collectively known as "AIBA," Appellants.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Dec 28, 1995.
Per Curiam.
Published
[*545] ORDER
PER CURIAM:
Order affirmed.