green
Positive treatment
8.8 score
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited "but see"
In Re Tardiff
But see In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222 , 228 n. 9 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1991) (criticizing circuit court opinion in Hudson ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Benton
In addition, to the extent Benton makes contributions to the Retirement Ordinance Plan, the plan is a self-settled trust. “ ‘There is substantial authority for the proposition that anti-alienation provisions in employee benefit plans are unenforceable under state law to the extent that the plan is funded by voluntary employee contributions, on the theory that the plan is in essence self-settled.’ ” In re Dunn, 215 B.R. 121, 128 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1997) (quoting In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 233 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1991) (collecting cases)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Dunn
“There is substantial authority for the proposition that anti-alienation provisions in employee benefit plans are unenforceable under state law to the extent that the plan is funded by voluntary employee contributions, on the theory that the plan is in essence self-settled.” In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 233 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1991) (collecting cases).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Briggs
Even in the absence of this ambiguity, the plain meaning rule should not be invoked here because it is plausible that Congress did not intend setoffs to be encompassed within the term "lien.” See In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 228-29 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1991) (suggesting that the plain meaning rule “should be applied where the statutory construction urged by a party is so inherently improbable that it defies common sense," but not where the construction “is at least plausible”). 12 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Plains Cotton Cooperative Ass'n v. Julien Co. (In Re Julien Co.)
Strictly stated, the “plain meaning rule” stands for the proposition “that, if a literal construction of an unambiguous statute does not produce an absurd or futile result, then it is inappropriate for a court to examine extra statutory materials in an effort to determine the ‘legislative intent’ of the statute.” In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 225 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1991); U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 109 S.Ct. at 1030-31 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In Re Shaker
See, e.g., Gladwell v. Harline (In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669, 673 (10th Cir.1991); Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3rd Cir.1991); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 365 (4th Cir.1991); Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 601-02 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Forbes v. Holiday Corp. Savings and Retirement Plan, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2275 , 114 L.Ed.2d 726 (1991); Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th Cir.1990); In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 234-35 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1991); Tatge v. Cheaver (In re Cheaver), 121 B.R. 665, 666 (Bankr.D.D.C.1990); In re Majul, 119 B.R. 118, 123…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Employee Benefits Committee v. Tabor (In Re Cress)
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Cf. Idalski, 123 B.R. at 230 (“we think it takes a certain leap of faith to infer” that Congress meant to exclude federal spendthrift trust law), with Goff, 706 F.2d at 582 (“from the legislative history of Section 541(c)(2) it is clear that Congress intended” to exempt only state spendthrift trusts) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In re NE Opco, Inc.
See also In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 231 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1991) (holding there was a "well-established rule which requires that the court consistently interpret words or phrases that appear in various provisions within a particular legislative act."). .Perrin v. U.S., 444 U.S. 37, 42 , 100 S.Ct. 311, 314 , 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) (citations omitted). .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Taunt v. General Retirement System (In Re Wilcox)
See also In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 233 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1991) (antialienation provisions in employee benefit plans that are funded solely by employee voluntary contributions are not enforceable under state law because the plans are self-settled). 6 Accordingly, although the Court finds that Debtor’s beneficial interest in the Plan is held in a trust, and that there is a restriction on that beneficial interest, the Court concludes that the restriction is not enforceable *159 under federal or state law.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Johnston
See also In re Idalski, 123 B.R. 222, 225 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.) (“It is well-settled that, state law to the contrary notwithstanding, 8 an antialienation clause contained in an ERISA-qualified pension plan precludes creditors of a plan beneficiary from levying on the beneficiary’s interest in the plan”) (citing General Motors v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir.1980)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re MARINA BAY DRIVE CORPORATION, Debtor, FIMSA, INC.
v.
MARINA BAY DRIVE CORPORATION. MARINA BAY DRIVE CORPORATION et al., v. FIMSA, INC., et al.
v.
MARINA BAY DRIVE CORPORATION. MARINA BAY DRIVE CORPORATION et al., v. FIMSA, INC., et al.
4:19-cr-00011.
District Court, S.D. Texas.
Oct 4, 1990.
123 B.R. 222
Hughes.
Published
Jeffrey E. Spiers, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.
Aaron Keiter, Houston, Tex., for defendant.
ORDER WITHDRAWING REFERENCE
HUGHES, District Judge.
The reference to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas is withdrawn on the claim by Marina Bay Drive Corporation and Charles E. Mellett against First Interstate Bank of Texas because bankruptcy courts may not conduct jury trials; they are enhanced special masters in chancery. There is more to the allocation of power in the constitution than legislative and judicial acquiescence in post-New Deal administrative excuses might suggest. Article III and Amendment VII subsist.