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Top citers, strongest first. 36 distinct citers.
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cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Simon v. City and County of San Francisco
Ct., 41 P.3d 3, 13 (Cal. 2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Castillero
In November 2015, at the time of Castillero's original fitness hearing, a minor (that is, any person under the age of 18) accused of a crime was generally subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile *398 court, unless the trial court determined the minor unfit for treatment under the juvenile court law. ( Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 548, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ( Manduley ); Lara , supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 306 , 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394 , 410 P.3d 22 ; former §§ 602, 707.) A minor 14 years of age or older accused of a serious crime set out in former section 707, subd…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Eggers
See, e.g., Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 787 (5th Cir.1977); Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3, 22 (2002); State v. Angel C., 245 Conn. 93 , 715 A.2d 652 , 662 *480 (1998); Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 822 (Wyo.1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Arizona v. Zachary Samuel Eggers
See, e.g., Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 787 (5th Cir. 1977); Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 22 (Cal. 2002); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 662 (Conn. 1998); Hansen v. State, 904 P.2d 811, 822 (Wyo. 1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Superior Court of Stanislaus Cnty.
(2×)
(Former § 707, Stats. 1975, ch. 1266, § 4, p. 3325.) As of January 1, 1995, Assembly Bill No. 560 lowered the age to 14 for minors alleged to have committed certain specified offenses, including murder. (§ 707, former subds. (d), (e), as amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 453, § 9.5.) Effective January 1, 2000, certain minors who were 16 years of age or older at the time they committed specified crimes were required to be prosecuted in a court of criminal jurisdiction, without any requirement of a determination by the juvenile court that the minor was unfit for treatment under the juvenile court …
examined
Cited "see"
People v. Suarez
(4×)
In pertinent part, it "confer[red] on prosecutors the discretion to bring specified charges against certain minors directly in criminal court, without a prior adjudication by the juvenile court that the minor [was] unfit for a disposition under the juvenile court law." ( Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 545, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ( Manduley ); see generally id . at pp. 548-550, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) Proposition 21 also decreased, to 14, the minimum age for mandatory criminal prosecutions. ( Manduley , at p. 550, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) John C…
examined
Cited "see"
People v. Brewer
(6×)
In pertinent part, it "confer[red] upon prosecutors the discretion *627 to bring specified charges against certain minors directly in criminal court, without a prior adjudication by the juvenile court that the minor is unfit for a disposition under the juvenile court law." ( Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 545, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ; see generally id ., at pp. 548-550, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) Proposition 21 also decreased, to 14, the minimum age for mandatory criminal prosecutions. ( Manduley , supra , at p. 550, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) Eliza…
examined
Cited "see"
People v. Navarra
(4×)
In pertinent part, it "confer[red] on prosecutors the discretion to bring specified charges against certain minors directly in criminal court, without a prior adjudication by the juvenile court that the minor is unfit for a disposition under the juvenile court law." ( Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 545, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ( Manduley ); see generally id . at pp. 548-550, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) Proposition 21 also decreased, to 14, the minimum age for mandatory criminal prosecutions. ( Manduley , at p. 550, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) Krista Pi…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Cervantes
(2×)
(Mar. 7, 2000) text of Prop. 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, § 26, pp. 126-127 (Proposition 21); see generally Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 548-550 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ] (Manduley); Juan G., at p. 1489 & fn. 4.) Some crimes, like Cervantes’s, were considered so serious by the voters that, if committed by a minor age 14 or older, juvenile court was not an option; filing in adult criminal court was mandated by statute (“mandatory direct filing”). 32 (Welf. & Inst.
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Salazar
(2×)
(E.g., Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 [ 183 L.Ed.2d 407 , 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464 ] (Miller) [‘‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing”]; see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 548 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ] [discussing differential treatment of juveniles and adults].) We draw such a distinction not only in the general domain of criminal sentencing, but in the specific context of the death penalty.
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Arroyo
(2×)
Code, former § 602, subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 996, § 12.2, pp. 7560, 7561 [referring to “the right to a preliminary hearing”]; see Guillory, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 175.) 1 Contrary to defendant’s argument, nothing in Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ] compels a different interpretation of section 707(d)(4).
discussed
Cited "see"
Juan G. v. Superior Court
(2×)
(Former § 602, subd. (b)(1)—(5), as amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 996, § 12.2, p. 7560; see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 549 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ] (Manduley) [as of Jan. 1, 2000 “certain minors who were 16 years of age or older at the time they committed specified crimes were required to be prosecuted in a court of criminal jurisdiction—without any requirement for a determination by the juvenile court that the minor was unfit for treatment under the juvenile court law”].) This provision for mandatory direct filing was further amended by Proposition 21…
examined
Cited "see"
United States v. Juvenile Male
(4×)
See Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3, 13 (Cal.2002); Davis v. Municipal Court, 46 Cal.3d 64 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 , 757 P.2d 11, 24 (1988) (noting that “the jurisdiction of a court is invoked and a judicial proceeding initiated” only when “an accusatory pleading is filed”).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Juvenile
See Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 13 (Cal. 2002); Davis v. Municipal Court, 757 P.2d 11 , 24 8 Our conclusion may not be determinative in a state where the bringing of charges by the prosecutor is not necessary to give a juvenile or other appropriate state court jurisdiction over a particular juvenile for a specific alleged illegal act.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Juvenile
See Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 13 (Cal. 2002); Davis v. Municipal Court, 757 P.2d 11, 24 (Cal. 1988) (noting that “the jurisdiction of a court is invoked and a judicial proceeding initiated” only when “an accusatory pleading is filed”). [6] In this case, no charges were ever brought against R.P. in any California court.
discussed
Cited "see"
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock
(2×)
See Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537, 572 , 27 Cal.4th 887A, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 (2002); Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th 472, 481-82 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 2 P.3d 581 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
In Re Marriage Cases
(2×)
"In analyzing a substantive due process claim, we first examine the nature of the interest at issue to determine whether it is a `fundamental right' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Where there is a fundamental right, we must next determine whether the state has significantly infringed upon this right. [Citation.] If so, we then consider whether an important state interest justifies the infringement. [Citation.]" ( In re Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 748 , 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 .) "In the absence of such factors, `a Legislature does not violate due process so lon…
discussed
Cited "see"
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock
(2×)
See Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537, 572 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 (2002); Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th 472, 481-82 , 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 2 P.3d 581 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Travis
(2×)
Or so the legislature may think.” (Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955) 348 U.S. 483, 489 [ 99 L.Ed. 563 , 75 S.Ct. 461 ]; see Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 482 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 2 P.3d 581 ].) “ ‘ “[S]ubject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 552 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ]; see also People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1412-1413 [ 48 Cal.Rp…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Rhodes
(2×)
Or so the legislature may think.” (Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955) 348 U.S. 483, 489 [ 99 L.Ed. 563 , 75 S.Ct. 461 ]; see Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 482 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 , 2 P.3d 581 ].) “ ‘ “[S]ubject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 552 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ]; see also People v. Thompson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 299, 304 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Superior Court
(2×)
Code, § 707, subd. (a); see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 548 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ].) However, upon the motion of the prosecutor and after an investigation and report by a probation officer, the juvenile court may find that the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment, and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court.
examined
Cited "see"
People v. Chacon
(4×)
(Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1732.6, subd. (b)(2); see Pen.Code, §§ 1170.17, 1170.19.)" ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 555, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 , italics added.) In Manduley , the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor's "traditionally ... broad power to charge crimes extends to selecting the forum...." ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 552 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) By selecting the forum, the prosecutor selects the procedure and protocol of that forum.
examined
Cited "see"
People v. Thomas
(4×)
(Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1732.6, subd. (b)(2); see Pen.Code, §§ 1170.17, 1170.19.)" *240 ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 555, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 , italics added.) In Manduley , the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor's "traditionally ... broad power to charge crimes extends to selecting the forum...." ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 552 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) By selecting the forum, the prosecutor selects the procedure and protocol of that forum.
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Eddie M.
(2×)
(E.g., §§ 602, subd. (b) [minors who “shall” be charged in criminal court], 707, subd. (d)(1)—(3) [minors who “may” be charged in criminal court]; see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 549-550 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ] (Manduley). 4 The maximum period of confinement is statutorily defined as “the longest of the three time periods set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code.” (§ 726, subd. (c), 2d par., italics added.) However, long after it appeared in section 726, the italicized DSA provision was redesignated subdi…
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Thomas
(2×)
(Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1732.6, subd. (b)(2); see Pen.Code, §§ 1170.17, 1170.19. )" ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 555, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 , italics added.) Manduley later states: "The voters, through the enactment of Proposition 21, have determined that the judiciary shall not make the determination regarding a minor's fitness for a juvenile disposition where the prosecutor initiates a criminal action pursuant to section 707(d)." ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 555 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 , fn. omitted.) We read that sentence as an art…
examined
Cited "see"
Gallivan v. Walker
(4×)
The power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate through initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share "equal dignity." Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 235-36 , 74 P.2d 1191, 1205 (1937) (Larson, J., concurring) (stating that "by the initiative process [under the Utah Constitution] the people [are] a legislative body coequal in power and with superior advantages to the Legislature"); see also Dewey, 3 Utah 2d at 4 , 277 P.2d at 807 (noting that electors' power to pass legislation via initiative is same as power of legislatur…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
League of Women Voters of PA v. Degraffenreid, V.
(2×)
Id., at 984 n. 1; see also Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3, 28 (2002) (various provisions must be reasonably related to common theme or purpose); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 990 (Fla.1984) (amendment must manifest “a logical and natural oneness of purpose ...”).[12] Although we are not bound by these decisions, we find them persuasive, and adopt the “subject matter test” for determining whether a ballot question violates Article XI, § 1.
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Superior Court
(8×)
(Stats. 1994, ch. 453 (AB 560), § 9.5; Hicks , at pp. 1655-1656, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) At that time, any transfer of a minor was still subject to a judicial determination of unfitness. ( Hicks , at pp. 1656-1657, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 ; see also Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 548-549, 548-549, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) Then, in 2000, the voters enacted Proposition 21, "the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act." ( Manduley v. Superior Court, supra , 27 Cal.4th at pp. 544-545, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) At that time, "certain minors who were 16 years…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Chatman
(2×)
The case upheld as rational a statute establishing discretionary sex offender registration for persons convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, but making it mandatory for individuals convicted of offenses involving other types of sexual activity with a minor. ( **15 Johnson , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 874 , 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 341 P.3d 1075 .) What we reiterated is that we had "authority to construe our state Constitution independently" but saw no reason to bifurcate state and federal analysis in that context. ( Id. at p. 881, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 341 P.3d 1075 ; see also Mandul…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Weatherford v. City of San Rafael
(2×)
For instance, in Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 807 P.2d 1063 , we rejected the petitioner's claim that a private citizen had either a " 'beneficial interest' " or public interest standing to challenge a criminal defendant's resentencing. ( Id . at p. 451, 279 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 807 P.2d 1063 .) Though the petitioner-victim argued that the prosecutor's decisions in the resentencing proceeding implicated a " 'public duty,' " we rejected the invitation to infringe upon a core aspect of prosecutorial discretion. ( Id. at p. 453, 279 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 807 P.2d 1063 .) …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Christopher F.
(2×)
(See People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 901 ]; see also Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 593 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) No statute or rule of court specifically applicable to juvenile proceedings allocates the burden of proof on this issue.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Delacy
Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. [Citations.]’ (Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 465 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 ]; see also Manduley [v. Superior Court (2002)] 27 Cal.4th [537,] 571 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 10 , 41 P.3d 3 ] [‘equal protection provisions in the California Constitution “have been generally thought... to be substantially [the] equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
California Family Bioethics Council, LLC v. California Institute for Regenerative Medicine
(2×)
(Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1157 , italics omitted; see also Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 576-579 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ] [initiative amending statutes regarding gang-related crime, sentencing of repeat offenders, and juvenile justice system did not violate single-subject requirement.
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
Grimaud v. Commonwealth
(4×)
Id., at 984 n. 1; see also Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3, 28 (2002) (various provisions must be reasonably related to common theme or purpose); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984, 990 (Fla.1984) (amendment must manifest “a logical and natural 'oneness of purpose ... ”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Wilkinson
(2×)
Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. [Citations.]" ( Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 , 100 L.Ed.2d 465 ; see also Manduley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 571 , 117 Cal. Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 ["equal protection provisions in the California Constitution *430 `have been generally thought ... to be substantially equivalent of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutio…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Brazill v. State
(2×)
As the supreme court has written, "the discretion of a prosecutor in deciding whether and how to prosecute is absolute in our system of criminal justice." Cain, 381 So.2d at 1367 ; see also Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 , 117 Cal. Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3, 19 (2002).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re Pamela C. MARTINEZ on Habeas Corpus.
S103581.
California Supreme Court.
Feb 20, 2002.
George.
Published
Petition for review GRANTED.
GEORGE, C.J., KENNARD, J., BAXTER, J., WERDEGAR, J., CHIN, J., BROWN, J. and MORENO, J., concur.