In Re Urayna L., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). · Go Syfert
Search
In Re Urayna L., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
45 citation events (39 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: In re J.P. CA4/2 (calctapp, 2026-04-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re J.P. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Where “no objection to the sufficiency of the assessment reports was made at time of trial, [we] refer to the familiar principle that failure to object to the admission of improper or inadequate evidence [forfeits] the right to raise the issue on appeal. [Citation.] If the complaint on appeal be deemed not the admissibility . . . of inadequate assessment reports, but substantive insufficien[c]y to establish requisite findings, this complaint, too, [is forfeited] by failure to raise it at the trial level. [Citation.]” (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 , fn. omitted; In re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re K.T. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 (Urayna L.).) “[A]ny other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts by standing silently by, thus permitting the proceedings to reach a conclusion 9 in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable.” (Ibid.) Moreover, that objection to the report “is just the kind of issue which should be developed by putting on one’s own evidence or cross-examining the person who prepared the report.” (Id. at p. 887.) Father argues that he has not forfeited his challenge to the adequacy of the report, or that we shoul…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re D.F. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [waiver of issue of adequacy of adoption assessment].) Such a contention also fails on the merits because the excerpts of mother’s visits did in fact provide favorable characterizations of mother’s interactions with the child.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 707 East Ocean Blvd. LP v. Rogers CA2/8
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(Cf. In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [applying rule of waiver where failure to do so “would permit a party to trifle with the courts by standing silently by, thus permitting the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable”].) Here, defendant argues that the special verdict form, like the one in Taylor, failed to establish an essential element of plaintiff’s claim against him.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re D.B. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 200, fn. 12 (Joshua G.); In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [a parent forfeited the right to challenge the adequacy of an adoption report by failing to raise the issue with the trial court].) “A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. [Citations.] Forfeiture . . . applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re M.M.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [waiver of issue of adequacy of adoption assessment].) We agree.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Sadie C. CA2/8
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Id. at p. 641; see also In re Alexandria P. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1346 [forfeiture of argument that Indian tribe’s consent to foster care placement waived application of ICWA adoptive placement preferences]; In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [mother forfeited challenge to adequacy of adoption assessment by failing to object below]; In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558 [parent forfeited forum non conveniens objection by failing to raise it in trial court]; In re Daniel D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823 , 1831 2 Father did not file a reply brief in this matter o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Naomi S. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(E.g., In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143 , 1157- 1158 [mother waived right to counsel claim]; see In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 956, fn. 8 [adequacy of assessment report not raised below]; In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [mother waived objection to department report]; In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 209-210 [mother waived lack of notice claim]; Armando D. v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1024 [father waived evidentiary objections]; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 328 [mother waived insufficiency of dependency petition all…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Orange County Social Services Agency v. Nakia A.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
(In re Aaron B., supra, at p. 846.) In In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 437 ], the mother argued she had not waived the right to challenge adoptability because the social services agency had the burden of proving adoptability but had failed to provide a complete assessment of adoptability.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alameda County Social Services Agency v. Cristian L.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
(Id. at pp. 1153-1154, citing In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ]; In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 27 ]; and In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 437 ].) Of the cases cited by the Lukas B. court, only Crystal J. actually supports the proposition that the ultimate issue of whether the child is likely to be adopted can be waived by failing to argue the point at the section 366.26 hearing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Rungsun B.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 27 ]; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 ]; In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 437 ].) However, we will consider the issue of adoptability, if only to demonstrate that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue the issue.
discussed Cited "see" San Benardino County Children & Family Services v. M.P.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
(See §§ 366.21, subd. (i)(l)(H), 366.24, subd. (b).) However, Mother forfeited this argument by failing to assert it in the juvenile court. ( G.C., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1398-1399 [father forfeited argument that court did not consider appropriateness of TCA as the minor’s permanent plan]; see In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 885-886 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 437 ]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 ].) But even if the contention had not been forfeited, any failure to address TCA was harmless.
discussed Cited "see" Marriage of Sherr CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: accord · confidence high
(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293.) ‘The rule that contentions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal is founded on considerations of fairness to the court and opposing party, and on the practical need for an orderly and efficient administration of the law.’ (People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1468 ; accord, In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501 .) Otherwise, opposing parties and trial courts would be deprived of opportunities to correct alleged errors, and parties and appellate courts would be required to deplete costly resources ‘to ad…
discussed Cited "see" Sacramento County Department of Health & Human Services v. Kelly E.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: accord · confidence high
(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 90 R3d 746].) “The rule that contentions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal is founded on considerations of fairness to the court and opposing party, and on the practical need for an orderly and efficient administration of the law.” (People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1468 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ]; accord, In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 196 ].) Otherwise, opposing parties and trial courts would be deprived of opportunities to correct alleged errors, and par…
discussed Cited "see" In Re SC (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: accord · confidence high
DISCUSSION I In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party ordinarily must raise the objection in the trial court. ( In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 , 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 786 , 90 P.3d 746 .) "The rule that contentions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal is founded on considerations of fairness to the court and opposing party, and on the practical need for an orderly and efficient administration of the law." ( People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1468 , 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 217 ; accord, In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501 , 102 Cal. Rptr.2d 196…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re Adam S. CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence low
(In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672 ; see also In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 .) Further, and even if we overlook mother’s forfeiture, the juvenile court’s case plan was appropriate.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re Luis N. CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672 [an appellant forfeits a challenge to a ruling “‘if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court’”]; see also In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [parent forfeited challenge to adequacy of adoption assessment by failing to object below].) Father urges that substantial evidence challenges cannot be forfeited, but this is irrelevant because father is challenging the reasonableness of these services against the backdrop of the case, not the substantiality of evidence.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re URAYNA L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Kimberly L., Defendant and Appellant.
B129396.
California Court of Appeal.
Oct 15, 1999.
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437
Croskey.
Cited by 29 opinions  |  Published

Konrad S. Lee, Riverside, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Lloyd W. Pellman, Los Angeles, County Counsel, and Doraine F. Meyer, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CROSKEY, J.

Kimberly L. (mother) appeals from an order entered January 5, 1999, which terminated her parental rights as to her child, Urayna L., thus freeing Urayna for adoption pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] We affirm that order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[2]

Mother had a substance abuse problem. She had placed Urayna with a relative, but that relative died, which apparently brought Urayna to the attention of Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) when mother's twin boys were born and tested positive for drugs. Mother ended up in jail, and her children, including Urayna, became dependents of the court and were placed in foster care. Services were provided to mother, who did not complete the reunification plan. Time ran out, and the trial court terminated reunification services. Urayna was found to be adoptable, and mother's parental rights were terminated.

At the hearing at which mother's rights were terminated, the trial court had before[*438] it a report which included a review, pursuant to section 366.22, subdivision (b)(2), of the amount of and nature of the contact between Urayna and her biological relatives during the time she had been a dependent of the court. This report stated that mother's visits, which were supervised, took place on an average of one or two times a month, that mother had only arranged for one of these visits, and that the others had been arranged by the maternal grandmother, who was the person prompting mother to visit. The report also noted that the minors, including Urayna, were not comfortable with mother during the visits. An earlier report had commented that grandmother was more consistent in visiting the minors than was mother, and would attend visits even if mother missed them. Mother filed timely notice of appeal.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Mother contends that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by terminating mother's parental rights in the face of an adoption assessment which failed to report on the nature of the relationship between Urayna and Urayna's maternal grandmother. The Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) disputes this contention. DCFS also contends that mother waived this issue by failing to assert her right to a more complete report below, but mother responds that because it is DCFS's burden to establish the adoptability of the minor, it did not meet that burden when it failed to assess the relationship between Urayna and her grandmother.

DISCUSSION

Section 366.22, subdivision (b), provides, in relevant part: "Whenever a court orders that a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 shall be held, it shall direct the agency supervising the child and the licensed county adoption agency, or the State Department of Social Services when it is acting as an adoption agency in counties that are not served by a county adoption agency, to prepare an assessment that shall include: [11] ... [f] (2) A review of the amount of and nature of any contact between the child and his or her parents and other members of his or her extended family [which includes grandparents] since the time of placement."

Mother contends that because the report before the trial court at the section 366.26 hearing failed to provide any evidence about the relationship between Urayna and her maternal grandmother, the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to order that the missing, and legislatively-mandated, information be provided, and that therefore it was improper for the trial court to proceed to terminate mother's parental rights in the absence of this information.

DCFS contends that mother waived this issue by failing to assert her right to have such information included in the report, citing In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal. App.4th 843, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 27 and In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 613; mother responds that because it is DCFS's burden to establish the adoptability of the minor, it did not meet that burden when it failed to assess the relationship between Urayna and her grandmother, so waiver is not applicable, citing In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal. App.4th 1463, 1475-1476, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 385.

We conclude that by failing to raise the adequacy of the report below, mother waived this issue. The cases of In re Aaron B. and In re Crystal J. are on point, because they involved the failure to object to the adequacy of the adoption assessment.

As many courts have noted, any other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts by standing silently by, thus permitting the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339,[*439] 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 and cases cited there.) Here, if there had been contacts between Urayna and her maternal grandmother which were such that Urayna's adoption would have been detrimental to Urayna, which contacts were not reported, mother could have raised them herself; so, too, if the contacts which were reported were not adequately described, mother could have put on evidence of how those visits went, and what it was about them which had any bearing on the issue of termination of her parental rights. Mother's silence below signifies that she did not see anything which was not included in the reports by DCFS which might have helped her case.

In re Precious J. is distinguishable. In that case, mother waived her right to complain about the adequacy of the reunification plan by failing to object below, but did not waive her right to visitation, which is a fundamental aspect of a reunification plan. Parents' rights cannot be terminated in the absence of reunification services. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248-249, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 851 P.2d 1307 [DCFS must, with certain statutory exceptions, provide family reunification services before it can propose terminating parents' rights.].) However, what the appellate court found to be reversible error was that there was no evidence in the record that DCFS had complied with that plan and provided services. The plan called for DCFS to arrange visitation between the mother and her child, and there was no evidence of visitation. DCFS contended that the record was silent on the issue of visitation because the mother did not raise the subject below, and opined that she might have waived her right to visitation while she was incarcerated. However, the record showed that mother had made her desire for visitation while incarcerated abundantly clear, and that she had been assured by both DCFS and the court that visitation would occur. (In re Precious J., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1477-1478, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 385.) Furthermore, DCFS, not the mother, "had the obligation to make a record at the six-month and twelve-month review hearings establishing that reasonable services were provided," and DCFS even implicitly conceded that it did not facilitate visitation by refusing to acknowledge responsibility for providing such a service. (Id. at p. 1478, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 385.) In other words, because mother's rights could not be terminated unless reunification services had been provided, and the record showed that, in fact, the most important component of such services, visitation, had not been provided, the trial court erred by terminating the mother's rights.

Here, DCFS did make the report listing the contacts between Urayna and her grandmother; mother's contention that the report was not adequate is just the kind of issue which should be developed by putting on one's own evidence or cross-examining the person who prepared the report. In other words, once DCFS puts on some evidence of the contacts, and their nature (including the fact that they were unremarkable, as signified by the lack of any statements that the minor was particularly attached to, or particularly fearful of, the relative), it is up to the parent to produce evidence that, in fact, the minor would benefit from continuing the relationship so much that termination of the parental rights is inappropriate. (See In re Lorenzo C, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 562 [statutes requiring department of human services to prepare study about likelihood that minor will be adopted and to review amount and nature of any contact between minor and his relatives since time of placement does not require department to go beyond general description of postplacement contacts between relative and child and into detailed evaluation about whether continuance of relationship would be beneficial to child, and a report which did not address what real strength and quality of child's bonding with his relative was, and whether loss of that relationship would be substantial loss for child, was not deficient].)

[*440] DISPOSITION

The order of January 5, 1999 which terminated Kimberly L.'s parental rights to Urayna L. is affirmed.

KLEIN, P.J., and ALDRICH, J., concur.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code except as otherwise noted.
2 The following facts are taken from the reporter's and clerk's transcripts. Because the single issue on appeal is primarily one of law, not fact, we recite only the most basic of facts.