Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Mitchell May, Jr., 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956). · Go Syfert
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Mitchell May, Jr., 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
43 citation events across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bread Political Action Committee v. The Federal Election Commission (ca7, 1980-12-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1956 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1956 1991 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Bread Political Action Committee v. The Federal Election Commission (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
7th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
From May 11, 1976 , the effective date of the 1976 amendments, through December 1976, the number of individuals solicited by BreadPAC dropped to 462.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Committee for New Management of Butler Aviation v. Widmark
E.D.N.Y · 1971 · confidence medium
The court reaches this conclusion mindful of the admonition that stockholder disputes should not be viewed as “political contests, with each side free to hurl charges with comparative unrestraint, the assumption being that the opposing side is then at liberty to refute and thus effectively deflate the ‘campaign oratory’ of its adversary.” Securities and Exchange Commission v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2 Cir. 1956). 5 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Locke Manufacturing Companies v. United States
D. Conn. · 1964 · confidence medium
Securities and Exchange Commission v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2 Cir. 1956); cf. Howard v. Furst, 140 F.Supp. 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y.1956), aff’d, 238 F.2d 790 (2 Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 , 77 S.Ct. 814 , 1 L.Ed.2d 759 (1957). 18 . 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 19 .
cited Cited "see" Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation
2d Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See SEC v. May, 134 F.Supp. 247, 258 (S.D.N.Y.1955), aff’d., 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956); Willoughby v. Port, 277 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); 2 L.
discussed Cited "see" General Time Corporation v. Talley Industries, Inc. (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See SEC v. May, 134 F.Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y.1955), aff’d, 229 F.2d 123 , 55 A.L.R.2d 1123 (2d Cir. 1956).
cited Cited "see" Central Foundry Company v. Gondelman
S.D.N.Y. · 1958 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.E.C. v. May, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1955, 134 F.Supp. 247 , affirmed 2 Cir., 1956, 229 F.2d 123 ; S.E.C. v. Okin, D.C.S.D.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Securities and Exchange Commission
v.
Mitchell May, Jr., Alfred W. Parry, Jr., Wilbur E. Dow, Jr., Individually and as Members of Independent Stockholders Committee of Libby, McNeill & Libby, and Libby, McNeill & Libby, a Corporation
19-655.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jan 11, 1956.
229 F.2d 123
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published

229 F.2d 123

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Mitchell MAY, Jr., Alfred W. Parry, Jr., Wilbur E. Dow, Jr., individually and as members of Independent Stockholders Committee of Libby, McNeill & Libby, Defendants-Appellants, and
Libby, McNeill & Libby, a corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 222.

Docket 23843.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued December 20, 1955.

Decided January 11, 1956.

William H. Timbers, Gen. Counsel, Securities & Exchange Comm., Washington, D. C. (Bruce L. Carson, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Alexander Cohen, Sp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., and Ezra Weiss, Atty., New York City, Securities and Exchange Commission, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Leo Brady, New York City (Gordon, Brady, Caffrey & Keller, New York City, on the brief), for defendants-appellants.

Charles H. Tuttle, New York City (Breed, Abbott & Morgan, Thornton C. Land, Thomas W. Kelly, and Charles T. Hall, New York City, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and MEDINA and WATERMAN, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Chief Judge.

1

The Securities and Exchange Commission on August 16, 1955, obtained a preliminary injunction against defendant members of an "Independent Stockholders Committee of Libby, McNeill & Libby" — an anti-management stockholders group — (1) enjoining these defendants from soliciting voting proxies by means of false and misleading statements and without disclosing the names of all persons for whom solicitation was being made, (2) enjoining the exercise of powers conferred by any proxy already obtained, and (3) postponing until September 7, 1955, the annual stockholders' meeting of Libby, McNeill & Libby then scheduled for August 17. Circuit Judge Lumbard, who issued the injunction while sitting by designation as a district judge, sets forth in a thorough, but succinct, opinion the facts and reasoning which support his finding that these defendants have committed acts violative of SEC Rule X-14, 17 CFR § 240.14a, promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78n. D.C.S.D.N.Y., 134 F.Supp. 247. The defendants were unsuccessful in their attempts to secure a stay from a judge of this court and the circuit justice; and the meeting was held on September 7, with results favorable to the old management.

2

We accept the well-supported findings and conclusions of Judge Lumbard as reported in the opinion below. Appellants argue that § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), and regulations adopted thereunder are unconstitutional as unauthorized delegations of legislative power and otherwise; but these contentions have no merit. American Power & Light Co. v. S. E. C., 329 U.S. 90, 67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834. Furthermore, the Commission's proxy rules as applied either to management or to insurgent stockholder groups are clearly authorized by the statute.

3

Appellants' fundamental complaint appears to be that stockholder disputes should be viewed in the eyes of the law just as are political contests, with each side free to hurl charges with comparative unrestraint, the assumption being that the opposing side is then at liberty to refute and thus effectively deflate the "campaign oratory" of its adversary. Such, however, was not the policy of Congress as enacted in the Securities Exchange Act. There Congress has clearly entrusted to the Commission the duty of protecting the investing public against misleading statements made in the course of a struggle for corporate control.

4

Affirmed.