Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1962). · Go Syfert
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Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1962). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: David H. Melasky & Audrey Melasky v. Commissioner (tax, 2018-10-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1962 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1962 1994 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David H. Melasky & Audrey Melasky v. Commissioner (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tax Ct. · 2018 · confidence medium
In Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305, 306 (3d Cir. 1962), the Third Circuit held that the date of tender was the payment date.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bush v. United States (2×)
Fed. Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 , 110 S.Ct. 1361 , 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990); Lewyt Corp. v. Comm’r, 349 U.S. 237, 249 , 75 S.Ct. 736 , 99 L.Ed. 1029 (1955); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25 , 28 n. 3 (1st Cir.1993); In re Graham, 981 F.2d 1135, 1138 (10th Cir.1992); Ewing v. United States, 914 F.2d 499, 501 (4th Cir.1990); Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305, 306 (3d Cir.1962) (noting that “taxation is a game which must be played strictly in accordance with the rules”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Conston, Inc. (In Re Conston, Inc.)
D. Del. · 1995 · confidence medium
Indeed, it is not at all inconceivable that a discharged debtor would attempt to defend against an IRS action for unpaid discharged priority taxes by asserting the maxim “taxation is a game which must be played strictly in accordance with the rules,” Philadelphia & Reading v. United States, 944 F.2d 1063, 1070 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305, 306 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 820 , *778 83 S.Ct. 36 , 9 L.Ed.2d 60 (1962)), and arguing the IRS has no statutory authority to collect, as a contract claim or otherwise, for failure to make a valid assessm…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Philadelphia & Reading Corporation v. United States (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
In general, however, the courts take them literally: the game must be played according to the rules." Johnson, An Inquiry into the Assessment Process, 35 Tax L.Rev. 285, 286 (1980). 41 Years earlier, this Court wrote in Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305, 306 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 820 , 83 S.Ct. 36 , 9 L.Ed.2d 60 (1962): "[W]e and other courts have pointed out in many instances that taxation is a game which must be played strictly in accordance with the rules." 42 Reported decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits provi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arthur C. Ewing A/K/A A. Clifford Ewing Maxine H. Ewing v. United States
4th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
E.g., Lewyt Cory. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237, 240 , 75 S.Ct. 736, 739 , 99 L.Ed. 1029 (1955); Brafman v. United States, 384 F.2d 863, 867-68 (5th Cir.1967); Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305, 306 (3d Cir.) (“taxation is a game which must be played strictly in accordance with the rules”), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 820 , 83 S.Ct. 36 , 9 L.Ed.2d 60 (1962).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. John & Patricia Forma
2d Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Indeed, many courts have gone further and said that, in tax, jurisdictional rules “must be strictly construed, requiring compliance with even purely formal or technical conditions imposed.” Richardson v. United States, 330 F.Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.Tex.1971); see also Richardson v. Smith, 301 F.2d 305, 306 (3d Cir.) (“[T]axation is a game which must be played strictly in accordance with the rules.”), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 820 , 83 S.Ct. 36 , 9 L.Ed.2d 60 (1962); Young v. United States, 203 F.2d 686, 689 (8th Cir.1953) (“[Gjeneral principles of equity may not be applied in tax cases, but…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
E. Stanley Richardson, Rommel Wilson and George M. Clarke, Executors of the Estate of Gertrude Rommel Wilson, Deceased
v.
Francis R. Smith, Individually and as Former Collector of Internal Revenue Forthe First District of Pennsylvania
13798.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
May 4, 1962.
301 F.2d 305
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

301 F.2d 305

62-1 USTC P 12,072

E. Stanley RICHARDSON, Rommel Wilson and George M. Clarke,
Executors of the Estate of Gertrude Rommel Wilson,
Deceased, Appellants,
v.
Francis R. SMITH, Individually and as Former Collector of
Internal Revenue forthe First District of Pennsylvania.

No. 13798.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued March 20, 1962.
Decided March 28, 1962, Rehearing Denied May 4, 1962.

Logan Morris, Philadelphia, Pa. (Nesbit, Morris, Pugh & Noonan, Philadelphia, on the brief), for appellants.

Alan D. Pekelner, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (John B. Jones, Jr., Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, I. Henry Kutz, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., Drew J. T. O'Keefe, U.S. Atty., of the brief), for appellee.

Before GOODRICH, McLAUGHLIN and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

[*~305]1

This is an action for the recovery of federal estate taxes. The defense is the statute of limitations of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which requires claims for refund to be presented to the Commissioner within three years after payment.[1] The taxpayers filed a federal estate tax return for their decedent and paid the amount they figured to be due. This return was examined by an agent of the Commissioner who claimed a deficieny. The defendant sent and the taxpayers received a form letter requesting payment of the deficiency, with interest computed to March 28, 1946. The taxpayers did not concede that the amount of the alleged deficiency was correct but on the same day drew a check for the claimed amount and mailed it without explanation to the Collector of Internal Revenue for the First District of Pennsylvania. The taxpayers' receipt for this payment bore the date of April 10, 1946, but on the same document the date April 1, 1946 appeared.

2

The taxpayers claim that the date of payment was April 10, the date stamped in large type on the receipt. The Collector contends that the date was April 1, which was the date the check was received by the Collector and which date is also shown upon the receipt. The district court relied upon the decision of this Court in Hill v. United States, 3 Cir., 263 F.2d 885 (1959).

3

We think the district court was correct and that the Hill case governs. The set of facts here is almost like that in Hill. There the taxpayers sent their check with their estimated tax; here the taxpayers sent their check upon receipt of a Government request to pay. We can see no difference in principle between the two cases.

4

The taxpayers claim estoppel against the Government because they relied upon the April 10 date shown on the receipt. But it is to be kept in mind that that same receipt showed also, though not so conspicuously, the April 1 date. Under these circumstances we cannot see how a convincing argument for the application of an estoppel-- even assuming that the Government would be bound by an estoppel-- can be made.

5

There is no appealing equity in the Government's position here. But we and other courts have pointed out in many instances that taxation is a game which must be played strictly in accordance with the rules.

[*~306]6

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

1

Int.Rev.Code of 1939, 910, 26 U.S.C.A. 910