United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. State Bank, 372 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1967). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. State Bank, 372 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1967).
Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 8515Feb 10, 1967

United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. State Bank

Quick Summary
24 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
Cited for
At page 450Allowing third-party claims under the Miller Act12 citing cases“regardless of the success or failure of the plaintiff's cause, the third-party plaintiffs claims against the third-party defendant would persist as an entirely independent claim.”2 citing courts quote it · passage not found verbatim in the opinion (79%)
  • United States ex rel. Owens v. Olympic Marine Servs., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Va. 1993).published
    Co. v. American State Bank, 372 F.2d 449, 450 (10th Cir.1967).
  • Paur v. Crookston Marine, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 466 (D.N.D. 1979).published
    United States v. Joe Grasso & Son, Inc., 380 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1967); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American State Bank, 372 F.2d 449, 450 (10th Cir. 1967).
  • Moorhead Constr. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 508 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1975).published
    Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1442 at 206 (1971); Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a); cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American State Bank, 372 F.2d 449, 450 (10th Cir. 1967).
  • United States v. Hutchins, 47 F.R.D. 340 (D. Or. 1969).published
    Hutchins has cited no cases, and I find none, which give him a reimbursement right against Mullins and Richey for any sum Hutchins is required to pay the United States as a result of the illegal “kickback.” “The fact that the third-party c…
  • United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. R. S. Perkins, 388 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1968).published
    Co. v. American State Bank, supra, 372 F.2d at 450, although such fact may be a cohesive factor as in Limerick v. T.
  • United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Perkins, 388 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1968).published
    Co. v. American State Bank, supra, 372 F.2d at 450, although such fact may be a cohesive factor as in Limerick v. T.
  • Li v. Lewis, No. 1:20-cv-00012 (D. Utah May 15, 2020).
    Kan. 1986). 17 Id.; accord United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American State Bank, 372 F.2d 449, 450 (10th Cir. 1967). 18 See Docket No. 5-89, at 14 (“Plaintiff is correct in asserting that Jack’s third-party claims are not sufficien…
  • United States ex rel. B & M Roofing of Colorado, Inc. v. AKM Assocs., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1441 (D. Colo. 1997).published
    (finding that Miller Act payment and performance bonds represent separate obligations for the benefit of separate obli-gees)
  • Bethany Med. Ctr. v. Harder, 641 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1986).published
    See also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American State Bank, 372 F.2d 449, 450 (10th Cir.1967).
  • United of Omaha Life Ins. v. Reed, 649 F. Supp. 837 (D. Kan. 1986).published
    See also United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. American State Bank, 372 F.2d 449, 450 (10th Cir.1967).
Show 2 more citing cases
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY
v.
The AMERICAN STATE BANK, Frank Farris, Howe Sound Company, Murray Director Affiliates, Inc., and Security National Bank of Kansas City, Kansas
No. 8515.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Feb 10, 1967.
Published opinion
372 F.2d 449
1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 7470
David H. Sanders, Tulsa, Okl., and Gus Rinehart, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Rinehart & Morrison, Oklahoma City, Okl., and Sanders, McElroy & Whitten, Tulsa, Okl., of counsel, on the brief with them), for appellant., Coleman H. Hayes and John H. Cantrell, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Wm. J. Holloway, Jr., Crowe, Boxley, Dunlevy, Thweatt, Swinford & Johnson, Monnet, Hayes, Bullís, Grubb & Thompson, and Cantrell, Douglass, Thompson & Wilson, Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief with them), for appellees.
Lewis.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
DAVID T. LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

This case reaches us as a Rule 54(b) offshoot, Fed.R.Civ.P., in an original ac[*450]tion brought under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a and 270b, by the United States for the use and benefit of Flint Steel Corporation, a subcontractor, against the PLS Company, a joint venture engaged as prime contractor on a federal project at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma. The United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company was joined as party defendant as surety on the Miller Act bonds required of PLS for both payment and performance. After obtaining leave of court, the appellant surety filed a third-party complaint alleging a right to recover from appellees actual and punitive damages together with attorney’s fees suffered and expended by the surety under the requirements of its performance bond. Appellees were non-residents of Oklahoma and the claim against them was premised upon allegations of ex maleficio deeds leading to a right to indemnity implied in law. The specific allegation asserted that appellees had conspired to present a totally false statement of PLS’s financial worth that had induced appellant to issue its surety bonds. This appeal followed an order of the trial court vacating its previous order allowing the filing of the third-party complaint, quashing the service of summons upon appellees, dismissing them from the action, and dismissing the action.

Although the full scope of this appeal has required the parties to present arguments touching upon the jurisdictional and venue aspects of the Miller Act, the requirements of Rules 4(f) and 14, Fed. R.Civ.P., as they apply to the Miller Act, and the availability of the Oklahoma long-arm statute in such cases, we deem a threshold question to be dispositive. Did the court err in dismissing the third-party complaint when it became apparent that the appellant surety’s claim against appellees was founded on the performance bond and was totally unrelated to the payment bond on which the use plaintiff brought the original action ? We hold that the court did not err and affirm the judgment.

In Limerick v. T. F. Scholes, Inc., 292 F.2d 195, this court held it proper under the Miller Act to allow a third-party complaint by the surety wherein it was alleged that the third-party defendants had agreed to indemnify the prime contractor for any failure of the sub-contractor to perform and that the claim in the,.main .action was predicated on the non-performance of the sub-contractor. In Limerick the amount claimed by the use plaintiff was the identical amount for which the indemnifying third parties would be liable and the fact of liability of the third parties was dependent upon the success of the use plaintiff in the main action. In the case at bar, in contrast, no attempt is made to pass on to third parties all or part of the claim asserted against the original defendants. The original suit is on a payment bond. The third-party complaint is for indemnification for losses on a performance bond.[1] Under the Miller Act these bonds represent separate obligations running to separate obligees; to persons supplying materials and labor in the case of the payment bond and to the government of the United States in the case of the performance bond. Here, regardless of the success or failure of the use plaintiff’s cause, the appellant surety’s claims against appellees would persist as an entirely independent claim. The fact that the third-party claim arises against the same general background as the main claim is not enough to allow application of Rule 14 to independent claims. Horn v. Daniel, 10 Cir., 315 F.2d 471; 3 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 14.07.

Affirmed.

1

In the third-party complaint, surety asked for $400,000 as its cost of taking over and completing the project for PLS Company, $400,000 for punitive damages, and $40,000 for attorney’s fees. The prayer for damages did not mention surety’s potential amount of liability on the payment bond.