Iberia Hampton, Adm'x, Etc. Verlina Brewer, Etc., & Deborah Johnson v. The City of Chicago, Cook Cnty., Illinois & Edward v. Hanrahan, Fannie Mae Clark, Adm'x of the Est. of Mark Clark, Deceased v. The City of Chicago, & Edward v. Hanrahan, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Iberia Hampton, Adm'x, Etc. Verlina Brewer, Etc., & Deborah Johnson v. The City of Chicago, Cook Cnty., Illinois & Edward v. Hanrahan, Fannie Mae Clark, Adm'x of the Est. of Mark Clark, Deceased v. The City of Chicago, & Edward v. Hanrahan, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“a construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.”
395 citation events (73 in the last 25 years) across 81 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hamilton v. Oswego Community Unit School District 308 (ilnd, 2021-02-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Royer
N.D. Ind. · 2026 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in those situations in which immunity is properly claimed, the action is defeated at the outset.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hamilton v. Oswego Community Unit School District 308
N.D. Ill. · 2021 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Carroll v. City of Oak Forest
N.D. Ill. · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 u.s.c. 1983...cannot be immunized by state law.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eberhardt v. Village of Tinley Park
Ill. App. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.’ ” Id. at 284 n.8 (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) T.Z., By and Through his Parent and Legal Guardian, P.Z. v. Tippecanoe School Corporation
N.D. Ind. · 2023 · confidence medium
That’s because “[a] construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.” 2015 WL 5252400 , at *15 (emphasis added) (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tracy Conley v. United States
7th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997) (“When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is ‘nei‐ ther appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, 20 No. 20‐2439 immunity should protect the one and not the other.’”), quot‐ ing Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) North Atlantic Security Company v. Blache
M.D. La. · 2020 · confidence medium
The investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of determining whether a licensee is in compliance with R.S. 37:3270-3298” and the Board’s regulations.81 Even Blache’s characterization of his own acts, i.e., “he received information regarding a rules violation and then took affirmative steps to independently verify the accuracy of the allegations,”82 indicates that 75 Beck, 204 F.3d at 637. 76 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 , quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973). 77 R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Presutto v. Hull
Ohio Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Thus, if a prosecutor plans and executes a raid on a suspected weapons cache, he “has no greater claim to complete immunity than activities of police officers allegedly acting under his direction.” 484 F.2d at 608-609.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clarence Brown v. Allison Taylor
5th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277 , 284 n.8, 100 S.Ct. 553 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) ("Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C, § 1983 .... cannot be immunized by state law.” (quoting Hampton v. City of Chi., Cook Cnty., Ill., 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Azita Shirkhanloo, App. v. Laurie Olsen & Edward Schau, Resp.
Wash. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 555 (1988)). 24 Buckley. 509 U.S. at 273 (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago. 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)). 25 Buckley. 509 U.S. at 274 . 26 Buckley. 509 U.S. at 276-77 . 27 Buckley. 509 U.S. at 275 . -8- NO. 70336-6-1/9 functions."28 Because the statements to the media had no "functional tie to [the] judicial process," qualified, not absolute, immunity was proper.29 In Fletcher, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied only qualified immunity to a prosecutor who allegedly made false statements in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich (2×)
7th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hatchett v. City of Detroit
E.D. Mich. · 2010 · confidence medium
Thus, if a prosecutor plans and executes a raid on a suspected weapons cache, he “has no greater claim to complete immunity than activities of police officers allegedly acting under his direction.” 484 F.2d, at 608-609.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allison v. Utah County Corp.
D. Utah · 2004 · confidence medium
When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is “neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.” Id. at 273 , 113 S.Ct. 2606 (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir.1973)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Van Meter v. Darien Park District (2×)
Ill. · 2003 · confidence medium
App. 3d 685, 689 (1983), citing Hampton v. City of Chicago , 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973); see also Howlett v. Rose , 496 U.S. 356, 376 , 110 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Niebur v. Town of Cicero
N.D. Ill. · 2002 · confidence medium
It could not be asserted against a § 1983 claim, for obvious reasons, see Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973) (Stevens, J.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Swope v. Krischer
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Thus, if a prosecutor plans and executes a raid on a suspected weapons cache, he "has no greater claim to complete immunity than activities of police officers allegedly acting under his direction." 484 F.2d at 608-609.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sims v. Kernan (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Ind. · 1998 · confidence medium
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d at 610 (bare allegations that Mayor of City and Police Superintendent knew of conspiracy by subordinates held insufficient to state a claim under § 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JoAnn Brandon v. Charles B. Laux
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Liability under § 1986 “‘is dependent on proof of actual knowledge by a defendant of the wrongful conduct.’ ” Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 , 674 n. 15, 100 S.Ct. 1398 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (Owen) (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir.1973)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brandon v. Lotter
8th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Liability under § 1986 " 'is dependent on proof of actual knowledge by a defendant of the wrongful conduct.' " Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 , 674 n. 15, 100 S.Ct. 1398 , 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (Owen ) (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir.1973)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gilliam v. Department of Social & Health Services
Wash. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. at 273 (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gilliam v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVS.
Wash. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
But see Babcock v. State, 116 Wash.2d at 608 , 809 P.2d 143 ("[b]ecause of the extraordinary sweep of absolute immunity," our Supreme Court has not extended prosecutorial or judicial immunity to anyone but prosecutors and judges); Waller v. State, 64 Wash.App. 318, 334 , 824 P.2d 1225 (1992) (reversing summary judgment in favor of CPS caseworker and State on claim of negligent investigation brought by father and his children; holding "investigation of child abuse allegations is not [absolutely] immune, with the exception of immunity for actual initiation of dependency proceedings."). [29] Buck…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kalina v. Fletcher (2×)
SCOTUS · 1997 · confidence medium
Thus, if a prosecutor plans and executes a raid on a suspected weapons cache, he `has no greater claim to complete immunity than activities of police officers allegedly acting under his direction.' 484 F. 2d, at 608-609." Id., at 273-274. *127 These cases make it clear that the absolute immunity that protects the prosecutor's role as an advocate is not grounded in any special "esteem for those who perform these functions, and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office, but because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself." Malley, 475 U. S., at 342 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brandon v. Lotter
D. Neb. · 1997 · confidence medium
Moreover, as Mr. Justice Stevens made clear when he was a circuit judge, “Liability under § 1986 ... is dependent on proof of actual knowledge by a defendant of the wrongful conduct....” Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir.1973) (mayor and police commissioner were not liable under section 1986 for the consequences of an alleged conspiracy by police officers to kill two members of the Black Panthers and to punish seven other members for exercising their First Amendment rights because there was no claim that the mayor and police commissioner had actual knowledge of the co…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reese v. May
N.D. Ill. · 1996 · confidence medium
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir.1973), ce rt. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 1414, 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 , 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2615-16 , 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (finding that prosecutor is not absolutely immune from suit when he performs administrative or investigative functions, but only when he acts as an advocate of the state); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 491-93 , 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1941-43 , 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (finding that a prosecutor is entitled to judicial immunity only for actions connected1 *877 to judici…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spiegel v. Rabinowitz
N.D. Ill. · 1996 · confidence medium
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608-9 (7th Cir.1973) rejecting the prosecutors argument "that evidence gathering is so closely related to the presentation of evidence at trial that it should also be clothed with immunity”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. Clabaugh
unknown court · 1994 · confidence medium
The courts have nevertheless required “actual knowledge.” See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Perez v. Cucci, 725 F.Supp. 209, 254 (D.N.J.1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. Clabaugh
unknown court · 1994 · confidence medium
The courts have nevertheless required "actual knowledge." See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Perez v. Cucci, 725 F.Supp. 209, 254 (D.N.J.1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (2×)
SCOTUS · 1993 · confidence medium
Thus, if a prosecutor plans and executes a raid on a suspected weapons cache, he “has no greater claim to complete immunity than activities of police officers allegedly acting under his direction.” 484 F. 2d, at 608-609.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anderson v. Village of Forest Park (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1992 · confidence medium
Hampton, 484 F.2d at 607.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cooney v. Park County (2×)
Wyo. · 1990 · confidence medium
We there cited cases making this distinction: Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir.1973) (planning a raid to obtain evidence of criminal activity not covered by prosecutorial immunity), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 91 (D.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. Cucci
D.N.J. · 1989 · confidence medium
See Buck v. Board of Education, 536 F.2d 522, 524 (2d Cir.1976); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 610 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Rogin, supra, at 696; Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 518 F.Supp. 993, 1007 (S.D.Tex.1981) (quoting Dowsey v. Wilkins, 467 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir.1972)); Riccobino v. Whitpain Twnshp., 497 F.Supp. 1364, 1371 (E.D.Pa.1980); Thompson v. State of New York, 487 F.Supp. 212, 228-29 (N.D.N.Y.1979); Santiago, supra, at 156 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Petry v. Lawler
S.D. Ind. · 1989 · confidence medium
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608-609 (7th Cir.1973) (no absolute immunity for prosecutors involved in planning an illegal police raid).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. Williams
11th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 994-95 (3d Cir.1980); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973) ("A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. Williams
11th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 994-95 (3d Cir.1980); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973) ("A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.") In this regard it is significant that Eleventh Amendment immunity is based in part on respect for the financial integrity of the states. "[A] Sec. 1983 action ... may not include a retroactive award which requires t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griess v. Colorado
10th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
In addition to being unacceptable from a practical standpoint, such a result would violate the principle that “[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law.” Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974), quoted with approval in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 553 , 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griess v. State of Colorado
10th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Sec. 1983 or Sec. 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law." Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974), quoted with approval in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 553 , 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). 20 Accordingly, we hold that the assumption of an indemnification obligation on the part of the state does not confer a derivative constitutional immunity upon its indemnified employees.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Montgomery v. City of Chicago (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Ill. · 1987 · confidence medium
But see U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir.1979) (no abuse of discretion for district court to dismiss pendent party claim, citing Aldinger); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir.1973) (claim based upon diversity could not sustain pendent party jurisdiction); and Marcano v. Northwestern Chrysler-Plymouth Sales, Inc., 550 F.Supp. 595, 604-05 (N.D.Ill.1982) (holding that even where primary claim is a federal question, pendent party jurisdiction is not a recognized basis of jurisdiction in the Seventh Circuit).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Betty J. Archie, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Rena M. Delacy, Deceased v. City of Racine, Ronald W. Chiapete, and George W. Giese
7th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Stores, 749 F.2d 1423 , 1431 (10th Cir.1984), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, 106 S.Ct. 40 , and certiorari denied in part, 474 U.S. 818 , 106 S.Ct. 65 , 88 L.Ed.2d 53 , reaffirmed by 796 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir.1986), certiorari denied, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 275 , 93 L.Ed.2d 251 ; see Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco, 758 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir.1985), certiorari dismissed, 107 S.Ct. 390 , 93 L.Ed.2d 325 ; Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1378 (10th Cir.1980); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609-10 (7th Cir.1973), certiorari denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Josiah Haynesworth and Fred Hancock v. Frank P. Miller, Chief, Law Enforcement Section, Office of the Corporation Counsel, (Two Cases) (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Id. at 430 & n. 31, 96 S.Ct. at 995 & n. 31, 47 L.Ed.2d at 143 & n. 31 (citing Guerro v. Mulheam, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir.1974); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608-609 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir.1965)). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weber v. Dell
2d Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
In any event, immunity from liability under section 1983 is not a question of state law but of federal law. " 'A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.' " Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 284 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 553 , 558 n. 8, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Higgs v. DIST. COURT IN AND FOR DOUGLAS CO.
Colo. · 1986 · confidence medium
Far from establishing a "bright-line rule" bottomed on the filing decision, our functional approach merely considers the temporal relationship of the challenged prosecutorial conduct to the filing decision as one factor in determining whether the conduct is sufficiently identified with the judicial phase of the criminal process as to be classified as advocatory in character and thus absolutely immune. [18] See also Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir.1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1414 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974) ("the State's Attorney's alleged participation in the…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tarkowski v. County of Lake
7th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
We have softened our statement with a "perhaps" in recognition that although several decisions in this circuit, notably Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir.1973), and Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 630 (7th Cir.1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 , 100 S.Ct. 1987 , 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (per curiam), say that this kind of malicious prosecution is actionable under section 1983, their discussion of this question is summary and we have found no case that has actually found liability.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tarkowski v. County of Lake
7th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
We have softened our statement with a “perhaps” in recognition that although several decisions in this circuit, notably Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir.1973), and Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 630 (7th Cir.1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 , 100 S.Ct. 1987 , 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (per curiam), say that this kind of malicious prosecution is actionable under section 1983, their discussion of this question is summary and we have found no case that has actually found liability.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Borek v. Town of McLeansboro
S.D. Ill. · 1985 · confidence medium
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 606 (7th Cir.1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Randall Edward Rex v. John P. Teeples, Donald E. Johnson, Jr., and Edward Rupert, Defendants (2×)
10th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
We there cited cases making this distinction: Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir.1973) (planning a raid to obtain evidence of criminal activity not covered by prosecutorial immunity), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 91 (D.C.Cir.1974) (prosecutorial immunity not available when a civil rights claim "focuses on a prosecutor's actions in the course of directing police investigative activity"); and Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.1974) ("Making an arrest is a police function, not a judicial one ...."…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth M. Brown, Riggie A. Lott and All Other Inmates That Have Been Subject to the Conditions in the Adjustment Unit v. United States of America (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1414 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. City of Chicago
N.D. Ill. · 1984 · confidence medium
See Arnolt, 52 Ill.2d 27 , 282 N.E.2d at 144 ; Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 610-11 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Benedetto v. National Association of Letter Carriers
N.D. Ill. · 1984 · confidence medium
See Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 671 F.2d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir.1982); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Waller v. Butkovich (3×) also: Cited "see"
M.D.N.C. · 1984 · confidence medium
“The immunity doctrine would be of little value if such characterization____could force the prosecutor to stand trial.” Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1974), quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Saxner and Alfred Cain, Jr., Cross-Appellants v. Charles Benson, Cross-Appellees (2×)
7th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
E.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 , 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107 , 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (type of immunity available to a judge depends upon the nature of the act); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 , 94 S.Ct. 1413 , 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974) (nature of prosecutor's immunity depends upon character of conduct).
Iberia Hampton, Administratrix, Etc. Verlina Brewer, Etc., and Deborah Johnson
v.
The City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois and Edward v. Hanrahan, Fannie Mae Clark, Administratrix of the Estate of Mark Clark, Deceased v. The City of Chicago, and Edward v. Hanrahan
72-1277.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Aug 24, 1973.
484 F.2d 602
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published

484 F.2d 602

Iberia HAMPTON, Administratrix, etc. Verlina Brewer, etc.,
and Deborah Johnson et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
The CITY OF CHICAGO, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS and Edward V.
Hanrahan et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Fannie Mae CLARK, Administratrix of the Estate of Mark
Clark, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The CITY OF CHICAGO, and Edward V. Hanrahan et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 72-1277, 72-1300.

United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 6, 1973.
Decided Aug. 24, 1973.

Michael Deutsch, Jeffrey H. Haas, Chicago, Ill., Arthur Kinoy, William J. Bender, Newark, N. J., David Scribner, New York City, Jonathan M. Hyman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Michael J. Goldstein, Charles A. Powell, Asst. State's Attys., Richard L. Curry, Corp. Counsel, Gayle F. Haglund, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before FAIRCHILD, STEVENS and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges.

STEVENS, Circuit Judge.

[*~602]1

Plaintiffs allege that 14 Chicago police officers raided an apartment at 2337 West Monroe Street at 4:15 A.M. on December 4, 1969, for the purpose of killing Mark Clark and Fred Hampton and punishing seven other residents of the apartment because they were black and had exercised their First Amendment rights as members of the Black Panther Party. They also allege that 15 other defendants conspired to imprison and prosecute seven surviving occupants without any legal basis whatsoever. In four separate complaints, containing a total of 49 counts, plaintiffs claim actual and punitive damages under the Federal Civil Rights Act and Illinois law. Accepting the allegations as true, as the law requires, the district court denied motions to dismiss filed by the fourteen participating officers,[1] but entered a final judgment dismissing all claims against the remaining 15 defendants. Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment.[2]

2

The appellees include: (1) The State's Attorney (Hanrahan) and three Assistant State's Attorneys (Jalovec, Sorosky and Meltreger); (2) seven police officers who participated in certain investigations after the raid;[3] (3) the Mayor of Chicago (Daley) and the Superintendent of Police (Conlisk); and (4) the City of Chicago and the County of Cook, municipal corporations. The district court held that the prosecutors were protected by quasi-judicial immunity, that the allegations against the appellee police officers, Mayor Daley and Superintendent Conlisk were insufficient, and that the City and County were not "persons" within the meaning of the federal civil rights statutes and are immune from liability on a respondeat superior theory. In three of the cases jurisdiction stems from the federal questions which are raised; in the fourth, plaintiff Brewer is a citizen of Michigan and therefore diversity jurisdiction is also asserted.

[*~603]3

For the purposes of this appeal we must assume that all of plaintiffs' allegations are true. The test of sufficiency is whether ". . . it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80.[4] Since different issues are raised with respect to different appellees, we consider the relevant allegations separately.

4

In view of the large number of claims asserted, and the fact that the district court order requires all pleadings to be amended, we limit our review, with respect to each appellee, to the question whether any sufficient claim for relief has been alleged. Since reversal as to any appellee on any theory renders the district court's other rulings respecting that appellee subject to revision at any time prior to the conclusion of the entire trial, see Rule 54(b) Fed.R.Civ.P., it would be inappropriate to discuss the sufficiency of claims which may be amended and which need not be passed upon in order to determine this appeal.

[*~604]5

1. Hanrahan and Jalovec. The Hampton complaint alleges that "under color of state search warrant" 14 police officers illegally entered the residence of Fred Hampton and, without provocation, fired over 90 bullets from machine guns, pistols, shotguns and carbines into the general living quarters, critically wounding Fred Hampton, who was otherwise physically abused and ultimately died. In addition, the officers allegedly stole or damaged Hampton's personal property and destroyed evidence of their illegal conduct. These alleged acts were "perpetrated upon Fred Hampton, Chairman of the Illinois Black Panther Party, because of his beliefs, thoughts, words and associations" (p 21) in order "to create fear and terror in the Black Community" (p 23).

6

Hampton's administratrix alleges that Hanrahan and Jalovec, with the 14 officers, planned the raid and agreed to use excessive and deadly force against Hampton and others in his residence. Their alleged purpose was to deprive him of his constitutional rights because of his race and his political beliefs.

[*~605]7

The Clark complaint tersely alleges that the officers shot and killed Mark Clark without any authority of law and thereby denied him due process of law by imposing summary punishment of death upon him. It alleges that defendant Hanrahan, or his Assistant State's Attorney, did "with specific intent, plan and execute the acts as alleged herein" (p 16); further, that these acts were the result of a tacit understanding "to treat the deceased as they did because he was Black."

[*~606]8

The Johnson and Brewer complaints describe the raid in greater detail. They allege that four of the plaintiffs[5] were wounded by gun fire and that all of them were physically and verbally abused and illegally arrested. Again the complaints allege that Hanrahan and Jalovec, as well as the 14 officers, "wilfully, maliciously, and with specific intent planned and executed the acts" recited in the complaints. These complaints also include a number of counts alleging state law claims of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution; these charges also involve defendants Hanrahan and Jalovec but will be discussed in Part 2 of this opinion.

9

As the district court correctly held, the allegations are plainly sufficient to state claims against the participating officers under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985(3). It is equally clear that the allegations respecting the planning and execution of the raid by Hanrahan and Jalovec are sufficient unless their prosecutorial offices gave them immunity.

[*607]10

The district court erroneously relied on the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.[6] Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 or Sec. 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1968). The immunity claim raises a question of federal law.

11

The claim of immunity must not be confused with the defense of good faith. That defense is available to a person who, either because of his position or because of his conduct, is not immune from suit. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed.2d 288. In those situations in which immunity is properly claimed, the action is defeated at the outset. An essential purpose of the doctrine is to give the officer freedom to exercise his discretion and to perform his official duties without fear that his conduct will be called into question at an evidentiary hearing or subject him to personal liability.

12

The source of the immunity is found in common law doctrine recognized in federal judicial decisions. The Supreme Court has squarely held that the broad language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not abolish this protection for legislators "acting in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 379, 71 S.Ct. 783, 789, 95 L.Ed. 1019, or for judges for acts "within their judicial jurisdiction . . . even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. . . ." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288.[7] With respect to legislators and judges, it is clear that the doctrine may not be circumvented by allegations of improper motive; rather, the availability of immunity depends on the character of the conduct under attack.

13

The scope of immunity enjoyed by a state prosecutor has not yet been defined by the Supreme Court. We are nevertheless confident that at least some of his traditional functions must be immune from suit under Sec. 1983. See Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, and cases cited at page 409 (7th Cir. 1972). In view of the overriding importance of federal law, the area of his protection cannot be either limited or expanded by a state's statutory definition of his authority or responsibility; we therefore do not pause to review the respective parties' analyses of the relevant Illinois statute.[8] Nor do we attach any weight in analyzing the immunity question to the numerous ways in which the pleadings characterize the motivation of the prosecutor as wrongful-ranging from "sadistic" or "racial" to the more familiar "malicious" or "discriminatory." The immunity doctrine would be of little value if such characterization of his motive could force the prosecutor to stand trial.

14

Prosecutorial conduct which traditionally has been treated as immune is often described as "quasi-judicial" as opposed to investigatory activities normally performed by laymen, such as police officers. Judge Ely's exposition of the distinction in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) properly focuses on the character of the defendant's conduct, rather than his alleged motivation:

15

"We believe, however, that when a prosecuting attorney acts in some capacity other than his quasi-judicial capacity, then the reason for his immunity-integral relationship between his acts and the judicial process- ceases to exist. If he acts in the role of a policeman, then why should he not be liable, as is the policeman, if, in so acting, he has deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws? See Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. 167, at 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; see also Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, 158 N.W. 182, L.R.A.1916F, 399 (1916), cited in Yaselli [Yaselli v. Goff] 12 F.2d 396 at 405, 2 Cir. To us, it seems neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other." Id. at 536-537.

16

The conduct of Hanrahan and Jalovec in planning the raid may be described in various ways. At one extreme the complaints may be read to charge that they deliberately planned to have the police officers kill Hampton and Clark. Even without the allegation of improper political or racial motivation, it is plain that no immunity would apply under that reading. Regardless of his motives, the prosecutor certainly may not order subordinates to kill or to punish a free citizen without trial. Notwithstanding the tone of these complaints, however, appellants have not urged this extreme reading on the court; we therefore do not so interpret the allegations.

[*~608]17

At the other extreme, defendants Hanrahan and Jalovec argue that they are charged with nothing more than the drafting of a search warrant which the raiding officers executed, an act which should be accepted as a traditional duty of the Attorney for the County. But we are persuaded that the "planning" allegations cannot fairly be read so narrowly. At the very least they charge that Hanrahan and Jalovec planned a raid in order to obtain evidence of criminal activity. Defendants argue that evidence gathering is so closely related to the presentation of evidence at trial that it should also be clothed with immunity. We find this argument unpersuasive. Even though defensible if conducted in good faith with probable cause, the State's Attorney's alleged participation in the planning and execution of a raid of this character has no greater claim to complete immunity than activities of police officers allegedly acting under his direction.

18

The district court erred in holding that the immunity doctrine requires dismissal, without trial, of plaintiffs' charges against defendants Hanrahan and Jalovec.

19

2. Mulchrone, Ervanian, Meade, Kukowinski, Purtell, Koludrovic, Sadunas, Sorosky and Meltreger. The Johnson and Brewer complaints also allege that nine appellees, including seven police officers and two additional Assistant State's Attorneys, joined with Hanrahan and Jalovec and the 14 participating officers in an extensive conspiracy to cause the false arrest and imprisonment of the surviving plaintiffs, the institution of an unfounded prosecution, and the concealment of the truth from the public.

20

Several of the plaintiffs were arrested on December 4, 1969, charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery, and imprisoned until December 21, 1969; their prosecutions were continued until May 8, 1970. They allege that there was no legal basis for the arrests, the charges, or the imprisonment. Quite plainly, if the allegations are true, Sec. 1983 authorizes relief against each person who, acting under color of state law, is responsible for these wrongs. Moreover, the conspiracy which they allege is also actionable under Sec. 1985(3). We are satisfied that the post-raid charges against Hanrahan, Jalovec and the 14 police officers are sufficient under both Sec. 1983 and Sec. 1985(3). The sufficiency of the charges against the other defendants is less clear.

21

The complaints charge that these defendants took certain action designed to conceal the fact that there was no basis for arresting, holding or prosecuting the plaintiffs, and that the continuing concealment aggravated plaintiffs' injuries. Thus, Mulchrone and Ervanian, Supervising Officers of the Internal Inspections Division of the Chicago Police Department, allegedly limited the scope of their investigations in order to prevent information contradiciting the participating officers' version of the raid from coming to light. Defendant Meade prepared a set of questions and answers for the officers that would avoid a fair test of their veracity. Defendants Sorosky and Meltreger helped to edit these questions and answers.[9] Defendants Sadunas and Koludrovic gave false testimony at the coroner's inquest. Sadunas allegedly gave testimony before the grand jury which he knew to be false. Defendants Purtell and Sadunas allegedly filed an incomplete and erroneous firearms report-again to corroborate the official, but false, version of the raid.

22

The complaints allege that as a direct result of the conspiracy, the unfounded prosecution was continued until May 8, 1970, and plaintiffs incurred expenses in preparing their defense. The conspiracy charge is somewhat tenuous since it merely alleges that "some or all" of the defendants participated, and the causal connection between the conduct of several appellees and the alleged injury to plaintiffs is doubtful at best. Nevertheless, serious allegations of conspiracy have been made, and matters such as the extent of injury and causal connection raise questions for the trier of fact. Since we cannot say with certainty that there is no possibility that any set of facts which might be proved in support of the allegations would entitle one or more of the plaintiffs to some relief, it was error for the district court to enter judgment finally disposing of the claims against these defendants.

[*~609]23

If the alleged conspiracy did exist, as we must assume at this stage of the case, and if it did prolong a completely unfounded prosecution, plaintiffs are entitled to relief against each conspirator. The vague allegation that "some or all" of the defendants were participants does not justify requiring them all to stand trial. But if some are in fact liable, it would be unjust to permit a final judgment to exonerate all before trial, or even discovery, has commenced. We therefore conclude that even if the charges against certain of the defendants may have been properly dismissed because the allegations were deficient, it was error to enter final judgment in favor of Mulchrone, Ervanian, Meade, Kukowinski, Purtell, Koludrovic, Sadunas, Sorosky and Meltreger at this stage of the case.

24

3. Daley and Conlisk. In the Johnson and Brewer complaints, plaintiffs claim that Mayor Daley and Superintendent Conlisk are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1986 for the consequences of the alleged conspiracy.[10] The charge, in essence, is that they had the power and authority to prevent a violation of Sec. 1985(3) by the other defendants and failed to do so. Liability under Sec. 1986, however, is dependent on proof of actual knowledge by a defendant of the wrongful conduct of his subordinates. In their brief, plaintiffs summarize the critical charges against Daley and Conlisk by stating that the complaints allege "that due to their positions of authority and responsibility, [they] knew of the conspiracy against the plaintiffs." Brief for Appellants at 43. We agree with the district court that those allegations are insufficient.

25

4. City of Chicago and County of Cook. The several claims against the City and the County under the Civil Rights Act were properly dismissed because these defendants are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L. Ed.2d 596 (1973). That decision makes it clear, however, that the district court had jurisdiction over Brewer's state law claims against the County and presumably the City as well, on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 411 U.S. at 714-722, 93 S.Ct. 1785.

26

Those claims, asserted in Counts 13, 14 and 15 of the Brewer complaint, allege common law torts of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The district court held that these claims against the County are barred by the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 85, Sec. 1-101 et seq. The district court relied primarily on Mills v. County of Winnebago, 104 Ill.App.2d 366, 244 N.E.2d 65 (2d Dist.1969).[11] Subsequent to the decision of the district court, that case was overruled sub silentio by Arnolt v. Highland Park, 52 Ill.2d 27, 282 N.E.2d 144 (1972). See Krieger v. Carpentersville, 8 Ill.App.3d 243, 289 N.E.2d 481, 484 (2d Dist.1972). As we read those cases, it now seems quite clear that the Illinois statute does not immunize municipal corporations from liability if their agents are guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct. The allegations in the Brewer complaint against the City of Chicago and Cook County are therefore sufficient.

27

The district court dismissed parallel state law claims in the Johnson complaint on the same grounds. However, there was no diversity of citizenship in that case, and this court ruled in Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction does not permit joinder of claims against a new party. Therefore, the dismissal of the state law claims in the Johnson complaint should be for want of jurisdiction, and the lower court's order is appropriately modified.

28

Insofar as the district court's order of February 3, 1972, dismissed the charges against the City of Chicago and the County of Cook, it is reversed with respect to the Brewer complaint and affirmed as modified with respect to the Johnson complaint; insofar as it dismissed the charges against Mayor Daley and Superintendent Conlisk, it is affirmed; insofar as it dismissed the charges against defendants Hanrahan, Jalovec, Mulchrone, Ervanian, Meade, Kukowinski, Purtell, Koludrovic, Sadunas, Sorosky and Meltreger, it is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[*~610]29

Reversed and remanded.

1

With respect to the motions to strike and dismiss of defendants James Davis, Daniel Groth, Edward Carmody, John Ciszewski, Ray Broderick, George Jones, John Marusich, Lynwood Harris, Fred Howard, William Corbett, William Kelly, Philip Joseph, Joseph Gorman and Robert Hughes, the district court stated: "These police officers of the City of Chicago were detailed and/or on detached service with the Office of the Cook County State's Attorney as State's Attorney's police or detail. This group of policemen is charged in all four of the consolidated complaints with actual on-thescene participation in the raid on the Monroe Street apartment occupied by Fred A. Hampton, Mark Clark, Verlina Brewer, Deborah Johnson, Ronald Satchel, Harold Bell, Blair Anderson, Brenda Harris and Louis Truelock. Plaintiffs charge illegal and forced entry of the apartment and the unjustifiable use of excessive and deadly force by these officers acting under color of law. In the various complaints these policemen are charged with killing Fred Hampton in the presence of his fiance, Deborah Johnson, with killing Mark Clark, with wounding plaintiffs Satchel, Anderson and Harris, and with physically and verbally abusing and illegally arresting plaintiffs Brewer, Johnson, Satchel, Bell, Anderson, Harris and Truelock. They are also charged with conspiracy and conspiracy in connection with alleged and malicious prosecutions [sic]. These allegations and others are set forth in detail in the various complaints. As to certain of the allegations made in the complaints against these defendants, the court is of the opinion that there are questions of fact and of law that cannot be resolved except upon trial." 339 F.Supp. 695, 700-701 (N.D.Ill.1972)

2

The district court consolidated the four cases. His order of dismissal directed the plaintiffs to file amended complaints against the 14 participating officers and expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay in entering final judgment in favor of the 15 appellees; the order is therefore appealable. The appeals have been consolidated in this court

3

John Mulchrone, Harry Ervanian, John Meade, Robert Kukowinski, David Purtell, Charles Koludrovic and John Sadunas

4

Despite the City's suggestion to the contrary, we must ignore what it describes as "several contradictory facts made a matter of public record" in the state criminal prosecution of defendant Hanrahan; cited at page four of the City's brief as People v. Hanrahan, Circ. Ct. of Cook County No. 71 Cr. 1791. A finding in favor of defendants in that case is clearly no bar to this action since none of these plaintiffs is a party to that judgment

5

Satchel, Anderson, Harris and Brewer

6

Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, Ch. 85, Sec. 1-101 et seq

7

"Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it 'is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.' (Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 349, note, at 350.) It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Id. at 553-554, 87 S.Ct. at 1217-1218

8

See Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 14, Sec. 5

9

The purpose of their review was allegedly to make certain that the officers would not give testimony inconsistent with previous official statements about the incident. The alleged conduct of Assistant State's Attorneys Sorosky and Meltreger clearly exceeded the scope of their quasi-judicial immunity. For, in substance, plaintiffs allege the deliberate preparation of perjured testimony

10

Section 1986 provides:

"Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued."

11

It also cited Fustin v. Board of Education of Community Unit District No. 2, 101 Ill. App.2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308 (5th Dist.1968), and Woodman v. Litchfield Community School District, No. 12, 102 Ill.App.2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780 (5th Dist.1968)