Chinese For Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Chinese For Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“he record before us sheds no light on the problem, and the city's own statement of mootness cannot support an affirmance on that ground.”
53 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S (ca9, 2018-06-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S
9th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he record before us sheds no light on the problem, and the city's own statement of mootness cannot support an affirmance on that ground.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Logan Taijeron and G.D., a minor by and through his parent v. Judith T. Won Pat, Ed.D., in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Guam Department of Education
D. Guam · 2026 · confidence medium
California, 593 U.S. at 672 ; 22 U.S.C. § 2201 (a). 1 basis for the requested relief “could not be reasonably be expected to recur.” [Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2 1998)] (quoting Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brito v. Hendrix (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D. Or. · 2023 · confidence medium
Thus, “‘a claim for injunctive relief becomes moot once subsequent events have made clear the conduct alleged as the basis for the requested relief ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Id. (citing Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dolores Huerta Foundation v. Panama-Buena Vista Union School District
E.D. Cal. · 2022 · confidence medium
“The basic question in determining mootness is 27 whether there is a present controversy as to which effective relief can be granted,” Northwest 28 Environmental Defense Center v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988), and claims for 1 injunctive relief become moot when the challenged activity ceases if “subsequent events have 2 made it clear that the alleged violations could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Chinese for 3 Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978). 4 “When a case becomes moot, federal courts lose jurisdiction.” S. Cal. All. of P…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stroeder v. Service Employees International Union, Local 503, Oregon Public Employees Union
D. Or. · 2019 · confidence medium
Similarly, “[c]laims for injunctive relief become moot when the challenged activity ceases if subsequent events have made it clear that the alleged violations could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Ruiz, 160 F.3d at 549 (quotation omitted); Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tayler Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.
9th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Thus, a claim for in-junctive relief becomes moot once subsequent events have made clear the conduct alleged as the basis for the requested relief “could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Ruiz, 160 F.3d at 549 (quoting Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Montana Chamber Of Commerce v. Ed Argenbright
9th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Although we have previously held that challenges to election procedures should be made before the election occurs, see Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee, 849 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1988) (post-election challenge came too late); Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1978) (parties must bring complaints forward for preelection adjudication), we have not expressly considered whether it is error for a court to refuse to resolve such challenges on the footing that a pre-election challenge is premature.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright
9th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Although we have previously held that challenges to election procedures should be made before the election occurs, see Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee, 849 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (9th Cir.1988) (post-election challenge came too late); Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1978) (parties must bring complaints forward for preelection adjudication), we have not expressly considered whether it is error for a court to refuse to resolve such challenges on the footing that a pre-election challenge is premature.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8215, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,452 Esperanza Ruiz Joseph Talaugon Iltra Garcia Francisco Delgado v. City of Santa Maria City Council of Santa Maria Bob Orach Janet R. Kalland, City Council Members, City Clerk All Sued in Their Official Capacities Roger Bunch Toru Miyoshi Joseph Centeno Abel Maldonado (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Claims for injunctive relief become moot when the challenged activity ceases if "subsequent events have made it clear that the alleged violations could not reasonably be expected to recur." Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978). 19 The district court recognized that the effective relief Plaintiffs sought was a district election system but stated that the real reason for bringing the lawsuit was to elect Hispanic-preferred candidates.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Claims for injunctive relief become moot when the challenged activity ceases if “subsequent events have made it clear that the alleged violations could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Wildlife Federation, Idaho Wildlife Federation, and the Nez Perce Tribe, Intervenor-Petitioner v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
In contrast, in Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978), we denied fees to voting rights plaintiffs, although they won reversal of an order dismissing their complaint without prejudice and a ruling that good faith was no defense to their action, because "[n]o issue on the merits ha[d] been finally determined” and hence they were not prevailing parties.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Soules v. Kauaians For Nukolii Campaign Committee
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Therefore, in order to create an appropriate incentive for parties to bring challenges to state election procedures when the defects are most easily cured, we have held that "[t]he law imposes a duty on parties having grievances based on discriminatory practices to bring their complaints forward for preelection adjudication." Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Therefore, in order to create an appropriate incentive for parties to bring challenges to state election procedures when the defects are most easily cured, we have held that “[t]he law imposes a duty on parties having grievances based on discriminatory practices to bring their complaints forward for preelection adjudication.” Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jose J. Olagues, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Joseph P. Russoniello, Individually and in His Capacity as United States Attorney for the Northern District of California, Jose J. Olagues, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated Hispanic Coalition for Human Rights, Chinese for Affirmative Action, and San Francisco Latino Voter Registration Education Project v. Joseph P. Russoniello, Individually and in His Capacity as United States Attorney for the Northern District of California O'malley, William A., Individually and in His Capacity as District Attorney for Santa Clara County Underwood, Lon, Individually and in His Capacity as Registrar of Voters for Contra Costa County Smith, Arlo, Individually and in His Capacity as District Attorney for San Francisco County
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief therefore become moot when the challenged activity ceases if subsequent events show that the activity "could not reasonably be expected to recur," Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979), unless there is a possibility of "continuing, present adverse effects," O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496 , 94 S.Ct. at 676 ; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 , 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1664 , 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (six-month moratorium does not make case…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Olagues v. Russoniello
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief therefore become moot when the challenged activity ceases if subsequent events show that the activity “could not reasonably be expected to recur,” Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979), unless there is a possibility of “continuing, present adverse effects,” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496 , 94 S.Ct. at 676 ; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 , 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1664 , 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (six-month moratorium does not…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Jose J. Olagues, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Joseph P. Russoniello, Individually and in His Capacity as United States Attorney for the Northern District of California, Jose J. Olagues, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated Hispanic Coalition for Human Rights, Chinese for Affirmative Action, and San Francisco Lation Voter Registration Education Project v. Joseph P. Russoniello, Individually and in His Capacity as United States Attorney for the Northern Ca O'malley, William A., Individually and in His Capacity as District Attorney for Contra Costa County Underwood, Lon, Individually and in His Capacity as Registrar of Voters for Contra Costa County Smith, Arlo, Individually and in His Capacity as District Attorney for San Francisco County (4×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Claims for equitable relief therefore become moot when the challenged activity ceases if subsequent events show that the activities "could not reasonably be expected to recur," Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979), unless there is a possibility of "continuing, present adverse effects." O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496 , 94 S.Ct. 676 . 7 There is a heavy burden, however, on the defendant to show that there is no reasonable expectation of repetition.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Olagues v. Russoniello (3×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Claims for equitable relief therefore become moot when the challenged activity ceases if subsequent events show that the activities “could not reasonably be expected to recur,” Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979), unless there is a possibility of “continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496 , 94 S.Ct. 676 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Solomon v. Emanuelson
D. Conn. · 1984 · confidence medium
Chinese For Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hanrahan v. Hampton (2×)
SCOTUS · 1980 · confidence medium
See Bly v. McLeod, 605 F. 2d 134, 137 (CA4 1979) (Voting Rights Act); Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F. 2d 1006, 1009 (CA9 1978) (same); Grubbs v. Butz, 179 U. S. App. D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Welfare Commission
N.D. Cal. · 1979 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf., e. g., Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978) (although dispute over city’s past compliance with Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975 was moot, current compliance is or may be a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hart v. King
D. Haw. · 1979 · confidence medium
Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Toney and stating that “[t]he law imposes a duty on parties having grievances based on discriminatory practices to bring their complaints forward for preelection adjudication”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979).
cited Cited "see" Bonnie Mantolete v. William G. Bolger, in His Capacity as Postmaster General, United States Postal Service
9th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See 580 F.2d at 1008 .
discussed Cited "see" Weldon Wiggins v. Ruth Rushen, Director of the California Department of Corrections, Main Classification Committee at Soledad (2×)
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Lequennec, 580 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979).
discussed Cited "see" Harmon v. San Diego County
9th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979) (plaintiff entitled to fees for appeal where an issue is finally determined on the merits in its favor).
discussed Cited "see" 35 Fair empl.prac.cas. 606, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,497 Stephen Harmon v. San Diego County (A Public Corporation) David K. Speer, Chief Administrative Officer of San Diego County William D. Winterbourne, Director of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel for San Diego County Joseph Stables, David G. Martinez, Veryl J. Mortenson, King O. Taylor, Timothy M. Considine, Members, San Diego County Civil Service Commission
9th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 , 99 S.Ct. 1047 , 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979) (plaintiff entitled to fees for appeal where an issue is finally determined on the merits in its favor). * The Honorable Gus J.
discussed Cited "see" Hendon v. North Carolina State Board Of Elections (2×)
unknown court · 1983 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006 , 1008 (9th Cir.1978); Hart v. King, 470 F.Supp. 1195, 1197-98 (D.Hawaii 1979).
discussed Cited "see" Hendon v. North Carolina State Board of Elections (2×)
unknown court · 1983 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006 , 1008 (9th Cir.1978); Hart v. King, 470 F.Supp. 1195, 1197-98 (D.Hawaii 1979).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Chinese for Affirmative Action, San Francisco Council, League of United Latin American Citizens, Lue She Tom, Tak Lan Chan Huey, Rose Yuen, Nilsa M. Matos and of Themselves and Those Similarly Situated
v.
Lawrence J. Leguennec, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Registrar of Voters
76-1517.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 25, 1978.
580 F.2d 1006
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

580 F.2d 1006

CHINESE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, San Francisco Council,
League of United Latin American Citizens, Lue She Tom, Tak
Lan Chan Huey, Rose Yuen, Nilsa M. Matos and of themselves
and those similarly situated, Appellants,
v.
Lawrence J. LEGUENNEC, Individually and in his official
capacity as Registrar of Voters, et al., Appellees.

No. 76-1517.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Aug. 25, 1978.

Peter B. Sandman (argued), of Legal Aid Society, San Francisco, Cal., for appellants.

Judith L. Teichman, Deputy City Atty. (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Before GOODWIN and HUG, Circuit Judges, and PALMIERI[*], District Judge.

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:

[*~1006]1

Chinese and Spanish American minority plaintiffs appeal the dismissal without prejudice of their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of their rights under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 Et seq.

2

The complaint alleged that the City of San Francisco failed to meet the requirements of the Act in city elections in November and December of 1975. Plaintiffs assert: (1) no action had been taken to provide voter registration materials and voter affidavits in any language other than English; (2) no multilingual ballots or voting machines were provided; (3) an unequal burden was placed on language-minority voters who desired election information.

The Act, in pertinent part, provides:

3

"Prior to August 6, 1985, no State or political subdivision shall provide registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots, only in the English language if the Director of the Census determines (i) that more than 5 percent of the citizens of voting age of such State or political subdivision are members of a single language minority and (ii) that the illiteracy rate of such persons as a group is higher than the national illiteracy rate. * * * " 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b).

4

On September 3, 1975, the Director of the Census designated San Francisco as a political subdivision covered by § 1973aa-1a(b). On October 21, 1975, appellants filed their complaint.

[*~1007]5

The district court dismissed the action from the bench "as premature", adding that there was "no indication that the defendants are acting other than in good faith". The dismissal was based on the court's belief that the city was entitled to reasonable time to meet the requirements of the newly-enacted amendments.

6

The determination, in early September, that the city was subject to § 1973aa-1a(b) left the city only a few days in which to make the contracts and accomplish the changes necessary to modify its election procedures to comply with the Act before the November elections. However, shortage of time will not necessarily shield election officials from the diligent assertion of rights under the Act. It is Congress's intention to eradicate voting discrimination with all possible speed. Briscoe v. Bell,432 U.S. 404, 410, 97 S.Ct. 2428, 53 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977). The law imposes a duty on parties having grievances based on discriminatory practices to bring their complaints forward for preelection adjudication. Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 1973). Therefore, the complaint was not "premature", even though it may have been highly inconvenient. The city could have been protected by the conditions of any injunction from unreasonable or impossible burdens.

[*~1008]7

The city describes the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of good faith as "eminently reasonable". While good faith has an abstract element of equity about it, and may be a defense under some circumstances to an action brought under civil rights acts for Damages, it is not a bar to an action for injunctive and declaratory relief. Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973). Moreover, the good-faith defense is available only to the extent that the common law action based on the parallel tort so provides. Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973). Because a federal claim based on a denial of voting rights has no deep common law roots, there is no well-defined common law defense of good faith to such a claim. Since good faith is not a defense to the violations alleged in this case, dismissal of the complaint on the ground of good faith was error.

[*1009]8

The city now asserts that actions taken since 1975 in regard to election procedures have rendered the case moot or "about to become moot". This action might indeed be considered moot if subsequent events have made it clear that the alleged violations could not reasonably be expected to recur. But the record before us sheds no light on the problem, and the city's own statement of mootness cannot support an affirmance on that ground. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Association, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968). The dispute over the elections of November and December 1975 is now moot, but the sufficiency of the city's current compliance with the Act is, or may be, a live, justiciable controversy "capable of repetition, yet evading review". Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC,219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911), Quoted in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). Only a trial court can answer the relevant questions.

9

Finally, both parties seek attorneys' fees. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1973L (e) permits this court, in its discretion, to allow attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party" in "any action to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment".

10

No issue on the merits has been finally determined in favor of any party. Any award of attorneys' fees can await the outcome of the action in the district court. When the prevailing party has been determined, the district court may consider in any award of attorneys' fees the effort expended in the appeal by the attorneys for the party that ultimately prevails.

11

Vacated and remanded.

*

The Honorable Edmund L. Palmieri, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation