United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982).

Copy Cite United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982).

green Positive treatment published 8.1 score

Quick Summary

45 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.

Strongest positive: United States v. Presgraves, 658 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Va. 2009)

Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of

1982 2004 2026

How cited ↗

Cited for

At page 186Determining the scope of RICO's ambit for union conduct6 citing caseson rehearing, reversing position on this issue taken in United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.1981), and holding that “The proper question should have been whether the affairs of the [enterprise] were conducted through the pattern of racketeering activity, not whether they were benefitted…1 citing court put it this way · 5 listed here

United States v. Presgraves, 658 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Va. 2009).published
Id. at 439 (citing United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185, 186 (4th *776 Cir.1982)).
De Wit v. Firstar Corp., 879 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Iowa 1995).published
Ass’n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185, 186-87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 , 102 S.Ct. 1991 , 72 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982); United States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512, 516 (7th C…
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990).published 2 cites
United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185, 186-87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 , 102 S.Ct. 1991 , 72 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982).
United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).published
(on rehearing, reversing position on this issue taken in United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.1981), and holding that “The proper question should have been whether the affairs of the [enterprise] were conducte…)
United States v. G. Cecil Hartley, Travis Dell & Treasure Isle, Inc., 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982).published
United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185, at 186 (4th Cir. 1982).

At page 187Affirming convictions for narcotics distribution conduct1 citing caseted or advanced or whether profit to the 1508 Club resulted. “Conducted”, it is true, signifies repeated, even patterned carrying on of affairs. It may be…opening of page *187 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)

United States v. Rex C. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983).published
See Hartley, 678 F.2d at 990-91 ; Welch, 656 F.2d at 1062 ; cf. United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir.) (modifying earlier opinion holding that enterprise’s affairs must be benefitted), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 , 102 S.Ct.…

Other citing cases8 with no pin cite or quoted language on record

O'Rear v. Am. Fam. Life Assurance Co., 139 F.R.D. 418 (M.D. Fla. 1991).published
Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1460 (M.D. Fla. 1991).published
United States v. Larry D. Swan, A/K/A William Anderson, United States of Am. v. Barbara L. Swan, A/K/A Mary Anderson, 940 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1991).unpublished
United States v. Ancel James Holland, 925 F.2d 1458 (4th Cir. 1991).unpublished
United States v. Norman Henson, 887 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1989).unpublished
State v. Valenzuela, 536 A.2d 1252 (N.H. 1987).published
United States v. Shipp, 578 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).published
United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002).published

Treatment classes

Mentioned in passing 30

Cited as authority (rule) 7

Cited "see" 7

Cited "see, e.g." 1

Treatment by court

ca4	0R/0Y/3G	9
ca11	0R/0Y/1G	7
ca3	0R/0Y/0G	4
ca1	0R/0Y/1G	2
ca2	0R/0Y/0G	2
cadc	0R/0Y/2G	2
flmd	0R/0Y/2G	2
mdd	0R/0Y/0G	2
njd	0R/0Y/0G	2
nysd	0R/0Y/2G	2
tnmd	0R/0Y/0G	2
ca5	0R/0Y/1G	1

Frequently cited alongside

#1	green	United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) The term enterprise under RICO includes both legitimate and illegitimate organizations and encompasses any group of persons associated together for a common purpose. A defendant was convicted of conspiracy to participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The Court of Appeals held that the term 'enterprise' applied only to legitimate organizations. The Supreme Court addresses whether the statutory definition of 'enterprise' encompasses exclusively criminal organizations. Applying the plain meaning of the statute, the Court determines that the definition includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact, regardless of whether the entity is legitimate or illegitimate. The Court concludes that RICO applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.	co-cited 10×
#2	green	United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981) RICO requires proof that racketeering activity advances the affairs of an enterprise rather than merely maintaining a connection or substantial nexus with the enterprise. Defendants were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for allegedly conducting the affairs of a legitimate bar through a pattern of illegal drug activity. The court must determine whether the statute requires the racketeering activity to benefit the enterprise or if a mere connection suffices. The court applies the statutory text, holding that the word “through” requires the racketeering activity to advance the enterprise's affairs. Because the evidence showed the bar merely facilitated the drug trade without deriving benefit from it, the court reverses the RICO convictions.	co-cited 8×
#3	green	United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981) The requirement of five persons for a conspiracy charge does not necessitate that all participants act in concert at the same time. In a complex drug trial, the court substituted an alternate juror after deliberations began due to a regular juror's heart attack. Defendants argued this violated the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c). The court held the substitution did not violate the Constitution or constitute reversible error. The trial court employed extensive safeguards, including sequestering the alternate, individually questioning remaining jurors to ensure they could start anew, and instructing the jury to disregard prior deliberations. Because these precautions negated the danger of prejudice and the alternate fully participated in subsequent deliberations, the convictions were affirmed.	co-cited 8×
#4	green	Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1931) To determine if a single act violates two distinct statutory provisions, the court must decide whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. A defendant was charged with multiple counts under the Harrison Narcotic Act for selling morphine. Some counts involved separate sales at different times, while others involved a single sale that violated two distinct statutory provisions: one requiring the drug be in an original stamped package and another requiring a written order from the purchaser. The court must determine if these violations constitute separate offenses. When the same act or transaction violates two distinct statutory provisions, the test to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Because each provision required proof of a different element, the court held that two distinct offenses were committed.	co-cited 7×
#7	red	Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980) Legislative history serves as crucial material for interpreting the purpose of a statute when the statutory language is ambiguous (interpreting § 924(e)). A defendant is convicted of a federal felony involving the use or carrying of a firearm, where the underlying felony statute contains its own enhancement provision for the use of a dangerous weapon. The court must determine if the defendant can also be sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Applying principles of statutory construction, the court holds that prosecution and enhanced sentencing under § 924(c) is not permissible when the predicate felony statute contains its own enhancement provision. Because a more specific statute takes precedence over a more general one, the specific enhancement in the predicate felony statute applies, and § 924(c) does not apply.	co-cited 6×

Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…

United States
v.
Walter R. WEBSTER, a/k/a Gangster, a/k/a Mr. G, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Walter R. WEBSTER, a/k/a Gangster, a/k/a Mr. G, a/k/a G, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Richard ADAMS, a/k/a Mr. Richard, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Norma THOMPSON, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Boysie ASH, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Victoria WILLS, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. John V. CHRISTIAN, a/k/a Wolf, Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. Herbert Leon JOHNSON, a/k/a Herb

Nos. 79-5204 and 79-5240 to 79-5246.

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

Jan 14, 1982.

Published opinion

669 F.2d 185

1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 22612

Google Scholar ↗ | CourtListener ↗

Henry Jay Myerberg, Baltimore, Md. (Harold I. Glaser, Lawrence A. Arch, George L. Russell, Jr., Kenneth L. Thompson, Howard L. Cardin, Benjamin Lipsitz, Baltimore, Md., Mark Lee Phillips, Stanley H. Miller, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellants., David B. Smith (Russell T. Baker, Jr., U. S. Atty., Glenn L. Cook, D. Christopher Ohly, Asst. U. S. Attys., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.

Murnaghan.

Cited by 20 opinions | Published

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:

Our earlier decision, in United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981) has been set down for rehearing by the panel. The rehearing has concentrated on the interpretation we had made of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (part of the RICO statute).

The desire for variety should be indulged with caution and restraint when explaining the meaning and reach of a'statute. It would have been far preferable had the earlier panel opinion adhered strictly to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) which makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with an enterprise “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises’ affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Unfortunately, we introduced “promoted”, “improved”, “advanced” and “benefitted”, as practical synonyms for “conducted”, influenced, no doubt, by the consideration that the enterprise, the 1508 Club Tavern and Liquor store, was organized for profit.

We simply overlooked that even businesses out to make money may conduct their affairs for other purposes. The problem in the approach we took immediately surfaces in cases where the enterprise is governmental in nature, and almost universally not organized for profit. See United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981).

The proper question should have been whether the affairs of the 1508 Club were conducted through the pattern of racketeering activity, not whether they were benefit-[*187]ted or advanced or whether profit to the 1508 Club resulted. “Conducted”, it is true, signifies repeated, even patterned carrying on of affairs. It may be doubted that an isolated incident amounts to “conduct”. Having made that observation, we are nevertheless satisfied that the answer to the “conduct” question must here be given in the affirmative. We have reviewed the record again, and are satisfied that we correctly stated its contents when we said:

Evidence introduced at the trial tended to show that, by means of the telephone company’s call-forwarding service, telephone calls to Webster’s and Thompson’s home telephone (which was tapped by court order) were frequently forwarded to the telephone at the 1508 Club; that Club facilities and personnel were used to accept and relay narcotics related messages; and that, on at least one occasion, a Club employee was asked by Webster to provide Club-owned drinks to one of Webster’s narcotics customers who was waiting for drugs to be brought so that a transaction could take place.

United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 183 (4th Cir. 1981).

The evidence which the government has offered as sustaining the convictions under subsection (c) indicates that the facilities of the 1508 Club were regularly made available to, and put in the service of, the defendants’ drug dealing business.

Id. 184.

Even if the single provision of refreshment did not constitute “conduct”, the regular and repeated acceptance and relay of messages did. Accordingly, the convictions of Webster and Thompson under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) are affirmed, and the earlier opinion, published at 639 F.2d 174 is modified to that extent. In all other respects the earlier opinion remains undisturbed.

Your account

Appearance

Create a free account

You’re in.