Ass'n Of Orange Cnty. Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
Ass'n Of Orange Cnty. Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dorr v. Weber (iand, 2010-05-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dorr v. Weber
N.D. Iowa · 2010 · confidence medium
See Gross v. Norton, 120 F.3d 877, 878 (8th Cir.1997) (holding plaintiff had no property interest in gun permit “because local authorities have broad discretion [under Minnesota law] to withhold a permit to carry a pistol”); see also Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122-23 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that an individual has no property right to gun permit when local authorities have discretion to deny such a permit); Guillory v. Orange County, 731 F.2d 1379, 1382-1383 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that a licensed private investigator does not have a property interest in receiving a concealed weapon per…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lee v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 ; Bloch v. Powell 348 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C.Cir. 2003); Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joon S. Lee, M.D. v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission and Rod Bordelon
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Cir. 2003); Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joon S. Lee, M.D. v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission and Rod Bordelon
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Cir. 2003); Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates , 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Greene v. Babbitt
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
In Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 , 104 S.Ct. 1909 , 80 L.Ed.2d 458 (1984), the Ninth Circuit elaborated on Roth by noting that “[a] reasonable expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms.” (Emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6595, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,299 Margaret Greene, in Her Capacity as Chairman of the Samish Indian Tribe of Washington Samish Indian Tribe, of Washington v. Bruce E. Babbitt, in His Capacity as Secretary of the Interior
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
In Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 , 104 S.Ct. 1909 , 80 L.Ed.2d 458 (1984), the Ninth Circuit elaborated on Roth by noting that "[a] reasonable expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms." (Emphasis added). 26 In the years since Goldberg, the Supreme Court has found protectable property interests in things as disparate as welfare benefits, disability benefits, utility service, high school education, government em…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jay E. Wallace v. City and County of San Francisco
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
"A reasonable expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms." Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. Lamb
D. Nev. · 1995 · confidence medium
Where a plaintiff looks to state law to provide a basis for a property interest, “[a] reasonable expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms.” Wedges/Ledges, 24 F.3d at 62 (citing Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 , 104 S.Ct. 1909 , 80 L.Ed.2d 458 (1984)). “[A] statute will create an entitlement to a governmental benefit either if the statute sets out conditions under which the benefit must be granted o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jack Allen v. City of Beverly Hills (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
If “the decision to confer a benefit is unconstrained by ‘particularized standards or criteria,’ no entitlement exists.” Fidelity Financial Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir.1986) (.Fidelity), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064 , 107 S.Ct. 949 , 93 L.Ed.2d 998 (1987), quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 , 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747 , 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983); see also Loehr v. Ventura County Community College District, 743 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir.1984); Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.1983) (Orange County Deputy S…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kraft v. Jacka
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
"A reasonable expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms." Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied sub nom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kraft v. Jacka
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
“A reasonable expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms.” Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied sub nom.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Reed v. Iranon
D. Haw. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
In Allen , the court held that because of the broad discretion vested in the city to lay off the plaintiff “in the interests of the economy,” the plaintiff has no constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. 911 F.2d at 371 ; see also, Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733 , 734 (9th Cir.1983) (concluding that requirement of good cause prior to the denial of a former deputy sheriffs weapons certificate “does not create a constitutionally protected property interest, because it is not a significant substantive restriction on the basis for [the] agency’s…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs, George Byrd, Robert Singer, Cliff Miller, and John White
v.
Brad Gates, Sheriff-Coroner, County of Orange, and County of Orange
82-5686.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Sep 23, 1983.
716 F.2d 733
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

716 F.2d 733

ASSOCIATION OF ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS, George Byrd,
Robert Singer, Cliff Miller, and John White,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
Brad GATES, Sheriff-Coroner, County of Orange, and County of
Orange, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 82-5686.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 3, 1983.
Decided Sept. 23, 1983.

Edward N. Duran, Santa Ana, Cal., for defendants/appellees.

Gregory G. Petersen, Santa Ana, Cal., for plaintiffs/appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before CHAMBERS, KENNEDY and HUG, Circuit Judges.

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge:

[*~733]1

Appellants Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs Robert Singer and Cliff Miller appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment to appellees holding Cal.Penal Code Secs. 12031(b)(1) and 12027 do not grant entitlements sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[1] The district court also rejected appellants' claim that their liberty interests were implicated and injured by appellees' action. We affirm.

2

Appellants, former deputy sheriffs retired under medical disability, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 alleging they had been denied certificates allowing them, after retirement, to carry concealed and loaded weapons.[2] Appellants argue Cal.Penal Code Secs. 12031(b)(1) and 12027,[3] which provide for the certificates, create an entitlement sufficient to warrant constitutional protection.[4]

3

"A property interest in a benefit protected by the due process clause results from a legitimate claim of entitlement created and defined by an independent source, such as state or federal law." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). This interest does not arise "whenever a person has only 'an abstract need or desire for' or 'unilateral expectation of,' a benefit." Erdelyi v. O'Brien, 680 F.2d 61, 63 (9th Cir.1982) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709). A reasonable expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of the statute and the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms. See Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 1348, 64 L.Ed.2d 247 (1980).

4

The only restrictions imposed by Sec. 12027(a) and Sec. 12031(b)(1) are 1) the agency from which the officer retires issues a certificate indicating whether or not the officer may carry a concealed weapon[5] and 2) the privilege of carrying a loaded concealed weapon may be denied or revoked for "good cause".[6] This court finds, as did the court below, that the requirement of "good cause" prior to the denial of a weapons certificate does not create a constitutionally protected interest, because it is not a "significant substantive restriction on the basis for [the] agency's action." Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.1980). See also Erdelyi v. O'Brien, supra, (private investigator did not have property interest in concealed weapons permit under Cal.Penal Code Sec. 12050).

5

Similarly, the court rejects appellants' argument that the denial of the exemption causes a loss of liberty without due process of law in that their reputations were damaged and alternative sources of employment were foreclosed. "Unpublicized accusations do not infringe constitutional liberty interests because, by definition, they cannot harm 'good name, reputation, honor or integrity.' (Citations omitted) ... When reasons are not given, inferences drawn from [denial of the exemption] alone are simply insufficient to implicate liberty interests." Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir.1981). Further, alternative sources of employment would not be foreclosed for failure to issue a certificate authorizing the carrying of a loaded concealed weapon as appellants can apply for such a permit under Cal.Penal Code Sec. 12050 notwithstanding their success under the statutes at issue here.

6

Finally, appellants have moved to strike pages three and four of appellees' opening brief. That motion is granted as appellees' allegations are insufficiently set forth.[7]

[*~734]7

AFFIRMED.

1

Plaintiff Byrd and White were dismissed by the trial court as their claims did not present a case or controversy within Article III. The propriety of their dismissal was not contested on appeal

2

This court, as did the district court, assumes appellants are equal in status to those honorably discharged

3

Cal.Penal Code Sec. 12031 provides in relevant part:

12031. Carrying of loaded firearm; misdemeanor, exceptions (a) [Carrying a loaded firearm in a public place is a misdemeanor]

(b) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to any of the following:

(1) Peace officers listed in Section 830.1 or 830.2, whether active or honorably retired ...

The agency from which a peace officer is honorably retired may, upon initial retirement of the peace officer, or at any time subsequent thereto, deny or revoke, for good cause, the retired officer's privilege to carry a weapon as provided in this paragraph. A retired peace officer shall petition the issuing agency for renewal of his or her privilege to carry a loaded firearm in public every five years. Any peace officer who has been honorably retired shall be issued an identification certificate containing an endorsement by the issuing agency and indicating whether or not the retired peace officer has the privilege to carry a weapon pursuant to this paragraph and the date when the endorsement is to be reviewed again.

Section 12027 provides in relevant part:

12027. Persons exempt

Section 12025 [carrying a concealed weapon is a misdemeanor or felony] does not apply to or affect any of the following:

(a) Peace officers.

Peace officers listed in section 830.0 or 830.2 whether active or honorably retired ...

The agency from which a peace officer is honorably retired may, upon initial retirement of the peace officer, or at any time subsequent thereto, deny or revoke, for good cause, the retired officer's privilege to carry a weapon as provided in this subdivision.

4

The right of a retired deputy sheriff to carry concealed weapons is not so fundamental as to warrant constitutional protection apart from its status under state law. See Erdelyi v. O'Brien, 680 F.2d 61 (9th Cir.1982)

5

Appellants have received their certificates; their objection is the certificates expressly do not authorize the carrying of a concealed weapon

6

Appellants were denied the privilege as contrasted to it being revoked. The court does not express an opinion with respect to the latter situation

7

Appellants have also requested this court to remand the case so they can amend their complaint to allege additional facts. Because this decision is based on legal as opposed to factual issues, the request is denied