Interco Sys., Inc. v. Omni Corp. Servs., 733 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1984). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Interco Sys., Inc. v. Omni Corp. Servs., 733 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1984).
Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitPublished opinionNo. 1056, Dockets 84-7008, 84-7012Apr 30, 1984

Interco Sys., Inc. v. Omni Corp. Servs., 733 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1984)

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26 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
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Cited for
At page 255Distinguishing prior rulings on counsel disqualification6 citing casesformer general counsel should not assert claims against the company which are based in significant part on events occurring while it represented the company1 citing court put it this way · 5 listed here
  • Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 522 A.2d 812 (Conn. 1987).published
    See, e.g., Kahle v. Oppenheimer & Co., 748 F.2d 337, 338-39 (6th Cir. 1984); Gibbs v. Paluk, 742 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1984); Interco Systems, Inc. v. Omni Corporate Services, Inc., 733 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Armstrong v. McAlpin,…
  • Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller ex rel. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985).published 2 cites
    Compare Gibbs v. Paluk, 742 F. 2d 181, 184 (CA5 1984) (rejecting appeal pursuant to § 1291 in reliance on Flanagan ), and Kahle v. Oppenheimer & Co., 748 F. 2d 337 (CA6 1984) (rejecting appeal of order disqualifying counsel who was needed…
  • Koller ex rel. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 737 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    We conclude, with the Second Circuit, see Interco Systems, Inc. v. Omni Corporate Services, 733 F.2d 253 at 255 (2d Cir.1984), that Flanagan does not bar the immediate appeal of disqualification orders in civil cases. 38 In civil cases the…
  • Patt Gibbs v. Bruno Paluk, 742 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    Interco Systems, Inc. v. Omni Corporate Services, Inc., 733 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir.1984). . 625 F.2d 433, 437-41 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 , 101 S.Ct. 911 , 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981) (holding grants of dis…
  • Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Blinder, Robinson & Co. (In re Blinder, Robinson & Co.), 123 B.R. 900 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).published
    (former general counsel should not assert claims against the company which are based in significant part on events occurring while it represented the company)
Other citing cases3 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
INTERCO SYSTEMS, INC.
v.
OMNI CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., Sanford Wasserman, Paul Solomon, Jay Joseph, Eugene Linsky, Robert Carpenter
No. 1056, Dockets 84-7008, 84-7012.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Apr 30, 1984.
Published opinion
733 F.2d 253
1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22988
Warren B. Rosenbaum, Rochester, N.Y. (Shapiro, Rosenbaum & Liebschutz, Rochester, N.Y., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant., Gordon J. Lipson, Rochester, N.Y. (Gold-stein, Goldman, Kessler & Underberg, Rochester, N.Y., of counsel), for defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff moved in the district court to disqualify defendants’ attorneys of record, Goldstein, Goldman, Kessler & Underberg (Goldstein firm) and their co-counsel in fact, although not of record, Kohrman, Jackson & Weiss Co., L.P.A. (Kohrman firm). Judge Telesca below, after careful consideration of the circumstances presented by extensive documentary submissions, granted the motion with respect to the Kohrman firm, which had previously been general counsel to plaintiff, but denied it with respect to the Goldstein firm, which had no connection with plaintiff before the lawsuit. On these cross-appeals, we write primarily to resolve an issue of appealability-

The immediate appealability of pretrial disqualification orders has been the subject of careful consideration by this court in the past. In Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437-41 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S.Ct. 911, 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981), Chief Judge Feinberg thoroughly reviewed our prior decisions and concluded that in a civil case an order denying disqualification was not immediately appealable, but that an order granting disqualification would be appealable.

In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981), the Supreme Court confirmed that denial of a disqualification motion in a civil case is not immediately appealable. The Court expressly reserved, however, the question of immediate appealability of pretrial denials of disqualification motions in criminal cases and of pretrial grants of disqualification motions in both criminal and civil cases. Id. at 372 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. at 672 n. 8. In Flanagan v. United States, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a pretrial order disqualifying defense counsel in a criminal prosecution is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

While the language of the Flanagan opinion might be regarded as a call to reexamine this circuit’s established rule permitting interlocutory appeals of disqual[*255]ification orders in civil cases, see Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin v. State of New York, 732 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1984), we do not respond to the call. In its Firestone and Flanagan decisions, the Supreme Court has divided the appealability problems surrounding disqualification orders into four discrete categories: (1) grants in a civil case, (2) denials in a civil case, (3) grants in a criminal case, and (4) denials in a criminal case. Its circumscribed holdings in Firestone and Flanagan have denied appealability in categories (2) and (3) respectively, but have not ruled on category (1), relevant in this case, or category (4). Under these circumstances, we think that our en banc decision in Armstrong v. McAlpin, which carefully analyzed the relevant factors, should control the practice in this circuit by allowing appeals from grants of disqualification in civil cases until the issue is otherwise specifically determined by the Supreme Court.

On the merits of defendants’ appeal we conclude that Judge Telesca’s determination to disqualify the Kohrman firm in the circumstances here lay within the discretion accorded to him as the trial judge. See Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 903, 101 S.Ct. 1338, 67 L.Ed.2d 327 (1981); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir.1975). Having served for three years as plaintiff’s general counsel during which it dealt directly with defendant Wasserman, who was then president of plaintiff, the Kohrman firm should not now participate as counsel opposing plaintiff’s claims of unfair competition and misappropriation of trade secrets asserted against Wasserman and based in significant part on events occurring while the Kohrman firm represented plaintiff.

Accordingly, we hold that the order disqualifying the Kohrman firm from participating as defendants’ attorneys is immediately appealable and, on the merits of the appeal, we affirm.

Plaintiff’s cross-appeal is dismissed because that part of the order which denied plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the Goldstein firm is not appealable. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, supra; Armstrong v. McAlpin, supra. In light of these authorities we reject plaintiff’s argument that we should create an exception to the rule against immediate appealability of orders denying disqualification in civil cases where the order in question both grants and denies related disqualification motions, and where the grant is appealed.

Appeal affirmed, cross-appeal dismissed.