Rau v. Ryerson
The bankruptcy estate includes all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property, including contingent interests that are not yet subject to possession.
A debtor filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy while employed as a district manager under an agreement providing for a termination payment based on pre-bankruptcy service. The question presented is whether this contingent right to future payment constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate. The court applies the rule that the estate includes all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case, including contingent interests that are not yet subject to possession. The court holds that the debtor’s interest in the contract value is part of the estate because it is rooted in pre-bankruptcy services, although any portion attributable to post-petition services is excluded.
At page 1425Determining if contingent interests are part of the estate46 citing cases“by including all legal interests without exception, congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time.”
- Parks v. Dittmar (In re Dittmar), 410 B.R. 71 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009).published(By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although the may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time.)
- James Nichols Beverly Ann Nichols v. David A. Birdsell, 491 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2007).published(By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be 5408 NICHOLS v. BIRDSELL contingent and not subject to possession…)
- Simply Essentials, LLC, No. 20-00305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 5, 2022).“By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time”
- Callahan(76), Jr v. Decker, No. 19-05006 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2020).(holding payments for prepetition services are not excluded from the estate simply because the payments were received postpetition and additional services were required to receive the payments)
- In re Charles A. Hamm, II, No. CC-20-1049-LSF (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2020).unpublished(holding that post-petition proceeds from a contingent pre-petition employment contract were part of the estate)
- In re Stephen J. Anderson & Melanie Anderson, 572 B.R. 743 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2017).published(contingent interests in payments due under a prepetition contract were property of the estate and passed to the trustee)
- In re Craighton Thomas Boates, No. AZ-15-1279-KuJaJu (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 8, 2016).publishedRau 10 v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1984); 11 see also Sliney v. Battley (In re Schmitz), 270 F.3d 1254 , 1258 12 (9th Cir. 2001) (listing additional Ninth Circuit cases); Johnson 13 v. Taxel (In re Johnson), 1…
- Arnot v. Endresen (In re Endresen), 530 B.R. 856 (Bankr. D. Or. 2015).published“to include all legally cognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time”
- In re William David Goldstein & Molly K. Goldstein, 526 B.R. 13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).publishedThis includes prepetition tort causes of action, id., as well as prepetition causes of action based on contract, Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1984).
- David Longaker v. Boston Sci. Corp., 715 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2013).published (debtor’s interest in “contract value” payment was part of bankruptcy estate even though the payment was “contingent at the time of filing and not payable” until the debtor was terminated)
Show 35 more citing cases
- In re Kenneth Bruce Tishgart & Lori Anne Tishgart, No. NC-12-1160-PaMkH (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2012).unpublishedRau v. 22 Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1984); 23 24 7 (...continued) 25 its own later determination that the deemed admissions were only one part of the merits analysis, we infer that the bankruptcy 26 court wa…
- Longaker v. Boston Sci. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 816 (D. Minn. 2012).publishedIn In re Ryerson, 739 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.1984), the court determined that the contract value, “albeit contingent at the time of filing and not payable until such time as his appointment is terminated or cancelled, is includable within the…
- Nisselson v. Fasarakis (In re Fasarakis), 423 B.R. 34 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).published“By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time”
- Crum v. Tomlinson (In re Hettick), 413 B.R. 733 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009).publishedCrum cites Ran v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1984) where the Ninth Circuit held that choses-in-action and claims against parties as of the commencement of the case are property of the estate, “clearly” including…
- Parks v. Progressive N. Ins. (In re Hokanson), 383 B.R. 548 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008).publishedRau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1984). 46 .
- Araj v. Kohut (In re Araj), 371 B.R. 240 (E.D. Mich. 2007).published Moreover, “[b]y including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time.” In re Ry…
- Burgess v. Sikes, 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006).published Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1424.
- Hoseman v. Weinschneider, 277 B.R. 894 (N.D. Ill. 2002).published “at least to the extent the payments are related to pre-bankruptcy services”
- Annas v. Allard, 272 B.R. 633 (E.D. Mich. 2002).published“By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time”
- Drews v. Vote (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001).published See e.g., In re Alvarez, 224 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir.2000); In re Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir.1993); In re Barowsky, 946 F.2d at 1518-19 ; Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1984); In re Potter, 228 B.R.…
- Allard v. Ackhoff (In re Ackhoff), 281 B.R. 889 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2001).published“By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time”
- Sharp v. Dery, 253 B.R. 204 (E.D. Mich. 2000).published Congress intended “property of the estate” to encompass “all interests of the debtor, including a debtor’s contract right to future, contingent property.” Banner v. Bagen (In re Bagen), 186 B.R. 824, 828 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Rau v.…
- McDonald v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (In re Clay), 241 B.R. 534 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).published(fees related to prebankruptcy services paid through contact value received upon termination of position are property of the estate)
- In re Paul Clayton Jess, Debtor. Paul Clayton Jess v. Raymond Carey, Tr., 169 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1999).published In re Wu, 173 B.R. at 414 -15 (quoting Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1426).
- Field v. Transcontinental Ins., 219 B.R. 115 (E.D. Va. 1998).publishedFor other cases holding that contingent interests constitute property under § 541(a)(1), see In re Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1425; Kloos v. Dias (In re Dias), 37 B.R. 584, 586-87 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1984); Turner v. Burton (In re Turner), 29 B.R. 62…
- Jess v. Carey (In re Jess), 215 B.R. 618 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).published Id. at 1425.
- Johnson v. Taxel (In re Johnson), 178 B.R. 216 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).publishedRau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1425-26 (9th Cir.1984).
- In re Taronji, 174 B.R. 964 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).published In determining the extent to which this payment was property of the estate, the court held that (1) pursuant to Section 541(a)(1), the contract right to the termination payment was property of the estate at the time the case commenced, eve…
- Towers v. Wu (In re Wu), 173 B.R. 411 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).published The court rejected the contention that the estate had no interest in the “contract value” because Ryerson had not yet been terminated at the time he filed bankruptcy and his right to contract value was therefore unvested and contingent. 73…
- DeMarco v. Ohio Decorative Prods., Inc., 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994).unpublished First, in Ryerson v. Rau, 739 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.1984), prior to filing a petition in bankruptcy, a Chapter 7 debtor and his employer, an insurance company, entered into an "Appointment Agreement." This agreement not only provided that the…
- In re Knight, 164 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).published Id. at 1425, citing H.R.Rep.
- Hoffman v. Bruneau (In re Bruneau), 148 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992).publishedThe Ryerson court concluded that on the date of the petition, the debtor had accumulated four full years of value under the agreement, that the debtor’s right to this value, although contingent as to payment date, was property of the estat…
- In re Carey, 150 B.R. 196 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).publishedId. at 1425.
- Gilbert v. Osburn (In re Osburn), 56 B.R. 867 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).publishedRau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson) 739 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1983).
- In re Josefina Lopez, No. 2:23-cv-04286 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023).See In re Ryerson, 739 F.2d 1423 , 1426 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Nichols v. Birdsell, 491 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2007), (“By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recogni…
- In re Edmonds, 273 B.R. 527 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).published
- Banner v. Bagen (In re Bagen), 186 B.R. 824 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
- United States v. Aldrich, 795 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1986).published
- Jane Hm Doe v. Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Phoenix, 533 P.3d 214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).published
- In re Michener, 342 B.R. 428 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).published
- In re Richards, 249 B.R. 859 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).published
- Walsh v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Kingsley), 181 B.R. 225 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995).published
- Booth v. Vaughan (In re Booth), 260 B.R. 281 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2001).published
- Ramirez v. Fuselier (In re Ramirez), 183 B.R. 583 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).published
- In re Azbill v., No. 06-8074 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2008).unpublished
At page 1426Determining property of the estate for after-acquired property17 citing casesThe Code follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property ‘sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past.’
- Shelley Krohn v. Jan Glaser, No. 19-60015 (9th Cir. June 30, 2020).unpublished(The Code follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property ‘sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past.’)
- Church Jt. Venture, L.P. v. Earl Blasingame, 986 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2021).published“the code follows segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past' but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor's ability to make a fresh sta…”
- Rhita Bercy v. City of Phoenix, 103 F.4th 591 (9th Cir. 2024).published“sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past”
- In re Jokiel, 447 B.R. 868 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).published“are ‘sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past’ as to be included within the bankruptcy estate”
- Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. (In re Jones), 410 B.R. 632 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009).publishedSegal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 , 86 S.Ct. 511 , 15 L.Ed.2d 428 (1966); Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir.1984); Johnson v. Taxel (In re Johnson), 178 B.R. 216, 218 (9th Cir. BAP1995).
- Burgess v. Sikes, 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006).published Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1424.
- In re Camellia Food Stores, Inc., 287 B.R. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002).published(discussing the continuing effectiveness of Segal)
- Hoseman v. Weinschneider, 277 B.R. 894 (N.D. Ill. 2002).published Ryerson held that the termination payments due under a pre-petition contract were part of the bankruptcy estate, even though paid after commencement of the case, “at least to the extent the payments are related to pre-bankruptcy services,”…
- In re Edmonds, 263 B.R. 828 (E.D. Mich. 2001).published (finding that “[t]he termination payments are ‘sufficiently rooted in the prebankrupt-cy past’ as to be included within the bankruptcy estate.)
- In re Paul Clayton Jess, Debtor. Paul Clayton Jess v. Raymond Carey, Tr., 169 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1999).published In re Wu, 173 B.R. at 414 -15 (quoting Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1426).
Show 6 more citing cases
- Jess v. Carey (In re Jess), 215 B.R. 618 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).published Id. at 1425.
- In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996).publishedWhile it is true that post-petition earnings are not properly of the estate of a Chapter 7 debtor ( 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(6)), earnings from services which were performed prior to bankruptcy but were paid after the filing of the petition are…
- In re Taronji, 174 B.R. 964 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).published In determining the extent to which this payment was property of the estate, the court held that (1) pursuant to Section 541(a)(1), the contract right to the termination payment was property of the estate at the time the case commenced, eve…
- Towers v. Wu (In re Wu), 173 B.R. 411 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).published The court rejected the contention that the estate had no interest in the “contract value” because Ryerson had not yet been terminated at the time he filed bankruptcy and his right to contract value was therefore unvested and contingent. 73…
- In re Leff, 84 B.R. 72 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).publishedRau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir.1984).
- In re Fernando R. Alvarez, Debtor. Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, P.A. v. Fernando R. Alvarez, 224 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2000).published
At page 1424CANBY, Circuit Judge: Ryerson appeals from a decision of by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 30 B.R. 541. The panel determined that money to which Ryerson…2 citing cases
- Burgess v. Sikes, 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006).published Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1424.
- DeMarco v. Ohio Decorative Prods., Inc., 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994).unpublished First, in Ryerson v. Rau, 739 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.1984), prior to filing a petition in bankruptcy, a Chapter 7 debtor and his employer, an insurance company, entered into an "Appointment Agreement." This agreement not only provided that the…
Other citing cases
- Mark Nebel v. Lawrence Warfield, No. 17-16350 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2019).unpublished
- In re Bolton, 584 B.R. 44 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2018).published
- Baron v. Klutchko (In re Klutchko), 338 B.R. 554 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).published
- In re Dibiase, 270 B.R. 673 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).published
v.
Larry E. RYERSON, Debtor/Appellant
Ryerson appeals from a decision of by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 30 B.R. 541. The panel determined that money to which Ryerson became entitled upon the termination of his employment, some eight months following the filing of his petition in bankruptcy, should be included with the bankruptcy estate.
On January 12, 1977, Ryerson entered into an Appointment Agreement with the Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona appointing him to the position of District Manager for District 25. The Agreement provided that in the event of cancellation or other termination of the appointment “the Companies may at their option elect to- pay ‘contract value,’ as hereinafter defined, to the District Manager.” “Contract value” was defined as the service commission overwrite paid to the District Manager during the six months immediately preceding termination times a factor determined by the number of years of service as District Manager. Nothing was payable until the District Manager had served one full year. The Agreement further provided that as a condition precedent to the District Manager’s right to receive “contract value” he must be in good standing with the Companies on the date of - his termination and that he not have been guilty of certain specified forms of misconduct. Termination occurred upon the death of the District Manager, and the contract could be cancelled by either party without cause upon 30 days written notice.
Ryerson filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding on February 10, 1981. His appointment as District Manager for the Farmers Insurance Group terminated on November 1, 1981. The “contract value” on the date of termination was determined to be $18,588, which has not yet been paid to the debtor. Ryerson sought a declarato[*1425]ry judgment from the bankruptcy court declaring that this sum was not property of the bankruptcy estate.
The old Bankruptcy Act provided that all “rights of action arising upon contracts” passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(6) (repealed). The current Bankruptcy Code defines the bankrupt estate as consisting of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Among the debtor’s legal interests that become a part of the bankruptcy estate under the Code are his choses in action and claims against third parties as of the commencement of the case. S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5868. These choses in action and claims clearly include rights of action based upon contract. See, e.g., Guarles House Apartments v. Plunkett (In re Plunkett), 23 B.R. 392 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1982); Varisco v. Oroweat (In re Varisco), 16 B.R. 634 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1981).
Under the Appointment Agreement, the contract has value upon termination or cancellation after the District Manager completes one year of service in that position. At the time this case was commenced, Ryerson had served four full years as District Manager. He therefore had accumulated value to which he was entitled upon termination or cancellation of his Appointment Agreement. The debtor nevertheless argues that at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition his appointment had not yet been terminated or cancelled and that therefore he had no claim to the “contract value.” He asserts that an unvested, contingent interest is not includable within the bankruptcy estate if it cannot be transferred by the debtor or levied upon or otherwise reached by the debtor’s creditors. Under the Act, a contingent interest in personal property passed to the trustee only if it was capable of being assigned or was subject to execution, seizure, or sequestration. 4A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 70.37 at 453 (14th ed. 1978). However, the requirement that the debtor must be able to transfer the interest or that his creditors by some means must be able to reach it has been eliminated under the Code. 4 id. 11 541.08[1] (15th ed. 1984). By including all legal interests without exception, Congress indicated its intention to include all legally recognizable interests although they may be contingent and not subject to possession until some future time. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175-76 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6136. We therefore conclude that Ryerson’s interest in the “contract value,” albeit contingent at the time of filing and not payable until such time as his appointment is terminated or cancelled, is includable within the bankruptcy estate pursuant to section 541(a)(1).[1]
Having concluded that Ryerson’s right to “contract value” is property of the bankruptcy estate, we have no difficulty concluding that any payments paid upon termination of Ryerson’s appointment are also property of the bankruptcy estate although paid after commencement of the case, at least to the extent the payments are related to prebankruptcy services. Section 541(a)(6) of the Code includes in the bankruptcy estate after-acquired property consisting of “[pjroceeds, product, offspring,[*1426] rents, and profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6). It follows therefore that earnings from services performed prior to bankruptcy are includable within the bankruptcy estate. Under the Act, the test was whether the after-acquired property was “sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past and so little entangled in the debtor’s ability to make a fresh start that it should not be excluded from property of the estate.” Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380, 86 S.Ct. 511, 515, 15 L.Ed.2d 428 (1966). The Code follows Se-gal insofar as it includes after-acquired property “sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past” but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor's ability to make a fresh start. See S.Rep. No. 989, supra at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5868. We think that the termination payments representing value for years of service completed prior to bankruptcy, and not being an arbitrary amount arising after bankruptcy, are “sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past” as to be included within the bankruptcy estate. See In re Durham, 272 F.Supp. 205, 209 (S.D.Ill.1967).
Our ruling does not necessarily mean that all of the $18,588 is property of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel determined that only the debt- or’s interest at the time of bankruptcy is property of the estate; any interest attributable to post-filing services was expressly excluded from the estate. We agree. Section 541(a)(6) excludes from the estate “earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case.” Thus any portion of the $18,588 related to services performed after February 10, 1981 are not includable within the bankruptcy estate.
The judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel is therefore AFFIRMED.
The debtor makes much of the fact that "contract value” is payable only at the option of the Company. Even if the payment of the "contract value” were truly optional, the fact that the contingency may not occur would not render the debtor’s interest unenforceable at common law. It is the nature of a contingent interest that it may never take effect in possession because of the failure of the specified event to occur. 2 Powell on Real Property ¶ 274 (1950). However, Ryerson’s right to the "contract value” is not truly contingent. First, the termination or cancellation of the appointment is an event certain to occur. Therefore, Ryerson’s right to the "contract value” is not made contingent by the fact that the appointment had not yet terminated at the time of bankruptcy filing. Second, the fact that the Company may elect not to pay the “contract value” does not necessarily have the effect of denying him the right to collect it: the Appointment Agreement permits Ryerson to recover the "contract value” from his successor in the event that the Company elects not to pay it. We therefore attach no significance to the fact that payment of the "contract value” is stated to be at the option of the Company.