Stephen C. Crane, on Behalf of Himself & Others Similarly Situated, Cross v. State of Texas v. Cnty. of Dallas, Ben Ellis, John Orvis, Mike Schwille, Berlaind Brashear & Chuck Miller, Cross v. Henry Wade & L.E. Murdoch, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
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Stephen C. Crane, on Behalf of Himself & Others Similarly Situated, Cross v. State of Texas v. Cnty. of Dallas, Ben Ellis, John Orvis, Mike Schwille, Berlaind Brashear & Chuck Miller, Cross v. Henry Wade & L.E. Murdoch, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
117 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 24 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: McDonald v. 81st Judicial District Office (txwd, 2023-11-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McDonald v. 81st Judicial District Office
W.D. Tex. · 2023 · confidence medium
In contrast, Plaintiff argues—citing Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 194 (5th Cir. 1985)—that district attorneys are properly viewed as county officials, not state officials, and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiff’s claims.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Zinter v. Salvaggio
W.D. Tex. · 2021 · confidence medium
Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion
Tex. Att'y Gen. · 2007 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf Crane v. State, 766 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. deniedsub. nom., Dallas County v. Crane, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985) (finding a district attorney to be a county official for purposes of county liability due to the district attorney's local election, funding, powers, and duties); Hill County v. Sheppard, 178 S.W.2d 26 1,263 (Tex. 1944) (criminal district attorney is a "class or kind" of district attorney).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Srivastava v. Newman
7th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499-1506 (3d Cir.1996) (analyzing New Jersey’s constitution and statutory provisions); Crane v. State of Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1985) (analyzing Texas constitution and statutes).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ramsay v. McCormack
D.N.H. · 1999 · confidence medium
The plaintiff relies in particular upon Crane v. State of Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bibbs v. Newman
S.D. Ind. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1499-1506 (3d Cir.1996) (for § 1983 purposes, New Jersey county prosecutor made policy for county when refusing to promote investigator); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 535-36 (2d Cir.1993) (New York county district attorney is state policy-maker when deciding when or whom to prosecute, but is a municipal policymaker under § 1983 on administrative matters such as office policy and training of employees); Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1206-09 (9th Cir.1989) (plaintiff might be able to prove for § 1983 purposes that Arizon…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McMillian v. Johnson (2×)
11th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
E.g., Id.; Crane v. State of Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas
N.D. Tex. · 1991 · confidence medium
See Turner v. Upton County, Texas, 915 F.2d 133, 136-37 (5th Cir.1990) (finding where district attorney and sheriff were accused of conspiring to violate civil rights that “actions of elected district attorney” were sufficient for imposition of municipal liability even though district attorney’s jurisdiction was larger than that of sheriff), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 788 , 112 L.Ed.2d 850 (1991); Mairena v. Foti, 816 F.2d 1061, 1065 (5th Cir.1987) (finding that district attorney’s participation in the formulation of contested policy met the “policy or custom” requirement …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Earl Edwin Gobel and Michael J. Defranco v. Maricopa County, Thomas E. Collins, David P. Stoller, and Frank Gary
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cox
D. Kan. · 1986 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Diaz, 777 F.2d at 1237-39 (charge against defendant is so serious, threatened punishment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is so heavy, and evidence of guilt is so strong that temptation to flee would be overwhelming, especially for a defendant such as this one who has access to large sums of money and is fluent in Spanish); Volksen, 766 F.2d at 193 (evidence was presented that defendant *1054 had said she would flee to Canada rather than go to jail); Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 1037 (defendant was an illegal alien from Columbia with no ties to the United States).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Scott County Master Docket
D. Minnesota · 1985 · confidence medium
Crane v. State of Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam). 31 .
cited Cited "see" League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.1985).
cited Cited "see" League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.1985). 9 The Texas Constitution requires the Chief Justice to supervise the state district courts.
discussed Cited "see" Charlesworth R. Martin v. Theodore Thomas, Milo K. Shepard, Robert L. Prater and L.L. Clarkson
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Crane v. State of Texas, 759 F.2d 412 , 428 n. 17 (5th Cir.), amended in part, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985) (“The Eleventh Amendment is obviously no bar to actions for damages against officials sued in their individual capacities”); American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi, Inc. v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1341-42 (5th Cir.Unit A 1981) (“It is well settled, for instance, that a public officer’s conduct can be sufficiently “official” to constitute state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment withou…
discussed Cited "see" Martin v. Thomas
5th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Crane v. State of Texas, 759 F.2d 412 , 428 n. 17 (5th Cir.), amended in part, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985) ("The Eleventh Amendment is obviously no bar to actions for damages against officials sued in their individual capacities"); American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi, Inc. v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336 , 1341–42 (5th Cir.Unit A 1981) ("It is well settled, for instance, that a public officer's conduct can be sufficiently "official" to constitute state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment without at the …
examined Cited "see" Cooney v. Park County (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Wyo. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See similarly the practice for arresting with a warrant, Crane v. State of Texas, 759 F.2d 412 , aff'd as modified 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Caldwell v. Medina
W.D. Tex. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
See generally Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 , 1849 (2019) (courts should consider subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte). “[S]overeign immunity ‘does not erect a barrier against suits to impose individual and personal liability.’”4 Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (2017) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 , 30–31 (1991)); see also Crane v. State of Texas, 759 F.2d 412 , 428 n.17 (5th Cir.) (“The Eleventh Amendment is obviously no bar to actions for damages against officials sued in their individual capacities.”), amended on denial of reh’g, 766 F.2d 19…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Odonnell v. Harris County
S.D. Tex. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence low
To determine if an official is a state or local actor for sovereign immunity purposes, the Fifth Circuit uses a six-factor test: (1) “whether the state statutes and case law view the agency as an arm of the state”; (2) whether the entity is funded by the county or the state; (3) “the entity’s degree of local autonomy”; (4) “whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems”; (5) “whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name”; (6) “whether it has the right to hold and use property.” Clark, 798 F.2d at 744-45 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Green v. State
Tex. App. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
In determining reasonableness, the nature of the underlying offense is of no moment.”). *611 In Texas, a misdemeanor capias is valid when issued from a court with proper jurisdiction after a neutral magistrate has made a determination of probable cause. 2 See Sharp v. State, 677 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); see also Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412 , 422 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Boyer v. County of Washington
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
Contrary to DeClue's contention, the law is clearly established that "under the Fourth Amendment a warrant can be validly issued only by a 'neutral and detached magistrate.' " Fairchild v. Lockhart, 675 F.Supp. 469, 477 (E.D.Ark.1987) (quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 , 78 S.Ct. 1245 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958)), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1051 , 109 S.Ct. 884 , 102 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1989); see also Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412 , 426 (5th Cir.), modified, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 55…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Boyer v. County of Washington
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
Contrary to De-Clue’s contention, the law is clearly established that "under the Fourth Amendment a warrant can be validly issued only by a ‘neutral and detached magistrate.”’ Fairchild v. Lockhart, 675 F.Supp. 469, 477 (E.D.Ark.1987) (quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 , 78 S.Ct. 1245 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958)), aff’d, 857 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1051 , 109 S.Ct. 884 , 102 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1989); see also Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412 , 426 (5th Cir.), modified, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Yaron v. Township of Northampton
3rd Cir. · 1992 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d 959, 972 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (entertaining petition for appellate fees) with Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (refusing to entertain petition for appellate fees and remanding to district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985) with Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1296-1300 (5th Cir.1978) (petition brought in court of appeals but remanded to district court for calculation of amount). 13 The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided this question.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Yaron v. Township of Northampton
3rd Cir. · 1992 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 648 F.2d 959, 972 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (entertaining petition for appellate fees) with Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (refusing to entertain petition for appellate fees and remanding to district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 , 106 S.Ct. 570 , 88 L.Ed.2d 555 (1985) with Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1296-1300 (5th Cir.1978) (petition brought in court of appeals but remanded to district court for calculation of amount).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parker v. Williams
11th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Crane v. Texas, supra (although characterized as a state official under state law, Texas district attorney is county official for section 1983 purposes).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parker v. Williams
11th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Crane v. Texas, supra (although characterized as a state official under state law, Texas district attorney is county official for section 1983 purposes).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parker v. Williams
11th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
The court in Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir.1982), gave one definition: "When an official has final authority in a matter involving the selection of goals or of means of achieving goals, his choices represent governmental policy." The en banc Fifth Circuit explained that "[p]olicymakers act in the place of the governing body in the area of their responsibility; they are not supervised except as to the totality of their performance." Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 , 105 S.Ct. 3476 , 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985); see als…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Parker v. Williams
11th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
The court in Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 989 (5th Cir.1982), gave one definition: "When an official has final authority in a matter involving the selection of goals or of means of achieving goals, his choices represent governmental policy." The en banc Fifth Circuit explained that “[plolicymakers act in the place of the govern ing body in the area of their responsibility; they are not supervised except as to the totality of their performance." Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 , 105 S.Ct. 3476 , 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985); see …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Stephen C. Crane, on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated, Cross
v.
State of Texas v. County of Dallas, Ben Ellis, John Orvis, Mike Schwille, Berlaind Brashear and Chuck Miller, Cross v. Henry Wade and L.E. Murdoch
83-1650.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jul 22, 1985.
766 F.2d 193
Cited by 25 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 55%

766 F.2d 193

Stephen C. CRANE, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant,
v.
STATE OF TEXAS, Defendant-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF DALLAS, Ben Ellis, John Orvis, Mike Schwille,
Berlaind Brashear and Chuck Miller,
Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees,
v.
Henry WADE and L.E. Murdoch, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-1650.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

July 22, 1985.

Earl Luna, Dallas, Tex., for Ellis et al. and Dallas County.

Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Mary F. Keller, Lawrence J. King, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for State of Tex.

Peter Lesser, Johnston & Larson, Douglas R. Larson, Dallas, Tex., for Crane.

Sue L. Lagarde, Dallas, Tex., for appellees Henry Wade and Larry Murdoch.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion May 2, 1985, 5 Cir., 1985, 759 F.2d 412)

Before GEE, WILLIAMS, and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

[*~193]1

On motion for rehearing, appellant Dallas County advances one contention requiring comment: that a Texas district attorney is an officer of the State of Texas, not of the county in which he serves, and hence that Dallas County is not responsible for the policies which its District Attorney set for it. The point is a nice one and fairly debatable. A complementary contention by the appellant district attorney maintains that as such a State official he partakes of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

2

It is indubitable that a Texas district attorney has numerous, if relatively minor, attributes of a State official. As appellants point out, the geographic extent of his office's authority is created by a specific state statute for each territory ("district") within the state, some few of which comprise more than one county. E.g., Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 332b-2(b) (64th Judicial District: Hale and Swisher Counties). In the event of a vacancy in his office, the Governor appoints his interim successor. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 328 (1973). His bond for faithful performance of his duties runs to the Governor of the State. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 323 (1973). A state administrative body, the Prosecutor's Council, exists to discipline and assist the holders of his office. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 332d (1985). The District Attorney is required by statute to make reports to the State Attorney General upon his request. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 333 (1973). His office is created by Article V, Sec. 21, of the State Constitution; and a text on state law describes him, partly on the basis of this, as "an officer of the state." 31 Tex.Jur.3rd 394.[1]

3

Other and more significant factors, generally speaking, argue that he is a local official. He is elected by the voters of his district, usually one county. Tex.Const. art. V, Sec. 21. His major powers and duties--which concern the prosecution of serious crimes and which he exercises alone and without responsibility to the State Attorney General, who has no general prosecutorial powers--are limited to the territory of his district. He is paid by county funds, although these are partly reimbursed by the state. And the significance of the creation of his office by the State Constitution is diminished by the circumstance that other local offices are created by it as well. See e.g., Article V, Sec. 19 (Justices of the peace) and Sec. 20 (County clerks). In sum, much like the county itself, his office is a local entity, created by the State of Texas and deriving its powers from those of the State, but limited in the exercise of those powers to the county, filled by its voters, and paid for with its funds. As for the case in hand, District Attorney Wade was responsible for the county policy attacked and conclusively demonstrated his ability to alter it on his own by doing that very thing.

4

For present purposes, then, we conclude that he is properly viewed as a county official, elected by its voters and responsible for its relevant policy. In such circumstances, we see no injustice in holding the County responsible for his actions of this sort. Doubtless he is also in some senses an officer of the State (or of the state), at least as ultimately deriving the powers of his office from that source. But even were he a State official in every sense, called so in State law and designated by the State to make policy for its other creature, the county, our answer would likely remain the same; county responsibility for violation of the Constitution cannot be evaded by such ingenious arrangements. At all events, his immunity or want of it is of little practical consequence. The joint and several judgment against him in his official capacity only and against the county will expend itself on the county treasury. See, Kentucky, dba Bureau of State Police, Petitioner v. James E. Graham, et al., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114, (1985).

5

Plaintiff has filed with us a motion for attorneys' fees and costs on appeal, as well as one for restoration of a portion of trial attorneys' fees because of developments on appeal. We conclude that such matters are better addressed as one by the district court, and we therefore amend our original disposition to VACATE the award of attorneys' fees heretofore made and REMAND to permit the district court to do so.

[*~194]6

In all other respects, the Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED; and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 35), the Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc are DENIED.

1

Another cited basis is dubious, a reference to the duties of prosecutors in Lackey v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 623, 190 S.W.2d 364, 365 (1945) ("[P]rosecuting attorneys are officers of the state, whose duty is to see that justice is done, ...."). It seems plain that this reference is to the "state" in the abstract, rather than as a particular political entity