Front Royal & Warren Cnty. Indus. Park Corp. v. Town Of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
Front Royal & Warren Cnty. Indus. Park Corp. v. Town Of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
64 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown (mdd, 2001-03-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown
D. Maryland · 2001 · confidence medium
Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library
E.D. Va. · 1998 · confidence medium
Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, Va., 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989) (withholding of sewer service).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jenkins v. Medford
4th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir. 1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cooper v. Lee County Board of Supervisors
W.D. Va. · 1997 · confidence medium
Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989); Scott v. Greenville Co., 716 F.2d 1409 , 1423 (4th Cir.1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miles-Un-Ltd., Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham, RI
D.N.H. · 1996 · confidence medium
Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, Va., 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chicago Miracle Temple Church, Inc. v. Fox
N.D. Ill. · 1995 · confidence medium
Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Suhre v. Board of Commissioners
W.D.N.C. · 1995 · confidence medium
Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1422 (4th Cir.1983); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 280 (4th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 2BD ASSOCIATES v. Queen Anne's County Com'rs (2×)
D. Maryland · 1995 · confidence medium
Thus, an official with title of legislator does not receive absolute immunity for actions that are administrative in nature, and conversely, an official whose title is that of an executive will receive absolute immunity for actions which are legislative in nature. (6) The question, thus, is whether the acts about which deposition testimony is being sought were undertaken in a "legislative capacity", Roberson, supra at 134 , ( quoting Front Royal, supra at 79, Bruce, supra at 279 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roberson v. Mullins (2×)
4th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Rather, a local governmental body only acts in a legislative capacity when it engages in the process of “adopt[ing] prospective, legislative-type rules.” Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 79 (quotation omitted); Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423 . 4 Every other court of appeals that has attempted to define when a local governmental body acts in a legislative capacity has set forth the same, or a very similar, standard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roberson v. Mullins (2×)
4th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Rather, a local governmental body only acts in a legislative capacity when it engages in the process of "adopt[ing] prospective, legislative-type rules." Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 79 (quotation omitted); Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423 . 4 9 Every other court of appeals that has attempted to define when a local governmental body acts in a legislative capacity has set forth the same, or a very similar, standard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Manders v. Brown
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
E.g., Hughes v. Tarrant County, 948 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir.1991); Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.1991); Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989); Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 577-78 ; Altaire Builders, Inc. v. Village of Horseheads, 551 F.Supp. 1066, 1073 (W.D.N.Y.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Terry v. Bobb
E.D. Va. · 1993 · confidence medium
For example, in Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 79, the Fourth Circuit held that the failure of local legislators to authorize sewer service for landowners was not legislative action, and therefore, legislators were only protected by executive qualified immunity instead of absolute legislative immunity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Norbert C. Pearson, Also Known as Spike v. City of Grand Blanc, J. Larry Tomlinson
6th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989); Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1278 (quoting Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 , 1423 (4th Cir.1983)). 55 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal
4th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Front Royal I, 865 F.2d at 79.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corporation, a Virginia Corporation Fred W. McLaughlin Gladys L. McLaughlin v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia, a Municipal Corporation John Marlow, Individually and as Mayor of the Town of Front Royal Michael Kitts, Individually and as a Member of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia Edwin L. Pomeroy, Individually and as a Former Member of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia Albert G. Ruff, Jr., Individually and as a Former Member of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia George E. Banks, Individually and as a Former Member of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia Brackenridge H. Bentley, Individually and as Town Manager of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia, Virginia Association of Counties Local Government Attorneys of Virginia, Incorporated, Amici Curiae. Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corporation, a Virginia Corporation Fred W. McLaughlin Gladys L. McLaughlin v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia, a Municipal Corporation John Marlow, Individually and as Mayor of the Town of Front Royal Michael Kitts, Individually and as a Member of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia Edwin L. Pomeroy, Individually and as a Former Member of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia Albert G. Ruff, Jr., Individually and as a Former Member of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia George E. Banks, Individually and as a Former Member of the Town Council of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia Brackenridge H. Bentley, Individually and as Town Manager of the Town of Front Royal, Virginia, Virginia Association of Counties Local Government Attorneys of Virginia, Incorporated, Amici Curiae
4th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Front Royal I, 865 F.2d at 79.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Coakley v. Welch
4th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989); Foremost Guar.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal
W.D. Va. · 1989 · confidence medium
After noting that the denial of a claim of absolute immunity is appropriate for interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “We agree with the district court that defendants’ decisions had to do with zoning enforcement rather than with rule making.” Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp., et al. v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia, et al., 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989).
cited Cited "see" Lacorte v. Hudacs
N.D.N.Y. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989).
cited Cited "see" West Virginia Pride, Inc. v. Wood County, W. Va.
S.D.W. Va · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 79.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corporation, a Virginia Corporation Fred W. McLaughlin Gladys L. McLaughlin
v.
Town of Front Royal, Virginia John Marlow, and as Mayor Michael Kitts, Individually and as Member of Town Council Edwin L. Pomeroy, Individually and as Member of Town Council Albert G. Ruff, Jr., Individually and as Former Member George E. Banks, Individually and as Former Member, Brackenridge H. Bentley, Individually and as Town Manager
88-2066.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Jan 31, 1989.
865 F.2d 77
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

865 F.2d 77

FRONT ROYAL AND WARREN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION, a
Virginia Corporation; Fred W. McLaughlin; Gladys
L. McLaughlin, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
TOWN OF FRONT ROYAL, VIRGINIA; John Marlow, and as Mayor;
Michael Kitts, individually and as member of Town Council;
Edwin L. Pomeroy, individually and as member of Town
Council; Albert G. Ruff, Jr., individually and as former
member; George E. Banks, individually and as former member,
Brackenridge H. Bentley, individually and as Town Manager,
Defendants-Appellants.

No. 88-2066.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 5, 1988.
Decided Jan. 9, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1989.

Mark D. Obenshain (Glenn M. Hodge, Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, Harrisonburg, Va., on brief) for defendants-appellants.

Robert C. Fitzgerald (Myron C. Smith, Fitzgerald & Smith, P.C., Fairfax, Va., on brief) for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before WINTER, SPROUSE and ERVIN, Circuit Judges.

ERVIN, Circuit Judge:

[*~77]1

Plaintiffs in this consolidated Sec. 1983 action are two Front Royal, Virginia, landowners and the Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corporation. Plaintiffs seek damages from defendants, the Town of Front Royal ("Front Royal") and various Front Royal officials, for alleged violations of plaintiffs' fifth and fourteenth amendment rights. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion to strike defendants' absolute immunity defense. We hold that the district court's order striking the defense was immediately appealable, and affirm.

I.

2

Plaintiffs own parcels of land annexed by Front Royal in 1976 and 1978. At the times of annexation, the Virginia Annexation Court ordered Front Royal to extend sewer service to the annexed parcels as quickly as reasonably possible, and in any event within five years. Plaintiffs allege that Front Royal has denied their repeated requests for sewer service. When plaintiffs filed suit on February 12, 1987, Front Royal had not yet extended sewer service to the annexed parcels.

3

Plaintiffs' complaints alleged that defendants' failure to provide sewer service had deprived plaintiffs of all economically viable and reasonable uses of their land. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants had deprived them of equal protection of the laws by withholding sewer service from plaintiffs while providing service to other landowners whose needs were no greater than plaintiffs'.

4

Defendants interposed a number of affirmative defenses, among them that absolute legislative immunity insulated them from suit. Plaintiffs moved to strike the absolute immunity defense, contending that defendants had taken no legislative action with respect to sewer service. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion to strike in an order from which defendants noticed an interlocutory appeal.[1] Plaintiffs in turn argue that the order is not immediately appealable.

II.

5

Plaintiffs advance the threshold contention that the district court's order is not immediately appealable under the test articulated in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982).[2] We disagree. The Supreme Court has several times held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are immediately appealable. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 742, 102 S.Ct. at 2697.

[*~78]6

We also note initially that we have held that orders denying absolute immunity are, as a general matter, immediately appealable under the Nixon criteria. England v. Rockefeller, 739 F.2d 140, 142 (4th Cir.1984); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 948, 105 S.Ct. 349, 83 L.Ed.2d 285 (1984). Plaintiffs nonetheless contend that this appeal presents no serious and unsettled question of law. Because what defendants have asserted is essentially the right to avoid trial, we believe the district court's denial of immunity presents a serious legal issue. We know of no Supreme Court case that has resolved an absolute immunity claim similar to that broached by defendants. See Nixon, 457 U.S. at 743, 102 S.Ct. at 2697-2698. We therefore conclude that the district court's order in this case was immediately appealable.

III.

7

It is well established that local legislators enjoy absolute immunity from suit for decisions made in their capacity as legislators. Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1422-23 (4th Cir.1983); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir.1980). The inquiry in this case is accordingly whether the district court correctly concluded that the defendants' denials of requests for sewer service were not legislative actions. We believe the district court was correct to conclude that the defendants' decisions were not legislative.[3]

8

In Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423, we held that when municipal officials "do more than adopt prospective, legislative-type rules and take the next step into the area of enforcement, they can claim only the executive qualified immunity appropriate to that activity." We agree with the district court that defendants' decisions had to do with zoning enforcement rather than with rulemaking. See First Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 301 S.E.2d 8, 11 (1983) (municipal officer liable for misfeasance of a ministerial duty); Howlett v. City of South Norfolk, 193 Va. 564, 69 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1952) (construction of authorized public works as a ministerial activity); Hoggard v. Richmond, 200 S.E. 610, 615 (1939). The order of the Virginia Annexation Court removed what discretion defendants might otherwise have had to approve or decline plaintiffs' requests for sewer service. Defendants have not argued that they could lawfully have defied the annexation court's order,[4] or that their failure to comply with the order represented a policy decision that to do so was in the best interests of Front Royal's citizens. Defendants have, in short, not claimed that their failure to authorize sewer service is the sort of discretionary, prospective determination that warrants absolute immunity.

[*~79]9

AFFIRMED.

1

The order also denied defendants' motion to dismiss the action based on absolute immunity

2

Nixon declared that:

[A] small class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to courts of appeals.... [T]his class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 [98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351] (1978)) ... [A]n additional requirement [is] that collateral appeal of an interlocutory order must "presen[t] a serious and unsettled question." (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 93 L.Ed. 1528] (1949)).

457 U.S. at 742, 102 S.Ct. at 2697 (citations omitted).

3

Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's denial of their motion to strike defendants' qualified executive immunity defense. Our decision accordingly reflects no opinion on the applicability or effect of the qualified immunity defense

4

Counsel stated in oral argument that the Virginia Annexation Court no longer exists, but did not contest the continuing validity of the court's orders with respect to plaintiffs' parcels