Doe v. Connecticut Dep't of Child & Youth Servs., 911 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Doe v. Connecticut Dep't of Child & Youth Servs., 911 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1990).
Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitPublished opinionNo. 536, Docket 89-7601Aug 13, 1990

Doe v. Connecticut Dep't of Child & Youth Servs., 911 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1990)

Quick Summary

Qualified immunity protects child welfare officials who remove a child based on objectively reasonable beliefs of danger, even if state procedural requirements are not strictly met or action is delayed.

Parents sue state child welfare officials for damages after the emergency removal of their minor child based on allegations of sexual abuse by a sibling. The parents argue that the officials' failure to strictly comply with state procedural requirements and the delay in acting preclude the qualified immunity defense. The court applies the standard that qualified immunity protects officials unless their conduct objectively violates clearly established federal rights, noting that violations of state law do not create federal claims or defeat the defense. The court finds that the officials' belief in the necessity of removal was objectively reasonable given the severity of the abuse allegations and that the delay did not render the subsequent action unreasonable. The court affirms the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

79 citation events (42 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Cited for
At page 869Failure to comply with state law does not violate section 198317 citing cases[A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiffs] a [Section] 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper [Section] 1983 claim.” (citation omitted)7 citing courts put it this way
  • Lewis v. Delmar, No. 6:21-cv-06738 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2023).
    “a violation of state law neither gives a plaintiff a 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper 1983 claim.”
  • Miller v. Nye Cnty., No. 2:19-cv-00601 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2021).
    “a violation of 23 state law neither gives plaintiffs a 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper 1983 claim.”
  • Raquinio v. Kohanaiki Cmty. Ass'n, No. 1:21-cv-00255 (D. Haw. Aug. 12, 2021).
    “a violation of state law neither gives plaintiffs a 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper 1983 claim.”
  • Comm. to Protect our Agric. Water v. Occidental Oil & Gas Corp., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2017).published
    “a violation of state law neither gives plaintiffs a 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper 1983 claim.”
  • Holland v. City of New York, 197 F. Supp. 3d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published
    “a violation of state law neither gives plaintiffs a 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper 1983 claim.”
  • Allah, No. 9:23-cv-00785 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2026).
    ([A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiffs] a [Section] 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper [Section] 1983 claim.” (citation omitted))
  • Uwadiegwu v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 91 F. Supp. 3d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).published
    “The question presented [in a § 1983 action] is not whether ... defendants violated state law, but whether they violated plaintiffs federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Young, 999 F.Supp. at 287 (citing Doe v. Connecticut Dep’t of…
  • Harris v. Taylor, 441 F. App'x 774 (2d Cir. 2011).unpublished
    While failure to comply with a state law or administrative directive does not by itself establish a violation of § 1983, see Doe v. Connecticut Department of Child & Youth Services, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir.1990), the record demonstrates…
  • McLaughlin v. Town of Front Royal, 38 Va. Cir. 387 (Warren Cir. Ct. 1996).published
    E.g., Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990); Doe v. Connecticut Department of Child and Youth Services, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990); Pesce v. J.
  • Am. Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester, 34 Va. Cir. 421 (Winchester Cir. Ct. 1994).published
    E.g., Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990); Doe v. Connecticut Department of Child and Youth Services, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990); Pesce v. J.
Show 7 more citing cases
  • McLaughlin v. Town of Front Royal, 34 Va. Cir. 352 (Warren Cir. Ct. 1994).published
    E.g., Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3rd Cir. 1990); Doe v. Connecticut Department of Child and Youth Services, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990); Pesce v. J.
  • Cecere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1992).published 2 cites
    (same as to state welfare officials)
  • Baltas v. Hardy, No. 3:23-cv-00930 (D. Conn. Oct. 25, 2024).
    ([A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiffs] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.)
  • Salaman v. Semple, No. 3:20-cv-00032 (D. Conn. Nov. 16, 2020).
    See Harris v. Taylor, 441 F. App'x 774 , 29 775 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[F]ailure to comply with a state law or administrative directive does not by itself establish a violation of § 1983.”) (citing Doe v. Connecticut Department of Child & Youth…
  • Kia P. v. McIntyre, 2 F. Supp. 2d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).published
    See Doe v. Connecticut Dep’t of Child and Youth Servs., 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir.1990); Robison, 821 F.2d at 922 ; Dietz, 932 F.Supp. at 453 .
  • Spencer v. Lavoie, 986 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).published
    See Doe v. Connecticut Dep’t of Child and Youth Servs., 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir.1990).
  • Patterson v. Armstrong Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 141 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Pa. 2001).published
    (violation of state law regarding removal of child under protective custody neither establishes due process violation under section 1983 nor de *538 prives defendant of qualified immunity)
[A] violation of state law neither gives [a plaintiff] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.no pin page on record · 6 citing cases listed
  • Lewis v. Delmar, No. 6:21-cv-06738 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2023).
    ([A] violation of state law neither gives [a plaintiff] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.)
  • Raquinio v. Kohanaiki Cmty. Ass'n, No. 1:21-cv-00255 (D. Haw. Aug. 12, 2021).
    (A violation of state law neither gives plaintiffs a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.)
  • Comm. to Protect our Agric. Water v. Occidental Oil & Gas Corp., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2017).published
    (A violation of state law neither gives plaintiffs a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.)
  • Holland v. City of New York, 197 F. Supp. 3d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).published
    ([A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiffs] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.)
  • Mejia v. Kurtzenacker, No. 3:21-cv-01222 (D. Conn. Jan. 3, 2022).
    ([A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiffs] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.)
  • Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F. Supp. 2d 416 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).published
    ([A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiff] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.)
At page 870Determining objective reasonableness of child removal2 citing casesgranting qualified immunity to state social workers who, inter alia, placed 96-hour hold on parental custody and placed child in foster home1 citing court put it this way
  • Pace v. Montalvo, 186 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Conn. 2001).published
    (granting qualified immunity to state social workers who, inter alia, placed 96-hour hold on parental custody and placed child in foster home)
  • Tenenbaum ex rel. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 862 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).published
    The removal remained objectively reasonable when it was undertaken. 911 F.2d at 870 (emphasis added).
Other citing cases19 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Show 9 more citing cases
John DOE b/k/a Mary Doe, Mary Doe and Frank Doe
v.
CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES and Mark J. Marcus, Raymond Farrington, Patricia Simpson, and David Goldner, individually and officially as employees of the Connecticut Department of Child and Youth Services
No. 536, Docket 89-7601.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Aug 13, 1990.
Published opinion
Joseph D. Garrison, New Haven, Conn. (Garrison, Kahn, Silbert & Arterton, New Haven, Conn., on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants., Daniel R. Schaefer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn. (Clarine Nardi Riddle, Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Altimari, Jon, Newman, Timbers.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
JON 0. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal, like van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep’t of Social Services, 911 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.1990), decided this day, concerns the availability of the qualified immunity defense in the context of temporary interruption of parental custody. Two parents and their minor child appeal from the May 19, 1989, judgment of the District Court for the District of Connecticut (Peter C. Dorsey, Judge) dismissing, on motion for summary judgment, their suit against the Connecticut Department of Social Services and some of its employees. The suit sought damages for the actions of the defendants in removing the minor child from the parental home on an emergency basis for a 96-hour period, see Conn.Gen.Stat. § 17-38a(e) (1988), and placing him in a state home. The defendants acted in response to serious allegations of sexual child abuse perpetrated upon the child by his older brother, with the toleration, and perhaps the participation of, the child’s parents.

In a thorough opinion, Judge Dorsey concluded that the defendants were entitled, as a matter of law, to the defense of qualified immunity. Doe v. Connecticut Dep’t of Children and Youth Services, 712 F.Supp. 277 (D.Conn.1989). The facts are fully set forth in the District Court’s opinion and need not be recounted here.

Appellants challenge Judge Dorsey’s conclusion, essentially on two grounds, neither of which has merit. First, they contend that factual issues remain as to whether the defendants fully complied with the requirements of state law. Even if true, the claim is irrelevant. The question is whether “ ‘no reasonable jury, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences most favorable to, the plaintiffs, could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant^]’ to believe that [they were] acting in a fashion that did not clearly violate an established federally protected right.” See Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 189 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Scalia, J., sitting by designation)) (emphasis added). “[A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiffs] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.” Id. at 922.

Second, appellants contend that qualified immunity is precluded, or at least that the issue requires a trial, because of the timing of the defendants’ action. This claim is based on the facts that the most specific allegations of the parents’ involvement related to events several months before the removal and that the defendants waited three days after receipt of their most recent information before acting. Neither circumstance defeats the defense of qualified immunity on the facts of this case. The psychologist who interviewed another victim of the older brother’s sexual abuse just prior to the removal reported to the defendants that “[g]iven the extent of sexual, physical, and mental abuse which allegedly occurred in the [Does’] home, in my opinion, this is an extremely volatile[*870] situation and a potentially dangerous one as well” (emphasis added). The fact that some of the information reported to the defendants had occurred a few months earlier did not make it objectively unreasonable for them to conclude, based on all the reported information, that temporary removal of the child was warranted.

Nor does the fact that the defendants waited three days from receipt of the psychologist’s report before invoking their authority under the state statute preclude the availability of qualified immunity. The suit sought damages for the removal of the child, not for the delay in taking such action. The removal remained objectively reasonable when it was undertaken.

We agree with Judge Dorsey, for the reasons set forth in his opinion, that the undisputed facts establish the availability of the qualified immunity defense. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.