green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
23.3 score
“regardless of the plaintiff's characterization of the cause of action, 2680(h) bars suit for claims based on conduct which constitutes one of the excepted torts . . . .”
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990
2008
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited "but see"
SunTrust Bank v. Hudgins (In Re Systems Engineering & Energy Management Associates, Inc.)
But see Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.1990) (criticizing the decision in Angeles Real Estate Co).
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Mashburn v. Arzate
by definition, property held by the debtor in trust is not part of the bankruptcy estate.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Mendenhall v. United States
regardless of the plaintiff's characterization of the cause of action, 2680(h) bars suit for claims based on conduct which constitutes one of the excepted torts . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Martinez v. United States
claim based on conduct constituting the tort of intentional infliction of 11 emotional distress is not excluded as a matter of law from ftca
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sandra Joyce McGrath and Dale Allen Rogers
At the core of bankruptcy law is the policy of “obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for creditors.” BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 , 114 S. Ct. 1757 , 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994); Research–Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir.1990) (noting that the preference provisions found in 11 U.S.C. § 547 further this important policy).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Walters v. Stevens, Littman, Biddison
News 5787, 5956–57, (§ 547(b) serves the “prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors” by ensuring that all creditors of the same class will receive the same pro rata share of the debtor’s estate, and serves to prevent the dismemberment of the debtor); accord Union Bank v. Wolas (In re ZZZZ Best Co.), 502 U.S. 151 , 160–61, 112 S. Ct. 527 , 116 L.Ed.2d 514 (1991); Begier [v. I.R.S.], 496 U.S. [53,] 58, 110 S. Ct. 2258 [(1990)]; Gillman v. Scientific Research Prods., Inc. (In re Mama D’Angelo, Inc.), 55 F.3d 552, 554 (10th Cir. 1995); Clark v. Balcor Real Es…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gonzales v. Sun Life Insurance (In re Furr's Supermarkets, Inc.)
Research Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir.1990); see also Restatement (First) of Trusts § 74 cmt. a (1935)(Beneficiary loses interest in trust property when transferred to a bona-fide purchaser.) Rather, the beneficiary has a cause of action against the trustee for breach of its fiduciary obligations.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.)
(2×)
First Capital, 917 F.2d at 427. .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rinard v. Positive Investments, Inc. (In Re Rinard)
At the core of bankruptcy law is the policy of “obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for creditors.” BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 , 114 S.Ct. 1757 , 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994); Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir.1990) (noting that the preference provisions found in 11 U.S.C. § 547 further this important policy).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Holcomb v. Hardeman (In Re Holcomb)
At the core of bankruptcy law is the policy of “obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for creditors.” BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 , 114 S.Ct. 1757 , 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994); Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir.1990) (noting that the preference provisions found in 11 U.S.C. § 547 further this important policy).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Manchester v. First Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Moses)
No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 5956-57, (§ 547(b) serves the “prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors” by ensuring that all creditors of the same class will receive the same pro rata share of the debtor’s estate, and serves to prevent the dismemberment of the debtor); accord Union Bank v. Wolas (In re ZZZZ Best Co.), 502 U.S. 151, 160-61 , 112 S.Ct. 527 , 116 L.Ed.2d 514 (1991); Begier, 496 U.S. at 58 , 110 S.Ct. 2258 ; Gillman v. Scientific Research Prods., Inc. (In re Mama D’Angelo, Inc.), 55 F.3d 552, 554 (…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Heintz v. Carey (In Re Heintz)
In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp., 917 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc) (noting that á court approved settlement of a preference action is treated the same as property recovered after a judgment on the same action).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Henady
See also Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 59 , 110 S.Ct. 2258, 2263 , 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990); In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp., 917 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir.1990).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hoff v. Carroll (In Re Carroll)
Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir.1990); Stone v. Feldman (In re Feldman), 111 B.R. 481, 486 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990).
cited
Cited "see"
Chavez v. United States
See Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir.), 17 amended by 917 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1990); see Michel v. United States, No. 16-CV-277- 18 GPC (AGS), 2017 WL 5067608 , at *17 (S.D.
discussed
Cited "see"
Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.)
See Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.) 375 F.3d 51, 70 (1st Cir.2004) ("[W]e ... conclude that Fleet’s 502(h) claim would have the status of a prepetition secured claim, entitling it to full recovery of the gap proceeds were we to undertake the exercise of avoiding the gap payments."). . 917 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.1990). .
discussed
Cited "see"
Tippetts v. United States
See Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir.) (“FECA compensates government employees only for physical harm.”), modified on other grounds, 917 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.1990); cf. DeFord v. Sec’y of Labor, 700 F.2d 281, 290 (6th Cir.1983) (suggesting that FECA does not cover mental distress for intentional discrimination).
cited
Cited "see"
In Re JD Services, Inc.
See Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corporation), 917 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.1990); Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 554 , 190 P.2d 135 (1948).
cited
Cited "see"
Roth v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
See Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir.), amended by 917 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.1990) (order).
discussed
Cited "see"
In Re Hildebrand
See, generally, In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp., 917 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir.1990) (cases cited); In re Butcher, 46 B.R. 109 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1985). 15 There can be little doubt that the escrow arrangement created a trust relationship. 16 Merely because the trustee or debtor enters into an escrow arrangement after the commencement of the case ( 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(7)) does not convert those escrowed funds into estate property.
discussed
Cited "see"
Sonitrol Financial Corp. v. Oklahoma City Abstract & Title Co. (In Re Yeary)
See In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp., 917 F.2d 424 , 426 (10th Cir.1990); In re Seneca Oil Co., 906 F.2d 1445 , 1453 (10th Cir.1990); In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 817 F.2d 682 , 684 (10th Cir.1987); First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Gillman, 158 B.R. 498 (D.Utah 1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
John Harvey Adamson v. Samuel A. Lewis, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections
(2×)
See Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168 , 1172 n. 7 (9th Cir.) (collecting cases), amended by 917 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.1990). 27 District courts and appellate panels are fully capable of applying the Supreme Court precedent and distinguishing it from circuit court precedent that is inconsistent.
cited
Cited "see"
CCDC Financial Corp. v. Craven (In re CCDC Financial Corp.)
See First Capital Mortgage Loan Corporation, 917 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir.1990) (By definition, property held by the debtor in trust is not part of the bankruptcy estate).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In re Silver
Compare Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Corporation), 917 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc) (no constructive trust on funds which were transferred to a good faith transferee prepetition and then recovered by the trustee). b.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Burtch v. Ganz (In Re Mushroom Transportation Co.)
See 28 Am.Jur.2d, Escrow § 20 (2000); see also In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp., 99 B.R. 462 , 464 n. 1 (D.Utah 1987) (“At times courts also refer to escrow agents as ‘trustees,’ but in a strict sense an escrow agent is not a trustee because he does not hold legal title to the property entrusted to Mm”), rev’d, 872 F.2d 335 (10th Cir.1989), panel decision vacated, district court aff'd, 917 F.2d 424 , 428 n. 3 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc) (“Significant authority exists for the proposition that an escrow holder is an agent with neither legal nor equitable title to the funds it h…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Burtch v. Hydraquip, Inc. (In Re Mushroom Transportation Co.)
Thus, the plaintiff was obligated to plead that the defendants knew or should have known “that the money [paid to them] was procured by fraudulent means.” Id., at 288 ; see also In re First Capital Mortg., Loan Corp., 917 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir.1990) (“Once the funds were transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value, neither the debtor nor [the trust beneficiary] had any claim to them”); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 142 B.R. at 639 (applying New York law); cf. Colonia Ins.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
In Re Southeast Railroad Contractors, Inc.
See Barber v. McCord Auto Supply, Inc. (In re Pearson Indus., Inc.), 178 B.R. 753, 761-62 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1995) (holding that “where the secured creditor has no independent claim to the property which is subject to the trustee’s avoiding powers and could not recover it from the third party, the secured creditor cannot improve its position because of the trustee’s exercise of the avoiding powers and assert an additional claim by claiming it from the trustee who recovered it.... ”); Lease-A-Fleet, Inc. v. University Cadillac, Inc. (In re Lease-A-Fleet, Inc.), 152 B.R. 431, 439 (Bankr.E.D.…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Robert J. Blair, Jr. v. Secretary of the Army
Consequently, the courts have no jurisdiction over FTCA claims where the Secretary of Labor determines that FECA applies." (quotations omitted)); see also Sheehan v. United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.), amended, 917 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.1990). 1 9 Here, the defendant submitted documentation showing that Blair had pursued a FECA remedy for his on-the-job injuries and had received compensation for his claim.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
54 Fair empl.prac.cas. 688, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,378, 5 indiv.empl.rts.cas. 1664 Joan Sheehan, Formerly Known as Joan Wycoff
v.
United States
v.
United States
88-15120.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Nov 6, 1990.
Browning, Pregerson, Thompson.
Cited by 21 opinions | Published
Citer courts: D. Alaska (1) · D. Arizona (1)
ORDER
The opinion filed February 16, 1990 is amended as follows: (1) add the following footnote after “(citations omitted).” on line 12, 896 F.2d 1168, 1174:
Our decision reviewing the scope of FTCA coverage in this case does not conflict with the cases from other circuits cited by the government in its petition for rehearing. Each of those cases denies review of the Secretary’s decisions in circumstances where “coverage in and of itself” is the issue. See Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472 (5th Cir.1986) (whether injury occurred while employee was at work); Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.1984) (whether injury occurred while plaintiff was Navy employee); DiPippa v. United States, 687 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.1982) (whether injury was work-related); Gill v. United States, 641 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.1981) (same).
and (2) strike the final paragraph on 896 F.2d at 1174 beginning “Moreover, we have jurisdiction____”
With this amendment, the panel has voted to deny appellee’s petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en bane and no active judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. (Fed.R.App.P. 35.)
The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.