green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 11×
34.9 score
G Cite
cited 7× by 7 distinct cases, 2018–2025 · 4 courts ·
…agencies must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000
2013
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Olowo, Esther v. Ashcroft, John D.
But cf. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1351 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that the INS’ determination “that six-year-old children lack sufficient capacity to assert, on their own, an asylum claim—is [not] unreasonable”).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Esther Olowo v. John D. Ashcroft, United States Attorney General
But cf. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1351 (11th Cir.2000) (finding that the INS’ determination "that six-year-old children lack sufficient capacity to assert, on their own, an asylum claim — is [not] unreasonable”).
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Movimiento Democracia, Inc. v. Johnson
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
as a matter of law, it is not for the courts, but for the executive agency charged with enforcing the statute.. .to choose how.to fill such gaps.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Aileen Lisabet Piedra v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
agencies must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Overton v. O'Malley (CONSENT)
agencies must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Puryear v. Saul
agencies must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
U.S. Federal Credit Union v. Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A.
where congress has committed the enforcement of a statute to a particular executive agency, 28 usca11 case: 20-13462 date filed: 12/22/2020 page: 29 of 44 congress has sufficiently indicated its intent that statutory gaps be filled by the executive agency.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Gayle v. Field Office Director Miami Field Office
agencies must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Richardson v. Berryhill
agencies must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Hall v. Saul
agencies must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Lindell Washington v. Commissioner of Social Security
agencies must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Alabama Environmental Council v. Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
an after-the- fact rationalization of agency action-an explanation developed for the sole purpose of defending in court the agency's acts-is usually entitled to no deference from the courts.
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Tammy Burke v. John Smith
hen a parent brings an action on behalf of a child, and it is evident that the interests of each are the same, no need exists for someone other than the parent to represent the child's interests under rule 17(c).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Oscar Alberto Donaire-Jarquin v. U.S. Attorney General
Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (quota- tion marks omitted) (quoting Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Linda J. Romano-Murphy v. Commissioner
(3×)
Id. (citing Gonzales, 212 F.3d at 1349). !
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ashok Kumar Gandalal Patel v. U.S. Attorney General
“Not all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
F.L.B. v. Lynch
In Gonzalez, the. plaintiff, Elian Gonzalez, arrived in the United States at the age of six, having endured a boat ride from Cuba during which his mother died. 212 F.3d at 1344.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Department of Agriculture
(2×)
Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1350; see also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 , 83 S.Ct. 239, 246 , 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962) (“The courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jiaren Shi v. U.S. Attorney General
This conduct when taken as a whole exceeds the abuse presented in Zheng and Djonda , and makes it very hard for us to simply characterize what the police did to Shi as mere “harassment or intimidation,” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mejia v. U.S. Attorney General
While a “few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation” do not demonstrate past persecution, Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355 (citation omitted), the threats and attacks the petitioners suffered were neither “isolated” nor simply “harassment.” Mejia was physically attacked twice: once when a large rock was thrown at him and once when members of the FARC pointed a gun at his head and then broke his nose with the butt of a rifle.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Luis Heladio Acuna Romero v. U.S. Atty. General
As we have discussed previously, “persecution” is an “extreme concept,” requiring “more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Edmond Cenolli v. U.S. Attorney General
Furthermore, “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Alejandro Rondon v. U.S. Attorney General
Furthermore, “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Maria Parra v. U.S. Attorney General
Furthermore, “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355; see also Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that five-day detention during which petitioner was not harmed, petitioner’s termination from his job and inability to find another in that city, and occasional search of his parents’ home by the police constituted harassment but did not compel a finding of past persecution).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Doris De La I. Tavera Lara v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
Furthermore, “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Diego Leon Guzman v. U.S. Attorney General
Furthermore, “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Frazier Ex Rel. Frazier v. Alexandre
Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1346, n. 7 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Harry Marquez v. U.S. Attorney General
The telephone calls that allegedly came from FARC guerillas were merely “a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cielo Castro Arango v. U.S. Attorney General
Demonstrating past persecution requires showing “more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or in *854 timidation,” and “mere harassment does not amount to persecution.” Id. (citing Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2000)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fawzi Aboushehata v. U.S. Attorney General
Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Goss Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft
While “[rjespect for the authority of the executive branch in foreign affairs is a well-established theme in our law....,” it “does not mean [however] that the executive branch has unbridled discretion in creating and in implementing policy.” Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1349.
discussed
Cited "see"
Olivia Dsouza v. U.S. Attorney General
“Persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.” Del- gado, 487 F.3d at 861 (alteration adopted) (quoting Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005)); accord Murugan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 10 F.4th 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355 (11th Cir. 2000))).
discussed
Cited "see"
Karastan Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing to and analyzing Chenery when discussing the different levels of deference afforded to agency adjudications).
discussed
Cited "see"
Karastan Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing to and analyzing Chenery when discussing the different lev- els of deference afforded to agency adjudications).
discussed
Cited "see"
Abraham Lincoln Memorial Hospital v. Sebelius
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1350 (11th Cir.2003) (noting that “[a]n after-the-fact rationalization of agency action — an explanation developed for the sole purpose of defending in court the agency’s acts — is usually entitled to no deference from the courts,” but concluding that the agency’s position, developed in the course of administrative proceedings before litigation commenced is not such a justification).
discussed
Cited "see"
Catherine A. Raniolo v. Commissioner of Social Security
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1351 (11th Cir. 2000) (accepting agency interpretation where it “comes within the range of reasonable choices” in interpreting statutory text).
cited
Cited "see"
Marlene Del S. Torres-Sanchez v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355 (11th Cir.2000).
cited
Cited "see"
Imelda Maria Efie Suharti v. U.S. Attorney General
See Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1355 (not all offensive or exceptional treatment is persecution).
cited
Cited "see"
Julio Jimenez Pablo v. U.S. Attorney General
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355 (llth Cir.2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County School Board
(2×)
See generally, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1350 & n. 14 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that the INS had determined that Cuba is "a communist-totalitarian state," and quoting the U.S. Dept. of State, 1999 Country Reports *1214 on Human Rights Practices: Cuba (2000) for the proposition that "Cuba is a totalitarian state," where the Communist Party "exercises control over all aspects of Cuban life"); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 537 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1272 (S.D.Fla.2008) (referring to "totalitarian Cuba's forced labor system"); Rodriguez v. Ridge, 310 F.Supp.2d 1242, 1246 (S.D.Fla.2004) (refer…
discussed
Cited "see"
Honglun Lei v. U.S. Attorney General
See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226 , 1231 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (persecution requires “ ‘more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation’ ”) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355 (11th Cir.2000)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Jose Antonio Zakia Antor v. U.S. Attorney General
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir.1998) for the holding that “ ‘persecution’ requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty”).
discussed
Cited "see"
Gabriel Salvatierra v. U.S. Attorney General
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355 (11th Cir.2000) (explaining that persecution is an “extreme concept,” which “requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty” and that “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution”).
cited
Cited "see"
Roman Ashnurov v. U.S. Attorney General
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355 (11th Cir.2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
Fransiscus Lukman Wibowo v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355 (11th Cir.2000); see also Ghaly v. I.N.S, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir.1995) (explaining that “persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive”).
cited
Cited "see"
Donato Dalrymple v. United States
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir.2000). 3 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Hernan Montagut Cifuentes v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
DISCUSSION An alien seeking asylum must show that he suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A); see Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1230. “[Persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (internal quotations omitted). “ ‘[M]ere harassment does not amount to persecution,”’ Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355-56 (11th Cir…
cited
Cited "see"
Juan G. Cadavid Jimenez v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 , 1355.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Elian Gonzalez
v.
Janet Reno
v.
Janet Reno
00-11424.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jun 1, 2000.
212 F.3d 1338
Published
SCI LIQUIDATING CORPORATION, f.k.a. Sunrise Carpet Industries, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee.
v.
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, a Connecticut Corporation, Defendants-Appellants,
No. 98-9069.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
June 20, 2000.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (No. 97-00124-4-CV- HLM); Harold L. Murphy, Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
v.
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, a Connecticut Corporation, Defendants-Appellants,
No. 98-9069.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
June 20, 2000.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (No. 97-00124-4-CV- HLM); Harold L. Murphy, Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The facts in this case are set out in our prior opinion, in which we certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Georgia on a controlling issue of law:
DOES SEXUAL HARASSMENT OR RETALIATION BY A SUPERVISOR TRIGGER EXCLUSION SIXTEEN ON PAGE THREE OF THE UMBRELLA INSURANCE POLICY IN THIS CASE, WHERE THE INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUDES: "COVERAGE AFFORDED ANY OF [THE INSURED'S] EMPLOYEES TO 'BODILY INJURY' OR 'PERSONAL INJURY' ... TO OTHER EMPLOYEES ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT"?
SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir.1999). The Supreme Court
of Georgia responded, "we find that exclusion sixteen of the umbrella policy does not exclude coverage for Sunrise's claims originating from the sexual harassment suit." SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 526 S.E.2d 555, 556 (Ga.2000). In light of the Supreme Court of Georgia's response, we find that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiff-Appellee SCI Liquidating Corporation ("SCI") was covered under the umbrella policy's "personal injury" provisions.
The district court found that SCI was covered under both the umbrella policy's "personal injury"
provisions and the commercial general liability policy's "bodily injury" provisions. We reaffirm our prior holding that the district court erred in finding coverage under the commercial general liability policy. See
SCI Liquidating Corp., 181 F.3d at 1217. Thus, we reverse the judgment for SCI against Defendant-
Appellant Hartford Fire Insurance Company.
Because we conclude that SCI was covered under the umbrella policy and because the amount of damages is not in dispute, we affirm the judgment for SCI against Defendant-Appellant Hartford Casualty
Insurance Company in the amount of $ 187,972.21, plus prejudgment interest, and $3,384 in costs.
REVERSED IN PART and AFFIRMED IN PART.
[*2]