green
Positive treatment
Trending · 57 recent citers
Quoted verbatim 4×
51.6 score
G Cite
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases ·
…ven a casual comparison of the two compositions compels the conclusion that the two compositions are practically identical.
at p. 1232
⚠ not in text
Topic ↗
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002
2014
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Thornton v. J Jargon Co.
In a criminal copyright action, the Eleventh Circuit held that "[i]n copyright infringement actions, the period of limitation begins on the date of the last infringing act.” United States v. Shabazz, 724 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir.1984); but see Calhoun, 298 F.3d at 1236 (Birch, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he limitations period may be triggered when a plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known about an infringement.”); see also Brewer-Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281 , 1285 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that "The broadcast of the offending E…
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Pharrell Williams v. Frankie Gaye
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
ven a casual comparison of the two compositions compels the conclusion that the two compositions are practically identical.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Pharrell Williams v. Frankie Gaye
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
ven a casual comparison of the two compositions compels the conclusion that the two compositions are practically identical.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Bridgette Burgin v. Tim LaHaye
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited "see"
once offers evidence of independent creation, has the burden of proving that in fact copied .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Williams v. Gaye
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
ven a casual comparison of the two compositions compels the conclusion that the two compositions are practically identical.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
George Lee Clark v. Dr. Eben Alexander, III
Two works are substantially similar when the “average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appro- priated from the original work.” Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citation omit- ted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sound and Color, LLC v. Smith
Cf. id. at 102 (noting “the limited number of musical notes (as opposed to words in a language)” (quoting Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002))).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Science Photo Library Limited v. Bell Performance, Inc.
(3×)
Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g., 298 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring) (“The limitations period may be triggered when a plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known about an infringement.”).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Morford v. Cattelan
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
“Proof of access and substantial similarity raises only a presumption of copying which may be rebutted by [the defendant] with evidence of independent creation.” Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sherman Nealy v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc.
On the other hand, it also means that a claim accrues only one time: “when a copyright own- ership claim is time-barred, ‘all those claims logically following therefrom should be barred, including infringement claims.’” Web- ster, 955 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Griffin v. Google
A. Copyright Infringement Copyright infringement claims have two elements: the plaintiff must possess a valid copyright, and the defendant must have copied the “[original] constituent elements of the copyrighted work[.]” Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’ng, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Feist v. Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Marcus Gray v. Katheryn Hudson
See Satava, 323 F.3d at 812 & n.5 (expressing concerns over monopolization when limited creative choices are available); see also Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1079–80 (Watford, J., concurring) (“There are relatively few ways to express a combination of five basic elements in just four measures, especially given the constraints of particular musical conventions and styles . . . . [O]nce [the artist] settled on using a descending chromatic scale in A minor, there were a limited number of chord progressions that could reasonably accompany that bass line (while still sounding pleasant to the ear).”…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Tolbert v. High Noon Productions LLC
Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Griffin v. Google
There are two requisite elements for a copyright infringement claim: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) copying of “constituent elements of the copyrighted work that are original.” Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kobi Karp Architecture & Interior Design, Inc. v. O'Donnell Dannwolf and Partners Architects, Inc.
Calhoun v. Lillenas Publishing, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Buddy Webster v. Dean Guitars
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that federal claims generally “accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action”); Calhoun v. Lilenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring) (noting that a copyright infringement claim’s “limitations period may be triggered when a plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known about an infringement”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Thomas S. Ross v. Apple, Inc.
To establish copying, the second prong of a copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff may show that the defendant (1) had access to the copyrighted work, and (2) the two works are so “substantially similar” that “an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the original work.” Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Charles Watt v. Dennis Butler
(6×)
also: Cited "see"
Calhoun, 298 F.3d at 1232, 1234 n. 11.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lee McCaskill v. Margot L. Ray
(2×)
Thus, because McCaskill showed she owned a valid copyright and Ray had copied constituent elements of the copyrighted work, McCaskill established a prima facie case of copyright infringement that Ray failed to rebut. 4 See Calhoun, 298 F.3d at 1232.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fun Spot of Florida, Inc. v. Magical Midway of Central Florida, Ltd.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
As to the second element, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work, and that the alleged copy is substantially similar so that “an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the original work.” Calhoun, 298 F.3d at 1232, quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d 821 , 829 (11th Cir.1982).
cited
Cited "see"
Kobi Karp Architecture & Interior Design, Inc. v. CASTELLANOS DESIGN STUDIO, LLC
See Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002).
discussed
Cited "see"
Roberts v. Gordy
See Calhoun v. Lillenas Publishing, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that, on summary judgment, a defendant "can fully negate" a prima facie case of copyright infringement); Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Cont'l Homes, Inc. , 785 F.2d 897 , 903 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining that if a plaintiff presents " prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate," "[t]he burden then shifts to the defendants to rebut this presumption of validity."); see also Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. , 342 F.3d 149 (…
cited
Cited "see"
Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources
See Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1236 (11th Cir.2002) (a delay of over 23 years is presumed unreasonable when the plaintiff knew of the legal remedies available).
cited
Cited "see"
Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C.
Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, 193 F.3d 1241 , 1247-48 (11th Cir.1999); accord Calhoun v. Lillenas Publishing, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1232 (11th Cir. *1167 2002).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Garland Wayne Carr, Jr.
See Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1230 n. 2 (11th Cir.2002) (‘We may affirm the district court on different grounds as long as the judgment entered is correct on any legal ground regardless of the grounds addressed, adopted or rejected by the district court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited "see"
John Williams v. Robert B. Carney
See Calhoun v. Lillenas Publishing, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1230 n.2 (11th Cir.2002) (holding we “may affirm the district court on different grounds as long as ‘the judgment entered is correct on any legal ground regardless of the grounds addressed, adopted or rejected by the district court’”).
cited
Cited "see"
Nicholls v. Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc.
See Calhoun v. Lillenas Publishing, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1230 n. 3 (11th Cir.2002); Keeler Brass Co. v. Continental Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1065-66 (4th Cir.1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Beidleman v. Random House, Inc.
See Warren Freedenfeld Assocs., 531 F.3d at 44-46 ; Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir.2007); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 653 (8th Cir.2004); Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 , *1134 796 (4th Cir.2001); Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir.1994); see also Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ’g, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1236 (11th Cir.2002) (Birch, J., specially concurring) (“The limitations period may be triggered when a plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the infringeme…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Jasper v. Bovina Music, Inc.
Appx. 579, 582 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished opinion) ("Publishing royalties ... arise by statute [ 17 U.S.C. § 115 ] and compensate the owner of a musical composition for use of the copyrighted material at a set statutory rate."); see also Calhoun v. Lillenas Publishing, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1234 (11th Cir.2002) (intended meaning unclear).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Jasper v. Bovina Music, Inc.
Appx. 579, 582 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished opinion) ("Publishing royalties ... arise by statute [ 17 U.S.C. § 115 ] and compensate the owner of a musical composition for use of the copyrighted material at a set statutory rate."); see also Calhoun v. Lillenas Publishing, 298 F.3d 1228 , 1234 (llth Cir.2002) (intended meaning unclear).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Andrew J. WAGNER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAEWOO HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA CORPORATION, Jack Mosler, George Valencia, David O’dell, Donald Adams, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
v.
DAEWOO HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA CORPORATION, Jack Mosler, George Valencia, David O’dell, Donald Adams, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
01-11998.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jul 23, 2002.
Stephen M. Katz, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Dudley Cecile Rochelle, L. Stanford Sherrill, Jr., Littler Mendelson, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Edmondson, Tjoflat, Anderson, Birch, Dubina, Black, Carnes, Barkett, Hull, Marcus, Wilson.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (1) · Ninth Circuit (1)
BY THE COURT:
A member of this court in active service having requested a poll on whether this case should be reheard by the Court sitting en banc, and a majority of the judges in this court in active service having voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that the above cause shall be reheard by this court en banc. The previous panel’s opinion is hereby VACATED.