green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
11.4 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2000–2018 · 2 courts ·
…a judgment that has been vacated, reversed, or set aside on appeal is thereby deprived of all conclusive effect, both as res judicata and as collateral estoppel.
at p. 1469
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Hernandez
a judgment that has been vacated, reversed, or set aside on appeal is thereby deprived of all conclusive effect, both as res judicata and as collateral estoppel.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
United Western Bank v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
franklin ii
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Schand v. City of Springfield
Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Superv., 35 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1994)). 10 Further review by the First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that it was unlikely that Johnson’s prior criminal proceeding was vacated or invalidated because it continued to be cited as precedent.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Columbian Financial Corporation v. Stork
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1471 (10th Cir. 1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jackson v. Coalter
Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Superv., 35 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir.1994); 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Franklin Savings Corp. v. United States
Ass’n, 35 F.3d at 1472 (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram
Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir.1994) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 662 (1st Cir.1997) (“Vacating a consent decree ... wipes the slate clean, not only rendering the decree sterile for future purposes, but also eviscerating any collateral effects and, indeed, casting a shadow on past actions taken under the decree’s imprimatur.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph A. v. Lawrence B. Ingram
Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 662 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Vacating a consent decree . . . wipes the slate clean, not only rendering the decree sterile for future purposes, but also eviscerating any collateral effects and, indeed, casting a shadow on past actions taken under the decree's imprimatur.").
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph A. Ex Rel. Wolfe v. Ingram
Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir.1994) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649, 662 (1st Cir.1997) (“Vacating a consent decree ... wipes the slate clean, not only rendering the decree sterile for future purposes, but also eviscerating any collateral effects and, indeed, casting a shadow on past actions taken under the decree’s imprimatur.”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lee R. Phillips v. Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, in Her Official Capacity and Department of the Air Force
Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir.1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Phillips v. Widnall
Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
First National Insurance v. Federal Deposit Insurance
“A judgment that has been vacated, reversed or set aside on appeal is thereby deprived of all conclusive effect, both as res judicata and as collateral estoppel.” Franklin Savings Ass’n. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1466 (11th Cir.1988)); see also Ornellas v. Oakley, 618 F.2d 1351, 1356 (9th Cir.1980).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Double J. Land & Cattle Co. v. United States Department of the Interior
The Due Process Clause protects against the improper deprivation of a significant property interest. ‘Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.’ Franklin Savings Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1471 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 , 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)) (further…
discussed
Cited "see"
Franklin Savings Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision
See Franklin Savings Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 35 F.3d 1466, 1471 (10th Cir.1994) (observing that FSA and its stockholders did not retain authority to control specific assets after the conservator took control); see also, e.g., Delta Sav.
cited
Cited "see"
Franklin Savings Corp. v. United States (In Re Franklin Savings Corp.)
See Franklin II, 821 F.Supp. at 1418-24 , aff'd, 35 F.3d at 1469-71. 7 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Franklin Savings Corporation v. United States
(2×)
See 35 F.3d at 1468. 4 In 1990 the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) determined that FSA was "in an unsafe and unsound condition to transact business" and appointed the RTC as its conservator. 2 FSA and its parent, Franklin Savings Corporation (FSC), filed suit under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to remove the conservator.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Michael RIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTD., and the Shipping Corporation of India, Defendants-Appellees
v.
SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTD., and the Shipping Corporation of India, Defendants-Appellees
92-55139.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Sep 30, 1994.
Wood, Reinhardt, Rymer.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
Citer courts: District of Columbia (1) · N.D. Oklahoma (1)
ORDER
The Supreme Court vacated our opinion, reprinted at 8 F.3d 1442, and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., — U.S. —, —, 114 S.Ct. 2057, 2064, 129 L.Ed.2d 78 (1994). Accordingly, consistent with the Howlett decision, we now affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the vessel. The district court’s decision is
AFFIRMED.