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…fficers with a particularized basis to believe that a situation may pose safety risks may handcuff or point a gun at an individual without converting an investigative detention into an arrest.
at p. 884
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Juan Price
fficers with a particularized basis to believe that a situation may pose safety risks may handcuff or point a gun at an individual without converting an investigative detention into an arrest.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Coleman v. Ortiz
officers with a particularized basis to believe that a situation may pose safety risks may 1 arrest
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Juan Price
fficers with a particularized basis to believe that a situation may pose safety risks may handcuff or point a gun at an individual without converting an investigative detention into an arrest.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
United States v. Don White
it is undisputed that probable cause to conduct a full-scale search arose at the latest when the agents encountered the smell of unburned marijuana emanating from the vehicle.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Williams
Because Williams did not raise that Brady claim below, we review it “only to determine if [its] denial would constitute plain error affecting [his] substantial rights.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Eisenmann v. Cox
An “arrest” occurs when an officer’s conduct “would cause a reasonable person to feel that . . . she will not be free to leave after brief questioning” but rather “that indefinite custodial detention is inevitable.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Robert Hamilton
United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gonzalez-Silva
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 730, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Justin Beasley
United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Irvine v. Cook
United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 208–09 (1979)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
(PS) Grissom v. Modesto Police Department
See id. at 701– 28 04; U.S. v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009); Alexander, 64 F.3d at 1320 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ulysses Ward
Because Ward did not raise this Brady claim in the district court, we review “to determine if [its] denial would constitute plain error affecting the appellant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Leibel v. Buckeye, City of
Thus, for purposes of assessing whether a Terry stop 21 transformed into an arrest, the question isn’t simply whether the suspect’s freedom to leave 22 was curtailed at any point during the encounter—rather, the question is whether the 23 intrusive measures “would cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she will not be free 24 to leave after brief questioning—i.e., that indefinite custodial detention is inevitable.” 25 United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 26 This standard is not satisfied where, as here, the use of force is to pr…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lidia Gonzalez v. County of Los Angeles
United States v. 4 Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 5 1244, 1252 (9th Cir. 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. James Brown
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
In distinguishing between a Terry stop and a full- blown arrest, we consider whether “a reasonable person would believe that he [or she] is being subjected to more than a temporary detention,” Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d at 884 (simplified), as well as “the justification for the use of such tactics, i.e., whether the officer had sufficient basis to fear for his safety to warrant the intrusiveness of the action taken,” United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2014) (simplified).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Tamaran Bontemps
We review determinations of reasonable suspicion de novo, but “factual findings underlying those determinations are reviewed for clear error, giving ‘due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement.’” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 881 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
El Paso County, Texas v. Trump
(2×)
Br. 6, 7-9, ECF No. 134 (citing United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 889 (9th Cir. 2009) (Government has a “strong interest [ ]” in “interdicting the flow of drugs” entering the United States)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Archer v. Orr
“The standard for determining whether a person is under arrest is not simply whether a person believes that he is free to leave, but rather whether a reasonable person would believe that he is being subjected to more than [a] temporary detention[.]” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “‘[W]here force is used such that the innocent person could reasonably have believed he was not free to go and -13- that he was being taken into custody indefinitely, an arrest has occurred.’” Id. (quoting Kraus v. Pierce County, 793 F.2d 1105, 1109 …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sierra Club v. Donald Trump
Cf. United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 889 (9th Cir. 2009).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Sierra Club v. Donald Trump
Cf. United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 889 (9th Cir. 2009).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Tuan Lam
At that point, a “reasonable person” would not “feel that he or she [would] be free to leave after brief questioning.” United States v. Guzman–Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 3 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mendez
(2×)
Because the primary purpose of a border search is to seize contraband property sought to be brought into the country, see United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877 (9th Cir. 2009), the government may search wherever evidence of contraband may be found, so long as the scope and duration of the search is reasonable.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Olushola Akinmboni v. United States
Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603, 607 (D.C.1996); United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 886 (9th Cir.2009).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Vargas Ramirez v. United States
Specifically, “it is well-established that intrusive measures may convert a stop into an arrest if the measures would cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she will not be free to leave after brief questioning.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir.2009).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Warren v. Marcus
The test is whether “a reasonable innocent person in these circumstances would not have felt free to leave after brief questioning,” id., “i.e., that indefinite custodial detention is inevitable.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Kraus, 793 F.2d at 1109 (“where force is used such that the innocent person could reasonably have believed he was not free to go and that he was being taken into custody indefinitely, an arrest has occurred.” (citation omitted))).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Reginald Edwards
This “inquiry is undertaken ... from the perspective of law enforcement,” while bearing in mind that “the purpose of a Terry stop is to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Theodore Stewart
The typical extended border search takes place at a location “away from the border where entry is not apparent, but where the dual requirements of reasonable certainty of a recent border crossing and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity are satisfied.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 878-79 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Plascencia v. Taylor
(2×)
See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1112 (“We reject the notion that an excessive force claim is subsumed in an unlawful arrest claim in the facts presented by this case.”); see also Romero v. Story, 672 F.3d 880, 882 (10th Cir. 2012) (analyzing unlawful arrest and excessive force claims separately). 8 unreasonable force.”); United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is well-established that intrusive measures may convert a stop into an arrest” under certain circumstances including those in which “force is used.” (quotation omitted)); Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Howard Cotterman
(2×)
We have “define[d] an extended border search as any search away from the border where entry is not apparent, but where the dual requirements of reasonable certainty of a recent border crossing and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity are satisfied.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 878-79 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rufino Valdes-Vega
(2×)
Cf. United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 882 (9th Cir.2009) (noting that the officer testified that it was rare to see Mexican plates where he spotted the defendant’s vehicle).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Newman v. San Joaquin Delta Community College District
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir.2009).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Michael Palumbo
“The standard for determining whether a person is under arrest is not simply whether a person believes that he is free to leave.” United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). “[Ijntrusive measures may convert a stop into an arrest if the measures would cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she will not be free to leave after brief questioning — i.e., that indefinite custodial detention is inevitable.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir.2009) (citation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Lopez
United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 890 (9th Cir.2009).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Cotterman
(2×)
Finally, the district court concluded that the customs officers "acted so presumptively, without even considering whether they had reasonable suspicion," because of their reliance on ICE field guidelines and an official memorandum "that make[ ] clear that electronic media may be seized at the border without any individualized suspicion." Thus, the district court made a factual finding that none of the other circumstances were even considered; the agents decided to take the equipment because they were told they could absent suspicion. [8] An extended border search is a "search away from the bor…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Redlightning
The “reasonable person” test is an objective test, California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), applied from the viewpoint of an innocent person, United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir.2009), and considering the readily apparent personal characteristics of the accused, see, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ; United States v. Moreno, 742 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that a factor in determining whether the defendant was seized was that the defendant was a Colombian citizen with limited English skills).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Villasenor
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
On account of the “practical difficulty of getting to and searching every vehicle or carrier at the precise moment it crosses land or sea borders,” id., border searches sometimes occur “at the functional equivalent of a border,” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877 (9th Cir.2009) (quotation marks omitted); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 , 93 S.Ct. 2535 , 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (citing “a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Stewart
The Ninth Circuit explained that “[ejxtended border searches, which ‘occur after the actual entry has been effected and intrude more on an individual’s normal expectation of privacy!,] ... must be justified by “reasonable suspicion” that the subject of the search was involved in criminal activity.’ ” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877-78 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir.1985)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Edgar Tapia
When a Brady issue is not raised below, however, this Court reviews the claim “only to determine if [its] denial would constitute plain error affecting the appellant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Guzmarir-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 890 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Palos-Marquez
Because the UPS driver’s in-person tip had such indicia of reliability, and in light of the notoriety of the area for alien smuggling, the pickup’s high rate of speed, and the pickup occupants’ nervous demeanor, there was more than enough evidence to “paint a picture that would create in the mind of a trained border patrol agent a reasonable suspicion that the [vehicle’s occupants were] engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 882 (9th Cir.2009) (quotation and citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Ricardo Palos-Marquez
Because the UPS driver’s in-person tip had such indicia of reliability, and in light of the notoriety of the area for alien smuggling, the pickup’s high rate of speed, and the pickup occupants’ nervous demeanor, there was more 1262 UNITED STATES v. PALOS-MARQUEZ than enough evidence to “paint a picture that would create in the mind of a trained border patrol agent a reasonable suspi- cion that the [vehicle’s occupants were] engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 882 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation and citation omitted).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Carlo Zaccagnini
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Extended border searches, 1 “which occur after the actual entry has been effect *134 ed and intrude more on an individual’s normal expectation of privacy[,] ... must be justified by reasonable suspicion that the subject of the search was involved in criminal activity.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877-78 (9th Cir.2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. David Perez-Lemos
United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 882 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Franco-Munoz, 952 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir.1991)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bailey v. County of San Joaquin
In determining whether a seizure is reasonable, “courts consider the totality of the circumstances, ... and ‘balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’ ” U.S. v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 876-77 (9th Cir.2009) quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 , 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) and citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) and Samson v. Ca., 547 U.S. 843, 848 , 126 S.Ct. 2193 , 165…
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Jones
See United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 889 (9th Cir. 2009).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Brooks
See United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865 , 886 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 558 F.2d 956 , 964–65 (9th Cir. 1977).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Jones
See United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 889 (9th Cir. 2009).
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Kenneth Door
See United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865 , 877 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that claims, not arguments, are waived or forfeited).9 An enhancement for obstructing or impeding the administration of justice is warranted if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
discussed
Cited "see"
United States v. Po Choe
See United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 881 (9th Cir. 2009) (listing factors to be considered in a Border Patrol search); United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the totality of the circumstances includes “the collective knowledge of the officers involved”). 3.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Willie Clifton
Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996); see United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Sharron Crabb
See United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
DO SUNG UHM; Eun Sook Uhm, a married couple, individually and for all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HUMANA INC., a Delaware corporation; Humana Health Plan Inc., a Kentucky corporation doing business as Humana, Defendants-Appellees.
v.
HUMANA INC., a Delaware corporation; Humana Health Plan Inc., a Kentucky corporation doing business as Humana, Defendants-Appellees.
06-35672.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jul 22, 2009.
Scott C. Breneman, Breneman Law Firm, Joseph Andrew Grube, Ricci Grube Aita, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Brian D. Boyle, Mark Davies, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, DC, Mary Rebecca Knack, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: B. FLETCHER, RICHARD A. PAEZ and MARSHA S. BERZON,[*] Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Appellees' request for reconsideration shall be treated as a petition for panel rehearing and is GRANTED. The opinion filed on August 25, 2008 and reported at 540 F.3d 980 (9th Cir.2008) is WITHDRAWN and shall not be cited as precedent. The petition for rehearing en banc is moot. The panel will file a new disposition in due course.
[*] Due to the unavailability of Senior District Judge William Schwarzer, Judge Berzon has been randomly drawn as a replacement judge.