Edom Williams v. Edwin Schario, 93 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 1996). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Edom Williams v. Edwin Schario, 93 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 1996).
Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 95-3912Aug 23, 1996

Edom Williams v. Edwin Schario, 93 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 1996)

Quick Summary
40 citation events (33 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Cited for
At page 528Guilty plea foreclosing section 1983 claims for arrest13 citing casesholding fingerprints are non-testimonial evidence, the admissibility of which is not affected by Miranda1 citing court put it this way · 1 cautionary
  • Jackson v. Rosen, No. 2:20-cv-02842 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020). Cited "but see"
    Pa. 2014) (“Heck does not bar a claim where a plaintiff seeks damages for the defendant’s use of improper procedures, so long as the validity of a plaintiff’s conviction is not called into question.”); but see Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d…
  • McBee, No. 4:24-cv-04118 (W.D. Ark. June 8, 2026). 2 cites
    Further, even if Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim is not barred by Heck, “a guilty plea forecloses a section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.” Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1996).
  • Kennedy v. White Cnty., No. 4:24-cv-00219 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 24, 2024).
    Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1996). e Kennedy’s individual capacity claim that Assistant Chief Gossett maliciously charged him with theft, despite knowing that Kennedy had been unsuccessful in using Avey’s credit card…
  • Brown v. Haupert, No. 3:21-cv-03019 (D.S.D. Mar. 21, 2023).
    Indeed, Brown’s guilty plea “forecloses a section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.” Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1996).
  • Hurst v. Sikes, No. 5:20-cv-05158 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 24, 2022).
    Malady v. Crunk, 902 F.2d 10, 11-12 (8th Cir. 1990); Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1996).
  • Charles Odom v. Kenan Kaizer, 638 F. App'x 553 (8th Cir. 2016).unpublished
    The district court concluded Odom’s guilty plea to the offenses for which he was arrested foreclosed his claim, citing this court’s rule that “a guilty plea forecloses a section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.” Williams v. Sc…
  • Timothy Collins v. Larry D. Bruns, 195 F. App'x 533 (8th Cir. 2006).unpublished
    The court further concluded that Collins’s guilty plea foreclosed his damages claim for any federal or state constitutional claims arising out of the conviction, citing Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam),…
  • Sam Thurmond-Green v. Gene Hodges, 128 F. App'x 551 (8th Cir. 2005).unpublished
    First, while there is case law in this circuit holding a guilty plea forecloses a section 1983 claim of arrest without probable cause, see Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam); Malady v. Crunk, 902 F.2d 10,…
  • Brian Gooden v. Calvin Lovorn, 32 F. App'x 179 (8th Cir. 2002).unpublished
    Additionally, Gooden’s guilty plea foreclosed any claim that he was arrested without probable cause, see Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam); he did not allege, in connection with his Miranda claim, that an…
  • Rice v. Barnes, 966 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1997).published
    See Williams, 93 F.3d at 528; R.S.
Show 3 more citing cases
  • United States v. Ramos-Flores, 233 F. App'x 347 (5th Cir. 2007).unpublished
    (holding fingerprints are non-testimonial evidence, the admissibility of which is not affected by Miranda)
  • Jackson v. Loftis, 189 F. App'x 775 (10th Cir. 2006).unpublished
    See, e.g., Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1996); Maietta v. Artuz, 84 F.3d 100 , 102 n. 1 (2d Cir.1996); Preast v. McGill, 65 F.Supp.2d 395 , 409 & n. 10 (S.D.W.Va.1999).
  • United States v. Carvajal-Garcia, 54 F. App'x 732 (3d Cir. 2002).unpublished
    See, e.g., Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Snow, 82 F.3d 935, 943 (10th Cir.1996).
At page 529Barring § 1983 claims when conviction invalidity is implied8 citing cases“a guilty plea forecloses a section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.”3 citing courts quote it · 1 cautionary
  • Jackson v. Rosen, No. 2:20-cv-02842 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020). Cited "but see"
    ([A] guilty plea forecloses a section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.)
  • McBee, No. 4:24-cv-04118 (W.D. Ark. June 8, 2026). 2 cites
    Further, even if Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim is not barred by Heck, “a guilty plea forecloses a section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause.” Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1996).
  • Meraz v. Liles, No. 5:24-cv-05255 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 29, 2025).
    The law is well-settled that “a guilty plea forecloses a section 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause,” Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527 , 528–29 (8th Cir. 1996), and a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on his claims for damages arisin…
  • Dunn v. Onondaga Cnty. Med. Exam'r's Off., No. 5:23-cv-00730 (N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2023).
    Since plaintiff's conviction v. Mitchell, 43 F.3d 786, 787-88 (2d Cir.1994) (per curiam) remains valid, plaintiff's claim for violation of his right to (affirming Heck-based dismissal of claim that police officers a fair trial is not cogni…
  • Robert Gautreaux, Sr. v. Sheriff Larry Sanders, 395 F. App'x 311 (8th Cir. 2010).unpublished
    See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 (§ 1983 damages claim for unlawful conviction, imprisonment, or other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render conviction or sentence invalid is not cognizable unless conviction o…
  • Danny Huff v. Canterbury Park Holding Corp., No. 23-3151 (8th Cir. Apr. 22, 2024).unpublished
    See Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). -2-
  • Lundy, No. 1:24-cv-00038 (N.D. Iowa July 20, 2026).
    See, e.g., Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (false testimony and malicious prosecution claims are Heck-barred where they necessarily imply invalidity of conviction or sentence).
  • Andy Buxton v. Iva Dougherty, 686 F. App'x 125 (3d Cir. 2017).unpublished
    (judgment in plaintiffs favor on damages claims that defendants presented perjured testimony at preliminary hearing “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction)
Other citing cases4 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Edom WILLIAMS, Appellant,
v.
Edwin SCHARIO, Police Officer; Tess Noeltner, Police Officer; Mike Naccarato, Supervisor of the Officer of the Public Defenders; Michael E. Dunkin; Dee Joyce Hayes; Unknown Ferguson, Appellees
95-3912.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Aug 23, 1996.
Published opinion
93 F.3d 527
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 21754
Edom Williams, pro se., Tyrone A. Taborn and Steven R. Wild, argued, St. Louis, MO, for Appellees.
Arnold, Beam, Loken, Morris, Per Curiam, Sheppard.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
Citer courts: E.D. Pennsylvania (1)

Lead Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Edom Williams, a Missouri inmate, appeals from the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We affirm in part and modify in part.

In February 1995, Williams pleaded guilty to second degree burglary. In this section 1983 action, he alleged that St. Louis police officers arrested him for burglary without probable cause, failed to inform him of his arrest or alleged crime, and took his fingerprints without informing him of his Miranda[1] rights. He also alleged that defendant officer Schario presented false testimony during Williams’s preliminary hearing, and engaged in malicious prosecution. Williams expressly stated that he sought damages only.

The district court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding Williams’s claims were barred by his guilty plea and by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

The district court correctly concluded that a guilty plea forecloses a section[*529] 1983 claim for arrest without probable cause. See Malady v. Crunk, 902 F.2d 10, 11 (8th Cir.1990). Williams’s Miranda claim also lacks merit because the taking of his fingerprints in the absence of Miranda warnings does not constitute testimonial incrimination as proscribed by the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832-33,16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (holding that drawing blood did not constitute testimonial self-incrimination because blood is identifying characteristic). Similarly, Williams’s claims he was not informed of his arrest or the charges against him are not cognizable causes of action. Cf. Kladis v. Brezek, 823 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir.1987) (no Fourth or Sixth Amendment right to be informed of reason for arrest; Fourth Amendment satisfied if arrest based on probable cause, no Sixth Amendment right until government commits to prosecute). As none of these claims has merit, they were subject to dismissal with prejudice.

We agree with the district court that a judgment in Williams’s favor on his damages claims that defendants engaged in malicious prosecution and presented perjured testimony would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence”; therefore, Williams’s claims are not cognizable and must be dismissed unless and until Williams shows his “conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” See Heck, 512 U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2372.

We reject Williams’s argument that the grant of summary judgment was premature. We grant his motion to supplement his brief, and we deny his motions to compel discovery and appoint counsel.

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Williams’s malicious-prosecution and perjured-testimony claims without prejudice, but modify the dismissal of his remaining claims to be with prejudice.

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Concurrence in Part

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,

concurring and dissenting.

I concur in all of the court’s judgment except so much of it as holds that Mr. Williams’s claim that perjured testimony was used against him is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Mr. Williams is entitled to damages on this claim if he can prove it, whether or not he would have been convicted without the perjured testimony. A judgment in favor of Mr. Williams on this claim would therefore not “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction,” id. at-, 114 S. Ct. at 2372, and the claim therefore survives an application of the principles announced in Heck.

I therefore respectfully dissent from this portion of the court’s judgment.