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Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "see"
Blumberg v. Garcia
See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 , 123 S.Ct. 1166 , 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). *1105 Although a particular state court decision may be both “contrary to” and “an unreasonable application of’ controlling Supreme Court law, the two phrases have distinct meanings.
discussed
Cited "see"
Davis v. Felker
See Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000). [2] Although a particular state court decision may be both “contrary to” and “an unreasonable application of’ controlling Supreme Court law, the two phrases have distinct meanings.
cited
Cited "see"
McGreal, James T. v. Ostrov, Eric Dr.
See Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
Officer James T. McGreal v. Eric Ostrov, Doctor, Village of Alsip, Kenneth Wood, Chief of the Alsip Police Department
(2×)
See Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir.2000), ce rt. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 273 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw. Net Corp.
(2×)
See Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 577 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 273 (2000).
cited
Cited "see"
Salgado v. Hood
See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see"
Torres v. Newland
Torres contends that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of third-party culpability in the form of evidence relating to the victim’s cocaine use, which would have supported a theory that the victim’s death resulted from a drug deal. 1 His contention is unpersuasive, because the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence that did not directly link a third party to the crime was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 USC § 2254 (d)(1); see Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9…
cited
Cited "see"
Metcalf v. Newland
See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143,1152 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000).
cited
Cited "see"
Hill v. Ratelle
See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich
(2×)
Vargas-Harrison, 272 F.3d at 971 . 8 Thus, under the so-called "policy-maker corollary to the Pickering analysis," "the First Amendment does not prohibit the discharge of a policy-making employee when that individual has engaged in speech on a matter of public concern in a manner that is critical of superiors or their stated policies." Id. at 971-72; see also Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 977 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 273 (2000). 34 As we discussed earlier in this opinion, Ms. Kiddy-Brown has alleged facts which, if true, would be sufficien…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Kiddy-Brown, Sandra v. Blagojevich, Rod
(2×)
Vargas-Harrison, 272 F.3d at 971 . 8 Thus, under the so-called “policy-maker corollary to the Pickering analysis,” “the First Amendment does not prohibit the discharge of a policy-making employee when that individual has engaged in speech on a matter of public concern in a manner that is critical of superiors or their stated policies.” Id. at 971-72; see also Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 977 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 273 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Murdaugh v. Roe
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (defining a state court’s decision as “contrary to” federal law if the state court’s decision fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if the state court’s decision applies the controlling authority from an identical case, but reaches a different result); see also Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d, 1143, 1150 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Patricia Hart v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration
See, e.g., Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir.) (earlier caselaw established that mixed questions in habeas petitions were reviewed de novo, but under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the standard of review is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000). 29 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Almonor v. Keane
Compare Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that federal courts are required to determine whether a state court’s decision was erroneous before considering whether it was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of controlling law under AEDPA), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000), with Bell v. Jarvis, 286 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that there are no “persuasive reasons or purposes, not expressed in the statute, which would support ... imposing upon [circuit courts] and ... district courts a ‘met…
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Freddy Leon Wildman v. Dan Johnson
See, e.g., Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Tammy R. Garvin v. Teena Farmon, Warden
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 , 121 S.Ct. 340 , 148 L.Ed.2d 274 (2000). 7 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Morgan v. Robinson
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 , 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir.) (“[A]n ‘unreasonable application’ of clearly established federal law [occurs] when [this Court’s] independent review of the legal question does not merely allow [it] ultimately to conclude that the petitioner has the better of two reasonable legal arguments, but rather leaves [the Court] with a ‘firm conviction’ that one answer, the one rejected by the [state] court, was correct, and the other, the application of the federal law t…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Concho Residential Service, Inc.
v.
MHMR Services for the Concho Valley, aka Concho Valley Center for Human Advancement
v.
MHMR Services for the Concho Valley, aka Concho Valley Center for Human Advancement
No. 00-219.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 16, 2000.
Published
Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.