Truehill v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 3 (SCOTUS 2017). · Go Syfert
Truehill v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 3 (SCOTUS 2017). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
67 citation events (67 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ironburg Inventions Ltd. v. Valve Corporation (wawd, 2024-05-03)
Treatment trajectory · 2017 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2017 2021 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ironburg Inventions Ltd. v. Valve Corporation
W.D. Wash. · 2024 · confidence medium
A to Joint Status Report (docket no. 302-1) (containing a copy of the 21 Federal Circuit’s two-page judgment dated July 15, 2019). 22 1 As observed in this Court’s previous Order concerning IPR estoppel, docket 2 no. 320, Valve’s petition for the 948 IPR predated SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 3 1348 (2018), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the PTAB’s former practice of 4 instituting inter partes review as to less than all of the claims in an IPR petition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Herrera-Antunez v. Garland
2d Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
As Herrera-Antunez 2 concedes, her argument under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 3 2105 (2018), that her notice to appear (“NTA”) was 4 insufficient to vest jurisdiction with the immigration court, 5 is foreclosed by our decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 6 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2019).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) WildEarth Guardians v. David Bernhardt
C.D. Cal. · 2020 · confidence medium
(See Mot. 1–2, 9 n.1.) 1 In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Bar MK Ranches v. 2 Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1993)), vacated on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 3 443 (2017).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Michael Nuyen
6th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 3 Case No. 20-1212, United States v. Nuyen 1663, 1669–70 (2018).
cited Cited "see" Peterson v. City of Yakima
E.D. Wash. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lozman, 138 S. Ct. 3 at 1952 . 4 Plaintiff provided circumstantial evidence that he had a reputation among City 5 officials for being outspoken regarding City actions and proposals.
discussed Cited "see" Kentrell F. Johnson v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Truehill v. State , 211 So.3d 930 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 3 , 199 L.Ed.2d 272 (2017). 2 Spencer v. State , 615 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 3 The first nine issues were raised in Johnson's initial brief.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Michael Anthony Tanzi v. State of Florida (3×)
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
As I have stated previously, “[b]ecause Hurst requires ‘a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,’ the error cannot be harmless where such a factual determination was not made.” Hall v. State, 212 So. 3d 1001, 1036-37 (Fla. 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016)); see also Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 961 (Fla.) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Michael Gordon Reynolds v. State of Florida (3×)
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Ray Lamar Johnston v. State of Florida (3×)
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). -2- ‘a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,’ the error cannot be harmless where such a factual determination was not made.” Hall v. State, 212 So. 3d 1001, 1036-37 (Fla. 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016)); see also Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 961 (Fla.) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Samuel L. Smithers v. State of Florida (3×)
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
As I have stated elsewhere, “[b]ecause Hurst requires ‘a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,’ the error cannot be harmless where such a factual determination was not made.” Hall v. State, 212 So. 3d 1001, 1036-37 (Fla. 2017) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016)); see also Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 961 (Fla.) (Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017).
Quentin Marcus TRUEHILL
v.
FLORIDA. Terence Oliver v. Florida.
16-9448.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 16, 2017.
138 S. Ct. 3
The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.
Stephen Breyer.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Relating-to
Justice BREYER, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

In part for the reasons set forth in my opinion in Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) (concurring opinion in judgment), I would vacate and remand for the Florida Supreme Court to address the Eighth Amendment issue in these cases. I therefore join the dissenting opinion of Justice SOTOMAYOR in full.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER join, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.

At least twice now, capital defendants in Florida have raised an important Eighth Amendment challenge to their death sentences that the Florida Supreme Court has failed to address. Specifically, those capital defendants, petitioners here, argue that the jury instructions in their cases impermissibly diminished the jurors' sense of responsibility as to the ultimate determination of death by repeatedly emphasizing that their verdict was merely advisory. "This Court has always premised its capital punishment decisions on the assumption that a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity of its task," and we have thus found unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment comments that "minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for[*4] determining the appropriateness of death." Caldwell v. Mississippi , 472 U.S. 320 , 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).

Although the Florida Supreme Court has rejected a Caldwell challenge to its jury instructions in capital cases in the past, it did so in the context of its prior sentencing scheme, where "the court [was] the final decision-maker and the sentencer-not the jury." Combs v. State , 525 So.2d 853 , 857 (1988). In Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 624, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), however, we held that process, "which required the judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance," to be unconstitutional.

With the rationale underlying its previous rejection of the Caldwell challenge now undermined by this Court in Hurst , petitioners ask that the Florida Supreme Court revisit the question. The Florida Supreme Court, how-ever, did not address that Eighth Amendment challenge.

This Court has not in the past hesitated to vacate and remand a case when a court has failed to address an important question that was raised below. See, e.g., Beer v. United States , 564 U.S. 1050 , 131 S.Ct. 2865 , 180 L.Ed.2d 909 (2011) (remanding for consideration of unaddressed preclusion claim); Youngblood v. West Virginia , 547 U.S. 867 , 126 S.Ct. 2188 , 165 L.Ed.2d 269 (2006) ( per curiam ) (remanding for consideration of unaddressed claim under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ). Because petitioners here raised a potentially meritorious Eighth Amendment challenge to their death sentences, and because the stakes in capital cases are too high to ignore such constitutional challenges, I dissent from the Court's refusal to correct that error.