green
Positive treatment
5.3 score
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988
2007
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "see"
Agnes VERA-LOZANO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, Defendant-Appellant
(2×)
See Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 849 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, Avis Rent-A-Car of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Marshall, 484 U.S. 1065 , 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988); LaForest v. Autoridad de las Fuentes Fluviales de P.R., 536 F.2d 443, 446 (1st Cir.1976); see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 536-40 , 78 S.Ct. 893, 900-02 , 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958).
discussed
Cited "see"
McDevitt & Street Co. v. Marriott Corp.
(2×)
See LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 830 F.2d 522, 529 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988); Coastland Corp. v. Third Nat’l Mortgage Co., 611 F.2d 969 , 977-78 (4th Cir.1979); Mullen, 213 Va. at 768-69 , 195 S.E.2d at 700 ; see also Pennsylvania State Shopping Plazas, Inc. v. Olive, 202 Va. 862 , 120 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1961); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Hamilton & Dotson, 164 Va. 203 , 178 S.E. 777 , 780 *933 (1935).
discussed
Cited "see"
Freeman v. Package Machinery Co.
(2×)
See, e.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Ramos, 357 F.2d 341, 342 (1st Cir.1966) (Puer-to Rico statute allowing assessment of attorneys’ fees for “obstinacy” recognized in federal court “as a matter of substantive right”); accord Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845 , 852 n. 10 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see"
49 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1139, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,456, 27 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 198 Iver J. Freeman v. Package MacHinery Company
(2×)
See, e.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Ramos, 357 F.2d 341, 342 (1st Cir.1966) (Puerto Rico statute allowing assessment of attorneys' fees for "obstinacy" recognized in federal court "as a matter of substantive right"); accord Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845 , 852 n. 10 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Estate of Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Torres
(2×)
Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir.1996); see also Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 561 (1st Cir.1989) (confirming that in a § 1983 action, a superseding intervening cause that is reasonably foreseeable will not relieve a defendant of liability, but an “ ‘unforeseen and abnormal’ intervention” will break the chain of proximate causation) (quoting Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 , 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Objective, Inc.
(2×)
See id. at 349; Mullen, 195 S.E.2d at 700 (denying-damages for lost profits where “the anticipated profits ... could have been based only on speculation and conjecture”); see also La-Vay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Association, 830 F.2d 522, 529 (4th Cir.1987) (“Damages may not be awarded ... where an award would be based on an estimate of lost profits which is speculative.”), cer t. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 , 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde
(2×)
See also LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 830 F.2d 522, 527 (4th Cir.1987) (holding one year limitations period of Va.Code § 8.01-248 applies to claims against bank directors for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and gross negligence), ce rt. denied 484 U.S. 1065 , 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988); C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett, 124 B.R. 689, 693 (W.D.Va.1990) (holding breach of fiduciary duty of corporate officer is tort subject to Va.Code § 8.01-248 one year statute of limitations); RTC v. Everhart, 837 F.Supp. 155, 158 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding one year lim…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, Inc.
(2×)
See, e.g., LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 830 F.2d 522 , 529 (4th Cir.1987) ("Damages may not be awarded ... where an award would be based on an estimate of lost profits which is speculative.”) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (1979)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 , 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988). 23 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bakker v. Grutman
(2×)
Rule 11 imposes upon substitute counsel a duty to investigate the legal and factual sufficiency of the claims he or she takes up; see Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466 ; Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir.1987); but until substitute counsel files some paper indicating an intention to continue prosecution of the suit, such a decision will not be presumed by looking to the complaint itself. 4 See, e.g., Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir.1988) (filing of opposition to motion for summary judgment sanctionable under Rule 11); see also La Vay Corp. v. Do…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Bakker v. Grutman
(2×)
We conclude that Pavelic supports only the latter. 20 Rule 11 imposes upon substitute counsel a duty to investigate the legal and factual sufficiency of the claims he or she takes up; see Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466 ; Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir.1987); but until substitute counsel files some paper indicating an intention to continue prosecution of the suit, such a decision will not be presumed by looking to the complaint itself. 4 See, e.g., Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir.1988) (filing of opposition to motion for summary judgment sa…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Pablo De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular De Seguros
(2×)
See, e.g., Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 852 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 , 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Scott Peckham v. Continental Casualty Insurance Co., Scott Peckham v. Continental Casualty Insurance Co.
(2×)
As we have written: “Application of the legal cause standard to the circumstances of a particular case is a function ordinarily performed by, and peculiarly within the competence of, the factfinder.” Id.; see also Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845 , 850-51 & n. 8 (1st Cir.1987) (similar), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 , 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988); Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871, 876 (1st Cir.1987) (“[n]ot only ordinary fact questions, but also ‘evaluative applications of legal standards ... to the facts’ are properly [for the factfinder]”) (citations and footnote …
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Parts and Electric Motors, Inc., an Illinois Corporation v. Sterling Electric, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
(2×)
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 926, 930 (7th Cir.1978); see also Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir.1987) (“law of the case doctrine ‘is not to be lightly disregarded’ ”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 1026 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ralph Swift, Sr., Etc. v. United States
(2×)
Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 320 (5th ed. 1984)) (footnote omitted); see also Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845 , 850-51 & n. 8 (1st Cir.1987) (discussing foreseeability as a question within the province of the factfinder), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 1027 , 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
LaVay Corp.
v.
Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
v.
Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
No. 87-1076.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Feb 22, 1988.
Published
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.