Bd. of Trs. of the City of Pontiac v. City of Pontiac, 878 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 2016). · Go Syfert
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Bd. of Trs. of the City of Pontiac v. City of Pontiac, 878 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 2016). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
55 citation events (55 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People of Michigan v. Jamieson Bryan Woolard (michctapp, 2026-04-30)
Treatment trajectory · 2016 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2016 2021 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) People of Michigan v. Jamieson Bryan Woolard
Mich. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 921 (2016).
cited Cited as authority (rule) People of Michigan v. Bradley Alan Berklund
Mich. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 921 (2016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People of Michigan v. Raymond Shawn-Paul Reece
Mich. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Accordingly, defendant has not established that this evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403.4 3 “The list of considerations in Watkins provides a tool to facilitate, not a standard to supplant, this proper MRE 403 analysis, and it remains the court’s responsibility to carry out such an analysis in determining whether to exclude MCL 768.27a evidence under that rule.” People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 922 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People of Michigan v. Jimmy Foster Hall
Mich. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Nonetheless, we must recognize that the Watkins factors are but “a tool to facilitate, not a standard to supplant, [the] proper MRE 403 analysis, and it remains the court’s ‘responsibility’ to carry out such an analysis in determining whether to exclude MCL 768.27a evidence under that rule.” People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 922 (2016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People of Michigan v. Jimmy Foster Hall
Mich. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Nonetheless, we must recognize that the Watkins factors are but “a tool to facilitate, not a standard to supplant, [the] proper MRE 403 analysis, and it remains the court’s ‘responsibility’ to carry out such an analysis in determining whether to exclude MCL 768.27a evidence under that rule.” People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 922 (2016).
cited Cited "see" People of Michigan v. Jerry James Hoskins
Mich. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Uribe, 499 Mich at 922 .
discussed Cited "see" People of Michigan v. Don Paul Mattila
Mich. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 922 ; 878 NW2d 474 (2016) (stating that the apparent inconsistency between the proposed testimony and prior statements made by a witness and dissimilarities of the acts were not, in and of itself, sufficient to render the probative value of the proposed testimony as unfairly prejudicial).
discussed Cited "see" People of Michigan v. Ernesto Evaristo Uribe
Mich. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 974 ; 878 NW2d 474 (2016). 1 MCL 750.520b(2)(b) provides that an offender 17 years of age or older who is convicted of CSC I against an individual less than 13 years of age may be sentenced to imprisonment for life or any term of years, but not less than 25 years. -1- Meanwhile, on June 18, 2015, after this Court’s decision on the prosecution’s appeal, the trial court held a hearing on several motions filed by defendant.
discussed Cited "see" Board of Trustees of the City of Pontiac v. City of Pontiac (2×)
Mich. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See 499 Mich. 921 , 878 N.W.2d 477 .
cited Cited "see" People v. Kelly
Mich. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921 (2016).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People of Michigan v. Robert Lance Propp
Mich. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, People v Uribe, 499 Mich 921, 922 ; 878 NW2d 474 (2016).3 Finally, although the Watkins Court refused to read additional limitations into the singular restriction contained in the introductory section of MCL 768.27a, the Court additionally refused “to read into MCL 768.27a a legislative intent to foreclose the application of other ordinary rules of evidence, such as those that pertain to hearsay and privilege.” Watkins, 491 Mich at 485 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Board of Trustees of the City of Pontiac Police & Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Insurance Trust
v.
City of Pontiac
151717.
Michigan Supreme Court.
May 18, 2016.
878 N.W.2d 477
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

On April 6, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the March 17,2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The Court of Appeals erred in its reading of Executive Order 225 (EO 225). Contrary to the Court of Appeals conclusion, EO 225 by its plain language expresses the intent of the emergency manager to extinguish the defendant’s 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution. Although that contribution accrued on June 30, 2012, the defendant had not yet paid the obligation when EO 225 went into effect. EO 225 clearly states that, as of August 1, 2012, the defendant no longer has an obligation “to continue to make contributions” under Article III of the Trust Agreement. It does not differentiate between already accrued, but unpaid obligations and future obligations, and thus by its terms applies to both. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the emergency manager did not intend to extinguish the defendant’s 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution. Nonetheless, although the Court of Appeals determined that the emergency manager could retroactively extinguish the 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution through his authority under 2011 PA 14, it did not specifically address whether EO 225 was a permissible retroactive modification of the plaintiffs accrued right to the contribution. See LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich 26 (2014). We therefore reverse that part of the Court of Appeals judgment which interprets EO 225, vacate that part of the Court of Appeals judgment which discusses the plaintiffs breach of contract claim, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for it to consider: (1) whether the retroactivity analysis stated in LaFontaine applies to EO 225; (2) if so, whether the extinguishment of the defendant’s accrued, but unpaid, 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution by EO 225 is permissible under LaFontaine; and (3) if LaFontaine does not apply, the appropriate method for determining whether EO 225 constitutes a permissible retroactive modification of the 2011-2012 fiscal year contribution. We do not retain jurisdiction.