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Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
14.2 score
“matters of common knowledge and experience, subjects which are within the ordinary, common and general knowledge and experience of mankind, need not be established by expert opinion testimony.”
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
V & M STAR STEEL v. Centimark Corp.
matters of common knowledge and experience, subjects which are within the ordinary, common and general knowledge and experience of mankind, need not be established by expert opinion testimony.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D., L.L.C.
proper jury interrogatories must address determinative issues and must be based upon trial evidence.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
John Nocilla, Jr. v. Joe Bridges
Ohio Emergency Servs., Inc., 592 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ohio 1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Washburn v. OhioHealth Corp.
Dickerson Internationale, Inc. v. Klockner, 139 Ohio App.3d 371, 376 , 743 N.E.2d 984, 988 (2d Dist. 2000). {¶30} Under the common knowledge and experience exception, “subjects which are within the ordinary, common and general knowledge and experience of mankind, need not be established by expert opinion testimony.” Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97, 103 , 1992-Ohio-109 , 592 N.E.2d 828, 833 (1992).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
West v. Heimermann
Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc., 592 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ohio 1992) (citing McKay Machine Co. v. Rodman, 228 N.E. 2d 304 (Ohio 1967)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hawthorne v. DaVita Inc.
Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc., 64 Ohio St. 3d 97, 103 , 592 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ohio 1992).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wittenbrook v. Elecs. Recycling Servs., Inc.
No. 08 MA 85, 2008-Ohio-6368 , 2008 WL 5124431 , ¶ 11, citing Ramage at 107-108, 592 N.E.2d 828 . {¶ 39} "The standard under which we review a trial court's decision whether to submit a proposed interrogatory is abuse of discretion." Freeman v. Norfolk & Western Ry.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Cook
Ramage at 111, 592 N.E.2d 828 . {¶101} As the Staff Notes to Evid.R. 607 indicate, the reason for retaining the requirement that a party demonstrate surprise and affirmative damage before the party can impeach its own witness with prior inconsistent statements of that witness is to prevent that party from calling “a known adverse witness simply for the purpose of getting a prior inconsistent statement into evidence by way of impeachment, thus doing indirectly what it could not have done directly.” State v. Warren, 67 Ohio App.3d 789, 798 , 588 N.E.2d 905, 911 (6th Dist.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Malinou v. Miriam Hospital
“Likewise, ‘[w]here the alleged negligence involves the professional skill and judgment of a nurse, expert testimony must be presented to establish the prevailing standard of care, a breach of that standard, and that the nurse’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the patient’s injury.’ ” Id. (quoting Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828, 834 (1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hill v. Wadsworth-Rittman Area Hospital
Ramage , at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 21} However, “[i]n a negligence action involving conduct within the common knowledge and experience of jurors, expert testimony is not required.” Berdyck v. Shinde (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 581 , 613 N.E.2d 1014 , citing Ramage, at 103, 592 N.E.2d 828 . {¶ 22} Rather than the professional skills and judgment of Hoover, this case involves escorting a patient to her vehicle by wheelchair.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MacTavish v. Rhode Island Hospital
Since “the alleged negligence involves the professional skill and judgment of a nurse, expert testimony must be presented to establish the prevailing standard of care, a breach of that standard, and that the nurse’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the patient’s injury.” Id. at 690 (quoting Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828, 834 (1992)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Boccasile v. Cajun Music Limited
(2×)
Likewise, “[w]here the alleged negligence involves the professional skill and judgment of a nurse, expert testimony must be presented to establish the prevailing standard of care, a breach of that standard, and that the nurse’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the patient’s injury.” Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828, 834 (1992); see also Leonard v. Providence Hospital, 590 So.2d 906, 908 (Ala.1991) (“when there is no medical order requiring a certain type of treatment or precaution, it becomes a question of proper nursing…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Blodgett v. Kahn
Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc. (1992), 64 *469 Ohio St.3d 97, 102-104, 592 N.E.2d 828, 832-834 (expert testimony must be presented to establish standard of care and breach of that standard, and proximate cause must be established, to avoid directed verdict); see, also, Barbee v. Finerty (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 466, 470-472 , 654 N.E.2d 364, 366-368 ; Civ.R. 50(A)(4).
cited
Cited "see"
Whitnie Jackson v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, et al.
See Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc., 64 Ohio St. 3d 97 , 1992 Ohio 109 , 592 N.E.2d 828 , Wise v. Timmons, 64 Ohio St.3d 113 , 1992 Ohio 117 , 592 N.E.2d 840 .
cited
Cited "see"
In Re Niebert, Unpublished Decision (3-22-2006)
See Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828 , paragraph three of the syllabus.
cited
Cited "see"
In Re Meridia Products Liability Litigation
See Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828 ("Unless a matter is within the comprehension of a layperson, expert testimony is necessary.
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Rector, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2002)
See Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Serv., Inc. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828 , paragraph six of the syllabus.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Greene v. Marchyn, Unpublished Decision (9-27-2000)
Bruni , 46 Ohio St.2d at 131 -32 , 346 N.E.2d at 677 -78 . "[The] expert must be qualified to express an opinion concerning the specific standard of care that prevails in the medical community in which the alleged malpractice took place, according to the body of law that has developed in this area of evidence." Bruni , 46 Ohio St.2d at 131 -32 , 346 N.E.2d at 677 -78 ; see, also, Ramage , 64 Ohio St.3d at 102 , 592 N.E.2d at 833 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Millar
v.
Beacon Insurance Company of America
v.
Beacon Insurance Company of America
No. 92-350.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Jun 24, 1992.
Philip M. Collins & Associates and Philip M. Collins, for appellant., Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Becker, J. Stephen Teetor, James H. Ledman and David G. Jennings, for appellee.
Brown, Douglas, Holmes, Moyer, Resnick, Sweeney, Wright.
Published
Citer courts: Ohio Court of Appeals (1)
The motion to certify is allowed. The cause is reversed and remanded on authority of State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 397, 583 N.E.2d 309.
[*97] Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Douglas, H. Brown and Resnick, JJ., concur. Holmes and Wright, JJ., dissent.