Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970). · Go Syfert
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Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · …although the slang epithet 'nigger' may once have been in common usage, ... has become particularly abusive and insulting in light of recent developments.
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · …although the slang epithet nigger' may once have been in common usage, ... has become particularly abusive and insulting in light of recent developments.
1,437 citation events (302 in the last 25 years) across 54 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Taylor v. Metzger (nj, 1998-02-18) · Strongest negative: Helgeson v. American International Group, Inc. (casd, 1999-04-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1970 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1970 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined Cited "but see" Helgeson v. American International Group, Inc. (3×)
S.D. Cal. · 1999 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 (Cal.1970) (African-American employee alleged he was fired in a despicable manner when his supervisor did so while shouting various racial epithets was entitled to damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp., 162 Cal.App.3d 241, 255 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 524 (Cal.Ct.App.1984) (Evidence supported finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress where company fired plaintiff for dating another employee, even though company had policy of no…
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Taylor v. Metzger (20×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
N.J. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 6 verbatim quotes · confidence high
although the slang epithet 'nigger' may once have been in common usage, ... has become particularly abusive and insulting in light of recent developments.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anderson v. Automobile Club of Southern California CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 486 .) Conduct is considered outrageous when it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Ibid.) However, “liability ‘does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities,’ but only to conduct so extreme and outrageous ‘as to go beyond all possible bonds of decency.’ ” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, fn. 5 .) Plaintiff has failed to show she is likely to prevail on her claim of intentional inflictio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roush v. San Joaquin Valley College, Inc.
E.D. Cal. · 2024 · confidence medium
Compare Sanchez–Corea v. Bank of America, 38 Cal.3d 892, 909 , 701 P.2d 826, 838 , 215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 691 (1985); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493 , 496–97, 468 P.2d 216, 217 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 89 (1970); Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust, 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 229 , 192 Cal.Rptr. 492, 496 (1983); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal.App.3d 288 , 297–98, 131 Cal.Rptr. 547 , 553–54 (1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bailey v. S.F. Dist. Attorney's Office
Cal. · 2024 · confidence medium
(See Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 498, fn. 4 [observing the “particularly abusive and insulting” nature of the N-word]; see also Eisenstadt, The N-Word at Work: Contextualizing Language in the Workplace (2012) 33 Berkeley J.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Standley v. Clifton
N.D. Cal. · 2023 · confidence medium
Co. of Calif., 132 Cal. App. 4th 22 403, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress extends 23 ‘only to conduct so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bonds of decency, and to 24 be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”) (quoting Alcorn v. 25 Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499, n.5 (Cal. 1970)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peterson v. Harris CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Code, § 3425.3.) 24 471, 486-487 [accusing plaintiff of “vile and depraved activities” may constitute outrageous behavior]; see also Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138 , 148 [“aggravated circumstances” in which a defendant utters allegedly racist and insulting comments presents question of fact sufficient to overcome demurrer]; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 498 [same].) Third, we agree Peterson has failed to establish a duty the Harrises owed to maintain her cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Vargas v. The Vons Companies CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(See Trerice, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 883 [court can decide this issue in first instance]; Fowler, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 44 [same]; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499 [jury decides this issue only if reasonable minds may differ].) Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Duhm, however, raises triable issues of material fact.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bayne v. Bowles Hall Foundation
N.D. Cal. · 2021 · confidence medium
Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. 2 Cal.3d 493, 496-497 (1970) 1 (supervisor shouting insulting epithets, terminating employment, and humiliating plaintiff was 2 extreme and outrageous conduct unrelated the course of normal employment conduct). 3 Even intentional misconduct on the part of an employer that is unrelated to actions that are 4 a normal part of the employment relationship, however, may not be cognizable if insufficiently 5 extreme or outrageous.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
IIED Claim To state an IIED claim, the plaintiff must allege facts showing: “‘“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”’” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 .) The parties dispute only whether Pumarol’s comments amount to “extreme and outrageous conduct.” “‘Conduc…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Our Peculiar Family v. Inspire Charter Schools
C.D. Cal. · 2020 · confidence medium
Johnson, 534 F.3d 18 at 1124 (citing Alcorn, 2 Cal. 3d at 500) (“The court has explained . . . that the Unruh 19 Act . . . does not extend to claims for employment discrimination because other 20 California statutes are specifically tailored to provide relief for such conduct, most 21 notably the FEHA, which was passed by the California Legislature in the very same 22 session as the Unruh Act.”). 23 As the FAC’s allegations show that Plaintiffs’ relationship with Defendants is 24 not the type of relationship protected under the Unruh Act, Defendants’ Motion to 25 Dismiss Plaintiffs�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Viviriana Guatemala v. Regus Management Group, LLC
C.D. Cal. · 2019 · confidence medium
Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment. [citations omitted.]”)2; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 497-98 (1970) (a defendant’s “standing in a position of authority over plaintiff” and his “being aware of [plaintiff’s] particular susceptibility to emotional distress” can meet the IIED standards when defendant intentionally acted “for the purpose of causing plaintiff to suffer emotional and physical 2 But see McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Assn., 216 Cal. App. 4th 283, 295 (2013) (“An employer’s continued isolation and ostracism o…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Daniel v. Wayans (4×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
This word is “perhaps the most offensive and inflammatory racial slur in English, ... a word expressive of racial hatred and bigotry.” ’ ” We agree with our Supreme Court that although “ ‘nigger’ may once have been in common usage,” it is now considered to be “particularly abusive and insulting ... as it pertains to the American Negro.” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 498, fn. 4 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) Nigger, however, is not the term at issue here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Felix v. Fernandez CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
More fundamentally, we are aware of no case law, and Felix cites none, suggesting that an employer owes a duty to his employees to refrain from negligently9 inflicting distress.10 Felix has not identified any other duty that Dr. Fernandez could have breached from which her emotional distress arose. 9 The Supreme Court has stated, with respect to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, "plaintiff's status as an employee should entitle him to a greater degree of protection from insult and outrage than if he were a stranger to defendants." (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (197…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Benavidez v. Sandia National Laboratories
D.N.M. · 2016 · confidence medium
In cases in which a claim has successfully been stated, the behavior complained of has involved serious racial slurs, see Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932 , 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58, 67 (1979); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493 , 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216, 218-19 (1970), accusations of criminal behavior, see Agis v. Howard Johnson, 371 Mass. 140 , 355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1976); Beavers v. Johnson, 112 Ga.App. 677 , 145 S.E.2d 776, 777-78 (1965); Armano v. Federal Reserve Bank of Bos ton, 468 F.Supp. 674, 676 (D.Mass.1979)(Caffrey, J.), sexual harassment, see Nieto v. Ka…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. City of Sacramento
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) 4 Plaintiffs further claim the camping ordinance, as applied to them, violated their right to be free from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tselevich v. Allstate Ins. CA2/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress extends only to conduct by the insurer directed at the insured “so extreme and outrageous ‘as to go beyond all possible bonds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, fn. 5 ; Coleman v. Republic Indemnity Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Helper CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Ibid.) It must be so extreme " 'as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' " (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, fn. 5 (Alcorn), italics added.) Additionally, the context of the parties' relationship is important in the analysis of whether liability should be imposed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ferrick v. Santa Clara University
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. [Citation.]” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 673 P.2d 660 ].) In reviewing the ruling on a demurrer, “the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court [citations] .. . .” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to sta…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397-398 [insurance agent’s threatened and actual refusals to pay and threatening communication in bad faith to settle nonexistent dispute]; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496-497 [supervisor shouting insulting epithets, terminating employment, and humiliating plaintiff]; Golden v. Dungan (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 295, 305 [process server knowingly and maliciously banging on door at midnight].) Here, the allegations in the first amended complaint consist of defendants’ misleading plaintiffs into believing they would be compensated in an amount…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. CA6 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397-398 [insurance agent‟s threatened and actual refusals to pay and threatening communication in bad faith to settle nonexistent dispute]; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496-497 [supervisor shouting insulting epithets, terminating employment, and humiliating plaintiff]; Golden v. Dungan (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 295, 305 [process server knowingly and maliciously banging on door at midnight].) Here, the allegations in the first amended complaint consist of defendants‟ misleading plaintiffs into believing they would be compensated in an amount…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) II.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beasley v. Desai CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500 (Alcorn) [“there is no indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 51 to include discriminations other than those made by a ‘business establishment’ in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers”]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 77 [“the Unruh Civil Rights Act has no application to employment discrimination”].) Desai’s alleged refusal to consider retaining plaintiffs and his recruiting of other workers were done in the employment context.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Requa v. Regents of University of California
Cal. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 824 ].) Thus, when reviewing the propriety of a judgment sustaining a demurrer, the question of the plaintiffs’ or petitioners’ “ability to prove . . . allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) In reviewing the superior court’s order sustaining the demurrer, “we examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to st…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. Hynek
Cal. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
(Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) II.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beckwith v. Dahl
Cal. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
But when reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action, “the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove . . . [the] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court [citations] . . . .” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) b.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Executive Security Management, Inc. v. Dahl
C.D. Cal. · 2011 · confidence medium
Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 (1970).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tucker v. CBS Radio Stations, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
(Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) II.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fair v. City of Santa Clara
Cal. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
(Whitcombe v. County of Yolo (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 698, 702 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 189 ].)” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 673 P.2d 660 ].) “[T]he question of plaintiff’s ability to prove [the pleading’s] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court . . . .” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) On appeal, “[t]he judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is wel…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wong v. Jing
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 403, 416 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 744 ], quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, fn. 5 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ]; see Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001 .) Although posting a review containing false assertions may constitute extreme and outrageous conduct; posting a negative but otherwise truthful review could hardly be considered atrocious and intolerable conduct that goes beyond the bounds of decency.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Page v. Miracosta Community College District
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
(See 216 Sutter Bay Associates v. County of Sutter (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 860, 866 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ]; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) *500 B.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Proc., § 452.) If the complaint states a cause of action on any possible legal theory, we must reverse the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer. ( Palestini v. General Dynamics Corp. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 80, 86 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 ].) Whether a plaintiff will be able to prove its allegations is not relevant. ( Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) II.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP
9th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Alcorn, 2 Cal.3d at 500, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Riversied Healthcare
9th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Alcorn, 2 Cal. 3d at 500.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Los Altos Golf and Country Club v. County of Santa Clara
Cal. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
(Ibid.; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating error by the superior court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Riverside Healcare
9th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Alcorn, 2 Cal. 3d at 500. [9] Twenty-six years later in Strother v. Southern Califor- nia Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996), we interpreted the scope of liability available under § 51 in light of Alcorn and subsequent California cases and concluded that those precedents established the rule that relief under § 51 was available when the plaintiff was in a relationship with the offending business establishment “similar to that of the cus- tomer in the customer-proprietor relationship which the Act and its predecessors have most commonly covered.”2 Id. at 874. 2 In Strot…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP
9th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Alcorn, 2 Cal.3d at 500, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berkley v. Dowds
Cal. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
“The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is comprised of three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. [Citation.]” (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 494 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ].) “In order to meet the first requirement of the tort, the alleged conduct ‘ “.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove these allegations is not relevant. {Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) If the plaintiff failed to plead, or if the defendants negated, any essential element of a particular cause of action, this court should uphold the sustaining of the demurrers. {Kamen v. Lindly, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 201 .) 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ca9 2006
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493 , 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216, 219 (1970), the California Supreme Court dismissed a plaintiff's race-based employment discrimination claim, holding that "there is no indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 51 to include discriminations other than those made by a `business establishment' in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers." The California Supreme Court bolstered its holding that the Unruh Act does not apply to employment claims by noting: "This conc…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bass v. County of Butte
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216, 219 (1970), the California Supreme Court dismissed a plaintiffs race-based employment discrimination claim, holding that “there is no indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 51 to include discriminations other than those made by a ‘business establishment’ in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers.” The California Supreme Court bolstered its holding that the Unruh Act does not apply to employment claims by noting: “Th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coleman v. REPUBLIC INDEM. INS. CO. OF CAL.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress extends “only to conduct so extreme and outrageous ‘as to go beyond all possible bonds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499, fn. 5 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].) The Moradi-Shalal court did not foreclose common law actions, stating that “the courts retain jurisdiction to impose civil damages or other remedies against insurers in appropriate common law actions, based on *417 such traditional theories a…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Payne v. Anaheim Memorial Medical Center, Inc. (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Unruh Civil Rights Act The Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b), provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Our Supreme Court has interpreted the Act “ ‘in the broadest sense reasonably possible.’ ” (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alch v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
(Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ] (Alcorn).) However, the court’s holding in Alcorn was made in the context of a claim by an employee against an employer, and subsequent precedents have explained that the Act does not cover “the employer-employee relationship.” (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72, 83, fn. 12 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 150 , 707 P.2d 212 ].) No such relationship exists between the talent agencies and the writers. 51 Instead, the agencies are business establishments that provide a service to th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
The ability of the plaintiff to prove them is not in issue." ( Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1041 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 968 P.2d 539, fn. 4 ( Diamond ).) Instead, the facts alleged must be treated as having been admitted, and we review de novo to determine whether the facts as pleaded could entitle the plaintiff to any legal remedy as a matter of law. ( Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 ( Quelimane ).) A demurrer merely tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not its factu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
(Hernandez v. City of Pomona (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1497 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 406 ].) On appeal, “[w]e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and viewing its parts in context. [Citations.] We deem to be true all material facts properly pled. [Citation.]” (Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1501 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 368 ].) “In other words, ‘plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief [citation].’ (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ].)” (Gruenberg v.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schnall v. Hertz Corporation
Cal. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
(Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 960 P.2d 513 ], 38; Call v. Kezirian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 189, 195 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 103 ]; Custodio v. Bauer (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 303 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 , 27 A.L.R.3d 884 ].) “It is axiomatic that if there is a reasonable possibility that a defect in the complaint can be cured by amendment or that the pleading liberally construed can state a cause of action, a demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend. [Citations.]” (Minsky v. City of Los *1152 Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cochran v. Cochran
Cal. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam. . . .” (Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d, p. 73, italics added; Thomas v. Douglas (9th Cir. 1989) 877 F.2d 1428, 1435 [applying Rest.2d Torts, § 46, principles to Ariz. law]; Dove v. PNS Stores, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 1997) 982 F.Supp. 1420, 1424 ; Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 297 .) Examples of decisions where a defendant’s conduct was deemed sufficiently outrageous include: Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
SCOTUS · 1998 · confidence medium
See also White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209-1210 (La. 1991) (a supervisor’s harassment of a subordinate is more apt to rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress than comparable harassment by a coemployee); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 740 , 565 P. 2d 1173, 1176 (1977) (same); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498-499, and n. 2, 468 P. 2d 216, 218-219 , and n. 2 (1970) (same).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of America (3×)
Cal. · 1998 · confidence medium
But the fact remains, as we stated in Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 88 , 468 P.2d 216 ], and do well to restate here, “there is no indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 51 to include discriminations other than those made by a ‘business establishment’ in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers.” Over the years, we have considered section 51, but have not given the phrase “business establishments” a consistent or satisfying reading.
MANUEL D. ALCORN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ANBRO ENGINEERING, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
L.A. 29683.
California Supreme Court.
Apr 24, 1970.
468 P.2d 216
Burke.
Cited by 366 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 61%
Citer courts: Supreme Court of New Jersey (6)

[*496] COUNSEL

Robert D. Bash and Hillel Chodos for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Haight, Lyon, Smith & Nye, Charles B. Smith and Henry F. Walker for Defendants and Respondents.

OPINION

BURKE, J.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of dismissal entered after defendants' demurrer to the third amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. The complaint seeks to recover actual and exemplary damages against defendants, based upon their alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and alleged violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, §§ 51-52). (1a) We have concluded that the complaint states a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the order of dismissal must be reversed.

(2-4) At the outset, it is well settled that a general demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint (Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [15 Cal. Rptr. 87, 364 P.2d 263]); that the question of plaintiff's ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court (Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 6 Cal.2d 765, 769 [59 P.2d 473]; Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Barnes, 205 Cal. App.2d 337, 346 [23 Cal. Rptr. 55]); and that plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief (Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App.2d 793, 795 [56 Cal. Rptr. 115]).

(1b) In his first cause of action, plaintiff alleged that he is a Negro employed as a truckdriver by defendant Anbro Engineering, Inc., a corporation owned and operated by defendants Thomas Anderson, Sr., and Harlon Anderson, doing business as Anderson Bros., a partnership. On the day of the incident at issue, plaintiff informed defendant Palmer, Anbro's Caucasian field superintendent and plaintiff's foreman, that plaintiff, in his capacity as shop steward for the Teamster's Union, had advised another Anbro employee that he should not drive a certain truck to the job site, since that employee was not a teamster. Plaintiff's remarks to Palmer allegedly were neither rude, insubordinate nor otherwise violative of plaintiff's duties as an employee.

Immediately thereafter, Palmer allegedly shouted at plaintiff in a rude, violent and insolent manner as follows: "You goddam `niggers' are not going[*497] to tell me about the rules. I don't want any `niggers' working for me. I am getting rid of all the `niggers'; go pick up and deliver that 8-ton roller to the other job site and get your pay check; you're fired." Plaintiff thereupon delivered the roller and reported the incident to defendant Thomas Anderson, Jr., a Caucasian and Anbro's secretary, who allegedly ratified and confirmed Palmer's acts, including plaintiff's discharge, on behalf of Anbro and the other defendants.

As a result of the foregoing incident, plaintiff allegedly suffered humiliation, mental anguish and emotional and physical distress. Plaintiff was sick and ill for several weeks thereafter, was unable to work, and sustained shock, nausea and insomnia.

Plaintiff further alleged that defendant Palmer's conduct was intentional and malicious, and done for the purpose of causing plaintiff to suffer humiliation, mental anguish and emotional and physical distress, and that defendant Anderson, Jr.'s conduct in confirming and ratifying Palmer's conduct and in discharging plaintiff, was done with knowledge that plaintiff's emotional and physical distress would thereby increase, and was done intentionally or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to plaintiff.

Plaintiff also alleged that Negroes such as plaintiff are particularly susceptible to emotional and physical distress from conduct such as committed by defendants.

Plaintiff was reinstated with Anbro through grievance and arbitration procedures, and has received back pay. This action seeks the recovery of actual and exemplary[1] damages for the emotional and physical distress allegedly suffered by him.

This state has long recognized the right to recover damages for the intentional and unreasonable infliction of mental or emotional distress which results in foreseeable physical injury to plaintiff. (State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, supra, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-337; Vargas v. Ruggiero, 197 Cal. App.2d 709, 717-718 [17 Cal. Rptr. 568]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal. App.2d 124, 130 [217 P.2d 113, 17 A.L.R.2d 929]; Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App.2d 793, 794-795 [216 P.2d 571]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App.2d 313, 316-319 [198 P.2d 696]; see Rest. 2d Torts, § 312.)

Plaintiff's allegations that defendants intentionally inflicted emotional[*498] distress for the purpose of causing plaintiff to suffer emotional and physical harm, and that plaintiff did suffer physical illness, shock, nausea and insomnia as a result thereof, meet the requirements of the foregoing authorities. (5) The physical consequences of shock or other disturbance to the nervous system are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that plaintiff has suffered physical injury from defendants' conduct. (Emden v. Vitz, supra, 88 Cal. App.2d 313, 316-317; see Vanoni v. Western Airlines, supra, 247 Cal. App.2d 793, 796-797.)

Moreover, the courts of this state have also acknowledged the right to recover damages for emotional distress alone, without consequent physical injuries, in cases involving extreme and outrageous intentional invasions of one's mental and emotional tranquility. (State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, supra, 38 Cal.2d 330, 337-338; Cornblith v. First Maintenance Supply Co., 268 Cal. App.2d 564 [74 Cal. Rptr. 216]; Agostini v. Strycula, 231 Cal. App.2d 804, 808 [42 Cal. Rptr. 314]; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal. App.2d 472, 474 [28 Cal. Rptr. 898]; see Rest.2d Torts, § 46.)

Plaintiff has alleged facts and circumstances which reasonably could lead the trier of fact to conclude that defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous, having a severe and traumatic effect upon plaintiff's emotional tranquility. (6) Thus, according to plaintiff, defendants, standing in a position or relation of authority over plaintiff,[2] aware of his particular susceptibility to emotional distress,[3] and for the purpose of causing plaintiff to suffer such distress, intentionally humiliated plaintiff, insulted his race,[4] ignored his union status, and terminated his employment, all[*499] without just cause or provocation. Although it may be that mere insulting language, without more, ordinarily would not constitute extreme outrage,[5] the aggravated circumstances alleged by plaintiff seem sufficient to uphold his complaint as against defendants' general demurrer. (7) "Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability." (Rest. 2d Torts, § 46, com. h; accord, Halio v. Lurie (1961) 15 App.Div.2d 62 [222 N.Y.S.2d 759, 764]; Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp. (Mun.Ct.App. D.C. 1946) 49 A.2d 81, 83.)

The multitude of cases[6] upholding on various theories complaints alleging similar circumstances strongly indicates at least that plaintiff has pleaded a situation in which reasonable men may differ regarding defendants' liability. That being so, the order of dismissal should be reversed as to plaintiff's first cause of action.

Plaintiff's second cause of action alleges that he was discharged from employment with Anbro solely because of his race, and that such conduct constituted an unlawful discrimination under sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code. Section 51 requires "full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments" regardless of "color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin." Section 52 permits the recovery of damages for a violation of section 51.

[*500] Plaintiff contends that his right to remain in Anbro's employ was an "advantage" or "privilege" protected from discrimination under section 51. Although this court has held that the term "business establishments" in section 51 was used in the "broadest sense reasonably possible" (Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal.2d 463, 468-469 [20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313]), it is doubtful that the Legislature intended these sections to apply to discrimination in employment. The broad language of section 51 was adopted after several court decisions placed an unduly restrictive interpretation upon the former phrase "places of public accommodation or amusement" in the predecessor section to section 51. (See Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in "Business Establishments" Statute — A Problem in Statutory Application (1960) 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. 261, 272-276; Colley, supra, fn. 3, at pp. 190-194. (8) However, there is no indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of section 51 to include discriminations other than those made by a "business establishment" in the course of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers. (See Horowitz, supra, at pp. 288-289, 294.)

This conclusion is substantiated by the fact that at the same session wherein it adopted the language of section 51, the Legislature also enacted extensive provisions governing discrimination in employment. The Fair Employment Practices Act. (Lab. Code, § 1410 et seq.) declares that the opportunity to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination is a civil right (Lab. Code, § 1412), and provides for administrative procedures for relief from such discrimination, "including (but not limited to) hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay...." Lab. Code, § 1426.)[7]

(9) Although the Fair Employment Practices Act can not be deemed to have repealed any provisions of the Civil Rights Act (see Lab. Code, § 1432), we conclude that the concurrent enactment of the former act indicated a legislative intent to exclude the subject of discrimination in employment from the latter act. Consequently, defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's second cause of action was properly sustained.

The judgment of dismissal of the second cause of action is affirmed. The judgment of dismissal of the first cause of action is reversed, and the[*501] trial court is hereby instructed to overrule the demurrer and allow defendants to answer.

Mosk, Acting C.J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.

1 Defendants do not challenge the assumption that if plaintiff has stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, then exemplary damages would be a proper item of recovery. (See Civ. Code, § 3294; State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 341 [240 P.2d 282]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App.2d 628, 633 [286 P.2d 474].)
2 The cases and commentators have emphasized the significance of the relationship between the parties in determining whether liability should be imposed. (See Prosser, Law of Torts [3d ed. 1964], ch. 2, § 11, p. 49; Harper and James, The Law of Torts [1956], § 9, pp. 666-667; Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. e; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1051-1063; Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Cal.L.Rev. 40, 47; Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 108, 158-163.) Thus, plaintiff's status as an employee should entitle him to a greater degree of protection from insult and outrage than if he were a stranger to defendants. As provided in Labor Code section 1412: "The opportunity to ... hold employment without discrimination because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, or ancestry is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right."
3 Plaintiff's susceptibility to emotional distress has often been mentioned as significant in determining liability. (See Prosser, Law of Torts, supra, at p. 50; Harper and James, supra, at p. 669; Rest.2d Torts, supra, com. f; Prosser, supra, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40, p. 50.) With respect to the susceptibility of Negroes to severe emotional distress from discriminatory conduct, see Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising out of Violations of Civil Rights (1965-1966) 17 Hast.L.J. 189, 201.
4 Although the slang epithet "nigger" may once have been in common usage, along with such other racial characterizations as "wop," "chink," "jap," "bohunk," or "shanty Irish," the former expression has become particularly abusive and insulting in light of recent developments in the civil rights' movement as it pertains to the American Negro. Nor can we accept defendants' contention that plaintiff, as a truckdriver must have become accustomed to such abusive language. Plaintiff's own susceptibility to racial slurs and other discriminatory conduct is a question for the trier of fact, and cannot be determined on demurrer.
5 The Restatement view is that liability "does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities," but only to conduct so extreme and outrageous "as to go beyond all possible bonds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." (Rest. 2d Torts, § 46, com. d; see Prosser, Law of Torts, supra, at pp. 46-47.) For examples of allegations held insufficient to state a cause of action for extreme outrage, see Cornblith v. First Maintenance Supply Co., supra, 268 Cal. App.2d 564 (defendant-employer directed coemployees not to assist plaintiff); Agostini v. Strycula, supra, 231 Cal. App.2d 804 (defendants made factual statements regarding plaintiff's unsuitability for employment); Perati v. Atkinson, supra, 213 Cal. App.2d 472 (defendant-coemployee made factual statements regarding plaintiff's failure to obey orders). None of these cases involved vituperative language or vindictive conduct such as alleged in the instant case.
6 See, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. (Tex. 1967) 424 S.W.2d 627; Beavers v. Johnson (1965) 112 Ga. App. 677 [145 S.E.2d 776]; Ruiz v. Bertolotti (1962) 37 Misc.2d 1067 [236 N.Y.S.2d 854]; Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle (1959) 52 Wn.2d 440 [341 P.2d 859, 865]; Amos v. Prom (N.D.Iowa 1953) 115 F. Supp. 127, 133; Curnett v. Wolf (1953) 244 Iowa 683 [57 N.W.2d 915]; Odom v. East Ave. Corp. (1942) 178 Misc. 363 [34 N.Y.S.2d 312]; cf. Guillory v. Godfrey, supra (1955) 134 Cal. App.2d 628, 633.
7 Apparently, plaintiff waived his FEPA rights in favor of union arbitration.