State v. Jacobs, 115 P.3d 281 (Wash. 2005). · Go Syfert
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State v. Jacobs, 115 P.3d 281 (Wash. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2007 · …under the rule of lenity, where a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it in favor of the defendant. ✓
520 citation events (520 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Slattum (washctapp, 2013-02-19)
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 34 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Slattum
Wash. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
if a statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires us to interpret the statute in favor of the defendant absent legislative intent to the contrary.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Watson
Wash. · 2007 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
under the rule of lenity, where a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it in favor of the defendant.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Watson
Wash. · 2007 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
under the rule of lenity, where a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it in favor of the defendant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Strus
E.D. Wash. · 2020 · confidence medium
The Court discerns a statute’s plain meaning by 10 reference to the “ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute 11 in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a 12 whole.” Id. (citing State v. Jacobs, 115 P.3d 281, 283 (Wash. 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
E.D. Wash. · 2020 · confidence medium
The Court discerns a statute’s plain meaning by 15 reference to the “ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute 16 in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a 17 whole.” Id. (citing State v. Jacobs, 115 P.3d 281, 283 (Wash. 2005).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nagle v. Snohomish County
Wash. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Weaver, Washington Practice, Real Estate: Transactions § 13.3 at 92 (2d ed.2004). [14] (Emphasis added.) [15] State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596 , 115 P.3d 281, 283 (2005) (citing Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). [16] Jacobs, 115 P.3d at 283 . [17] Jacobs, 115 P.3d at 283 . [18] Washington Public Ports Ass'n v. Dep't of Revenue, 148 Wash.2d 637, 645 , 62 P.3d 462 (2003); Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 10-12 , 43 P.3d 4 . [19] Bona fide purchaser: One who buys something for value without notice of another's claim to the property and without ac…
discussed Cited "see" Southwick, Inc. v. Wash. State
Wash. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Conover, 183 Wash.2d at 711 -12 , 355 P.3d 1093 (applying the rule of lenity after finding the statute ambiguous (citing Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d at 600 -01 , 115 P.3d 281 ) ); State v. Evans, 177 Wash.2d 186 , 192-93, 298 P.3d 724 (2013) (using legislative history to resolve an ambiguity before applying the rule of lenity). ¶ 55 In this case, though, it does not matter; both point to the same result. ¶ 56 Regarding legislative history, the crime of disinterring the dead now codified at RCW 68.50.140 was originally intended to punish grave robbing.
discussed Cited "see" State Of Washington v. Clifford Paul Lapointe, Jr.
Wash. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See RCW 9A.52.100(4)(a). 9 We note both parties assume that "convicted at least two separate occasions" means "convicted on at least two separate occasions." But if the legislature inadvertently omitted the word "for," the statute could also read "convicted for at least two separate occasions." 7 No. 75218-9-1/8 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
cited Cited "see" State v. Houston-Sconiers
Wash. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
cited Cited "see" State v. Houston-Sconiers
Wash. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Dupuis
Wash. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (plain meaning of statute is discerned in part from context of statute in which provision is found).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Newcomb
Wash. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (if statute is ambiguous, rule of lenity requires us to interpret it in the defendant's favor absent contrary legislative intent).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Newcomb
Wash. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (if statute is ambiguous, rule of lenity requires us to interpret it in the defendant’s favor absent contrary legislative intent).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Kintz
Wash. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d at 601 , 115 P.3d 281 . ¶ 56 In my view, even if we assume the stalking statute is unambiguous, its plain language would compel the exact opposite result of that reached by the majority.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Failey
Wash. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (rule of lenity requires interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes in manner most favorable to defendant). ¶7 Applying the comparability analysis of RCW 9.94A.030(32)(u), Failey’s 1974 robbery is most comparable to the current offense of second degree robbery.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Failey
Wash. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (rule of lenity requires interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes in manner most favorable to defendant). ¶ 17 Applying the comparability analysis of RCW 9.94A.030(32)(u), Failey's 1974 robbery is most comparable to the current offense of second degree robbery.
discussed Cited "see" Gutierrez v. Department of Corrections
Wash. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See RCW 9.94A.660. [2] While not at issue in that appeal, the trial court in Jacobs had, like the trial court in this case, applied DOSA to the enhanced range. 154 Wash.2d at 599 , 115 P.3d 281 . [3] DOC argues that the remedy portion of State v. Miller, 110 Wash.2d 528 , 756 P.2d 122 (1988), was erroneously decided and should be overruled.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Flores
Wash. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
RCW 69.50.435(1)(a)-(g); see State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (discussing mandatory penalties under former RCW 9.94A.533(6) (2003)). ¶ 38 Another fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that when the legislature uses different words in statutes relating to a similar subject matter, it intends different meanings.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Flores
Wash. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
RCW 69.50.435(l)(a)-(g); see State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (discussing mandatory penalties under former RCW 9.94A-.533(6) (2003)). ¶38 Another fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that when the legislature uses different words in statutes relating to a similar subject matter, it intends different meanings.
cited Cited "see" State v. Lilyblad
Wash. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
Id. at 468-69, 140 P.3d 614 ; see State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
discussed Cited "see" City of Seattle v. Quezada
Wash. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600-01 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005). ¶20 The city asserts that under the plain language of RCW 46.61.5055, a deferred prosecution also constitutes a prior offense for the DUI conviction entered when that deferred prosecution is revoked.
discussed Cited "see" City of Seattle v. Quezada
Wash. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600-01 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005). *133 ¶ 20 The City asserts that under the plain language of RCW 46.61.5055, a deferred prosecution also constitutes a prior offense for the DUI conviction entered when that deferred prosecution is revoked.
discussed Cited "see" Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Wash. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. ¶ 10 Subject to specific exemptions, the MWA requires employers to pay their employees (as the act defines "employees") overtime pay for the hours they work over 40 hours per week.
cited Cited "see" Bostain v. Food Express, Inc.
Wash. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. f 10 Subject to specific exemptions, the MWA requires employers to pay their employees (as the act defines “employees”) overtime pay for the hours they work over 40 hours per week.
discussed Cited "see" Ago
Wash. Att'y Gen. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596 , 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 , 411 , 93 S. Ct. 1007 (1973) (criminal statutes "must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity"). 5 To meet the definition of "metal junk," material must be "no longer useful in its original form".
discussed Cited "see" State v. Cromwell
Wash. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 , 93 S.Ct. 1007 , 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973) (criminal statutes "must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity"). ¶ 36 Construing the statute in Cromwell's favor the prosecution would be required to provide evidence that the substance delivered was "methamphetamine." However, Dr. Suzuki testified unequivocally that the substances in this case were not methamphetamine but rather salts of methamphetamine.
cited Cited "see" State v. Cromwell
Wash. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 , 93 S. Ct. 1007 , 35 L.
discussed Cited "see" Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co.
Wash. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (“ ‘[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 586 , 817 P.2d 855 (1991)))). ¶38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. 17 Thus…
discussed Cited "see" Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., Inc.
Wash. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990)) ("[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent."). ¶ 38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. [17] Thus, we review the evidence under the standards applicable to a sex discrimination case as pled by Heg…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Cooper
Wash. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) and United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 , 93 S.Ct. 1007 , 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973) (criminal statutes "must *1238 be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity"). ¶ 20 Construed in Cooper's favor, RCW 9A.42.100 does not apply.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Bunker
Wash. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence low
“When statutory language is unambiguous, we look only to that language to determine the legislative intent without considering outside sources State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727 , 63 P.3d 792 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d 652, 657 , 152 P.3d 1020 (2007) (when a “ ‘statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005))).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Bunker
Wash. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence low
"When statutory language is unambiguous, we look only to that language to determine the legislative intent without considering outside sources." State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727 , 63 P.3d 792 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wash.2d 652, 657 , 152 P.3d 1020 (2007) (when a "`statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent'" (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Davis
Wash. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
"Postrelease supervision" is "that portion of an offender's community placement that is not community custody." RCW 9.94A.030(34). 139 Wash.App. at 603, n. 1 , 161 P.3d 483 . [32] 108 Wash.2d at 540 , 741 P.2d 1 . [33] 63 Wash.App. 117, 121 , 816 P.2d 1249 (1991). [34] 116 Wash.App. at 197 , 64 P.3d 687 . [35] Where a statute is ambiguous on an issue, "the rule of lenity requires us to construe the statute strictly against the State in favor of the accused." State v. Gore, 101 Wash.2d 481, 486 , 681 P.2d 227 (1984) (citing State v. Sass, 94 Wash.2d 721 , 620 P.2d 79 (1980); State v. Workman, 9…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Davis
Wash. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
Where a statute is ambiguous on an issue, “the rule of lenity requires us to construe the statute strictly against the State in favor of the accused.” State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 486 , 681 P.2d 227 (1984) (citing State v. Sass, 94 Wn.2d 721 , 620 P.2d 79 (1980); State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443 , 584 P2d 382 (1978); City of Seattle v. Green, 51 Wn.2d 871 , 322 P.2d 842 (1958)); see also State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
James Allen JACOBS, Petitioner. State of Washington, Respondent, v. Kathy Ann Austin-Bocanegra, Petitioner.
75436-5.
Washington Supreme Court.
Jul 7, 2005.
115 P.3d 281
Fairhurst.
Published
2 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 76%
Citer courts: Washington Supreme Court (2) · Court of Appeals of Washington (1)

[*282] Thomas Edward Doyle, Hansville, Patricia Anne Pethick, Tacoma, for Petitioner.

Steven Curtis Sherman, Allyn, for Respondent.

FAIRHURST, J.

¶ 1 Codefendants James Allen Jacobs and Kathy Ann Austin-Bocanegra were convicted of manufacturing a controlled substance. The jury also returned two special verdicts finding that they committed the crime while a person under 18 was present and that they manufactured a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop. The sentencing judge imposed two 24-month sentence enhancements based on those findings and applied them consecutively. Petitioners challenge their sentences, arguing that former RCW 9.94A.510 (2001),[1]recodified as RCW 9.94A.533(6),[2] only intends one 24-month sentence enhancement where these circumstances are present and, alternatively, that even if both may be applied, they must run concurrently.

¶ 2 Without deciding whether RCW 9.94A.533(6) allows for two 24-month enhancements, we hold that it is ambiguous as to whether the enhancements should be applied concurrently or consecutively. Under the rule of lenity, we must interpret the statute in favor of concurrent sentences. We reverse the Court of Appeals decision to the contrary, vacate the sentences, and remand for resentencing to include no more than 24-months of sentence enhancement.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 For allegedly conducting a methamphetamine lab in their mobile home with their infant child present, Austin-Bocanegra and Jacobs were charged as codefendants with manufacturing a controlled substance[*283] within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop, while a person under 18 was present in or upon the premises (count I), and criminal mistreatment in the second degree (count II). A jury convicted each of manufacturing a controlled substance but found them not guilty of criminal mistreatment. The jury also returned two special verdicts that the crime was (1) committed within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop, (2) while a person under 18 was present in or upon the premises. Each special verdict supported a 24-month enhancement.

¶ 4 Based on his offender score of zero, the standard range sentence for Jacobs would have been 51-68 months. After applying the two 24-month enhancements, the judge concluded that the applicable range was 99-116 months and sentenced Jacobs to 107.5 months. Based on Austin-Bocanegra's offender score of 7, her standard range sentence would have been 108-144 months. After applying the two 24-month enhancements, the range was 156-192 months. But the sentencing judge imposed a lesser sentence of 87 months, which was half of the midpoint of that range according to the drug offender sentencing alternative, RCW 9.94A.660.

¶ 5 Jacobs and Austin-Bocanegra appealed, arguing, among other things, that the sentence enhancements were incorrectly applied. In an opinion initially unpublished,[3] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding in pertinent part that the trial court did not err in applying two consecutive 24-month sentence enhancements. State v. Jacobs, 121 Wash.App. 669, 683, 89 P.3d 232 (2004). Jacobs and Austin-Bocanegra subsequently petitioned this court for review. We granted review of only one issue, "whether the sentencing court properly added two consecutive sentence enhancements to the standard range" and consolidated the two cases. State v. Jacobs, No. 75436-5, Order (Dec. 1, 2004).

II. ISSUE

¶ 6 Did the sentencing court properly add two consecutive sentence enhancements to the standard range sentences at issue here?

III. ANALYSIS

¶ 7 We are asked to interpret RCW 9.94A.533. Statutory interpretation involves questions of law that we review de novo. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). In construing a statute, the court's objective is to determine the legislature's intent. Id. "[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Id. at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4. The "plain meaning" of a statutory provision is to be discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, as well as from the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Wash. Pub. Ports Ass'n v. Dep't of Revenue, 148 Wash.2d 637, 645, 62 P.3d 462 (2003); Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 10-12, 43 P.3d 4. If after that examination, the provision is still subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires us to interpret the statute in favor of the defendant absent legislative intent to the contrary. In re Post Sentencing Review of Charles, 135 Wash.2d 239, 249, 955 P.2d 798 (1998); State v. Roberts, 117 Wash.2d 576, 585, 817 P.2d 855 (1991).

¶ 8 RCW 9.94A.533(6) states: "twenty-four months shall be added to the standard sentence range for any ranked offense involving a violation of chapter 69.50 RCW [the Uniform Controlled Substances Act] if the offense was also a violation of RCW 69.50.435[[4]] or 9.94A.605.[[5]]" Here, there was[*284] a violation of RCW 69.50.435(1)(c) and RCW 9.94A.605. At least one 24-month enhancement, and possibly two, apply to this fact situation. However, we need not decide whether two 24-month enhancements may be imposed where both RCW 69.50.435 and RCW 9.94A.605 are violated because according to the rule of lenity, even if both may be imposed, they must run concurrently. We hold that the sentencing court erred in applying them consecutively.

¶ 9 RCW 9.94A.533 is silent on whether enhancements under RCW 69.50.435 and RCW 9.94A.605 should be imposed consecutively or concurrently to one another or to other enhancements. The Court of Appeals quoted State v. DeSantiago, 149 Wash.2d 402, 418, 68 P.3d 1065 (2003), for our holding that all firearm and deadly weapon enhancements are mandatory and must be served consecutively. Jacobs, 121 Wash.App. at 683, 89 P.3d 232. The court then concluded that the sentence enhancements at issue here are mandatory and that the sentencing court did not err in applying them consecutively. Id. Petitioners argue that the statutory authority for imposing the enhancements consecutively is ambiguous and that under the rule of lenity the statute must be interpreted to require concurrent enhancements. The State, on the other hand, asserts that the statute permits consecutive sentences and argues that applying them concurrently would render meaningless the purposes the legislature intended for one of the enhancements.

¶ 10 Although sentencing courts generally enjoy discretion in tailoring sentences, for the most part that discretion does not extend to deciding whether to apply sentences concurrently or consecutively. Where a person is sentenced for two or more current offenses, the legislature has specified that if those offenses stem from the same criminal conduct, the sentences shall be served concurrently; consecutive sentences can be imposed only as an exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.535. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a).[6] In contrast, sentences for "two or more serious violent offenses arising from separate and distinct criminal conduct" must be applied consecutively to each other. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). In RCW 9.94A.589 the legislature also specified that courts must impose consecutive sentences for certain firearm related offenses. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(c).

¶ 11 RCW 9.94A.589 pertains to sentencing for multiple offenses, not enhancements, and therefore does not directly govern this situation. But it does demonstrate the legislature's presumption in favor of concurrent sentences as well as the lack of general discretion judges have in deciding whether to apply sentences concurrently or consecutively.

¶ 12 Furthermore, the legislature has chosen to specify that in the case of deadly weapon and firearm sentence enhancements, sentencing courts must apply them consecutively. RCW 9.94A.533(3)(e),(4)(e). Thus,[*285] the legislature clearly knows how to require consecutive application of sentence enhancements and chose to do so only for firearms and other deadly weapons. See Roberts, 117 Wash.2d at 586, 817 P.2d 855 ("`[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.'" (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 27, 804 P.2d 1 (1990))).

¶ 13 If anything, the statutory language and context seems to weigh in favor of intending concurrent sentences. However, the legislature's silence on the issue is far from "plain," and the legislative intent gleaned elsewhere in the statute does not conclusively resolve the issue. Thus, RCW 9.94A.533(6) appears ambiguous. Under the rule of lenity, where a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it in favor of the defendant. Roberts, 117 Wash.2d at 585, 817 P.2d 855. We must interpret RCW 9.94A.533(6) to require sentencing courts to apply enhancements for violations of RCW 69.50.435 and RCW 9.94A.605 concurrently to each another.

¶ 14 Whether two, concurrent 24-month enhancements or a single 24-month enhancement is imposed, the most either petitioner should serve for the relative enhancements is 24 months. The Court of Appeals decision is reversed, the sentences are vacated, and the cases are remanded for resentencing to include not more than 24 months of sentence enhancement. Therefore, because we reach the same result by requiring concurrent application of the sentence enhancements, we need not address whether the legislature actually intends RCW 9.94A.533(6) to allow imposition of two 24-month enhancements.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 15 We hold that RCW 9.94A.533(6) is ambiguous as to whether sentencing courts should apply sentence enhancements under RCW 69.50.435 and RCW 9.94A.605 consecutively or concurrently. Under the rule of lenity, sentencing courts should apply those enhancements concurrently to each another. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals, vacate the sentences, and remand for resentencing to include not more than 24 months of sentence enhancement.

C. JOHNSON, MADSEN, BRIDGE and OWENS, JJ., concur.

SANDERS, J. (concurring in result).

¶ 16 The majority does not reach the question whether RCW 9.94A.533 allows two sentence enhancements for violations of both RCW 69.50.435 (as relevant here, manufacturing a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop) and RCW 9.94A.605 (manufacturing a controlled substance with a minor present). Instead it concludes the statutory language is ambiguous as to whether two enhancements must run consecutively or concurrently, and applying the rule of lenity, settles on the latter. Thus, the defendants will face only 24 months of sentence enhancement. I concur in this result because RCW 9.94A.533 allows only one sentence enhancement for a violation of either or both of the two other statutes.

¶ 17 RCW 9.94A.533(6) provides, "An additional twenty-four months shall be added to the standard sentence range for any ranked offense involving a violation of chapter 69.50 RCW [controlled substances act] if the offense was also a violation of RCW 69.50.435 or 9.94A.605" (emphasis added). The defendants argue "or" requires a single enhancement for a single controlled substance offense. The State claims the "or" is disjunctive and thus allows an enhancement for a violation of each provision, citing Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash.2d 592, 595-96, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) to support the proposition that "or" is disjunctive unless there is clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent. But merely calling "or" disjunctive does not resolve the issue.

¶ 18 In the statement of logic "if p or q, then r," either p or q satisfies the condition, and r results. IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 354 (9th ed.1994). This logical form is modus ponens, which is classically stated, if p then q; p, therefore q. Id. Using "or" inclusively, if both p and q are present, r still follows, 2r does not. As applied here, a violation of either RCW 69.50.435 (p) or 9.94A.605 (q) triggers the[*286] application of RCW 9.94A.533(6) (r), which requires only 24 months of sentence enhancement. One cannot obtain two enhancements by violating both provisions.

¶ 19 On its face the statute contemplates a single enhancement for violation of either RCW 69.50.435 or RCW 9.94A.605. If both are violated, a single enhancement follows. The statute does not clearly require a second enhancement, and so the rule of lenity also favors a single enhancement. See State v. Roberts, 117 Wash.2d 576, 586, 817 P.2d 855 (1991) ("The rule of lenity requires the court to adopt an interpretation most favorable to the criminal defendant."). Thus, the defendants should serve only 24 months for a single sentence enhancement.

¶ 20 Because the majority vacates the sentences and remands for imposition of only 24 months of enhancement, majority at 285, I concur in the result.

J.M. JOHNSON, J., ALEXANDER C.J. and CHAMBERS, J., concur.

1 Petitioners cite this version incorrectly; the version in effect at the time of petitioners' crime was actually former RCW 9.94A.310(6) (2001).
2 This opinion discusses the current codification of the provision, RCW 9.94A.533.
3 The court later granted the State's motion to publish the opinion. State v. Jacobs, Order Granting Motion to Publish, No. 28419-7-II (Apr. 27, 2004).
4 RCW 69.50.435 states in pertinent part:

(1) Any person who violates RCW 69.50.401 by manufacturing, selling, delivering, or possessing with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance . . .:

(a) In a school;

(b) On a school bus;

(c) Within one thousand feet of a school bus route stop designated by the school district;

(d) Within one thousand feet of the perimeter of the school grounds;

(e) In a public park;

(f) In a public housing project designated by a local governing authority as a drug-free zone;

(g) On a public transit vehicle;

(h) In a public transit stop shelter;

(i) At a civic center designated as a drug-free zone by a local governing authority; or

(j) Within one thousand feet of a perimeter of a facility designated under (i) . . . may be punished by a fine of up to twice the fine otherwise authorized by this chapter, but not including twice the fine authorized by RCW 69.50.406, or by imprisonment of up to twice the imprisonment otherwise authorized by this chapter, but not including twice the imprisonment authorized by RCW 69.50.406, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The provisions of this section shall not operate to more than double the fine or imprisonment otherwise authorized by this chapter for an offense.

5 RCW 9.94A.605 states in pertinent part:

In a criminal case where:

(1) The defendant has been convicted of (a) manufacture of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.401 relating to manufacture of methamphetamine; or (b) possession of [certain chemicals]with intent to manufacture methamphetamine . . .; and

(2) There has been a special allegation pleaded and proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime when a person under the age of eighteen was present in or upon the premises of manufacture; the court shall make a finding of fact of the special allegation, or if a jury trial is had, the jury shall, if it finds the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to the special allegation.

6 RCW 9.94A.589 was formerly RCW 9.94A.400, but was recodified as RCW 9.94A.589 by Laws of 2001, ch. 10, § 6.