Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912 (1980). · Go Syfert
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Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912 (1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 6× by 1 distinct case · "a prevailing plaintiff should receive fees almost as a matter of course."
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “contingency adjustments” and "contingency factors”
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “no substantial difference between the provisions or purposes of the two statutes”
312 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 43 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Elliott v. Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission (me, 1984-12-31) · Strongest negative: Andrew S. Jacobs v. Anthony Mancuso, Etc. (ca1, 1987-07-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" Andrew S. Jacobs v. Anthony Mancuso, Etc.
1st Cir. · 1987 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.1979), ce rt. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 ; NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Association, 620 F.Supp. 1173, 1194-95 (E.D.Mich.1985); Roe v. City of Chicago, 586 F.Supp. 513, 516 (N.D.Ill.1984); cf. Jones v. Armstrong Cork Co., 630 F.2d 324 , 325 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1980) (collecting cases). 7 .
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Elliott v. Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission
Me. · 1984 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
contingency adjustments" and "contingency factors
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Fletcher Altman Smith, and Marguerite Elizabeth Smith v. Don Heath, and Jack Rohtert (2×)
6th Cir. · 1982 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
a prevailing plaintiff should receive fees almost as a matter of course.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Tasby v. Wright
N.D. Tex. · 1982 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
no substantial difference between the provisions or purposes of the two statutes
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McKenzie v. Osborne (2×)
Mont. · 1982 · confidence medium
This seems to be yet another case in which a court sanctions ‘egregious violations of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants by blandly reciting the formula ‘harmless error.’ Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912, 915 (1980), (MARSHALL and BRENNAN, JJ., dissenting).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McKenzie v. Osborne
Mont. · 1981 · confidence medium
This seems to be yet another case in which a court sanctions 'egregious violations of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants by blandly reciting the formula 'harmless error.' Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912, 915 (1980), (MARSHAEL BRENNAN, JJ., dissenting).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McKenzie v. Montana
SCOTUS · 1980 · confidence medium
It appears that only in petitioner’s case is the Montana court unwilling to apply this analysis. 7 This seems to be yet another case in which a court sanctions “egregious violations of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants by blandly reciting the formula 'harmless error.’ ” Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U. S. 912, 915 (1980) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
discussed Cited "see" Spearman v. Commissioner of Correction (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 333, 426 A.2d 298 (1979) ("[w]here a defendant proposes an alibi as his defense, one permissible method of determining whether the alibi was fabricated is to inquire into the specific details and the surrounding circumstances of the alibi on cross-examination in an attempt to show inconsistencies in the testimony of the various alibi witnesses, since the claim of alibi is subject to searching scrutiny"), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Media Vision Technology Securities Litigation
N.D. Cal. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 639 , cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1979); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 *1369 F.2d 546, 559 (long distance telephone expenses should be allowed as fees only if such expenses are usually charged separately in the area). 7 Although not all jurisdictions consider long distance phone calls taxable costs, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Northcross holding when the court decided that reasonable telephone costs were reimbursable.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Rudd
Tex. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nastu v. State, 589 S.W.2d 434, 441 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), ce rt. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980); Ransonette v. State, 550 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Smith v. State, 541 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 937 , 97 S.Ct. 1565 , 51 L.Ed.2d 783 (1977); Hill v. State, 504 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), overruled on other grounds, 591 S.W.2d 837 (1979); Gamboa v. State, 774 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, pet. ref'd); Gardner v. State, 745 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, no pet.).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Kwaak (2×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Vitale, supra. This examination provided the defendant with an opportunity to “expose before the jury any facts upon which the jury could determine the [witness’] credibility sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.” State v. Fenn, supra, 326 . “ ‘ “Once it is established that the trial court’s ruling on the scope of cross-examination is not constitutionally defective, this court will apply ‘[e]very reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discret…
discussed Cited "see" Allen v. Freeman
S.D. Fla. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F.Supp. 776 (E.D.Pa.1979).
cited Cited "see" Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County
S.D. Tex. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir.1979), ce rt. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980); Lindy Bros.
discussed Cited "see" Yaris v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County
E.D. Mo. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980) (award of attorneys' fees as part of costs under § 1988 includes reasonable expenses).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Girolamo (2×)
Conn. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
State v. Palmer, supra, 166 ; see State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 333 , 426 A.2d 298 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S. Ct. 3000 , 64 L.
discussed Cited "see" Eleanor Snyder, of the Estate of Leroy Liljedahl v. Bruton Smith (2×)
7th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624, 635 (6th Cir.1979), cert.denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). 14 In this case, the district court compelled arbitration, in a proceeding where the only judicial remedy sought was an order to arbitrate, and it retained jurisdiction to enforce any arbitration award.
discussed Cited "see" Martha Johnson and Delores J. Ceballos, Etc. v. University College of the University of Alabama in Birmingham George W. Campbell, Etc.
11th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Tasby v. *1208 Estes, 651 F.2d 287, 289-90 (5th Cir.1981) (quoting Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980)).
cited Cited "see" Ruiz v. Estelle
S.D. Tex. · 1982 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Smith v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbert v. State, 375 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Welty v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dobbert v. State, 375 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980); Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975); State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 , 94 S.Ct. 1950 , 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974).
discussed Cited "see" Ladies Center, Nebraska, Inc. v. Charles Thone
8th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 639-40 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980); Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education, 585 F.2d 618, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited "see" Ladies Center, Nebraska, Inc. v. Thone
8th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 639-40 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, Ml U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980); Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education, 585 F.2d 618, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Arcila v. State
Tex. App. · 1990 · signal: compare · confidence low
Cf. Lott, 686 S.W.2d at 307-08 . (apprehension was practical under the circumstances but failed to meet the exception relied upon by the State); compare *591 with Nastu v. State, 589 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), cert. denied 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980) (an acknowledgement that the reasonableness of police actions must be viewed in the context of often fast-moving and unpredictable circumstances).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lanasa v. City of New Orleans
E.D. La. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
Hourly rates should at least encompass some, if not all, of those factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974); see also, Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Feher v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations
D. Haw. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lackey v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Nastu v. State, 589 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 3000 , 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980), in which the Court held that, though the defendant made his consent to a search conditioned on his being able to calm his upset wife, his consent was voluntary.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Gordon (2×)
Conn. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ed. 2d 171 (1963) (Harlan, J., with whom Clark, Stewart, and White, Js., joined, dissenting); see also State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 337 , 426 A.2d 298 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912 , 100 S. Ct. 3000 , 64 L.
Linwood H. Briggs
v.
State of Connecticut
79-6383.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 9, 1980.
447 U.S. 912
Marshall, Brennan.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
3 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 76%
Citer courts: Sixth Circuit (2) · Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (1) · N.D. Texas (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use for impeachment purposes of evidence that a defendant remained silent after receiving the Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976). At petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutor repeatedly brought before the jury the fact that petitioner had not furnished police officers with his alibi at the time of his arrest. Respondent concedes, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed, that such use of petitioner’s postarrest silence violated petitioner’s constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the court sustained the conviction, over Justice Bogdanski’s dissent, on the ground that the error was harmless beyond a .reasonable doubt. I share Justice Bogdanski’s “unreasonable” belief that the violation of petitioner’s rights was not constitutionally harmless. A finding of harmless error on this record, in my view, can be nothing other than a means of avoiding the requirements of the Constitution in order to sustain the conviction of a defendant the court believed was factually guilty.

[*913] Petitioner’s defense was that he was in the company of his wife and was nowhere near the scene of the alleged crimes at the time they were committed. Petitioner’s wife testified to that effect, and petitioner’s testimony corroborated hers. On cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly forced petitioner to admit that he had not given his story to the police after receiving Miranda warnings. The cross-examination which the Connecticut Supreme Court held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was as follows:

“Q. Did you ever recall telling the police officer that you had gone to court in Stamford on June 8th [the date of the alleged offense] ?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Did you ever tell the police officer on June 15th [the date petitioner was arrested] that you were home from 6:45 to 8:55 in the morning?
“[Defense counsel’s objection was overruled.]
“A. No, I never told them nothing. Not anything.
“Q. Did you tell them that you were wearing red pants, red T-shirt and blue jacket, white, red and blue sneakers, at 6:15 on June—
“A. I did not tell the police officer nothing.
“Q. Did you ever tell them that you went to court with your wife and Kareen?
“A. Pardon me?
“Q. Did you ever tell them that you went to court with your wife and Kareen — the boy?
“A. Well, I started — I almost started a conversation but I cut it.
“Q. Did you ever tell the police officer what time you arrived at the court in Stamford?
“A. I did not tell the police officer nothing.” 179 Conn. 328, 334, n. 1, 426 A. 2d 298, 302, n. 1 (1979).

[*914] As if this colloquy did not sufficiently prejudice petitioner before the jury, the prosecutor called a police officer in rebuttal, who testified as follows:

“Q. And after you advised him of his rights, did he give any information with respect to his whereabouts on June 8th of 1977?
“A. The only information he would tell us was that he was in court on June 8th.
“Q. Did he tell you what time he was in court?
“A. No, he didn’t.
“Q. Did he tell you what judge—
“[Defense counsel’s objection was overruled.]
“Q. [by the Court] Wliat time did he said [sfc] he arrived in court?
“A. He didn’t tell me.
“Q. [by the prosecutor] Did you ask him?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Is there anything in your report with respect to the conversation you had with her or with Mr. Briggs?
“A. Yes, there is.
“Q. And may I see that, please?
“A. This is the accused, and what he said. Refused to give a statement.” Id., at 334-335, n. 2, 426 A. 2d, at 302, n. 2.

The repeated, cumulative impermissible references to petitioner’s constitutionally protected silence were obviously designed to imply that his defense was fabricated. The prosecutor knew very well that the defendant had remained silent after receiving Miranda warnings, and his questions were designed to hammer that fact home to the jury.

In holding that these repeated constitutional violations were harmless error, the Connecticut Supreme Court purported to apply a standard that has been adopted by several federal courts, namely, “ ‘[w]hen there is but a single reference at[*915] trial to the fact of defendant’s silence, the reference is neither repeated nor linked with defendant’s exculpatory story, and the exculpatory story is transparently frivolous and evidence of guilt is otherwise overwhelming, the reference to defendant’s silence constitutes harmless error.’ ” Id., at 336, 426 A. 2d, at 303, quoting State v. Zeko, 177 Conn. 545, 555, 418 A. 2d 917, 922 (1979). Accord, Chapman v. United States, 547 F. 2d 1240, 1250 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 908 (1977) ; Leake v. Cox, 432 F. 2d 982, 984 (CA4 1970). Even on the assumption that this was the appropriate standard, it is plain that the violations in this case were not harmless error. There were multiple references to petitioner’s silence; the references were linked — in detail — with petitioner’s exculpatory story; and petitioner’s alibi defense was not transparently frivolous.* Nevertheless, the court concluded that “the defendant’s silence was not so ‘highlighted’ by the prosecutor as to constitute prejudicial error” and that the comments had not “ ‘struck at the jugular’ of the defendant’s defense.” 179 Conn., at 337, 426 A. 2d, at 303.

This case exemplifies a disturbing and increasingly widespread trend among some courts to sanction egregious violations of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants by blandly reciting the formula “harmless error” whenever it appears that the accused was factually guilty. Our limited ability to exercise our certiorari jurisdiction prevents us from effectively policing the nullification of constitutional requirements through the abuse of the harmless-error doctrine; nor is it our role to correct such factual errors. Our judicial system relies on conscientious trial and appellate courts to assure that all persons accused of criminal offenses receive the full protections guaranteed them by the Constitution. Because this case exemplifies a serious failure to accept that weighty responsibility, I would grant the petition.

Petitioner’s wife and another witness testified to his whereabouts; the fact that the State presented three witnesses who controverted petitioner’s alibi defense does not necessarily mean the defense was frivolous.