Missouri Farmers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986). · Go Syfert
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Missouri Farmers Assn., Inc. v. United States, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
71 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 24 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Birchem (sdd, 1995-04-03) · Strongest negative: United States v. Currituck Grain, Incorporated (ca4, 1993-09-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 CFR § 1962.18 cited 2× in this case · 5 total citations of statute #1 CFR § 1962.17 cited 2× in this case · 9 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" United States v. Currituck Grain, Incorporated
4th Cir. · 1993 · signal: but see · confidence high
Assoc’s, Inc., 600 F.2d 513, 514 (5th Cir.1979); but see United States v. Missouri Farmers Ass’n, Inc., 764 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 , 106 S.Ct. 1281 , 89 L.Ed.2d 588 (1986).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Birchem
D.S.D. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See, i.e., U.S. v. Missouri Farmers Assn, Inc., 764 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 , 106 S.Ct. 1281 , 89 L.Ed.2d 588 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. David Ray, A/K/A David Young
D.C. Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Wardy, 777 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir.1985) [, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 [, 106 S.Ct. 1280 , 89 L.Ed.2d 587 ] (1986)] ("if the police apprehended a bank robber - during the course of a robbery and subsequently discovered that he had carried a gun concealed in his belt or in a shoulder holster, a conviction under § 2113(d) would probably be unwarranted”). .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Richard L. Rubin (2×)
2d Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Wardy, 777 F.2d 101, 107 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 , 106 S.Ct. 1280 , 89 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 154 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 260 (1980).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher
2d Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
Establishment of a § 1985(3) claim requires proof of a conspiracy between “two or more persons.” A conspiracy, for these purposes, need not be shown by proof of an explicit agreement but can be established by showing that the “parties have a tacit understanding to carry out the prohibited conduct.” United States v. Rubin, 844 F.2d 979, 984 (2d Cir.1988); see also United States v. Wardy, 777 F.2d 101, 107 (2d Cir.1985), ce rt. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 , 106 S.Ct. 1280 , 89 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986); Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 702 (10th Cir.1990) (conspiracy may be established by showing tha…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." ca2 1995
2d Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
Accord Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346, 1356-58 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 , 103 S.Ct. 788 , 74 L.Ed.2d 994 (1983); Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 48 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 , 102 S.Ct. 1253 , 71 L.Ed.2d 445 (1982). 87 Establishment of a Sec. 1985(3) claim requires proof of a conspiracy between "two or more persons." A conspiracy, for these purposes, need not be shown by proof of an explicit agreement but can be established by showing that the "parties have a tacit understanding to carry out the prohibited conduct." United States v. Rubin, 844 F.2d 979, 98…
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. DeSalvo
E.D.N.Y · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Arocena, 778 F.2d 943, 949 (2d Cir.1985) (similar character of multiple bombing attempts), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 , 106 S.Ct. 1281 , 89 L.Ed.2d 588 (1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Norman Katz Suzanne L. Hill v. Commissioner Internal Revenue Service
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
A trial court may reject even uncontradicted testimony "because of its inherent unbelievability, because a witness's demeanor raises doubt as to his sincerity, or because the testimony is clouded with uncertainty." Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505 , 514 n. 8 (9th Cir.1985)); see also United States v. DeRobertis, 766 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986) (a judge may disbelieve uncontradicted testimony without giving any reason).
Missouri Farmers Association, Inc.
v.
United States
85-727.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 3, 1986.
475 U.S. 1053
White.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice WHITE, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice White,

dissenting.

In this case the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a federal regulation provides the appropriate rule for deciding whether the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)[*1054] retains a continuing security interest in collateral to whose sale the FmHA allegedly consented.* 764 F. 2d 488 (1985). The question presented is whether, under United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715 (1979), the Eighth Circuit erred in looking to federal regulations rather than state law for the rule of decision.

In Kimbell Foods this Court determined that although federal law should determine the priority of liens stemming from federal lending programs, a national rule is not necessary to protect the federal interests underlying the loan programs of the Small Business Administration and FmHA. Thus, we held that “absent a congressional directive, the relative priority of private liens and consensual liens arising from these Government lending programs is to be determined under nondiscriminatory state laws.” Id., at 740 (emphasis added).

I find it difficult to reconcile the Court of Appeals’ decision with Kimbell Foods. A federal regulation is not a congressional directive, and although Kimbell Foods involves a question of lien priority while the present case concerns the extinguishment of a federal lien, that distinction is tenuous at best.

Besides being in obvious tension with Kimbell Foods, the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with the decision in United States v. Tugwell, 779 F. 2d 5 (CA4 1985), which holds that under Kimbell Foods the question whether a FmHA lien is extinguished upon sale of the collateral must be resolved by looking to state law. I would grant certiorari to resolve this conflict among the Courts of Appeals.

The regulation on which the Eighth Circuit relied is 7 CFR § 1962.18(b) (1985), which at the time the case was decided provided in relevant part:

“When borrowers [from the FmHA] sell security, the sale will be made subject to the FmHA lien. The property and proceeds will remain subject to the lien until the lien is released or the sale is approved by the County Supervisor and the proceeds are used for one or more of the purposes stated in § 1962.17.”

This regulation has since been rewritten: 50 Fed. Reg. 45787 (1985) (proposed 7 CFR § 1962.17(a)), which provides that “[w]hen the borrower sells security, the property and proceeds remain subject to the lien until the lien is released by the County Supervisor.” This change in wording is immaterial to the issues presented in this case.