Strachaan v. State, 156 So. 885 (Fla. 1934). · Go Syfert
Strachaan v. State, 156 So. 885 (Fla. 1934). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
31 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Coe v. Coe (fladistctapp, 2010-07-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1935 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1935 1980 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Coe v. Coe (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
However, the failure to formally take judicial notice of these files and to make them part of the record in this case to support the ruling is fatal. 3 Matthews, 133 So.2d at 96 (quoting Atlas Land Corp. v. Norman, 116 Fla. 800 , 156 So. 885, 886 (1934)).
cited Cited "see" Gulf Coast Home Hlt. v. Hrs Dept.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hillsborough County v. PERC, 424 So.2d at 134 -35 (quoting Atlas Land Corp. v. Norman, 116 Fla. 800 , 156 So. 885 (1934)).
cited Cited "see" Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corp.
Fla. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Atlas Land Corp. v. Norman, 116 Fla. 800 , 156 So. 885 (1934).
discussed Cited "see" Mullen v. Mullen
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Atlas Land Corporation v. Norman, 1934, 116 Fla. 800 , 156 So. 885 .) The lower court held hearings upon the motions and did deny the summary decrees sought, saying “Consideration has been given by the Court as to all pleadings, affidavits, depositions, briefs, etc., offered by the parties in support of their respective motions.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Austin v. ZION PRIMITIVE BAPTIST CHURCH OF WEST PALM BEACH
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1964 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Atlas Land Corp. v. Norman, 1934, 116 Fla. 800 , 156 So. 885 where the chancellor considered a record from another proceeding in order to arrive at his conclusion.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Will Strachaan, Alias Will Strong
v.
State.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 1, 1934.
156 So. 885
Roger Edward Davis, for Plaintiff in Error; Cary D. Landis, Attorney General, and Roy Campbell, Assistant, for the State.
Buford, Whitfield, Brown, Davis, Ellis, Terrell.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
Buford, J.

The defendant, plaintiff in error here, was informed against by information in three counts. He was convicted under count Two which operated as an acquittal[*737] under each of the other counts. Count Two was in the following language: .

“Charles A. Morehead, County Solicitor for the County of Dade, prosecuting for the State of Florida, in the said County, under oath, information makes that Will Strachaan, alias Will Strong, 538 N. W. 19th St., Miami, of the County of Dade and State of Florida, on the last day of May, in the year of our Lord, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Thirty-three, in the County and State aforesaid, unlawfully and feloniously was connected with a certain, Lottery, a more particular description of which said Lottery is to the County Solicitor unknown, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.”

It is unnecessary for us to discuss any of the assignments of error except those which attack the sufficiency of the information.

The Second Count of the Information, under which plaintiff in error was convicted, charges no offense whatever against the laws of the State of Florida. Therefore, motion in arrest of judgment should have been granted.

The count under consideration did not state that the lottery referred to was a lottery for money or other thing of value and was, therefore, under the holding of this Court in D’Alessandro v. State, in which opinion was filed February 27, 1934, reported 153 Sou. 95, fatally defective. Aside from this, this Count of the Information totally fails to charge the manner, means or extent in which the accused was alleged to have been connected with the lottery. It charged a conclusion and alleged no fact from which the conclusion could be drawn. Such a charge cannot constitute a basis for a judgment of conviction. It in no way protects the defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense. .

[*738] For the reasons stated, the judgment should be reversed and it is so ordered.

Reversed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Brown, J. J., concur. Davis, C. J., and Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.